Dare I say, ideal ground for an A-10 buy?

The A10 has good austere operating capability and good flight endurance, but I can't imagine any land component of an Australian/Indonesian shooting war in the 70s or 80s being big enough to warrant a specialised CAS aircraft.

There might be small raids on Australia and Indonesia by commando units, but these wouldn't likely even have vehicles. About the only place I could think of where large-ish land force might clash is East Timor, and even then, if Australia managed to get a sqn of tanks there it would be a great effort.

None of this would warrant a bit of GAU-8 action.
 
Thinking about what land forces might come into play or be needed I think this scenario will come to a head in 1974-75 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and subsequent decolonisation of East Timor.

In our history the anti-communist Indonesia invaded East Timor to stop the popular (communist) Fretilin party establishing a communist state on Indonesia's border.

In this scenario East Timor would be a useful buffer for Australia and the situation could be reversed, Australia (with US's support or blessing) might intervene in East Timor on the side of the (conservative) UDT in order to stop East Timor being either part of pro-communist Indonesia or becoming independent and communist itself.
 
I think by the early 60s the escort fleet would be 3 DDGs, 3 DDs refitted with Ikara and Sea Cat and 6 River DEs. In an emergency like a shooting war with Indonesia I'd expect 9+ of these ships to be available, so 4 would be with the Melbourne, certainly a DDG and maybe 2, certainly a DE and maybe a DD to make up the numbers.

This would be a 'Sea Control' Task Group, keeping the Indonesian surface fleet penned-in close to home where they can get fighter cover and providing ASW and AAW bubbles of various sizes in its vicinity.
Yeah, I think that’s reasonable and similar to what I envision. It seems balanced and possible to operate for the RAN.
Thinking about what land forces might come into play or be needed I think this scenario will come to a head in 1974-75 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and subsequent decolonisation of East Timor.

In our history the anti-communist Indonesia invaded East Timor to stop the popular (communist) Fretilin party establishing a communist state on Indonesia's border.

In this scenario East Timor would be a useful buffer for Australia and the situation could be reversed, Australia (with US's support or blessing) might intervene in East Timor on the side of the (conservative) UDT in order to stop East Timor being either part of pro-communist Indonesia or becoming independent and communist itself.
A proactive government would go first I think. Call it a “peacekeeping” or “stable transfer of power” mission and make sure Indonesia can’t invade
 
A proactive government would go first I think. Call it a “peacekeeping” or “stable transfer of power” mission and make sure Indonesia can’t invade
Would be rather... problematic, IMHO, considering that Indonesia controls West Timor and island chain to the north of it.
 
Dare I say, ideal ground for an A-10 buy?
Probably not. The A10 doesn't have good range (yeah, it's got endurance, but it's SLOW). Plus it didn't have much in terms of antiship capability. Okay, some of the Maverick missile variants have a 465lb warhead but an A10 only carries 6 Mavericks. Otherwise, you're looking at iron bombs versus ships. No thank you.


They might hold on to the Be-12s while adding Il-38s, given Indonesia's geography and the wide range of tasks the Be-12 could carry out as a seaplane (also ASW seaplanes do have advantages over ASW landplanes).

In a 'Wall not fallen' scenario, it is possible that an intact Soviet Union might also supply a few examples of the Beriev A-40 during the 1990s.
Agreed. Seaplane MPA can do some things that landplanes can not do. Hence why Japan has both US1/US2s and Neptunes/Orions/P1s.



The RAN was apparently quite enamoured with the Lynx / Skua combo (and prior to that SS12 on a Wasp or Allouette) and Seaking for ASW. Harrier was also seen as desirable, with a radar equipped AV-8B or Sea Harrier both seen as suitable.

3 DDGs, no helicopters, but Ikara, escorting three helicopter carriers, 10 DDL and 10 GP Frigates/Sloops with helicopters. Plans for missile craft as well.
Remember that 3 DDGs and 3 Helicopter Carriers means 1 ship deployed and one ship able to surge deploy.


The A10 has good austere operating capability and good flight endurance, but I can't imagine any land component of an Australian/Indonesian shooting war in the 70s or 80s being big enough to warrant a specialised CAS aircraft.

There might be small raids on Australia and Indonesia by commando units, but these wouldn't likely even have vehicles. About the only place I could think of where large-ish land force might clash is East Timor, and even then, if Australia managed to get a sqn of tanks there it would be a great effort.

None of this would warrant a bit of GAU-8 action.
FACs versus A10s would be the one place I see A10s shining in terms of antiship work.



Hm. So by 1970s they could be reasonably sure to operate being generally undetected by passive tracking stations.
I'd believe so.
 
IIUC it was a mix, some like Truscott were staging strips for USAAF B24s and B25s so would be the best candidates for upgrade and expansion. Tindal and Learmonth were both WW2 bases that were upgraded in the 60s and 70s.

I doubt there were many sealed roads up there in the 60s, but I'd think this scenario would see large scale development in the north.
In which case, would such air bases (including in New Guinea) - austere or not become principle targets for Indonesian Tu-16's?
If this is the case, then perhaps (including the realities of monsoon season), would it be worth the financial expenditure on upgrading/hardening such austere airbases and their defences or put such money into other defence programs/systems/platforms?
For example, this could be a great scenario for my suggested derivative of the McDonnell CA-4E/F Spey-powered Skyhawk, with it's carrier-centric ruggedness, paired with either JATO/RATO and the arrested-landing system, or Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) systems (which became operational in May 1966 in VietNam)......
There's probably no reason why a slightly modified Mirage IIIO(F) couldn’t be adapted to utilising SATS.

View: https://youtu.be/eXlIm1LRs5s?si=Aqv_ZyJ9xQLspsLc


Regards
Pioneer
 

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Main problem with the Mirage III : non-FBW delta wing sucks at takeoff and landings, high velocities and long distances. Although France found a solution for the Mirage IVA : JATO packs.

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In which case, would such air bases (including in New Guinea) - austere or not become principle targets for Indonesian Tu-16's?

There were only 26 Tu16s delivered and likely about 14 Tu22s in this scenario. I'm sure that airfields would be prime targets, but I'd suspect that the main RAAF bases and other key military/naval would be the first to be attacked rather than secondary airfields. Additionally, airfields are notoriously difficult to close for an extended period of time, so my guess is these secondary airfields would only be attacked if the Indonesians learned there were some attractive military targets on them.
If this is the case, then perhaps (including the realities of monsoon season), would it be worth the financial expenditure on upgrading/hardening such austere airbases and their defences or put such money into other defence programs/systems/platforms?
For example, this could be a great scenario for my suggested derivative of the McDonnell CA-4E/F Spey-powered Skyhawk, with it's carrier-centric ruggedness, paired with either JATO/RATO and the arrested-landing system, or Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) systems (which became operational in May 1966 in VietNam)......
There's probably no reason why a slightly modified Mirage IIIO(F) couldn’t be adapted to utilising SATS.

It's far easier to upgrade an airbase than bring a new aircraft into service, and things like RATO, land catapults and SATS systems have only ever been temporary expedients. What's more upgrading airfields provides much greater long-term benefit as aircraft produce higher sortie rates the better equipped the airbase.
 
There were only 26 Tu16s delivered and likely about 14 Tu22s in this scenario. I'm sure that airfields would be prime targets, but I'd suspect that the main RAAF bases and other key military/naval would be the first to be attacked rather than secondary airfields. Additionally, airfields are notoriously difficult to close for an extended period of time, so my guess is these secondary airfields would only be attacked if the Indonesians learned there were some attractive military targets on them.
Reasonable assumption. On the other hand, Indonesians would likely use their Mig-25MR high-speed recon capabilities (as well as Tu-123 drones) extensively to keep Australian northern airfields in check.
 
Reasonable assumption. On the other hand, Indonesians would likely use their Mig-25MR high-speed recon capabilities (as well as Tu-123 drones) extensively to keep Australian northern airfields in check.

What's the range of a Mig25R? Australia is a long, looooong way from Indonesia.
 
And if you give it side-looking sensors like Blackbird, you can gain another 300-500km "look" distance.
Re-checked the sources; Mig-25RB did not have aerial refueling capacity. But with drop tanks, its range (subsonic cruise, supersonic dash) was about 2400 km - i.e. circa 1200 km combat radius. And it did have a "Sablya" (rus. Saber) side-looking radar with about 200 km range.
 
So from Kupang airfields (on Timor) the Mig-29RB could surely reach Darwin and as far West as Port-Headland.

From Merauke (on New Guinea, albeit I'm not sure, when the airfield was build) it could reach Port Douglas.

And considering how fast this bird was, it would be almost like SR-71 intrusions in reverse.
 
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If Australia has Phantoms I'd suggest to cooperate with Israel, which faced the same isse circa 1971 with MiG-25R coming from Egypt. They tried to fire AIM-7E Sparrow from 45 000 ft zoom climb at MiG-25R 30 000 ft above. They got mixed results, and that's why they requested F-15 ASAP.
Another nation having a similar issue was Iran, but by this point (post 1975) they had Tomcats and Phoenix so it became moot very quickly !
 
IIIUC the 10 DDLs plan was in 1966 when they were planned to be 1,000t corvettes for patrolling Indonesia during the Confrontation. By 1972 they'd grown to 4,200t multi-role destroyers and only 3 were planned, however they are a key target for expansion in this scenario, i'd guess at least 4 would be built to replace the Darings and grow the fleet by 1 by 1980.

I think the Attack class patrol boat replacement in the late 70s would be far heftier than the Fremantle class. Maybe not a full 1,000t corvette but maybe 500t and able to carry a 76mm gun and a second weapon like a Limbo mortar to back up a fleet unit in a convoy.
Frazer's stated "two Ocean Navy" as Defmin was 23 destroyers and frigates, plus three carriers. The original DDL was conceived during the Indonesian Confrontation as a way to increase the size of the fleet with a modern equivalent to the WWII sloops, corvettes and frigates.

It grew once it was decided that it should carry a missile armed helicopter, and grew again when it was realised a ship of that size and capability should have an area defence missile system.

Once DDL became a Daring replacement it was to have been built in an initial batch of three but the plan was still ten long term. At this point a GP frigate (likely a Type 21 derivative) was conceived to increase numbers.

When the FFG-07 was ordered instead of the DDL, it was an initial two but the plan was still for ten total. This eventually became six, but was supplemented with a patrol frigate program that became the ANZAC.
 
One of the reason why I support more Bloodhounds instead of HAWK's, yes.
Different missiles for different roles. Bloodhound, was RAAF for fixed defence of vital assets, Hawk, was instead of Thunderbird as an Army system.

Personally, I think the RAAF would have been better off with a high-performance interceptor, rather than SAMs.
 
Reasonable assumption. On the other hand, Indonesians would likely use their Mig-25MR high-speed recon capabilities (as well as Tu-123 drones) extensively to keep Australian northern airfields in check.
Do you really think the Indoneasian's had the education and technical expertise at this point and time of this scenario to operate, let alone maintain the likes of the technically advanced MiG-25? Sure, there's every possibility that Soviet specialists would maintain, if not fly them under the guise of 'Indoneasians'.
As for the Indonesians being supplied with the strategically secretive Tu-123 Yastreb, I very much doubt it. The fact that the Soviets never supplied Yastreb to it's closest allies, let alone within the Warsaw Pact members says a lot about both it's capabilities and strategic importance.
If anything, the Soviets might have supplied the likes of the Yakovlev Yak-25RV high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, with it's two-engine redundancy over-water.....But, then again, no other military other than the Soviets employed the Yak-25, let alone the specialised Yak-25RV series in their ORBAT.

Regards
Pioneer
 

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Different missiles for different roles. Bloodhound, was RAAF for fixed defence of vital assets, Hawk, was instead of Thunderbird as an Army system.

Personally, I think the RAAF would have been better off with a high-performance interceptor, rather than SAMs.
If we are talking an improved and competent ADF to counter the threat of a far superior Indonesian political/military threat, I would like to think a more substantial integrated [layered] air defence system would be established, encompassing AEW, fighter-interceptor, SAM and AAA in relation to protecting vital assets.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Do you really think the Indoneasian's had the education and technical expertise at this point and time of this scenario to operate, let alone maintain the likes of the technically advanced MiG-25?
Iraq were able to do that, Egypt too. So not impossible, of course, with Soviet assistance.

As for the Indonesians being supplied with the strategically secretive Tu-123 Yastreb, I very much doubt it. The fact that the Soviets never supplied Yastreb to it's closest allies, let alone within the Warsaw Pact members says a lot about both it's capabilities and strategic importance.
Darn. My goof - I meant Tu-143 Reis.
 
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Personally, I think the RAAF would have been better off with a high-performance interceptor, rather than SAMs.
It depends. The interceptor could cover more area, sure, but they have worse reaction time & lower probability of intercept against small fast targets, like cruise missiles.
 
Iraq were able to do that, Egypt too. So not impossible, of course, with Soviet assistance.

Egypt also happened very early : circa 1971. Albeit it was a Soviet detachment, not the Egyptian air force proper so maybe not a good example.
 
Frazer's stated "two Ocean Navy" as Defmin was 23 destroyers and frigates, plus three carriers. The original DDL was conceived during the Indonesian Confrontation as a way to increase the size of the fleet with a modern equivalent to the WWII sloops, corvettes and frigates.

It grew once it was decided that it should carry a missile armed helicopter, and grew again when it was realised a ship of that size and capability should have an area defence missile system.

Once DDL became a Daring replacement it was to have been built in an initial batch of three but the plan was still ten long term. At this point a GP frigate (likely a Type 21 derivative) was conceived to increase numbers.

When the FFG-07 was ordered instead of the DDL, it was an initial two but the plan was still for ten total. This eventually became six, but was supplemented with a patrol frigate program that became the ANZAC.

Given the resources allocated to the ADF, even in the 60s when the danger seemed quite real, that 'plan' is a pipe dream at best.

3 Carriers?! They wouldn't even spring for 1 1/2!

In the interest of transparency, I am stating my personal preference for approaching AH thought experiments. I look at what happened and then try to bend that to meet the new scenario, whereas it looks as if you're in the other camp of looking at plans and meeting those.
 
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Do you really think the Indoneasian's had the education and technical expertise at this point and time of this scenario to operate, let alone maintain the likes of the technically advanced MiG-25? Sure, there's every possibility that Soviet specialists would maintain, if not fly them under the guise of 'Indoneasians'.

I have been giving this some thought, although I am loathe to put much weight into it as it is a nebulous concept.

Australia was a top tier military, we expected to fit fully integrated with the US and UK at the highest level we could contribute; Brigade group, combat aircraft wing, Naval Task Group and expect to perform these tasks as well as the best in the theatre. When this level of expertise met less developed countries which had recently been supplied with a lot of Soviet gear, they tended to come out on top with quite lopsided exchange rates. I suspect this would apply to an Australia-Indonesia shooting war in the 70s.

For starters Soviet aircraft tended to have availability rates of 50-55% whereas Western aircraft in western air forces tended to have availability rates of 85-90%. Thus, the Indonesians could expect to have ~14 Tu16s and ~7 Tu22s available on any given day while the RAAF would have ~21 F111s available, thus matching the numbers.

Maybe Australia wouldn't quite match Israel level results, but despite smaller numbers I'd expect Australia to achieve outsize results when the shooting starts.
 
I have been giving this some thought, although I am loathe to put much weight into it as it is a nebulous concept.

Australia was a top tier military, we expected to fit fully integrated with the US and UK at the highest level we could contribute; Brigade group, combat aircraft wing, Naval Task Group and expect to perform these tasks as well as the best in the theatre. When this level of expertise met less developed countries which had recently been supplied with a lot of Soviet gear, they tended to come out on top with quite lopsided exchange rates. I suspect this would apply to an Australia-Indonesia shooting war in the 70s.

For starters Soviet aircraft tended to have availability rates of 50-55% whereas Western aircraft in western air forces tended to have availability rates of 85-90%. Thus, the Indonesians could expect to have ~14 Tu16s and ~7 Tu22s available on any given day while the RAAF would have ~21 F111s available, thus matching the numbers.

Maybe Australia wouldn't quite match Israel level results, but despite smaller numbers I'd expect Australia to achieve outsize results when the shooting starts.
The biggest advantage I see is Australia can meet Indonesia on her terms. Australia can effectively distribute forces to prevent aircraft or fleet concentrations that could deal a catastrophic blow while engaging with raiding ops and strike on Indonesia whereas they can’t do the same back
 
The biggest advantage I see is Australia can meet Indonesia on her terms. Australia can effectively distribute forces to prevent aircraft or fleet concentrations that could deal a catastrophic blow while engaging with raiding ops and strike on Indonesia whereas they can’t do the same back

I was thinking something along the lines that Australia could concentrate its offensive forces on a single target in Indonesia. Maybe it could invade an island and because Indonesia is an archipelago the RAN/RAAF could isolate this island from reinforcement stationed elsewhere. Most of Indonesia's big Army are territorial forces with an important internal policing and national building role, these troops would struggle against the RAR troops and would require reinforcement for the Central Reserve forces that would have to run the RAN/RAAF gauntlet.

In contrast if Indonesia were to affect a lodgement on the Australian mainland it could be isolated by Army Reserve units, firstly from a great distance and then an ever-shrinking pocket until they could be engaged in battle by powerful Regular forces in due time.
 
I was thinking something along the lines that Australia could concentrate its offensive forces on a single target in Indonesia. Maybe it could invade an island and because Indonesia is an archipelago the RAN/RAAF could isolate this island from reinforcement stationed elsewhere. Most of Indonesia's big Army are territorial forces with an important internal policing and national building role, these troops would struggle against the RAR troops and would require reinforcement for the Central Reserve forces that would have to run the RAN/RAAF gauntlet.

In contrast if Indonesia were to affect a lodgement on the Australian mainland it could be isolated by Army Reserve units, firstly from a great distance and then an ever-shrinking pocket until they could be engaged in battle by powerful Regular forces in due time.
And logistics wise (given that’s my forte) Indonesia is in a pretty crap spot. They’re unable to prevent supply from the US and, the UK if they ship through the Atlantic. Meanwhile shipping to Indonesia will be hampered by Australian allies in the region (if not outright stopped). And this all presumes allies don’t get involved. A top end railway line dedicated for shipment to Darwin and its surrounds might also help in the movement of men and equipment
 
Most of Indonesia's big Army are territorial forces with an important internal policing and national building role, these troops would struggle against the RAR troops and would require reinforcement for the Central Reserve forces that would have to run the RAN/RAAF gauntlet.

In contrast if Indonesia were to affect a lodgement on the Australian mainland it could be isolated by Army Reserve units, firstly from a great distance and then an ever-shrinking pocket until they could be engaged in battle by powerful Regular forces in due time.
Yeah, I have to agree with your analogy there Rule of cool. It's one thing terrorising defenceless town and villages in West Papua and East Timor, but facing gungle warfare proficiant and hardened troops like the Australians of the era......

Regards
Pioneer
 
In such a scenario, I would imagine Australia government/RAAF pursuing their 'real-world' interest in acquiring a handful of Lockheed C-141 Starlifter (and later C-5 Galaxy) in 1960's due to the short comings of its C-130 Hercules fleet, in supporting it's commitment in South Vietnam......
Such heavy, strategic airlift would be invaluable.

(Profile by Chris Cooper - aka  Coops213)



Regards
Pioneer
 

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In such a scenario, I would imagine Australia government/RAAF pursuing their 'real-world' interest in acquiring a handful of Lockheed C-141 Starlifter (and later C-5 Galaxy) in 1960's due to the short comings of its C-130 Hercules fleet, in supporting it's commitment in South Vietnam......
Such heavy, strategic airlift would be invaluable.

(Profile by Chris Cooper - aka  Coops213)



Regards
Pioneer

The RAAF received 2 B707s in 1979, 2 more in the early 80s and the last 2 in the late 80s, 4 of which were converted into 2-point hose and drogue tankers in the early 90s.

I'd imagine this capability would be put together before 1975 in this scenario.
 
In such a scenario, I would imagine Australia government/RAAF pursuing their 'real-world' interest in acquiring a handful of Lockheed C-141 Starlifter (and later C-5 Galaxy) in 1960's due to the short comings of its C-130 Hercules fleet, in supporting it's commitment in South Vietnam......
Such heavy, strategic airlift would be invaluable.

(Profile by Chris Cooper - aka  Coops213)



Regards
Pioneer
C-5 would be interesting but I wonder if it wouldn’t be better to enlarge the Caribou and C-130 fleets? Most of the combat would be happening at shorter ranges than a C-5 is necessary for and C-5s are ridiculously expensive to operate from memory
 
Indeed C-5s are very expensive, and in the 1970's they were plagued by many illnesses. Better to borrow 747-200F from airlines. As for C-141, note that Lockheed build one L-300 civiliant variant. They got no customer and it ended at NASA, with an infrared telescope peering through the roof.
 

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