Dare I say, ideal ground for an A-10 buy?

The A10 has good austere operating capability and good flight endurance, but I can't imagine any land component of an Australian/Indonesian shooting war in the 70s or 80s being big enough to warrant a specialised CAS aircraft.

There might be small raids on Australia and Indonesia by commando units, but these wouldn't likely even have vehicles. About the only place I could think of where large-ish land force might clash is East Timor, and even then, if Australia managed to get a sqn of tanks there it would be a great effort.

None of this would warrant a bit of GAU-8 action.
 
Thinking about what land forces might come into play or be needed I think this scenario will come to a head in 1974-75 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and subsequent decolonisation of East Timor.

In our history the anti-communist Indonesia invaded East Timor to stop the popular (communist) Fretilin party establishing a communist state on Indonesia's border.

In this scenario East Timor would be a useful buffer for Australia and the situation could be reversed, Australia (with US's support or blessing) might intervene in East Timor on the side of the (conservative) UDT in order to stop East Timor being either part of pro-communist Indonesia or becoming independent and communist itself.
 
I think by the early 60s the escort fleet would be 3 DDGs, 3 DDs refitted with Ikara and Sea Cat and 6 River DEs. In an emergency like a shooting war with Indonesia I'd expect 9+ of these ships to be available, so 4 would be with the Melbourne, certainly a DDG and maybe 2, certainly a DE and maybe a DD to make up the numbers.

This would be a 'Sea Control' Task Group, keeping the Indonesian surface fleet penned-in close to home where they can get fighter cover and providing ASW and AAW bubbles of various sizes in its vicinity.
Yeah, I think that’s reasonable and similar to what I envision. It seems balanced and possible to operate for the RAN.
Thinking about what land forces might come into play or be needed I think this scenario will come to a head in 1974-75 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and subsequent decolonisation of East Timor.

In our history the anti-communist Indonesia invaded East Timor to stop the popular (communist) Fretilin party establishing a communist state on Indonesia's border.

In this scenario East Timor would be a useful buffer for Australia and the situation could be reversed, Australia (with US's support or blessing) might intervene in East Timor on the side of the (conservative) UDT in order to stop East Timor being either part of pro-communist Indonesia or becoming independent and communist itself.
A proactive government would go first I think. Call it a “peacekeeping” or “stable transfer of power” mission and make sure Indonesia can’t invade
 
A proactive government would go first I think. Call it a “peacekeeping” or “stable transfer of power” mission and make sure Indonesia can’t invade
Would be rather... problematic, IMHO, considering that Indonesia controls West Timor and island chain to the north of it.
 
Dare I say, ideal ground for an A-10 buy?
Probably not. The A10 doesn't have good range (yeah, it's got endurance, but it's SLOW). Plus it didn't have much in terms of antiship capability. Okay, some of the Maverick missile variants have a 465lb warhead but an A10 only carries 6 Mavericks. Otherwise, you're looking at iron bombs versus ships. No thank you.


They might hold on to the Be-12s while adding Il-38s, given Indonesia's geography and the wide range of tasks the Be-12 could carry out as a seaplane (also ASW seaplanes do have advantages over ASW landplanes).

In a 'Wall not fallen' scenario, it is possible that an intact Soviet Union might also supply a few examples of the Beriev A-40 during the 1990s.
Agreed. Seaplane MPA can do some things that landplanes can not do. Hence why Japan has both US1/US2s and Neptunes/Orions/P1s.



The RAN was apparently quite enamoured with the Lynx / Skua combo (and prior to that SS12 on a Wasp or Allouette) and Seaking for ASW. Harrier was also seen as desirable, with a radar equipped AV-8B or Sea Harrier both seen as suitable.

3 DDGs, no helicopters, but Ikara, escorting three helicopter carriers, 10 DDL and 10 GP Frigates/Sloops with helicopters. Plans for missile craft as well.
Remember that 3 DDGs and 3 Helicopter Carriers means 1 ship deployed and one ship able to surge deploy.


The A10 has good austere operating capability and good flight endurance, but I can't imagine any land component of an Australian/Indonesian shooting war in the 70s or 80s being big enough to warrant a specialised CAS aircraft.

There might be small raids on Australia and Indonesia by commando units, but these wouldn't likely even have vehicles. About the only place I could think of where large-ish land force might clash is East Timor, and even then, if Australia managed to get a sqn of tanks there it would be a great effort.

None of this would warrant a bit of GAU-8 action.
FACs versus A10s would be the one place I see A10s shining in terms of antiship work.



Hm. So by 1970s they could be reasonably sure to operate being generally undetected by passive tracking stations.
I'd believe so.
 
IIUC it was a mix, some like Truscott were staging strips for USAAF B24s and B25s so would be the best candidates for upgrade and expansion. Tindal and Learmonth were both WW2 bases that were upgraded in the 60s and 70s.

I doubt there were many sealed roads up there in the 60s, but I'd think this scenario would see large scale development in the north.
In which case, would such air bases (including in New Guinea) - austere or not become principle targets for Indonesian Tu-16's?
If this is the case, then perhaps (including the realities of monsoon season), would it be worth the financial expenditure on upgrading/hardening such austere airbases and their defences or put such money into other defence programs/systems/platforms?
For example, this could be a great scenario for my suggested derivative of the McDonnell CA-4E/F Spey-powered Skyhawk, with it's carrier-centric ruggedness, paired with either JATO/RATO and the arrested-landing system, or Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) systems (which became operational in May 1966 in VietNam)......
There's probably no reason why a slightly modified Mirage IIIO(F) couldn’t be adapted to utilising SATS.

View: https://youtu.be/eXlIm1LRs5s?si=Aqv_ZyJ9xQLspsLc


Regards
Pioneer
 

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Main problem with the Mirage III : non-FBW delta wing sucks at takeoff and landings, high velocities and long distances. Although France found a solution for the Mirage IVA : JATO packs.

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