No one has considered creating a game about the invasion of the UK by Soviet troops, because militarily it is almost impossible to do, even during the era of greater Soviet military power. Think of what it cost to land a few divisions in Normandy and the huge casualties of the Marines in the Pacific trying to land on islands far away from the Japanese metropolis.

Only the preparations made before the landing would have been detected by satellites long before the attack began, and the convoys of assault troops would have been enormously vulnerable to attack from Iceland and Norway for weeks.

It would have been much cheaper for the Politburo to buy off several generations of British politicians and civil servants and with this example I am not trying to suggest that they have done so.:D
 
No one has considered creating a game about the invasion of the UK by Soviet troops, because militarily it is almost impossible to do, even during the era of greater Soviet military power. Think of what it cost to land a few divisions in Normandy and the huge casualties of the Marines in the Pacific trying to land on islands far away from the Japanese metropolis.
Please. They made games about Soviet invasion in USA numerous times, which is far more improbable. The real reason is, that "Soviet invasion in UK" scenario is too specific for broad market; it's more reasonable from practical point of view to make a broader World War 3 game, with Britain only as one of many nations involved.
 
Most games about World War 3 in Europe focus on the Central Front with the Warsaw Pact aiming to reach the Rhine in Germany and The Netherlands.
Subsequent conflict with France has been covered in at least one tactical game.
The UK rarely appears on the map except as a source of reinforcements
Only one boardgame published in the early 70s allows you to play a global war.

I am showing my age by only talking about boardgames. Computer simulations are much more comprehensive.
 
Please. They made games about Soviet invasion in USA numerous times, which is far more improbable. The real reason is, that "Soviet invasion in UK" scenario is too specific for broad market; it's more reasonable from practical point of view to make a broader World War 3 game, with Britain only as one of many nations involved.
It is ironic that no one considered the possibility of NATO invading the Rodina.

When the Berlin Wall fell, analysts searched in vain for publications on social engineering studies that had foreseen the conversion from communism to capitalism... they found none. Historical determinism had already decided otherwise in thousands of publications since 1928.
 

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It is ironic that no one considered the possibility of NATO invading the Rodina.
You apparently did not understood the cultural situation. In post-war USSR, any kind of "future war" genre - which was rather popular in 1930s Soviet literature, by the way - was strictly forbidden. The Party official position was that "only capitalists could glorify the war", and any war-themed art outside of historical (and a bit of science fiction, but only if it happened on some "primitive planet, discovered by peaceful communist explorers") was forbidden.

When limitations fell in 1990s, first the literature, then the blooming game industry were quickly flooded with military fiction, first generic, then "dastardly NATO attacked Russia hoping to destroy it as they done with Serbia, we MUST fight back". The bombing of Serbia in 1999 were basically a turning point; the general friendly attitude of Russians toward the West started to change toward suspicion and fear of being subjected to some "peacekeeping action". The fiction reacted, of course.

It was exactly the rebon "future war" genre in Russian litersture, from which firstly our alternate history, and then "popadantsy" were born.
 
I
It is ironic that no one considered the possibility of NATO invading the Rodina.

When the Berlin Wall fell, analysts searched in vain for publications on social engineering studies that had foreseen the conversion from communism to capitalism... they found none. Historical determinism had already decided otherwise in thousands of publications since 1928.
In 1978 the same US publisher who had published the first NATOvsWarsaw Pact games came up with this

 
You apparently did not understood the cultural situation. In post-war USSR, any kind of "future war" genre - which was rather popular in 1930s Soviet literature, by the way - was strictly forbidden. The Party official position was that "only capitalists could glorify the war", and any war-themed art outside of historical (and a bit of science fiction, but only if it happened on some "primitive planet, discovered by peaceful communist explorers") was forbidden.

When limitations fell in 1990s, first the literature, then the blooming game industry were quickly flooded with military fiction, first generic, then "dastardly NATO attacked Russia hoping to destroy it as they done with Serbia, we MUST fight back". The bombing of Serbia in 1999 were basically a turning point; the general friendly attitude of Russians toward the West started to change toward suspicion and fear of being subjected to some "peacekeeping action". The fiction reacted, of course.

It was exactly the rebon "future war" genre in Russian litersture, from which firstly our alternate history, and then "popadantsy" were born.
interesting.
 
interesting.
Some details that Westerners usually have no clue about, yep. Pre-war USSR was as eager into "future war" genre as any other country - there were numerous books where dastardly imperialists/fascists/capitalists launched a treacherous attack (usually with some kind of superweapon) only to be beaten back by Red Army skill and determination (and even better superweapons) and then be overthrown by revolution of their own workers. Even some space opera fiction was written around this theme.

Post-war - any kind of military fantastic was strictly forbidden. The Party was weary of the war; they didn't want to even think about next war, and the older the Party leadership became, the more cantankerous and rigid they become. They thought that it would benefit Soviet international position more, if USSR would be constantly clamoring for peace and universal disarmament; and since any kind of military-themed fiction could harm this image (actually it likely won't even be noticed, but Party leadership was rather pricky in whatever they decided to choose as exemplification of their moral integrity). So no military fiction till late 1980s, and no space opera too; the ideological mandate over sci-fi was, that any future described must be peaceful, and all warring civilizations must be pre-space. The only kind of military fiction allowed was a historical fiction about historical conflicts.

What they apparently didn't realize, is that such cathegorical denial of all military fiction greatly harmed the image of Soviet military. From Soviet citizen point of view, Soviet Army/Navy/Air Force have a glorious past, very unclear present, and no future to speak about. This lack of credible media support caused military prestige and image to deteriorate rapidly. Idiotic secrecy didn't help too; there were cases, when custom services forbade import of Western military magazines and books into USSR... because there were images and descriptions of Soviet classified weaponry.
 
Some details that Westerners usually have no clue about, yep. Pre-war USSR was as eager into "future war" genre as any other country - there were numerous books where dastardly imperialists/fascists/capitalists launched a treacherous attack (usually with some kind of superweapon) only to be beaten back by Red Army skill and determination (and even better superweapons) and then be overthrown by revolution of their own workers. Even some space opera fiction was written around this theme.

Post-war - any kind of military fantastic was strictly forbidden. The Party was weary of the war; they didn't want to even think about next war, and the older the Party leadership became, the more cantankerous and rigid they become. They thought that it would benefit Soviet international position more, if USSR would be constantly clamoring for peace and universal disarmament; and since any kind of military-themed fiction could harm this image (actually it likely won't even be noticed, but Party leadership was rather pricky in whatever they decided to choose as exemplification of their moral integrity). So no military fiction till late 1980s, and no space opera too; the ideological mandate over sci-fi was, that any future described must be peaceful, and all warring civilizations must be pre-space. The only kind of military fiction allowed was a historical fiction about historical conflicts.

What they apparently didn't realize, is that such cathegorical denial of all military fiction greatly harmed the image of Soviet military. From Soviet citizen point of view, Soviet Army/Navy/Air Force have a glorious past, very unclear present, and no future to speak about. This lack of credible media support caused military prestige and image to deteriorate rapidly. Idiotic secrecy didn't help too; there were cases, when custom services forbade import of Western military magazines and books into USSR... because there were images and descriptions of Soviet classified weaponry.
In the West, the opposite happened, the media exaggerated Soviet military power either because of ideological affinity or because of corporate interests in financing new weapons. Until the war in Afghanistan, the established paradigm was the invincibility of the Soviet armed forces. Difficult political decisions are easier to make than selling to citizens.
 
Well, OTL it took them seven years and a major war on Far East to realize that something is wrong with their guns. The truth is, that German army attitude toward artillery was pretty conservative in late XIX century. They ordered good guns, but of pretty average and unremarkable designs (despite Krupp & others producing much better guns for export customers). While French, still reeling from humilating defeat, rapidly innovated, determined to have state-of-art artillery, Germans pretty much stagnated, only reacting on what French & Russians have.

I've refreshed my knowledge on this and am reminded how the Germany artillery in 1914 was dominant compared to the French.

Firstly, the Germans weren't backwards compared to the French. They introduced a modern 150mm medium field howitzer in 1902, 100mm field fun in 1904, modernised the 77mm field gun in 1904, modernised the 105mm light field howitzer in 1909, introduced the heavy 210mm field howitzer in 1910, a new 150mm medium field howitzer in 1913 and a new 100mm field gun in 1914. In contrast The French introduced the 75 in 1898, the Rimahilo 155mm howitzer (another innovative design) in 1907 and the 105mm heavy field gun in 1914.

Secondly there are the numbers.
In 1914 France had about 4,100 75s and 110 Rimahilo 155mm. The April 1914 Cadre law organised the French artillery, 110 Schneider 105mm heavy field guns were on order so 4 standard regiments each with 12 x 155mm howitzers (4 guns per battery) and 12 x 105mm that would be ready by 1915. A 5th non standard regiment was also to be stood up using 1878 120mm Le Bange guns taken from fortifications and put on motorised transport, 10 batteries of 6 guns. Longer term plans were to double this, a proposed follow-on order for 110 105mm heavy field guns, a proposed order for 110 medium field howitzers of an unspecified type and another 5 batteries of the old 120mm De Bange guns. This is a grand total of 280 heavy field guns by 1915 and 560 by 1917.

In 1914 the Germans had just over 5,000 77mm field guns, ~1280 105mm light field howitzers, 178 100mm heavy field guns, over 400 150mm medium field howitzers and over 200 210mm heavy field howitzers. That's a grand total 800 heavy field pieces in service in 1914 that France was attempting to counter with their 280 pieces by 1915 and 560 by 1917. The French had no answer to the almost 1300 light howitzers and Germany had more field guns than the French.

Thirdly, the devil is in the details.
The German 77mm field gun had less range and rate of fire than the French 75 and fired a lighter shell than the British 18pdr, but was lighter and therefore more mobile. This gun was good in the movement phase but found wanting in trench war compared to the French and British guns, however the German divisions had 18 105mm howitzers which were superior in trench warfare to the 75 and 18pdr. The French Rimhailo howitzer had a very high rate of fire, but it lacked range compared to the German 150mm howitzer and in any case was outnumbered 4 to 1. The French had 1000s gun pieces and millions of rounds of ammo in fortresses throughout the country, and these were pressed into services as soon as the lines stabilised, but without modern recoils systems these pieces had such a low rate of fire that a battery equated to a single modern gun.

Phew, .........it's good to put all that out in one place.
 
The Soviet stuff is interesting, it reminds me of the Chernobyl TV show, and how everything they did was based on lies on top of lies.
 
As far as I know the only "invasion"-style scenario that was ever considered in USSR for Britain (and that's 1920-30s) was a possibility of sparking a local revolution, quite like the French thought in late 1790s with Corresponding Societies and such. And it was only logical, in both cases, because typical revolution - as it was perceived - included a sailor revolt that effectively disabled the navy.
 
In North Atlantic '86 -


it appears that a Soviet player can capture Faroes, Scapa Flow and Iceland (!), but not Britain. Only blockade that erodes morale is an option.
Thanks. I have not wargamed for years and never got into computers.
This looks interesting.
The situation of France and Britain once the Warsaw Pact reached its goals on the Rhine is worth considering.
Let me begin by saying that I am only going by the exercises conducted by both sides. We have no way of knowing what would have happened in real life
It seems clear that large scale use of tactical nuclear weapons would have happened as NATO lost control of West Germany (only in exercises).
Much like in Ukraine today the areas along the Rhine would have seen two exhausted and badly bruised armies facing each other.
The exercises stop at this point. France and Britain would still have nuclear weapons. The USA would be continuing to build up its reserve forces.
It seems unlikely that NATO would have lost control of the Eastern Atlantic, North Sea and Channel. But that control would have still been challenged by WP submarines.
It is hard to see an invasion of Britain being possible at this stage. Indeed it would probably have not been necessary.
The likely loss of much of the Army, RAF and sizeable naval losses would have given the UK few options.
Meanwhile the US would probably pause the war to negotiate with Moscow and avoid getting involved in a nuclear exchange.
 
The situation of France and Britain once the Warsaw Pact reached its goals on the Rhine is worth considering.
The Soviet attitude was basically to leave France alone, if it would be willing to leave USSR alone. While the fighting with French forces in Germany was pretty much anticipated, it was assumed that France would not be keen to use nuclear weapons until its own territory would be threatened. So USSR hoped to talk a ceasefire with France after NATO defenses in Germany were broken; as long as France would not allow basing or transit of NATO troops through its territory, USSR would be pretty content to never step on French soil.

Britain was the different matter. USSR could not put the "we would not invade you, if you would stay out of it" pressure on Britain. And Britain was the obvious standing ground for US reinforcements. So the question was, would USA be willing to negotiate peace after having their armies in Europe smashed and West Germany defeated?
 
On an invasion, NATO Article 5 would be invoked by West Germany. With US soldiers getting killed in the invasion, use of US nuclear weapons, during the Cold War, with the political climate in the US of the day, would have been as close to automatic as makes no difference. I also cannot see a Soviet invasion force stopping at the Dutch and Belgian borders, Rotterdam and Antwerp as transport hubs would be too tempting not to take. They would have been marching through what would have been left of my old home town, where the traces of WW2 are visible to this day.

Have I mentioned before I am very happy none of this has happened - yet? In my home town, anyway.
 
On an invasion, NATO Article 5 would be invoked by West Germany. With US soldiers getting killed in the invasion, use of US nuclear weapons, during the Cold War, with the political climate in the US of the day, would have been as close to automatic as makes no difference
Yes, but Soviet assumption was, that if USA suffered big enough defeat in Europe and would bd denied staging ground for counter-offensive, it would likely agree to negotiate reasonable peace. Especially considering that USSR wasn't planning of making unreasonable demands. The most likely diplomatic outcome would be USSR demanding demilitarization of Western Germany (or maybe even re-unification of Germany as demilitarized neutral buffer) and signed neutrality of former NATO states (or at least removal of American troops from Europe).

also cannot see a Soviet invasion force stopping at the Dutch and Belgian borders, Rotterdam and Antwerp as transport hubs would be too tempting not to take. They would have been marching through what would have been left of my old home town, where the traces of WW2 are visible to this day.
If West wouldn't agree to negotiate peace with Soviet tanks crossing the Rhine, then yes, the next step was supposed to be a push toward Netherlands and Belgum, to deny American reinforcements their main disembarkation ports. France was supposed to be left alone as long as it would be possible (if France would agree to stay out, USSR would gladly leave France alone)
 
This reminds me of a certain treaty of mutual defense between Poland and France that was not fulfilled in 1939. A diplomatic paper curtain that did not stop the panzers.
 
Soviet assumption was, that if USA suffered big enough defeat in Europe and would bd denied staging ground for counter-offensive, it would likely agree to negotiate reasonable peace
In my view, that would have been a case of terminal optimism.
Saner minds prevailed.
 
In my view, that would have been a case of terminal optimism.
Saner minds prevailed.
Erm, it was sane position. USSR never wanted to START the war with West; Soviet leadership perfectly understood, that the only outcome would be a total devastation. All Soviet war plans assumed that West started shooting first, and it was hoped that major defeat in Germany would be enough to force a negotiations.

The greatest irony of Cold War was, that both sides have absolutely zero desire to start a fight - but both sides also didn't trust each other and assumed that the opponent is just waiting for opportunity to attack.
 
I agree pretty much with Dilandu's analysis.
The Soviet Union knew that the US had considered options for forcing their way to Berlin in the event of a renewed blockade. Although the UK and France pretty much squashed these options, I don't blame the USSR for being cautious.
The other factor was West Germany. The West German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) was well equipped and by the late 70s well trained compared with US forces. The German word "Forward Defence" evoked thoughts in the Kremlin on Northern and Central Army Groups charging into East Germany. Various open East German books about NATO showed maps of this.
I have seen nothing to support a gung ho attitude to war in Moscow in the Cold War years. Staff and exercise plans were just plans.
 
Erm, it was sane position.
My first reply was in reaction to what would persuade France not to use their nuclear weapons with a Soviet army on the banks of the Rhine.
I submit that a Soviet army on the banks of the Rhine would have been enough for triggering US nuclear weapons to be used. At which point what France decides becomes moot. YMMV.
 
My first reply was in reaction to what would persuade France not to use their nuclear weapons with a Soviet army on the banks of the Rhine.
I submit that a Soviet army on the banks of the Rhine would have been enough for triggering US nuclear weapons to be used. At which point what France decides becomes moot. YMMV.
US and Soviet nuclear weapons in exercises would already have been used by the time the WP reached the Rhine and controlled NL and BE.
France was clear that it would only use its tactical nuclear weapons (Pluton missiles and AN52 gravity bombs) if WP forces threatened French territory.
Where the exercises became vague was the next level. Would the US (and UK) use nuclear weapons against targets in the Soviet Union?
This level of escalation risked a Soviet response against targets in the UK and North America. From then on the exchange would be strategic.
We have no way of knowing but all the US and Soviet leaders in this period (even Stalin and Nixon!)were reasonable so I think Dilandu is right.
 
My first reply was in reaction to what would persuade France not to use their nuclear weapons with a Soviet army on the banks of the Rhine.
Well, actually France would likely NOT use its nuclear weapon until the French territory would be hit or invaded. The Force de dissuasion main function was always deterrence; and French nuclear arsenal was quite limited. There is nothing to be gained for France by striking prematurely, while it's still possible that they could get out of war relatively unharmed.

At which point what France decides becomes moot. YMMV.
Again, USSR did not plan to strike France, if this could be avoided.
 
Again, USSR did not plan to strike France, if this could be avoided.
With Soviet boots on the banks of the Rhine, Moscow and Washington would be history in short order. As well as my home town, as collateral damage.
 
With Soviet boots on the banks of the Rhine, Moscow and Washington would be history in short order. As well as my home town, as collateral damage.
Well, USSR hoped, that if it suggest negotiations at this point, West would be pretty happy NOT to escalate the situation further.
 
Hope, ah well...

Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’ entrate

I think a Cold War NATO invasion of Warsaw Pact nations would have been equally disastrous.
 
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I think a Cold War NATO invasion of Warsaw Pact nations would have been equally disastrous.
True. Albeit to be fair, till 1980s, NATO actually didn't have the manpower to consider such attack without bringing in massive American reinforcements (which would be immediately noticed by USSR, and Soviet reinforcements rushed in Europe to counter the NATO buildup, so basically NATO could not have a realistic chance).
 
NATO actually didn't have the manpower
In the Cold War, NATO and US policies were very much aligned. When I wrote 'NATO invasion', read 'NATO-including-USA invasion'.
When I wrote 'Warsaw Pact', read 'Warsaw Pact-including-Soviet-Union'. Because in the Cold War, Warsaw Pact and Soviet policies were much aligned as well.
 
In the Cold War, NATO and US policies were very much aligned. When I wrote 'NATO invasion', read 'NATO-including-USA invasion'.
When I wrote 'Warsaw Pact', read 'Warsaw Pact-including-Soviet-Union'. Because in the Cold War, Warsaw Pact and Soviet policies were much aligned as well.
Erm, I assumed exactly that.
 
Then putting 2+2 together, that would make it exceedingly unlikely NATO would march East. Because everybody would see it coming.
 
Then putting 2+2 together, that would make it exceedingly unlikely NATO would march East. Because everybody would see it coming.
Exactly. In 1980s, situation changed, though. The European NATO militaries became proportionally stronger, and Western advantage in electronics turned into decisive advantage in coordination, precise targeting and weapon technology. From 1980s position, the probability of Western attack on USSR increased significantly. That's why Soviet leadership became so worried; their superiority in conventional forces not only diminished quantitatively, but also was neutralized qualitatively.
 

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