Sealion 19?

[uk 75]

Between 1945 and 1990 the UK's only source of potential foreign invasion was the Soviet Union. Whereas Germany's Sealion plans of 1940 are the subject of numerous books and wargames, there is little or nothing about Soviet plans for Britain in the event of a war.

With most of Britain's army overseas there were only a handful of infantry units and even fewer armoured or artillery left in the UK. Unlike European countries British Police forces were not lavishly equipped with automatic weapons or light armoured trucks.
Air Defence was focussed on key military sites. Large urban centres were not protected.

It is perhaps understandable since most accounts of a possible WW3 end with nuclear exchanges in Europe spreading to both US and Soviet cities.

But in the 70s there were real fears that NATO was being hollowed out. Eurocommunists in several countries might welcome Soviet forces. The US seemed increasingly paralysed by Vietnam and its aftermath.

But the Soviet Union was much more cautious than it appeared. I suspect the truth is that invading Britain was dismissed as a step too far.

 

[Dilandu]

As far as I know, USSR never planned to actually invade Britain, even in case of war with NATO. The Soviet strategy was always more focused on "reaching Atlantic as fast as possible, blocking the American reinforcements from arriving to Europe".

 

[Rule of cool]

Invading Britain to conquer it would be a surefire way to get nuked, France wold be much the same. IIUC the Soviets weren't shy about nukes, as long as it was on their terms for their purposes.

 

[zen]

No one has successfully invaded Britain without first having local allies able to assist.
The Soviets would want to be invited in, with guarantees they could safely build up forces on the island to "help a fellow socialist government".

The Idea they could sail a fleet loaded with an Army past Norway or Sweden and Denmark to forcibly invade the UK is.......optimistic

 

[Rule of cool]

No one has successfully invaded Britain without first having local allies able to assist.
The Soviets would want to be invited in, with guarantees they could safely build up forces on the island to "help a fellow socialist government".

The Idea they could sail a fleet loaded with an Army past Norway or Sweden and Denmark to forcibly invade the UK is.......optimistic

I agree. I actually think they likely had an amphibious fleet able to do the (or at least A) job; but it would need to be assembled at jumping off points in the North Sea and that would require these countries to be suitably conquered. This is way too vague a concept to put too much planning effort into, although I'm sure the rough ideas would have been sketched out even if only as an intellectual exercise by planning geeks in their quiet times.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I have no idea what strategic goal of the USSR would necessitate full-scale invasion of the UK. Landing of raiding parties to achieve specific operational or strategic objectives - destroying nuclear weapons or critical infrastructure - I could see. But an actual invasion would require either diverting forces from Germany/Norway/elsewhere, or waiting until after operations on the European mainland had concluded.

The former case would introduce a high level of risk to the main effort for doubtful gain, while the latter is in the 'wishful thinking' category.

I wouldn't be entirely surprised if someone in the Kremlin (or possibly the Lubyanka) did a desktop study for how to provide military support after a British socialist movement overthrew the government. But if so it would have been filed away with all the other plans for implausible contingencies and forgotten about.

 

[lordroel]

Between 1945 and 1990 the UK's only source of potential foreign invasion was the Soviet Union. Whereas Germany's Sealion plans of 1940 are the subject of numerous books and wargames, there is little or nothing about Soviet plans for Britain in the event of a war.

With most of Britain's army overseas there were only a handful of infantry units and even fewer armoured or artillery left in the UK. Unlike European countries British Police forces were not lavishly equipped with automatic weapons or light armoured trucks.
Air Defence was focussed on key military sites. Large urban centres were not protected.

It is perhaps understandable since most accounts of a possible WW3 end with nuclear exchanges in Europe spreading to both US and Soviet cities.

But in the 70s there were real fears that NATO was being hollowed out. Eurocommunists in several countries might welcome Soviet forces. The US seemed increasingly paralysed by Vietnam and its aftermath.

But the Soviet Union was much more cautious than it appeared. I suspect the truth is that invading Britain was dismissed as a step too far.

Any Soviet invasion i think would focus on Iceland as that would cut of the convoys to Europe.

 

[Dilandu]

The Idea they could sail a fleet loaded with an Army past Norway or Sweden and Denmark to forcibly invade the UK is.......optimistic

Well, IF America would not interfer for some reason, it may be reasonably possible.

 

[Dilandu]

Okay, let's try to figure out the scenario requirements.

1) Nuclear deterrence must not work (otherwise USSR would just destroy Britain, even if suffering some significant damage)
2) USA must not interfer (otherwise the invasion would quickly turn into a draw, with both sides trying to push reinforcements to the island from both sides)

So let's assume that Britain did something really bad, that put it into total international isolation. For example, it was caught red-handed spreading biological warfare agents in Africa or Asia, under some hare-brained plan of "causing the pandemic that would collapse the thrid world socialist regimes". The whole world is outraged. The United Nations General Assembly put together and in unique case of agreement expulse the United Kingdom out of UN. The United States revoke Nassau treaty and took back their Polaris. So Britain found itself isolated, its nuclear deterrence crippled to a point of not being practical even to try, and nobody want to do anything with them.

And to make bad situation even worse, USSR decided that it's time to invade.

 

[Archibald]

The Soviets would have to start their invasion from Belgium, Netherlands, German, Denmark coasts. Indeed, bad luck for them the narrowest point - the Channel - is in France, and we would nuke the shit out of the Soviets if they ever got a bridgehead on the Rhine that couldn't be crushed through conventional weapons.

 

[Dynoman]

According to a 1970 USSR plan for invasion of western Europe obtained from Poland, see link below. Map insert is the targets of its nuclear arsenal with a plan to cross Europe to the Atlantic to block US landing and reinforcement opportunities.

This Is How the World Could Have Ended

World War III would have kicked off with hundreds of nukes

medium.com

 

[Rule of cool]

Leaving aside all the prerequisites, assuming the North Sea coast was in Soviet hands and the Baltic Sea amphibious fleet was not destroyed in that fracas, what could they bring to bear against Britain in the 60s-70s-80s? IIUC the Baltic fleet had quite a large amphibious components, a large number of LSTs and the like.

 

[Dilandu]

Leaving aside all the prerequisites, assuming the North Sea coast was in Soviet hands and the Baltic Sea amphibious fleet was not destroyed in that fracas, what could they bring to bear against Britain in the 60s-70s-80s? IIUC the Baltic fleet had quite a large amphibious components, a large number of LSTs and the like.

They were mostly planned to be used in supporting operation on Baltic, supporting the northern flank of Soviet advance.

 

[Rule of cool]

They were mostly planned to be used in supporting operation on Baltic, supporting the northern flank of Soviet advance.

I'm aware of that, the question is what did they have and when, and how would that stuff go if aimed at Britain from the North Sea ports?

 

[Dilandu]

I'm aware of that, the question is what did they have and when?

Could you specify the exact timeframe? There were a lot of amhpibious landing ships build for Baltic Fleet during Cold War, and Poland and Eastern German Navies also operated a sizable number of them. The ships were often transferred between fleets, of sold/gifted to other Socialist nations, so for specific data it would be best to specify the timeframe.

For 1960s, the Soviet amphibious force on Baltic was mainly composed of small and medium landing ships. The main type were Project 770 and Project 771 (with subclasses) medium units; a 1500-ton, sea-capable units, with a range of about 1800-2000 nautical miles (i.e. they could reach Britain from Baltic ports without the need to refuel). There were also about two dozens or less of small Project 189 and Project 106 units, but they have only 1200 nm range and weren't exactly designed for open sea.

There were about 17 Project 770 ships build for Baltic Fleet in 1963-1967, and 10 more were build for Polish Navy. Each was capable of carrying 5 medium (T-54/T-55) or 3 heavy tanks (IS-3/T-10), or three artillery pieces with tractors and ammo supply, or 10 trucks and up to 200 men.

There were about 7 Project 771 ships build for Baltic Fleet in 1966-1970, and 10 more were build for Polish Navy. Each was capable of carrying 6 medium (T-55) or light floating tanks (PT-76), or three artillery pieces with tractors and ammo supply, or 10 trucks, and up to 200 men.

So the total number of Baltic Fleet and Polish Fleet by the 1970 was about 44 medium amphibious ships with the carrying capacity of about 273 tanks and 8800 men.

 

[uk 75]

The key to winning both wars for Germany is to keep Britain and the United States out of the war.
Clumsy diplomacy by the Kaiser and Hitler failed to exploit the large number of politicians in both countries wanting to keep out of a European war.
For Japan it is harder. US and other colonial powers in Asia were not popular locally. Japan could have embarked on a longer anti-colonial war without the strike on Pearl Harbor which brought down the full weight of US power on its head.
Putin and Xi have learnt these lessons and are much more competent.

Knocking Britain out of the war is a lot easier than defeating the US. The German Navy in 1914 and the Luftwaffe in 1940 could have achieved that with different leadership and equipment.

 

[Rule of cool]

Knocking Britain out of the war is a lot easier than defeating the US. The German Navy in 1914 ........... could have achieved that with different leadership ........

This is one of my favourite historical topics, unfortunately not a big interest of people here.

 

[Dilandu]

The German Navy in 1914

How exactly?

 

[Dilandu]

This is one of my favourite historical topics, unfortunately not a big interest of people here.

Well, count me in)

 

[Rule of cool]

Well, count me in)

I'm a big believer that Germany winning the Race To The Sea would facilitate them winning the war. Here's a thread I started a little while ago.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/sea-air-development-if-germany-wins-the-race-to-the-sea-1914.44437/

 

[Dilandu]

I'm a big believer that Germany winning the Race To The Sea would facilitate them winning the war. Here's a thread I started a little while ago.

Thing is, they likely can't do it at all, and 1914 OTL was by far OPTIMISTIC course of events for Germany. Doubts in Moltke's plans became to arise already by 1890s, when more and more staff games led to the same conclusion; it just wouldn't work, French would be able to maneuver and either hit the Germans outstretched flank, or force them into head-on battle with inconclusive results. The German leadership clinged to Moltke's plans mainly out of lack of any other ideas. Abandoning it would be equival to admitting that Germany have no ability to win the war at all. The fact that Germans were even able to move as far as in OTL was incredible luck for them.

 

[uk 75]

How exactly?

Sorry I am outside my period of knowledge (Cold War) but have picked up the idea from other articles that Britain's East Coast ports were vulnerable to German naval raids and that Scapa Flow was too far away.
Broadly what is the point of the High Seas Fleet if it does not strike at Britain?

 

[Dilandu]

Sorry I am outside my period of knowledge (Cold War) but have picked up the idea from other articles that Britain's East Coast ports were vulnerable to German naval raids and that Scapa Flow was too far away.
Broadly what is the point of the High Seas Fleet if it does not strike at Britain?

They were vulnerable for raids, but damage from such raids was more psychological, than material. Basically, it made British population unhappy, since they always assumed that Grand Fleet would block the enemy in bases and prevent it from threatening British coasts.

The German strategy was based on the assumption, that those raids - performed by scouting force of battlecruisers mainly - would lure part of Grand Fleet in sea, and then it could be ambushed by the whole High Seas Fleet. Basically their idea was to create the impression, that those raids are performed ONLY by small number of battlecruisers, so British would send a manageable force against them. Which could then be ambushed and efficiently destroyed by the High Seas Fleet, covertly deployed also.

The great flaw in German strategy was, that British knew their codes. They got the German code books from Russian Empire, which obtained them from German cruiser SMS Magdeburg, which grounded on Baltic in 1914, and was captured by Russian Navy. Realizing the tremendous advantage they gained, Russian secret service put in motion the cunning operation, to persuade German spies that code books from Magdeburg were destroyed by its captain. The plan worked, and Germans continued to use the same codes, utterly unaware that they are known.

 

[uk 75]

They were vulnerable for raids, but damage from such raids was more psychological, than material. Basically, it made British population unhappy, since they always assumed that Grand Fleet would block the enemy in bases and prevent it from threatening British coasts.

The German strategy was based on the assumption, that those raids - performed by scouting force of battlecruisers mainly - would lure part of Grand Fleet in sea, and then it could be ambushed by the whole High Seas Fleet. Basically their idea was to create the impression, that those raids are performed ONLY by small number of battlecruisers, so British would send a manageable force against them. Which could then be ambushed and efficiently destroyed by the High Seas Fleet, covertly deployed also.

The great flaw in German strategy was, that British knew their codes. They got the German code books from Russian Empire, which obtained them from German cruiser SMS Magdeburg, which grounded on Baltic in 1914, and was captured by Russian Navy. Realizing the tremendous advantage they gained, Russian secret service put in motion the cunning operation, to persuade German spies that code books from Magdeburg were destroyed by its captain. The plan worked, and Germans continued to use the same codes, utterly unaware that they are known.

Lol are you sure that wan't Tom Hanks and the US Navy. But seriously thanks for sharing. Thanks should always be shown to those who help you.

 

[Dilandu]

Broadly what is the point of the High Seas Fleet if it does not strike at Britain?

Actually to deter Britain from entering the war against Germany, by threatening Royal Navy with severe losses, if it try to destroy German fleet.

It was Tirpitz "risk theory", which he used to justify German naval expansion; that German Navy should be just strong enough for Britain to be reluctant to fight Germany, fearing heavy losses. He acknowleged, that in open battle with British, German Navy would be destroyed - but the losses it could inflict would be so severe, that Royal Navy would be crippled too, and Britain would be reluctant to committ to such outcome.

So the main reason for High Seas Fleet existence was political. Its main military purpose was initially viewed as countering French and Russian fleets; then it became defending German coastline from British attacks. German admirals assumed, that if deterrence failed and Britain would declare war against Germany, it would attempt a close blockade - with blockading forces cruising just outside German harbors - and thus German Navy would be able to sortie against blockading forces, striking and retreating back to fortified bases.

 

[Dilandu]

Lol are you sure that wan't Tom Hanks and the US Navy. But seriously thanks for sharing. Thanks should always be shown to those who help you.

Its the real event, you know. The standing German order was to burn the codebooks in the ship's fireroom; but it was flooded when SMS Magdeburg grounded, so captain just threw them overboard in weightened bag. After cruiser surrendered, Russian divers methodically searched the shallow bottom, ahd soon found the books. Realizing that their value would be lost, if Germwn would realize, that books were captured (and change codes) Russian intelligence spread the rumor that books were indeed burned. The Magdeburg's captain - the only one amongst cruiser crew, who knew the books true fate - was immediately isolated from other prisoners, and sent to remote Khabarovsk. To maintain the illusion, the similar books were actually burned by Russian agents in wrecked cruiser fireroom. At some moment Germans sent a submarine to investigate the wreck, and, apparently, submarine crew found the burned books and assumed that codebooks were indeed, destroyed. So German Navy continued to use their old codes, while Britain, Russia and France could now read their radio communications.

 

[Rule of cool]

Thing is, they likely can't do it at all, and 1914 OTL was by far OPTIMISTIC course of events for Germany. Doubts in Moltke's plans became to arise already by 1890s, when more and more staff games led to the same conclusion; it just wouldn't work, French would be able to maneuver and either hit the Germans outstretched flank, or force them into head-on battle with inconclusive results. The German leadership clinged to Moltke's plans mainly out of lack of any other ideas. Abandoning it would be equival to admitting that Germany have no ability to win the war at all. The fact that Germans were even able to move as far as in OTL was incredible luck for them.

The progression of German war plans from in the years leading up to the war have their own sound logic to them from the German perspective and their execution in 1914 did leave something to be desired and therefore can explain the lack of a better result to an extent.

I am not surprised that the Germans got as far as they did against Belgium, France ad Britain in 1914 when looking at the details.as the Germans had some significant technical advantages over the French Army. Each German division had 18 x 105mm howitzers when the French divisions had no counterpart and each German Corps had a compliment of 150mm howitzers and each Field Army had 210mm Howitzers totaling something like 450-500 of these pieces to which the French had 102 x 155mm howitzers to 'match' this powerful force. Also the German engineers/pioneers had a few hundred Mnenwerfer, basically mortars, to which the Allies had no counter. On top of this was the famous German siege train with it's 410mm Big Bertha siege howitzers and 305mm,, (I think) Skoda siege guns borrowed from Austria Hungary. These detail advantages allowed the Germans to win dozens or hundreds of engagements that make up the 'named' battles to facilitate their huge advance into Belgium and France.

 

[Dilandu]

.as the Germans had some significant technical advantages over the French Army. Each German division had 18 x 105mm howitzers when the French divisions had no counterpart and each German Corps had a compliment of 150mm howitzers and each Field Army had 210mm Howitzers totaling something like 450-500 of these pieces to which the French had 102 x 155mm howitzers to 'match' this powerful force.

On the other hand, German field artillery was seriously behind French. The German main field cannon was a modified 1896 model; short-ranged, slow to reload and firing too light shell. So basically where it mattered in 1914 - in maneuver warfare, where heavy cannons weren't mobile enough to be efficiently employed - German artillery was inferior.

Also the German engineers/pioneers had a few hundred Mnenwerfer, basically mortars, to which the Allies had no counte

Just 160 barrels by 1914. Their effect was extremely limited. They helped Germans to develope more efficient mortar force, when the war became static, though.

 

[Rule of cool]

On the other hand, German field artillery was seriously behind French. The German main field cannon was a modified 1896 model; short-ranged, slow to reload and firing too light shell. So basically where it mattered in 1914 - in maneuver warfare, where heavy cannons weren't mobile enough to be efficiently employed - German artillery was inferior.

The German 1896 had a range of ~5600m, inferior to the French '75', particularly the newer models which increased the elevation from ~18 to ~30 degrees. However, at the divisional level the French were trained to fire out to 5,000m so in practice the German field guns weren't too disadvantaged. In any case the German 105mm light field howitzers in each Regular Division more than made up for any deficiency with the light field guns, the French had no answer to them at the Division and Corps level.

I've never heard that the German artillery overall was inferior, only that it was superior to the French. The British weren't so handicapped, with their 4.5" Howitzers and 60pdr (5") heavy field guns, however they did leave their 6" 30cwt howitzers behind when they deployed their first 4 divisions. After only a few weeks of fighting, they realised this error and quickly deployed these 'heavy' pieces. That said the British Army was a tiny player in the early weeks and months of the war.

Just 160 barrels by 1914. Their effect was extremely limited. They helped Germans to develope more efficient mortar force, when the war became static, though.

Of course, their effect was limited, but they did have an effect because it was 160 barrels to 0. As I said, these and other things helped the Germans win dozens or hundreds of engagements which made up the 'named' battles. They were a small area of superiority which helped make up the whole.

All of this is technical stuff, none of it addresses large German org chart problems.

 

[Dilandu]

I've never heard that the German artillery overall was inferior

Field artillery, I specify again. German field guns were inferior. Prior to 1904, they were hopelessly inferior. After 1904 - just inferior. Look at this gun:



This was the cannon Germans fielded in 1896. No recoil system, separate loading only. It was so plainly inferior to French Mle 1897, that if any war started in 1900-1908, the German army would be wiped out. In 1904, Germany initiated a crash program to modernize their obsolete guns to semi-modern standards... but the result was inferior.

P.S. Their howitzers suffered from the same problem, by the way. Prior to 1909, the 105-mm howitzer was a old-type weapon without any recoil system.

 

[Rule of cool]

Field artillery, I specify again. German field guns were inferior. Prior to 1904, they were hopelessly inferior. After 1904 - just inferior. Look at this gun:

View attachment 764586

This was the cannon Germans fielded in 1896. No recoil system, separate loading only. It was so plainly inferior to French Mle 1897, that if any war started in 1900-1908, the German army would be wiped out. In 1904, Germany initiated a crash program to modernize their obsolete guns to semi-modern standards... but the result was inferior.

P.S. Their howitzers suffered from the same problem, by the way. Prior to 1909, the 105-mm howitzer was a old-type weapon without any recoil system.

I don't understand the point you're trying to make. Was the German field artillery lacking once the 75 was introduced? Sure, but by the same token the French heavy artillery was lacking by 1913 and Joffre had started a project to introduce a lot more heavy artillery into the French army. He was going to achieve this at least in part by modernising 1878 model De Bange guns with modern carriages and recoil buffers, just like the Germans did with their older pieces. This is just part of the ebb and flow of any arms race, and WW1 broke out when Germany was in front. That said even when the French had completed their artillery modernisation it wouldn't match the Germans due to the lack of a divisional howitzer, they were addressing the shortage at the Corps and Field Army level.

 

[Dilandu]

I don't understand the point you're trying to make

My point was, that the advantages of German army weren't exactly as great as they often portrayed. They existed, sure. But they weren't overwhelming. And that's why I inclined to think that OTL 1914 was basically the very best outcome Germany could expect; any other outcome likely would be worse.

 

[Rule of cool]

My point was, that the advantages of German army weren't exactly as great as they often portrayed. They existed, sure. But they weren't overwhelming. And that's why I inclined to think that OTL 1914 was basically the very best outcome Germany could expect; any other outcome likely would be worse.

I agree in technical terms; the advantage was there and helped them to win engagements when the tactical situation was tolerable as opposed to being favourable which is what the French needed. This advantage would be eroded in time with the French heavy artillery modernisation, which no doubt the Germans would react to, but in 1914 the Germans could reasonably convince themselves their plans weren't ludicrous given this advantage and other expectations.

 

[Martes]

The main thing with invasion of Britain - as in all the attempts before - is to get some substantial army landed and keep it supplied.
With France acting as a buffer and a flank threat, I would think it's practically impossible. So Germany would have to either totally subdue France or lure it to an alliance. Combined, the German and the French navy would have at least a fighting chance of getting past the RN (although I wouldn't bet on it even then).

 

[Rule of cool]

It's the classic fleet and geographic paradigm. In WW1 Germany had a fleet, but not the geography and in WW2 the situation was reversed. The Cold War Soviet Union had niether, although they might have transformed that with a successful conquest of West Germany and the Low Countries.

 

[Dilandu]

This advantage would be eroded in time with the French heavy artillery modernisation, which no doubt the Germans would react to, but in 1914 the Germans could reasonably convince themselves their plans weren't ludicrous given this advantage and other expectations.

Well, the point is, that it took Germans seven years & observation of Russo-Japanese war, to finally admit that they need a fixed-ammo gun with recoil system. Extrapolating from that, we could safely conclude that it would took them at least a decade to realize the problem French heavy artillery creates.

 

[Dilandu]

The Cold War Soviet Union had niether, although they might have transformed that with a successful conquest of West Germany and the Low Countries.

Erm. USSR have a fleet, second in the world, despite being hampered by geography.

 

[Rule of cool]

Erm. USSR have a fleet, second in the world, despite being hampered by geography.

The Soviets had 4 fleets, but 2 of them are not relevant and I doubt if even combined the Northern and Baltic fleets would be powerful enough to dominate the North Sea once the Soviets conquered West Germany.

 

[Rule of cool]

Well, the point is, that it took Germans seven years & observation of Russo-Japanese war, to finally admit that they need a fixed-ammo gun with recoil system. Extrapolating from that, we could safely conclude that it would took them at least a decade to realize the problem French heavy artillery creates.

In late 1912 the Germans were awake to the immediate danger on their borders and switched from long term project of building up their Navy to short/medium term project of building up their Army. A new Naval Law was shelved and the Army increased by 135,000 over 2 years, the biggest increase in decades. This also when German planning dropped the 4 mobilisation options for one that would deal with Britain and France quickly before redeployment to face the slow mobilising and divided focus Russians.

In that environment I can't imagine the Germans would take almost a decade to react to the French artillery programme. In any case my previous post was incorrect, the Germans had over 400 150mm and over 200 210mm field howitzers in 1914, IIUC the French never intended to match those number's or even calibre.

 

[Dilandu]

In that environment I can't imagine the Germans would take almost a decade to react to the French artillery programme.

Well, OTL it took them seven years and a major war on Far East to realize that something is wrong with their guns. The truth is, that German army attitude toward artillery was pretty conservative in late XIX century. They ordered good guns, but of pretty average and unremarkable designs (despite Krupp & others producing much better guns for export customers). While French, still reeling from humilating defeat, rapidly innovated, determined to have state-of-art artillery, Germans pretty much stagnated, only reacting on what French & Russians have.