kaiserd said:
Hi last dingo, hope I'm not picking on you, good to have my perceptions challenged, hope you feel the same.
A few quick points;
- still not clear from where / whom this "tip of the spear" is supposed to come from.
- a (very small) mobile strategic reserve is great, never said it wasn't an advantage, but it's not the war winner in this type of conflict that you are saying it is. In fact Isis is a good example of this. In terms of numbers and commitment their not a million miles from what you are proposing, but Isis lacks the ability for knock out blows against Assad or Iraqi state forces.
- "Controlling ground is not all that difficult..." How much blood and treasure has been spent disproving this statement.....
- Constant refrains condemning "Western" this or that cheapen your arguments and portray a prejudice.
At best it's just lazy...
Some ways to assemble a mobile strategic reserve to break the stalemate
- subsidize (some) FSA leaders so it's able to get the militias under the FSA's roof to commit a few per cent of their fighters (a kind of levy) to it in exchange for supplies
- Assad used Hezbollah and originally the Syrian army as mobile forces, but with both of them exhausted, a Russian mechanized brigade may end up replacing them
- A 'legion' of volunteers, possibly recruited from refugee camps or even Western Muslims
- An Iranian volunteer regiment
- Jordan joining the fray with a brigade
- Legion Étrangère
Da'esh was actually doing fine for a while, but then the culminating point and suppressive bombing weighed them down, as well as the attrition battle at Kobane. Now they seem busy with defence, and will only regain their ability to launch offensives if they learn to accept (more) weakness in many places to free up forces AND find a way to attack in force without getting bombed decisively.
Controlling ground is not difficult. All civil war parties are doing it right now. Only Westerners fail at it in such countries, and nowadays only. You don't control a population by watching it all the time; you control it by having it fear you coming after them once they opposed you. Same as with ordinary policing. Western occupation forces don't do the "coming after them" in a fear-inducing way, and were thus pointless and never numerous enough.
I'm greatly annoyed, astonished and exasperated by the incompetence of political and military leadership in the wars since 2002 at the latest, but also during the Kosovo Air War. It's hugely disconcerting to remember that such incompetents are running our deterrence and defence. At best we're wasting billions every year that could have been saved if we had competents in charge of our defence.
Da'esh is not very interesting to me because it's by no stretch a relevant threat to my country or its alliances. Any Westerner who fears them is in my opinion a fearful p***y.
The Western military forces on the other hand are a part of us. Them being unable to accomplish missions even with a 100:1 superiority in resources is a horrible display of incompetence, unheard-of pre-1950. To bash Da'esh is pointless, redundant and utterly unoriginal, but to express concern about Western foreign policy and military incompetence makes sense.
In the end, the ineptitude (lack of decisiveness) displayed by Western intervention in Syria once again casts severe doubts regarding the competence of political and military leadership in the intervening countries.
What proposals for better strategies do we get? From super-primitive nonsense such as nuke fantasies up to the simplistic demands for more resources, particularly Western ground forces, by the usual suspects on TV and in newspapers (anglophone ones only, of course - as usual). Lots of primitive ideas, no indication of art of war competence anywhere. 14 year olds pulled from a schoolyard could give the same advices.