RN Sea Based Ballistic Missile

[zen]

"In March 1956, the Department of Defense (DoD) approved the Navy's parallel solid-propellant program."

"In May 1956, Lockheed proposed a solid-propellant vehicle "JUPITER-S." In keeping with the state-of-the-art (SOTA) of 1956, it would be a very large missile which would deliver a 3000 lb warhead at a 1500 nm range using a very heavy guidance system. The LMSC concept was a first stage (FS) cluster of six motors, each 40 in. in diameter, surrounding a similar single motor of the same dimensions which served as the second stage (SS). The overall diameter of the missile was 120 in. and its weight was estimated to be approximately 160,000 Ib."

Arguably a parallel UK effort was both possible and practical.
Remember Admiralty was thinking 750nm.
Much more achievable.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

A few interesting links detailing Polaris propellant development;-

Polaris Propulsion | Aviation - airports, aircraft, helicopters ...

Meanwhile, the navy's Polaris missile had made more far-reaching contributions. Until Polaris A1 became operational in 1960, all U. S. long-range missiles had

ourairports.biz

https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/techdigest/pdf/V13-N01/13-01-Watson.pdf

https://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/88635main_H-2330.pdf

It’s notable that the highest ISP was achieved with a composite modified double base propellant. Certainly there’s ref to similar systems in the U.K. in the mid 60’s albeit at a fraction of the size.

 

[zen]

Blue Streak Missile Length 80ft, diameter?
Silo K11 depth 138ft, diameter for missile at least 4 times the missile diameter. Not including adjacent facilities which contain refridgeration and containment for LOx, including generators etc...

Ergo, solid fuelled Polaris-like missile.....
Diameter of 54" or 4.5ft assuming missile silo diameter (only) is thus 18ft....call it 20ft.
Length A1 = 28.5ft (for simplicity), silo ought to be 76ft.
Scale of difference is substantial, and in turn volume of concrete, use of steel reinforcement, lack of LOx storage facilities, even the much smaller demands on a generator instead of generators suggests a much cheaper, simpler silo is achievable.

 

[zen]

What is the status of Stirling engines at this time for possible use in submarines?

By 1951 Phillips had a product for 180/200 W generator, some 150 sets built but it was loosing out due to the lower power requirements of transistor electronics. The product was aimed at areas where batteries weren't easily available.

Arguable the RN could have approached the Dutch to develop a Sterling Cycle engine for submarines in the 50's.
But at the time, HTP was of more interest.
That said, an SSK like Walrus type needs 4MW......Though the Dolfijn needed less and Amphions need just 4.66kW for 8kts submerged, so just 21 sets of the Dutch generator.....

 

[CNH]

Blue Streak Missile Length 80ft, diameter?
Silo K11 depth 138ft, diameter for missile at least 4 times the missile diameter. Not including adjacent facilities which contain refridgeration and containment for LOx, including generators etc...

Ergo, solid fuelled Polaris-like missile.....
Diameter of 54" or 4.5ft assuming missile silo diameter (only) is thus 18ft....call it 20ft.
Length A1 = 28.5ft (for simplicity), silo ought to be 76ft.
Scale of difference is substantial, and in turn volume of concrete, use of steel reinforcement, lack of LOx storage facilities, even the much smaller demands on a generator instead of generators suggests a much cheaper, simpler silo is achievable.

I think you being a little overoptimistic here. There was a proposal for a solid fuel alternative to Blue Streak. I attach a drawing.

Note that the first stage contains seven rocket motors, each 3'6" in diameter.

 

[zen]

Blue Streak Missile Length 80ft, diameter?
Silo K11 depth 138ft, diameter for missile at least 4 times the missile diameter. Not including adjacent facilities which contain refridgeration and containment for LOx, including generators etc...

Ergo, solid fuelled Polaris-like missile.....
Diameter of 54" or 4.5ft assuming missile silo diameter (only) is thus 18ft....call it 20ft.
Length A1 = 28.5ft (for simplicity), silo ought to be 76ft.
Scale of difference is substantial, and in turn volume of concrete, use of steel reinforcement, lack of LOx storage facilities, even the much smaller demands on a generator instead of generators suggests a much cheaper, simpler silo is achievable.

I think you being a little overoptimistic here. There was a proposal for a solid fuel alternative to Blue Streak. I attach a drawing.

Note that the first stage contains seven rocket motors, each 3'6" in diameter.

View attachment 640605

Well that seems rather like a parallel to the Solid Jupiter type missile and as such might explain 42 inch cylinder fuel press.
But this is for a 3,000lb warhead.

While a lightweight warhead would aiming for 700lb or as near as possible weight.

So in this AH, like with Jupiter, a transformation occurs with the twin changes in fuel and warhead. Resulting in a Polaris like solution.
Arguably then the silo scaled around this smaller missile becomes much more affordable.
But certainly in the early days something like this might be the basis of early work and planning.

 

[CNH]

In 1955 we didn't have any thermonuclear warheads, let alone a lightweight.

Grapple in 1957 was intended to produce a megaton yield for a ton weight.

 

[zen]

In 1955 we didn't have any thermonuclear warheads, let alone a lightweight.

Grapple in 1957 was intended to produce a megaton yield for a ton weight.

Previously in this thread based on readings such as in the links I typed.
"By '58 Lightweight warhead is projected 600lb and growth creep to less than 800lb is real world by '63."

Jupiter Solid is 1956,
Teller is stating Lightweight nuclear warhead in 1956.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Things moved so quickly in this period, timing is everything. I thinks Zens scenario works better with a later start date say 1960-62;- the techno bricks are all in place.

An alternate maybe a British Trident type system in 1980 or maybe an Anglo French M45 - 51 project. So long as the French are project leaders, I’m sure the Chevaline bus/decoy/3DQP RV technology would have been most welcome.

 

[CNH]

In 1955 we didn't have any thermonuclear warheads, let alone a lightweight.

Grapple in 1957 was intended to produce a megaton yield for a ton weight.

Previously in this thread based on readings such as in the links I typed.
"By '58 Lightweight warhead is projected 600lb and growth creep to less than 800lb is real world by '63."

Jupiter Solid is 1956,
Teller is stating Lightweight nuclear warhead in 1956.

You are talking US, not UK.
No lightweight warhead was available to the UK before the 1958 talks, and even then there were those in the UK who thought they would struggle to produce them. Brundrett (Chief scientific adviser to the Ministry of defence) was firmly opposed to these lightweight warheads, since, according to him, they used too much fissile material, which at that time was in very short supply in the UK. Ministers accepted this, and it was not until Skybolt that the concept of lightweight warheads came into play. This would have been in around 1961.

 

[zen]

Things moved so quickly in this period, timing is everything. I thinks Zens scenario works better with a later start date say 1960-62;- the techno bricks are all in place.

An alternate maybe a British Trident type system in 1980 or maybe an Anglo French M45 - 51 project. So long as the French are project leaders, I’m sure the Chevaline bus/decoy/3DQP RV technology would have most welcomed.

Getting facilities in place however needs an earlier start.
Getting further along with SSB(N maybe?) Needs that earlier start.
And frankly the basis of tjus thread is pursuit of the Submarine Launched Missile System.
Which effectively implies a focus on solid fuelled missiles and a lightweight warhead.
That's why this is an AH scenario. Not history

 

[zen]

A brief look at Italian Alfa missile, I see this is supposed to use a 1 ton warhead?
Two stages for 864nm range.
But then it's 21ft long.

So if one was to take the 2,240lb figure of 1 ton for single MT waread and a range figure of 750nm-850nm as was considered. Then the solid fuel missile launched from a submarine is achievable.
But certainly if a combined land and sea missile is sought it needs a 1,500nm-2,000nm range.
Then again even if we take resistance to lightweight warheads, ministers will appreciate the affordability of the solid fuel missile system that can achieve the range figures.

 

[zen]

Aahhhh I knew it was somewhere on this site!!

"John R. Walker, in "British Nuclear Weapons and the Test Ban 1954-73" states that Blue Granite would have been 20 inches in diameter with a weight of 2,500lbs, it was apparently to have been the third weapon fired (only if Green Granite II was successful) at the 1957 Grapple trials. "

20 inches, 2,500lb.
Before 1958.
Rather considerably less then the 45 inches and 4,500lb of earlier warheads.

And trawling though Chris Gibson's Vulcan's Hammer.
Orange Herald, 2,000lb. For P.27Z missile.
Plus.
A 1,000lb warhead for P.26Z missile. 1956. Presumably Red Beard.

 

[Dilandu]

Which effectively implies a focus on solid fuelled missiles and a lightweight warhead.

Er, not exactly. USSR worked for quite a long with storable liquid fuels. It is perfectly possible that UK would follow the same concept.

 

[PMN1]

This has been posted on Twitter




Along with a reply that 'If using peroxide missiles they'd mount them externally to the pressure hull and have blow out panels, like an Oscar II.'

 

[RP1]

Strangely enough, I am now browsing this thread to develop my thinking. I'm tending towards some enlarged Black Arrow, as Hill describes proposals for such and I think basing it on actual equipment is more plausable.

 

[Dilandu]

Along with a reply that 'If using peroxide missiles they'd mount them externally to the pressure hull and have blow out panels, like an Oscar II.'

Possible... but not exactly very likely. It would require rather wide-hull submarine, maybe twin-hulled (with missile tubes between pressure hulls).

 

[CNH]

Strangely enough, I am now browsing this thread to develop my thinking. I'm tending towards some enlarged Black Arrow, as Hill describes proposals for such and I think basing it on actual equipment is more plausable.

After the disaster of HMS Sidon, where 13 people were killed, the RN took a fairly understandable prejudice against liquid fuelled rockets. This persisted into the 1980s, when the Chevaline enhancement involved liquid fuels, to the very great opposition of the Navy.

 

[Pioneer]

Without Polaris or Blue Streak (which needed US input), the RAF would use the massive investment in the V force to keep pushing for stand-off bombs like Blue Steel.......

Well, at least V-bombers would in reality be far more versatile and efficiently used in ensuing conventional conflicts Britain would be involved in than that of IRBM's/SLBM's....


Regards
Pioneer

 

[Archibald]

Strangely enough, I am now browsing this thread to develop my thinking. I'm tending towards some enlarged Black Arrow, as Hill describes proposals for such and I think basing it on actual equipment is more plausable.

Got similar ideas. I called that one Black Archer, to keep with the medieval theme of "Black Knight ('tis but a scratch, LMAO) and Black Arrow.

I did some calculations related to diameter (see the attached picture called "volumes")
- Black Knight was 36 inch, too small
- CRUSADE was 54 inch
- Black Arrow first stage was 79 inch, it's second stage recycled CRUSADE 54 inch proposals.
The orbital Black Arrow threw 200 pounds to orbital velocity which is Mach 27.
An ICBM if not a FOBS won't go into orbit but to Mach 20
IRBM / ALBM / SLBM are merely Mach 15

So quite logically, an ICBM Black Arrow to Mach 20 can throw much more weight.
For once the exponential nature of the rocket equation helps instead of being such an annoying PITA.
A Black Arrow ICBM should be able to throw at least 2000 pounds to Mach 20.

When imagining Black Archer I shrunk / enlarged both stages to 68 inch, because it is right between 54 inch and 79 inch.

Why ? Because such a missile would fit under a TSR-2 belly.

Fundamentally, kerosene / peroxide is extremely dense (1.4 for HTP compared to water) and it is possible to build ICBMs or orbital vehicle that are extremely small and compact.

Black Archer would be small and compact enough to fit inside
- the prototype K-11 silo at Spadeadam
- contnairs on ship (Atlantic Conveyor, is that thou ?)
- rail carriage (fits inside the old tunnels)
- road trucks (roaming the countryside)
- Polaris / Poseidon launch tubes in submarines
- TSR-2 belly
- Vulcan's Skybolt wing pylons
- Victor and Valiant bomb bays
- AW.681 and Belfast transports
- Modified Concorde or VC-10 airliners
- Could go either ICBM or FOBS if needed

My conclusion: by carefully picking the correct diameter to length ratio, it would have been possible to create a 2-stage ICBM / LV / FOBS that fit a) a TSR-2 belly undercarriage ground clearance and b) the Victor bomb bay.
The Vulcan and all the others just don't care, but these two are the ones fixing tight size limits.

I wanted Black Archer to fit all the platforms listed above.

With a POD more or less similar to that brilliant story

Search results

One could imagine that the 1959 report would be dusted off after a very bad Skybolt crisis, and all the above options reviewed.

Apr-59
The Treasury insists that funds for Blue Streak development be minimised or held up while deterrent projects are under review. Never missing a chance to cut expenditures, it is pointed out that there is a precedent for putting the project on hold - in 1956 and 1957 funds were held up while designs were being finalised. At the insistence of the PM, funding is continued, although other ministries continue to have to chase for any payments to be made.

In a letter to the Admiralty, Air, Supply and Treasury ministries, the PM states that delaying or cancelling Blue Streak or Blue Steel without a clear replacement plan would damage the international perception of the capability of the UK's deterrent and the resolve of the country to maintain that deterrent. The cancellation of significant aviation projects in 1958 makes it unpalatable to subject the industry to further cuts at this stage. Nevertheless, if better or cheaper options can be found, these should be vigorously pursued. It is suggested that a committee be formed to draft a white paper on future delivery systems.

Britain is passed details of the proposed "Skybolt" stand off missile by the US. Planned for introduction in 1963, it is a missile with a range of 1000mi with a "megaton class" warhead. No details of the warhead are available, but it is clear to British engineers that the US is developing very lightweight weapons, as the design calls for a re-entry vehicle of around 1,000lbs mass. Even if "megaton class" only means around 600Kt, it is clear the US has progressed a long way. 1Mt designs from AWRE intended for Blue Streak weigh 4,200lbs including the re-entry vehicle.

The obscurely named "Strategy Scientific Policy Committee" is formed under the chairmanship of Sir Solly Zuckerman. It will report with a White Paper in the summer.

Quaerere Caelis

Something must be done -This is something, therefore we must do it The origins of one of the most famous projects in of the 20th Century are, like so much in history, an odd series of accidents, flavoured with national pride, economics and the quest for ever better weapons. Despite a...

www.alternatehistory.com

I checked the web, and this report really existed: it was a thorough review of "What can we do, post-V-bombers, related to nuclear delivery systems - in the year 1959 and beyond ?"

 

[PMN1]

Strangely enough, I am now browsing this thread to develop my thinking. I'm tending towards some enlarged Black Arrow, as Hill describes proposals for such and I think basing it on actual equipment is more plausable.

When imagining Black Archer I shrunk / enlarged both stages to 68 inch, because it is right between 54 inch and 79 inch.

Why ? Because such a missile would fit under a TSR-2 belly.

Fundamentally, kerosene / peroxide is extremely dense (1.4 for HTP compared to water) and it is possible to build ICBMs or orbital vehicle that are extremely small and compact.

Black Archer would be small and compact enough to fit inside
- the prototype K-11 silo at Spadeadam
- contnairs on ship (Atlantic Conveyor, is that thou ?)
- rail carriage (fits inside the old tunnels)
- road trucks (roaming the countryside)
- Polaris / Poseidon launch tubes in submarines
- TSR-2 belly
- Vulcan's Skybolt wing pylons
- Victor and Valiant bomb bays
- AW.681 and Belfast transports
- Modified Concorde or VC-10 airliners
- Could go either ICBM or FOBS if needed

My conclusion: by carefully picking the correct diameter to length ratio, it would have been possible to create a 2-stage ICBM / LV / FOBS that fit a) a TSR-2 belly undercarriage ground clearance and b) the Victor bomb bay.
The Vulcan and all the others just don't care, but these two are the ones fixing tight size limits.

What were the actual bomb bay dimensions for the Valiant, Victor and Vulcan?

 

[Archibald]

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/attachments/black-knight-irbm-png.658953/

Victor: 32 ft and 10 inch - damn imperial units with their weird obsession for human limbs: 10 meters long, vive la révolution !

Not easy to find on the Internet, btw: welcome to Absurdland... !!

 

[CNH]

Damn metric units with their obsession for circumference of the earth ...

 

[Archibald]

A la fin de l'envoi - touché ! (ROTFL)

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Mankind’s crowning & signature achievements such as going to the Moon, powered controllable flight, breaking the sound barrier, the electrical computer, the splitting of the atom, etc where all first done using Imperial units.

I’ve worked in both and generally find imperial a bit more intuitive, but I do have sympathy with you on the selection of 12 (or multiples thereof) or 14 or maybe something else as a base…..WTF were they thinking.

 

[uk 75]

I think it is important to stress the completely different rationales for the British and French nuclear deterrents.
Whereas France saw its deterrent as genuinely national and independent, successive British governments wanted its nuclear weapons as closely integrated with the US as possible.
The V Force and Bomber Command had the closest possible relationship with SAC.
The RAF Thors came and went entirely to suit the wishes of Washington.
Blue Streak and its unbuilt silos read across to developments in the US.
Mountbatten's unusual relationship with Rickover laid the basis for a link between the RN and USN nuclear forces that persists to this day.
If a national independent deterrent were ever to be needed, politcians like Macmillan and Thatcher would have seen it as a sign of failure and that the essential links with the US had broken down.
From Mcnamara to Trump some US politcians have been happy to contemplate that.

 

[zen]

That's a particular spin on this, and one which suit's an agenda.

Another is that it's hard to betray someone who is so integrated with your own. Hard to mask the pursuit of such betrayal as well.
Just too many connections, too many friendships. Too many opportunities for a conspiracy to leak out.....

While such integration is.....like any act of communication. A two way phenomenon. US influence on the UK....but also.....guess

Post Suez, if not post WWII. A view has emerged that if we should need the aid of the US. As in a existential conflict.
Then the risk of appeasers, and those favouring our enemies swaying the decisions of the US have to be countered. To avoid a situation such as occurred in the late 30's and through the early years of the War.
At the cost of apparent appeasement of US needs, and succumbing to US influence. Is the direct feed into their systems of politics and power. A feed of our perception, into theirs.

 

[uk 75]

Zen a bit too deep for a simple soul like me.
The US is the other large advanced English speaking democracy commited after the creation of NATO like us to defend Western Europe with (if needs be) nuclear weapons.
There have been various bumps along the way (Wilson/Johnson Heath/Nixon Major/Clinton May/Trump Johnson/Biden come to mind) but the military and civil servants in both countries have kept the relationship alive.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

A recently declassified file from 1975 on Polaris Chevaline detailing the decision to proceed with development.

If I may add a note not covered in the linked article;- In 75 the Royal Navy couldn’t accept the idea of liquid fuels anywhere within the weapon system (note we’re only talking about the 3rd stage manoeuvring bus). Prior to this the RAE had proposed a cold gas bus manoeuvring system using high pressure nitrogen gas precisely metered at the thruster . This was the system tested on the Falstaf rocket flight test as a technology demonstration, except it didn’t work. It had worked well in the vacuum chamber but not in low gravity….. just as few US experts had predicted. Hence the decision to adopt a liquid fuel, which needed the Admirals to be overruled, went right to the top;- no other than the PM himself.

Making a Mess of the Moscow Criterion - British Nuclear Policy in the 1970s

Defence blog focusing on 21st century analysis of Cold War defence, security and continuity of government problems.

thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com

Another note here is the variants quoted in the table;- I reckon “pyrotechnics” refers to the bursting charges in chaff bundles, “Solid fuel”refers to motors in the decoys and “liquid fuel” refers to the power source for the manoeuvring bus which produced the widely dispersed threat cloud.

Yet another note;- The RN condition for accepting the liquid fuel solution was only on the basis it was sub contracted to Raytheon as technology world leaders, reassuringly expensive and requiring very high level US blessing.

 

[Hood]

Actually its probably worse than that, Friedman in his Cold War subs book discusses the 'Moscow Criterion'. It was clear that no deterrent criteria was ever logically thought out. The initial Polaris decisions back in 1962-63 were based on assumptions of destroying 40 cities and the civil servants scratched their heads to figure out where the 40 cities requirement came from. Why 40 cities? Because that's what the V-Force could achieve. How did the RAF reckon that figure? Nobody knew but it seemed to be linked to how many bombs and bombers the RAF actually had but equally was a practical limit and not actually any rational target planning. What its original force intentions were nobody knew.
Which makes it questionable how Blue Streak was assessed in terms of destructive capacity (presumably 40 cities again based on the V-bomber figure).
So in the end wiping out Moscow seemed the most scary option we could throw at the Russians for Chevaline in the absence of real knowledge of what the Soviet leadership felt was an acceptable tradeoff in terms of losses "pfft comrade who cares if Minsk and Leningrad get incinerated?"
Ironically I'm not sure that the MoD or government ever considered what its rational trade-off was, what levels of destruction it was prepared to accept.

I'm currently reading an academic article on the French deterrent during its first decade, it seems to make much the same argument, that in real terms a small deterrent was treading the fine line from being insufficiently capable of wreaking enough havoc to be scary to be worthwhile in terms of the likely counter-blows heading in the opposite direction.

 

[Archibald]

I'm currently reading an academic article on the French deterrent during its first decade, it seems to make much the same argument, that in real terms a small deterrent was treading the fine line from "being insufficiently capable of wreaking enough havoc" to "be scary to be worthwhile in terms of the likely counter-blows heading in the opposite direction."

De Gaulle summarized that "fine line threading" his own, unique way

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French - that is, if there were 800 million French.

Remember that De Gaulle, his advisors (Pierre Gallois, André Beaufre) and his military had witnessed first hand, the 1940 collapse in six weeks - as a result of the absolute mess that was 1930's France at every level: political, industrial, military...

Beaufre was serving with General Aimé Doumenc, who in May 1940 tried to shook Generalissime Maurice Gamelin out of his ineptitude and complacency - and failed. Beaufre was still ashamed of the whole thing a quarter of century later (he gave a memorable testimony in the BBC "the world at war" (1973) and in a french documentary by Daniel Costelle).

De Gaulle fought in Moncornet and Abbeville to try and break the German encirclement from Sedan to the coast - that led to Dunkirk and France collapse.

Clearly, no such disaster would be allowed to happen a fourth time even with the Soviets replacing the Germans (after 1870, 1914 very close call, and 1940 repeat of 1870, Sedan included)

If a Soviet bridgehead (similar to Sedan 1940) happened on the Rhine and could not be reduced by NATO or French conventional weapons, then the only way out was Ripley memorable quote from Alien

"Takeoff and nuke (the bridgehead / from above). It's the only way to be sure."

And if the British and Americans didn't wanted to do it for fear of blowing the planet (which wasn't anti-americanism from De Gaulle: he acknowledged that, for a US president, "risk blowing up the planet" for "saving France / Europe a$$" was an impossible moral choice) - at least France could do it - and obviously, assume the consequences by "angry Soviets".

And there, De Gaulle quote came in handy...

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French - that is, if there were 800 million French.

Needless to say, it was a very risky bluff - akin to Clint Eastwood memorable quote in "Sudden impact"

"Go ahead, make my day." (clenched teeth).

To a robber holding a waitress hostage... put the gun near his face and go bluffling.

Risky business.

In the movie it works, but in a WWIII scenario with 70 000 nuclear weapons cumulated on both sides by 1986 (30 000 vs 40 000)... the risk is high.

De Gaulle could be a PITA and had little affection for the anglo-americans. But in this peculiar case, it was more subtle that basic anti-americanism.

I think he understood that,
- with WWIII not having gone nuclear by some miracle;
- yet the Soviet reaching the Rhine on sheer numbers of tanks and Migs and infantry alone;
Then:
- dropping just one tactical nuke on that Rhine bridgehead to save France from another 1940 humiliation; (or the rest of Europe, in passing: including Spain, Portugal, Italy, heck even Great Britain because the Soviets had amphibious troops better than 1940 sealion Germany)
- yet taking the risk of an unpredictible "angry Soviet reaction" = "blow the USA or even the planet"
The said US president could just say "Sorry I can't. Better to tolerate a Red Europe up to Portugal, rather than the risk of blowing the planet through incontrolable nuclear escalation".

Indeed once the Soviet Rhine bridgehead incinerated by just one tactical nuke... needless to say the Soviets would be a little pissed-off and claim "VENGEANCE !"
- best case: one Soviet tactical nuke on American troops, ten thousands NATO / American soldiers incinerated
"symmetrical answer" (Hackett or "Fail safe" style)
- worst case "screw the world, the Americans (nuclear) shot first, let's go massive repraisals". GAME OVER

 

[publiusr]

Hmmm…that would be something... "the peroxide submarine". AIP peroxide propulsion, peroxide torpedoes, and peroxide Black Arrow SLBMs.

If only H2O2 wasn't such a corrosive / explosive bastard stuff...

Pre-position drone assets towed by subs to trouble spots filled with only kerosene. Seawater converted to HTP on warning and fire!

Carriers pull an Ozawa and draw the other guy offsides.

“What happened?”

 

[Yellow Palace]

Yet another note;- The RN only accepted the liquid fuel solution only on the basis it was sub contracted to Raytheon as technology world leaders, reassuringly expensive and requiring very high level US blessing.

Which is highly ironic as what ultimately killed Poseidon for the RN was that the US wasn't willing to export the MIRV bus, meaning that the UK would have to develop its' own at considerable cost and technical risk, leading to forecasts of UK Poseidon entering service two to three years later than Chevaline. Of course, Chevaline encountered its own delays, no doubt due to the same technical risk, and entered service in the timeframe forecast for Poseidon - which would presumably have been even later.

The US actually suggested Trident C4 at one point for the RESOLUTION class, as the RN timescale for procuring Poseidon was long enough that the US would have stopped producing it!

 

[Hood]

I'm currently reading an academic article on the French deterrent during its first decade, it seems to make much the same argument, that in real terms a small deterrent was treading the fine line from being insufficiently capable of wreaking enough havoc to be scary to be worthwhile in terms of the likely counter-blows heading in the opposite direction.

The article is actually open access and is available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14682745.2020.1832472
Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–1974) by Benoît Pelopidasn & Sébastien Philippe.

 

[Archibald]

I'm currently reading an academic article on the French deterrent during its first decade, it seems to make much the same argument, that in real terms a small deterrent was treading the fine line from being insufficiently capable of wreaking enough havoc to be scary to be worthwhile in terms of the likely counter-blows heading in the opposite direction.

The article is actually open access and is available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14682745.2020.1832472
Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–1974) by Benoît Pelopidasn & Sébastien Philippe.

TBH, the M1 / M2 / M20 SLBMs range was uncomfortably short: early Redoutable class boomers patrol areas were quite narrow and close from both Black Sea and Murmansk... 3000 km.
It got better with the M4 in the 1980's: 6000 km.

Same for the Mirage IVs in the previous decade: range was short... although an often forgotten capability was buddy-buddy refueling with a conformal pack in place of the AN-11 nuke.
Somewhat ironically Vautours had much better range (like Buccaneers, cough) but pointy and supersonic were all the rage, so Mirage IV got the mission.

 

[ArtosStark]

I’ve worked in both and generally find imperial a bit more intuitive, but I do have sympathy with you on the selection of 12 (or multiples thereof) or 14 or maybe something else as a base…..WTF were they thinking.

Base 12 (and base 24 is even better) can be evenly divided into more numbers than base 10. Which is important before Calculators. Try dividing 70 by 3 in your head and keep track of the thirds and you can at least appreciate that 12/3 =4 x 7 = 28.

There is no excuse for Base 14.

 

[royabulgaf]

I’ve worked in both and generally find imperial a bit more intuitive, but I do have sympathy with you on the selection of 12 (or multiples thereof) or 14 or maybe something else as a base…..WTF were they thinking.

Base 12 (and base 24 is even better) can be evenly divided into more numbers than base 10. Which is important before Calculators. Try dividing 70 by 3 in your head and keep track of the thirds and you can at least appreciate that 12/3 =4 x 7 = 28.

There is no excuse for Base 14.

How about the Babylonian base 60? Actually, it was more like a base 10x6.

 

[alertken]

zt #149: Chevaline. D.Healey's Memoirs (The Time of My Life,Penguin,90; he was at Defence, 1964-70, Treasury 74-79) allude to this: P.455:

(sole AW error of '74-9 Govt:) “not to cancel (Chev. ,funded 9/75 solely to) penetrate (Moscow's) ABM system (Not) necessary (for UK to) guarantee (its) destruction (certain) ability to threaten the destruction of (12 cities would) deter (if NATO) had disintegrated. (On)‘Moscow Criterion (Staff were) in favour (without) serious argument except that to cancel (would) damage our prestige in (US/USSR).”​

 

[zen]

Further to the subject of the thread.
Final potential warhead option of domestic design.
Acorn
Little is known of it except that it incorporated a Tony boosted fission primary, and weighed approx 700 lb, around the same as the W-47.

Considering this incorporated a great deal of domestic theory, design and simulation results. We cannot exclude a similar solution wouldn't occur under these circumstances.
Which only reinforces the conclusion it all was within the ability of the UK to achieve.

 

[zen]

Further additional information relevant.
1958 ABM studies include RAE to examine motors of 240seconds and rapid burn times of 1 to 4 seconds.

Strong implication that something along this line was felt achievable.