RN post war carrier conundrums

[bobtdwarf]

Out of interest, if you have STOVL aircraft and can dispense with the steam catapults, would it be feasible to replace the steam turbine with gas turbines with the gas turbines having electric drive to the shafts to avoid needing all the trunking that usually goes with gas turbines?

There is nothing inherently wrong with steam plants.. the US had very good ones that they continued to automate lowering crew requirements. The problem is that the Brits used really crappy old pre WW2 designed plants that were a floating horror show. Nuke plants are not exactly light on the manpower usage... The UK could make new modern steam plants look at the SS Canberra and her turbo electric drive... oh three shafts of that would be sweet

 

[Hood]

I don't disagree that the F-14 could probably have been operated from CVA-01, I doubt it would have been a perfectly optimal match but then the Bucc and Hermes and Phantom and Ark weren't completely well matched but it worked out.
OR.346/AW.406 mystifies me, the RN spent quite a bit developing a novel new arrestor gear system to enable heavy aircraft to be safely recovered in a fairly small deck area and more powerful steam catapults but the aircraft all seemed to have those useless lift engines to shorten take-off/landing runs at the cost of more vital fuel and payload. CVA-01 should have made those features less necessary, unless the Admiralty felt CVA would still be marginal for these high-performance types or that they were hedging bets that Eagle and Ark would be the only likely carriers beyond the 1960s.
Also there is the P.1154 which was again all the rage when CVA-01 was developed, its rather odd that so many of the types planned for her were V/STOL or STOL when it was meant to be perfectly capable of operating heavy CTOL types. Just a hint of lack of confidence perhaps that CVA-01 had the necessary growth?

 

[Archibald]

We tend to forget how busy the RN was in the period we cover here. Any available ships were better than none.
At the same time our industry and infrastructure were not as developed as the US.
The RN in the seventies had Phantoms and Bucs but they were never used in anger. Hermes and Bulwark were probably more essential in the commando and asw roles for NATO.
The choice for the 80s was dominated by the Atlantic ASW role.

Well most of the European nations embraced NATO and, as far as NATO navies went, their main role became ASW uber alles. With destroyers, frigates, SSK, helicopters, and MARPAT aircraft like Orion, Atlantic, Neptune, Nimrod, Tracker...

Outside ASW the NATO navies only other role might have been land attack with carriers. Post-1960 when supersonic jets drove size and cost of carriers through the roof (> 30 000 tons threshold but the real deal was > 60 000 tons) three NATO powers tried their hands at that role
- The United States (USN)
- The GB Royal Navy (stopped in 1978 when Ark Royal went away)
- France with the pair of Clemenceaus
And that's it.
Now it is clear the USN completely dominated the field and really did not needed any NATO partner there, considering their colossal if not near-infinite resources. So GB facing a major economic decline chose to join the ASW pack with the Invincibles. France took a different path, half-independant from NATO yet in case of WWIII the two Clems would have joined the USN carriers in the North Atlantic, placing themselves under the AEGIS / Tomcat / Phoenix umbrella.

 

[Archibald]

Concerning the above, my personal feeling is that ASW is boring and sucks. I've long dreamed of a NATO-carrier-wank where
- the USN gets even more medium size carriers (CVV), or drag a dozen of Essex into the 80's, or pass them to NATO navies
- the RN don't get out of the carrier business
- the MN gets larger carriers than the Clems
- others Euroepan / NATO navies enter the carrier game.

What would it take to achieve that with a realistic post-1945 POD ?

 

[bobtdwarf]

We tend to forget how busy the RN was in the period we cover here. Any available ships were better than none.
At the same time our industry and infrastructure were not as developed as the US.
The RN in the seventies had Phantoms and Bucs but they were never used in anger. Hermes and Bulwark were probably more essential in the commando and asw roles for NATO.
The choice for the 80s was dominated by the Atlantic ASW role.

Well most of the European nations embraced NATO and, as far as NATO navies went, their main role became ASW uber alles. With destroyers, frigates, SSK, helicopters, and MARPAT aircraft like Orion, Atlantic, Neptune, Nimrod, Tracker...

Outside ASW the NATO navies only other role might have been land attack with carriers. Post-1960 when supersonic jets drove size and cost of carriers through the roof (> 30 000 tons threshold but the real deal was > 60 000 tons) three NATO powers tried their hands at that role
- The United States (USN)
- The GB Royal Navy (stopped in 1978 when Ark Royal went away)
- France with the pair of Clemenceaus
And that's it.
Now it is clear the USN completely dominated the field and really did not needed any NATO partner there, considering their colossal if not near-infinite resources. So GB facing a major economic decline chose to join the ASW pack with the Invincibles. France took a different path, half-independant from NATO yet in case of WWIII the two Clems would have joined the USN carriers in the North Atlantic, placing themselves under the AEGIS / Tomcat / Phoenix umbrella.

Thing is.. That the US offered the UK two rebuilt Essex(probably Franklin and Boxer from the time frame).. AT OUR EXPENSE.. just to keep them in the carrier game. They even tried to sell an Essex to the Canadians for the princely sum of 1 USD.

 

[zen]

I don't disagree that the F-14 could probably have been operated from CVA-01, I doubt it would have been a perfectly optimal match but then the Bucc and Hermes and Phantom and Ark weren't completely well matched but it worked out.
OR.346/AW.406 mystifies me, the RN spent quite a bit developing a novel new arrestor gear system to enable heavy aircraft to be safely recovered in a fairly small deck area and more powerful steam catapults but the aircraft all seemed to have those useless lift engines to shorten take-off/landing runs at the cost of more vital fuel and payload. CVA-01 should have made those features less necessary, unless the Admiralty felt CVA would still be marginal for these high-performance types or that they were hedging bets that Eagle and Ark would be the only likely carriers beyond the 1960s.
Also there is the P.1154 which was again all the rage when CVA-01 was developed, its rather odd that so many of the types planned for her were V/STOL or STOL when it was meant to be perfectly capable of operating heavy CTOL types. Just a hint of lack of confidence perhaps that CVA-01 had the necessary growth?

On this issue the problem was the requirement for TSR.2 like low level performance and also fighter capability.
Combining all this in a design was not trivial. Low level tends to me a high wingloading and that means high TO&L speeds for a given weight.
VG, blow, vectored thrust and lift jets solve the problem.

 

[zen]

No the second hand Essex offer was not at US expense. UK would have to fund the modernisation and further changes to meet RN aircraft standards and practices.
Evaluated as almost as expensive as building new but with less lifespan and less capability.

 

[Archibald]

Thing is.. That the US offered the UK two rebuilt Essex(probably Franklin and Boxer from the time frame).. AT OUR EXPENSE.. just to keep them in the carrier game. They even tried to sell an Essex to the Canadians for the princely sum of 1 USD.

I knew for the British but not for Canada. The Essex were excellent ships but unfortunately not adapted to foreign navies for a number of reasons
- too old
- manpower intensive
- lack of a viable air defense fighter beyond the Crusader (or Super Tiger, how I love this one. Also Skylancer !)
- the wooden deck, too. This surprised me and I took a long time to wrap my mind about the whys of the idea. Wooden deck is so XIXth century !

 

[Archibald]

No the second hand Essex offer was not at US expense. UK would have to fund the modernisation and further changes to meet RN aircraft standards and practices.
Evaluated as almost as expensive as building new but with less lifespan and less capability.

What I've learned since then is that, the two Essex severely crippled in WWII (USS Franklin and USS I-forgot-the-name-of-the-other-one) were repaired then immediately went into long-term storage, where they stayed for 25 years, until 1970.
Where it really get interesting is that plans were made to completely rebuild them to very modern standards. First atempt would have had no island. USS United States - style: not good. But the second atempt, I think it was in the early 60's, was far more interesting. Shame the RN didn't took THAT option.

Now that's an interesting alt-history... more Essex are crippled by Kamikazes late in WWII (not 2 but 5 - 6), patched, repaired, going in storage until 1960. Then that fleet is rebuild and sold to foreign navies - RN, RCN, RAAN...

EDIT. USS Bunker Hill. And USS Franklin. Those were the two crippled / maimed ones.

 

[uk 75]

Archibald France really makes its carrier programme work hard and successfully. As you say, not being tied into NATO helped (and the policies of the The General).
JFC Fuller above shows the UK could have done it if you take away the political and financial constraints.
If Churchill had not been booted out in 1945 and the Tories had stayed in power throughout the 50s, with a healthier and more dynamic successor than Eden, Britain might have followed a path more inclined to France's views. A successful intervention in Suez by a stronger leader than Eden.
Churchill was very keen on France and Macmillan I think also spoke French.
But this takes us a long way from the thread.

OR346/AW406 does materialise in various guises. The AFVG was a swing wing fighter/attacker in the spirit of the 1962 designs. MRCA as well. A more positive relationship between Britain and France might have seen BAC and Dassault working together (as they did briefly on MirageIIIV and then on Jaguar) in the same way Concorde did. An Anglo French fighter/attacker for the 70s to replace MirageIIIs, F100 Super Sabres, Crusaders, Etendards, Sea Vixens, Buccaneers, Canberras should have happened

 

[bobtdwarf]

No the second hand Essex offer was not at US expense. UK would have to fund the modernisation and further changes to meet RN aircraft standards and practices.
Evaluated as almost as expensive as building new but with less lifespan and less capability.

Actually the last offer was at US expense, the initial offer was not; but the final desperation one was on our dime. A case could be made that it was a bluff offer to ascertain UK intentions, but the offer WAS made. Came across that in a broader discussion of US/UK relations during the Vietnam war, part of the overall attempts to get the UK to give more active assistance in the war. The US was willing to do that plus prop up the pound and a couple of other bits all in exchange for the UK sending a battalion to South Vietnam to give it more of a UN peacekeeping feel. They couldn't have the French for obvious reasons leaving only Britain as a major Western ally that could give the needed political cover/support.

 

[zen]

That I can believe but for a host of reasons I can see why it failed.
Where will I find information on this later offer?

 

[bobtdwarf]

No the second hand Essex offer was not at US expense. UK would have to fund the modernisation and further changes to meet RN aircraft standards and practices.
Evaluated as almost as expensive as building new but with less lifespan and less capability.

What I've learned since then is that, the two Essex severely crippled in WWII (USS Franklin and USS I-forgot-the-name-of-the-other-one) were repaired then immediately went into long-term storage, where they stayed for 25 years, until 1970.
Where it really get interesting is that plans were made to completely rebuild them to very modern standards. First atempt would have had no island. USS United States - style: not good. But the second atempt, I think it was in the early 60's, was far more interesting. Shame the RN didn't took THAT option.

Now that's an interesting alt-history... more Essex are crippled by Kamikazes late in WWII (not 2 but 5 - 6), patched, repaired, going in storage until 1960. Then that fleet is rebuild and sold to foreign navies - RN, RCN, RAAN...

EDIT. USS Bunker Hill. And USS Franklin. Those were the two crippled / maimed ones.

Yeah the Franklin and Bunker Hill.. why did I think Boxer? Both were fully and completely rebuilt, low miles, METICULOUSLY maintained, and as fresh as a daisy.. well as fresh as one that had been sitting in cold storage for 15 years. They could have been fitted with thin metal decks, and the Australians were pretty certain they could operate modified Phantoms from them when they tried to pitch an Essex acquisition to their parliament.. USN thought the J79 phantom was marginal on them, F4K is a different story. As I recall one of the initial requirements for the F/A-18 was an ability to operate from CVA-19(Essex) class carriers and when they were talking about reactivating Oriskany in the 80's it was the lack of available Hornet squadrons, not the inability to operate them, that pushed them to consider using Marine A-4 squadrons on her(the were also thin on A-7s).. they just didn't have enough birds, and it made no financial sense to pull F-8s or F-11's out of storage for one ship for the USN. Australia wanted to get two, they figured the costs would be about 50-66% that of a CVA01 which they were also considering, inclusive of building IN Australia.

BTW that reactivation would have cost about $500mil and given her a 20 year lifespan, and a metal flight deck.. for the same amount of cash they could do an update of a Kittyhawk.. labor costs the same per hour regardless of the tonnage of the hull.

 

[bobtdwarf]

That I can believe but for a host of reasons I can see why it failed.
Where will I find information on this later offer?

I wish I remembered the title of the book, it was a google preview and I dumped the link out my bookmarks when they changed what pages were IN the preview. Yes I kick myself for not screen capping it. It wasn't that much more detailed other than the timeframe was about 1967. EDIT.. one other thing I remember from it was it made quite a point that the PM HATED Johnson on a personal level and that had an impact on everything.

the overall point I was trying to make is that the US WANTED other allies with a carrier force.. even if they were smaller carriers it was a nuclear carrier WE did not have to build and man.. allowing money to spent on other pressing national priorities.

 

[zen]

I've done similar on references too, now just sometimes vague memories or fading photocopies.

 

[bobtdwarf]

yea you never think that it will come up in a conversation.. and of course the fickle finger of fate will assure that it WILL come up in conversation

 

[bobtdwarf]

Has anyone more information on the offer to swap the Illustrious's for future Essex production during WW2? The information I read was that the offer was turned down coincidently the same month the US canceled the last flight of Essex production.

Imagine a world where they said "sure"... and had four brand new Oriskany type Essex's waiting to finish just before the 50's

 

[zen]

The drydocks are between 850ft to 855ft long and using the profile of Eagle this got a length of 865ft overall.

This is why the Essex won't fit it's 888ft length in and why they where pushing things to fit 870ft for the 1952 CV.

So the Essex option means extension or new build or use of civilian facilities.

 

[bobtdwarf]

The drydocks are between 850ft to 855ft long and using the profile of Eagle this got a length of 865ft overall.

This is why the Essex won't fit it's 888ft length in and why they where pushing things to fit 870ft for the 1952 CV.

So the Essex option means extension or new build or use of civilian facilities.

CV-D is also possible. 788 BP 3500 sq meter hangar and 1.5 inch STS flight deck

But better if they improved facilities all around

 

[zen]

Not sure about that.

A tweaked history would have existing infrastructure slightly longer and thus Essex types would be drydock-able in RN drydocks. But the RN views on hull stress would exclude such designs being built.
Though if said drydocks were slightly wider as well, then a domestic design would emerge.

It would however leave the Essex Option there for later.

However CVA-01's deck design emerges out of a desire for Continuous Operations, rather than Alpha Strike.

However all this avoids the simplest path which I have previously described.
At 850-ish feet such a design matches 1950's equipment able to operate aircraft upto Buccaneers and F4.
The chief deficiency would be the choice of deck edge lifts or a full gallery deck as the DNC concluded they couldn't get both on anything below 120 beam.
But 104ft fits the Locks C&D at Pompy and a few drydocks.
And 104ft beam allows a hanger of over 20ft height under the flightdeck beams.

The result is ships with a 30+ year lifespan taking CV force replacement into the 1990's.

Strictly if you try to design a CV with mk13 arrestors and mk4 catapults of 150ft stroke. Give clearance for a 38ft wingspan on the cat and 100ft wide recovery and overshoot of 10 degrees off ships axis. Accepting wires inside the 72ft circle from two thirds of waterline length.....then with 50ft of overhang you get.....about 850ft deck length on a hull of 800ft waterline length.

Or to put it another way you get a deck and hanger nearly as good as the 1952 CV on a ship that fits more facilities.

 

[uk 75]

The Through Deck cruiser programme was eventually first announced by the Heath Government in 1970 with an image of a white paper model appearing in an article in Air Pictorial. It also extended Ark Royal's life. The Tories had promised to bring carriers back.
But manpower constraints were cited for the decision not to put Eagle back into service.
Did the Heath Government ever consider building a new carrier instead of the TDCs? A new CV could have been built in the decade it took to get Invincible into service. A second could have joined it in 1982

 

[CNH]

To give you a quote from my Skybolt book - this is written by a Treasury official in the aftermath of the cancellation of Skybolt and the adoption of Polaris. It was also written in the panicked atmosphere of 'stop gap' weapons before Polaris would become operational:

"The Minister seemed most doubtful whether the USA would in fact agree to hire us POLARIS submarines while their own build-up was in progress. This is a blow, since it leaves the field open to the Minister of Aviation and the Air Staff to press a variety of expensive dodges for keeping the V-bombers more or less viable up to 1970 (more BLUE STEELS, more bombers, more tankers, better BLUE STEELS, airborne alert and so forth).

Even if we can shoot down most of this, it is clearly going to make the task of getting compensating savings in this field virtually impossible. We may therefore have to look at an alternative which will be equally unpopular, though in the Navy's quarter this time. We are in fact given a lead by a point the Admiralty made on the POLARIS build up. It is this.

The Admiralty say that one of the limiting factors on the build-up will be design staff; they will need, they say, freedom to recruit these in large numbers and at fancy rates. The obvious suggestion for the Chancellor to make, at a suitable early moment, would be that the first step on the design side is to switch the staff employed at Bath on the aircraft carrier successors from this work to work on the POLARIS submarines. This ought to have the effect of putting back the carrier successors by several years and thus giving us useful relief in the late 'sixties. The Admiralty, of course, will fight this tooth and nail."

 

[Grey Havoc]

With 'friends' like these, who needed enemies?

 

[uk 75]

I thought the victim was the 1962 escort cruiser programme which had until Nassau been planned to follow on from the County class through the 60s. Friedman and Brown/Moore both describe this move of desin staff.
However, I am sure it helped undermine CVA01. Got the Skybolt book after JFC Fuller reviewed. It is up there with Peter Hennessy books as a must go to book

 

[zen]

So under Wilson the plan became run on the force until retirement and then move to through deck cruisers. Wilson had no desire to abandon the carrier fleet and seems to try to keep something going.

Victorious being the odd ship out was a logical target.

RN held out hope that as long as they could keep Eagle and Ark Royal then they could recover under another administration.
That was expected of Heath......

Only Heath didn't come through.

I don't think the ASW needs were overwhelming during the 50's or the 28,000ton Medium Fleet CV would have swung matters instead of the 35,000ton version.

This is because 12 FAW, 12 F, 4 AEW and 2 SAR were viewed as the irreducible number for Air Defense during those Medium Fleet CV studies.

The smaller CV was an either or option. Either ASW or Strike but not both.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Pre-1957 there was a distinct role split between strike (heavy) carriers (declared to SACLANT as part of the striking fleet) and trade protection carriers (light fleets). The overall fleet size, even for wartime mobilisation, was actually quite small with two strike carriers and four trade protection carriers pre-1952, when one of the trade protection carriers was given up. Trade protection went beyond ASW and included the ability to defeat surface raiders (Sverdlovs) and provide air defence, hence the presence of strike and fighter aircraft.

Given the small size of the authorised fleet and the relative youth of the ships in it, it can be hard to discern exactly what the logic behind the various 1950s carrier studies was. The big 1952 carrier studies are clearly for the strike carrier role (with Canberra size aircraft in their earliest incarnation) but this must make them replacements for, and not supplements to, Ark Royal and Eagle. My assumption is, based purely on speculation, that the June 1952 decision that no more reconstructions (at least to Standard A) would be attempted after Victorious didn't just apply to the Illustrious class ships but also to Ark Royal, Eagle, and all the light fleets aside from Hermes. Thus the 1952 carrier was conceived as a replacement for the unmodernised Ark Royal and Eagle, one might argue that the much more expensive and comprehensive reconstruction originally planned for Eagle in 1955 is evidence of this. The quiet demise of the 1952 carrier should be unsurprising, at the time the RN was waging a political war against Duncan Sandys (then as Minister of Supply) for the very survival of the heavy carrier fleet and the striking fleet role - asking for significant funds to build a new heavy carrier just as it was trying to save the existing ones and the Buccaneer programme, would have been foolish in the extreme. The aforementioned 1955, and subsequent actual, reconstruction to Standard A of Eagle suggests that the cancellation of the 1952 carrier resulted in a policy reversal on the no-reconstructions policy, at least for Eagle and Ark Royal.

The 1954 medium carrier designs are clearly a trade protection carrier replacement, e.g. for Bulwark, Albion and Centaur. This is confirmed by the programme for delivering Standard A carriers in 1954, dates are for planned service entry:

Victorious (1958)
Hermes (1959)
Eagle (1961)
New medium carrier (1963)
Ark Royal (1964)

Victorious is the crossover point between the heavy/strike and light/trade protection carriers, in some documents she is described as a heavy carrier yet elsewhere she is regarded as a "fast, armoured Hermes", my interpretation is she was a heavy/strike carrier when Ark Royal or Eagle were out of commission but was generally considered as a trade protection vessel, giving the fleet of three that was set after 1952. It is not hard to imagine the above plan saw the envisioned second new medium carrier as a replacement for Victorious in the late 1960s with the latter then becoming the trials and training carrier, a role that was actually abandoned in 1957 (Warrior being the last ship so assigned, having replaced Bulwark). The medium versus light nomenclature may have been a belief that Hermes, with all her aluminium, exposed forward lift, smallish deck, limited defensive armament and 32 (versus 48 in Victorious) track CDS was not ideal, thats speculation based on the preference for the 35,000 ton design as described by various authors. Not to mention the 35,000 ton design has an air wing that gets close to that being considered for the reconstructed Eagle. In effect, we might consider the medium carrier as the ideal trade protection carrier, as conceived by the RN in the early-mid 1950s, and the reconstructed Victorious as exhibiting many of the features desired from it.

At some point around 1956/1957 the split between the two carrier types becomes one simply of air-group composition, not of ship size. The composition of the WoS air wings agreed in 1957, 1 x strike, 1 x fighter, 3 x ASW, are evidently a trade protection configuration and not just ASW. I have never found, nor have I ever seen any published book or journal article reference a source for, the moment when this happened but it evidently did. The 1959 long term programme had three 45,000 ton carriers pencilled in for construction in the mid-60s to complete in early 1970s, essentially the earliest identified manifestation of the CVA01 programme. I would note that the 35,000 ton 1954 carrier design has the same three shaft 135,000 shp propulsion configuration as was ultimately used on the much larger CVA01 design.

 

[uk 75]

It is worth mentioning that unlike the other NATO navies the Royal Navy does not use the S2 ASW aircraft and only the US goes on to use a jet replacement, the S3. The RN gives up its Gannets in favour of helicopters, though it takes a long time for these to enter service in any quantity. The SH3 Sea King deploys first on Eagle, then Blake, Ark and Tiger and finally Hermes and Bulwark. Originally planned to be ordered in 1962 the new cruisers become the Invincibles.
A US style strike carrier hence CVA is ordered not for the NATO strike fleet role, something I always find odd, but to replace the carrier East of Suez. This makes the QE, Eagle and Hermes force more understandable. It also explains how vulnerable the carriers were to cost cutting.
The ready availability of big US carriers for the strike fleet role, even with Vietnam, would be quoted by the Treasury as making a UK component not so essential, whereas ASW assets were

 

[Archibald]

A successful intervention in Suez by a stronger leader than Eden.

Suez aftermath surely enlarged the Channel rather than shrinking it. On the French side come De Gaulle, on the British side, the Nassau agreement...

 

[zen]

Pre-1957 there was a distinct role split between strike (heavy) carriers (declared to SACLANT as part of the striking fleet) and trade protection carriers (light fleets). The overall fleet size, even for wartime mobilisation, was actually quite small with two strike carriers and four trade protection carriers pre-1952, when one of the trade protection carriers was given up. Trade protection went beyond ASW and included the ability to defeat surface raiders (Sverdlovs) and provide air defence, hence the presence of strike and fighter aircraft.

Given the small size of the authorised fleet and the relative youth of the ships in it, it can be hard to discern exactly what the logic behind the various 1950s carrier studies was. The big 1952 carrier studies are clearly for the strike carrier role (with Canberra size aircraft in their earliest incarnation) but this must make them replacements for, and not supplements to, Ark Royal and Eagle. My assumption is, based purely on speculation, that the June 1952 decision that no more reconstructions (at least to Standard A) would be attempted after Victorious didn't just apply to the Illustrious class ships but also to Ark Royal, Eagle, and all the light fleets aside from Hermes. Thus the 1952 carrier was conceived as a replacement for the unmodernised Ark Royal and Eagle, one might argue that the much more expensive and comprehensive reconstruction originally planned for Eagle in 1955 is evidence of this. The quiet demise of the 1952 carrier should be unsurprising, at the time the RN was waging a political war against Duncan Sandys (then as Minister of Supply) for the very survival of the heavy carrier fleet and the striking fleet role - asking for significant funds to build a new heavy carrier just as it was trying to save the existing ones and the Buccaneer programme, would have been foolish in the extreme. The aforementioned 1955, and subsequent actual, reconstruction to Standard A of Eagle suggests that the cancellation of the 1952 carrier resulted in a policy reversal on the no-reconstructions policy, at least for Eagle and Ark Royal.

The 1954 medium carrier designs are clearly a trade protection carrier replacement, e.g. for Bulwark, Albion and Centaur. This is confirmed by the programme for delivering Standard A carriers in 1954, dates are for planned service entry:

Victorious (1958)
Hermes (1959)
Eagle (1961)
New medium carrier (1963)
Ark Royal (1964)

Victorious is the crossover point between the heavy/strike and light/trade protection carriers, in some documents she is described as a heavy carrier yet elsewhere she is regarded as a "fast armoured Hermes", my interpretation is she was a heavy/strike carrier when Ark Royal or Eagle were out of commission but was generally considered as a trade protection vessel, giving the fleet of three that was set after 1952. It is not hard to imagine the above plan saw the envisioned second new medium carrier as a replacement for Victorious in the late 1960s with the latter then becoming the trials and training carrier, a role that was actually abandoned in 1957 (Warrior being the last ship so assigned, having replaced Bulwark). The medium versus light nomenclature may have been a belief that Hermes, with all her aluminium, exposed forward lift, smallish deck, limited defensive armament and 32 (versus 48 in Victorious) track CDS was not ideal, thats speculation based on the preference for the 35,000 ton design as described by various authors. Not to mention the 35,000 ton design has an air wing that get close to that being considered for the reconstructed Eagle. In effect, we might consider the medium carrier as the ideal trade protection carrier, as conceived by the RN in the early-mid 1950s, and the reconstructed Victorious as exhibiting many of the features desired from it.

At some point around 1956/1957 the split between the two carrier types becomes one simply of air-group composition, not of ship size. The composition of the WoS air wings agreed in 1957, 1 x strike, 1 x fighter, 3 x ASW, are evidently a trade protection configuration and not just ASW. I have never found, nor have I ever seen any published book or journal article reference a source for, the moment when this happened but it evidently did. The 1959 long term programme had three 45,000 ton carriers pencilled in for construction in the mid-60s to complete in early 1970s, essentially the earliest identified manifestation of the CVA01 programme. I would note that the 35,000 ton 1954 carrier design has the same three shaft 135,000 shp propulsion configuration as was ultimately used on the much larger CVA01 design.

While I would agree with a lot of that my take on the 35Kton CV is it's closer to a Victorious successor and able to straddle the roles. Thus the focus on it, since it retains the Strike option should Eagle and Ark Royal are given up.

While the 28-30Kton CV is more a natural Trade Protection successor to the Hermes. Let down by limitations on aircraft.

Definitely the merger of the two is behind the 45Kton CVs and the concurrent 30Kton CVG 'hybrid cruiser-carrier'.
DAW is adamant about SAMs not being sufficient to replace DLI, but the continuation of Hybrid is a sign someone was trying to square the circle between requirements and affordable solutions.
Though it may also be bound up in NIGS.

As I've said before these Medium Fleet studies needed to happen earlier to achieve any hard outcomes.

 

[Jemiba]

This topic is in the "Alternative History ..", so in the most appropriate section here, I think.
Adressing someone in a negative way should always be avoided, even if it is done in the
fashion of "someone here ..", maybe followed by pieces of advice.
Talk about arguments, please, not about other members !
But spilling malice on someone, even just as funny pictures and the like, in my opinion isn't a way
to calm down a discussion.

So, please regard this as a warning and let me end my schoolmasterly gossip, as I'm sure,
everybody of you know his own bloopers anyway !

 

[JFC Fuller]

@zen, what I was hinting at above is that the term medium, in the context of the legacy vessels being considered light or heavy, and the large air wings the three shaft ship had could be taken to be the beginning of the intellectual and design process that lead to CVA01. As carrier design evolved in the mid-late 1950s the RN began rethinking the structure of the carrier fleet and began a design process that went from 35,000 tons and three shafts to 45,000 tons with three shafts and finally to circa 55,000 tons and three shafts under the guise of a vessel that started out as a half way point between a WW2 light fleet and the 1952 heavy. Unfortunately, at this time that can only be speculation as no material has been found, to my knowledge, that supports or refutes the idea but there is definitely something specific about the 'medium' label that makes me think there is something to it.

@uk75, As Minister of Supply 1951-54 Duncan Sandys went to war against the heavy carriers and the associated striking force concept, he ultimately lost and the role and the ships continued. When he became defence minister and began the 1957 review he once again went after the strike carrier concept. The RN performed an elegant pivot in which it repurposed its carrier force as an EoS force to replace the permanently deployed air and land forces Sandys was removing from that region. As I suggested in a previous post, the extent to which this shift was cosmetic is up for debate. However, from then onwards CVA01 came to be seen as an EoS asset.

 

[uk 75]

JFC Thank you for the explanation. I had forgotten that until NATO moved to flexible response in the 60s war was expected to be short and nuclear.
It would have been hard for the RN to use the Striking Fleet role to keep a carrier in the face of the ASW lobby

 

[zen]

Oh JFC Fuller! I seem to suggested something similar years ago so we are in some agreement here.
Possibly that was elsewhere though....Warships1?

I speculated quite a bit on the Medium Fleet CVs and I'm still in doubt about the precision of the displacement figures.

It's quite plausible that the 35Kton figure is directly connected to the 45Kton one and may be the same ship!
This hit me as I tried to estimate the dimensions of the 35Kton design.
The propulsive power of three sets of Y300 and the outcome in terms of speed suggested something not far from Akagi or HMS Hood. But then it became clear that the 35Kton figure could be a standard displacement rather than deep load.

This has led me to ponder the 28-30Kton CV and whether it too is a Standard displacement figure.

 

[JFC Fuller]

I would 100% agree with your JFC. I don't think its a coincidence that in 1960 the Escort Cruiser began precisely as a way to keep the carrier flightdeck clear of helicopters. Admittedly the RN was always wary of operating fixed and rotary wing on the same deck, but clearing the carrier decks had the very handy side-effect of making sure the carrier airgroup could be optimised for air defence and strike.

I meant to pick up on this earlier. The role of the escort cruiser is fascinating, I seem to have lost my notes on the earliest (1959) motivation for them but a fleet of six built to destroyer standards were initially seen as, in manpower terms, replacements for the eight Ca class destroyers within the authorised manpower levels. Their early role of carrying the carrier group's ASW helicopters is, as you say, borne from two motivations:

1) Genuine (albeit misplaced) concern about combining rotary and fixed operations on a single deck
2) Freeing up hangar space and facilities for more strike and fighter aircraft

But I think we miss an element. In 1957 the Cabinet Defence Committee agrees that the future RN will be based around three carrier task groups, each with four guided missile destroyers, four frigates and a cruiser. Very quickly the concept acquires Sea Slug, at this point it has the ability to take flag facilities and ASW helicopters from the carrier and can replace one of the four guided missile destroyers in the carrier group. Thus, my theory is that when the escort cruisers replaced DLG-09 and 10 in the construction programme in late 1961 they also took their places in the escort groups. I also wonder if in the long term they were seen as replacements for the gun cruiser too, thus freeing up more manpower. When, in April 1962 the ASW helicopters were relocated to the carrier the escort cruiser priority all but vanished but for me it's obvious why they stayed in the long term plans - conceptually they look a lot like small ASW orientated trade protection carriers.

 

[Hood]

I meant to pick up on this earlier.
The role of the escort cruiser is fascinating, I seem to have lost my notes on the earliest (1959) motivation for them but a fleet of six built to destroyer standards were initially seen as, in manpower terms, replacements for the eight Ca class destroyers within the authorised manpower levels. Their early role of carrying the carrier group's ASW helicopters is, as you say, borne from two motivations:

1) Genuine (albeit misplaced) concern about combining rotary and fixed operations on a single deck
2) Freeing up hangar space and facilities for more strike and fighter aircraft

But I think we miss an element. In 1957 the Cabinet Defence Committee agrees that the future RN will be based around three carrier task groups, each with four guided missile destroyers, four frigates and a cruiser. Very quickly the concept acquires Sea Slug, at this point it has the ability to take flag facilities and ASW helicopters from the carrier and can replace one of the four guided missile destroyers in the carrier group. Thus, my theory is that when the escort cruisers replaced DLG-09 and 10 in the construction programme in late 1961 they also took their places in the escort groups. I also wonder if in the long term they were seen as replacements for the gun cruiser too, thus freeing up more manpower. When, in April 1962 the ASW helicopters were relocated to the carrier the escort cruiser priority all but vanished but for me it's obvious why they stayed in the long term plans - conceptually they look a lot like small ASW orientated trade protection carriers.

I would agree with your hypothesis that the escort cruisers would have taken the place of the later planned DLGs in the task groups, or at least until any delayed DLGs appeared in the 1970s. I believe Friedman does state that they were seen as replacements for the gun cruisers. They were intended to cover several roles it seems, perhaps slightly too ambitious with the earlier studies having Sea Slug, 4.5in guns for fire support and helicopters. After the 1962 switch, they do seem to have been recast officially as command platforms to replace the last cruisers left, but certainly they had an eye on keeping these as effective ASW carriers. By then of course Type 82 was supposed to continue the DLG line.

 

[uk 75]

I recall reading somewhere that it was Mountbatten who pressed to keep cruisers in the RN order of bat. When the big Seaslug platform was reduced to a destroyer, an ASW helo carrier was developed instead. It may also explain why Blake and Tiger were coverted to helos rather than using Bulwark as later happened in the 70s, also Hermes

 

[Hood]

Had the GW96A cruisers been built it would have been interesting to see where the Escort Cruiser would have fitted into the task force or whether replacing the DLGs in the programme would have been unaffected.

 

[starviking]

I recall reading somewhere that it was Mountbatten who pressed to keep cruisers in the RN order of bat. When the big Seaslug platform was reduced to a destroyer, an ASW helo carrier was developed instead. It may also explain why Blake and Tiger were coverted to helos rather than using Bulwark as later happened in the 70s, also Hermes

I think there is a point made in Grove that Blake and Tiger’s conversions were originally intended for Assault rather than ASW, to help police the transition of the edges of Empire to Commonwealth (Tiger having such a role in putting down the Brunei Revolt in 1962).

Related to that, you could see the Escort Carriers filling that role too - but whether the RN would want to highlight that, seeing that the CVAs could also do that, is a different question.

 

[Archibald]

Wow. Never realized Britain planned 18 000 tons cruisers with Sea Slug. Impressive. Make sense, France Colbert and Jeanne D'Arc were 11 000 tons with the very similar MASURCA.

And the Suffren-class = County class

County-class destroyer - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Suffren-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[zen]

Wow. Never realized Britain planned 18 000 tons cruisers with Sea Slug. Impressive. Make sense, France Colbert and Jeanne D'Arc were 11 000 tons with the very similar MASURCA.

And the Suffren-class = County class

County-class destroyer - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Suffren-class frigate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It's the twin 6" automatic guns, Type 984 Radar, CDS and the Sea Slug system on a ship to cruiser standards that drives up the size.

I suspect these are the only ships that could actually mount full NIGS besides the Carriers.