Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

Seems fairly vague to pin it down until they actually make the speech. A "genuinely trilateral" plan could cover any combination of submarine, logistics and training options.

I'd like to think SSNX and the Aussie sub could merge, perhaps using SSN(X) sections - we already know SSNX is going to have a VLS for the first time in the RN and that system is going to be US for certain which raises the possibility of sharing hull sections.
 
Hood said:
Seems fairly vague to pin it down until they actually make the speech. A "genuinely trilateral" plan could cover any combination of submarine, logistics and training options.

I'd like to think SSNX and the Aussie sub could merge, perhaps using SSN(X) sections - we already know SSNX is going to have a VLS for the first time in the RN and that system is going to be US for certain which raises the possibility of sharing hull sections.
Click to expand...
But the SSNX likely:
- Will be significantly larger and more expensive than a Virgina. Including likely an even larger crew which may be a particular pinch point for the Australian navy.
- Won’t be available to Australia for an even longer timescale than Virgina class subs (the 1st SSNX is approx. a decade away from 1st being in the water, much greater scope for that to creep even later, greater risk of development problems and/ or technical growing-pains, plus when would any be available to Australia given that timescale? A probably unrealistically optimistic 20 years plus for the 1st?).

Given all the other challenges and risk associated with program (and the ticking clock of the Collins class continued availability) a Virgina variant appears likely to be the only horse in town.
Now if a radically different approach was/ is taken (building a number of new interim non-nuclear subs) then that may have opened up an option Australia choosing to time their joining the nuclear sub club with the SSNX. In the absence of such there would likely be a significant (near total?) run-down of the Collins sub fleet before any Australian SSNX subs were available, an approach that would call the whole rationale/ justification for nuclear subs (to deter China) into question.
 
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From here to the SSNX which imho, is the way to go, the infrastructure needs to be in place. In that time UK and US boats can be used to train up crews while maintaining patrols and propping up/replacing Collins class.
They cannot be replaced right now so why not use the time properly? This circular topic minuses on that point and repeating the use of interim classes etc which will dilute the funds required to plan properly. They need to be going for the option which builds upon and optimises the use of submarines in the RAN.
 
NeilChapman said:
Well, well, well. New boat.

I'm still of the opinion that Australia is better off starting as a maintenance hub for existing US and UK boats. Also, if Australia is willing, forward deploy boats for the US and UK. Crew sharing with the Australians would be a good part of that deal.
Click to expand...
I suspect this will be part of it
 
Interesting comments in this:

www.afr.com

Government announces review of defence industry policy

The urgency of the arms build-up heralds an end to an ‘obsession’ for local content, says Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy as the Albanese government waits for two key reports that will reshape Australia’s military.
www.afr.com www.afr.com

Such as:

Next month, the AUKUS submarine taskforce will set out the preferred “pathway” for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

That report will include measures to avoid a capability gap, which could involve Australia leasing an older submarine from the US, after Defence Minister Richard Marles ruled out this week an interim conventionally powered submarine.
Click to expand...
and
Mr Conroy said developing the industrial base and workforce to support the nuclear submarine project would be a “massive undertaking” and the government would start investing in that as soon as possible.

“This will be the greatest nation-building effort this country’s ever seen, like the Snowy Mountains [Scheme] will pale into insignificance in terms of the scale of this project, the technological challenges to be overcome,” he said.
Click to expand...
 
www.theguardian.com

Malcolm Turnbull says Labor has failed to answer if Aukus deal compromises Australian sovereignty

Former PM says if operation of nuclear subs depends on US then that is ‘a momentous change which has not been acknowledged’
www.theguardian.com www.theguardian.com

Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull:
“Australians should reasonably expect that military capabilities acquired by their government should be sovereign capabilities,” Turnbull said on Thursday. “In all my time in government we understood a sovereign capability as being one that can be deployed, sustained and maintained by the Australian government in Australia".

“So the question on US-built nuclear-powered submarines is simply this: can they be operated, sustained and maintained by Australia without the support or supervision of the US Navy?

“If the answer is that US Navy assistance will be required that would mean, in any normal understanding of the term, that they are not Australian sovereign capabilities but rather that sovereignty would be shared with the US.

“If that is the case then this acquisition will be a momentous change which has not been acknowledged let alone debated.”
Click to expand...
 
kaiserd said:
Hood said:
Seems fairly vague to pin it down until they actually make the speech. A "genuinely trilateral" plan could cover any combination of submarine, logistics and training options.

I'd like to think SSNX and the Aussie sub could merge, perhaps using SSN(X) sections - we already know SSNX is going to have a VLS for the first time in the RN and that system is going to be US for certain which raises the possibility of sharing hull sections.
Click to expand...
But the SSNX likely:
- Will be significantly larger and more expensive than a Virgina. Including likely an even larger crew which may be a particular pinch point for the Australian navy.
- Won’t be available to Australia for an even longer timescale than Virgina class subs (the 1st SSNX is approx. a decade away from 1st being in the water, much greater scope for that to creep even later, greater risk of development problems and/ or technical growing-pains, plus when would any be available to Australia given that timescale? A probably unrealistically optimistic 20 years plus for the 1st?).

Given all the other challenges and risk associated with program (and the ticking clock of the Collins class continued availability) a Virgina variant appears likely to be the only horse in town.
Now if a radically different approach was/ is taken (building a number of new interim non-nuclear subs) then that may have opened up an option Australia choosing to time their joining the nuclear sub club with the SSNX. In the absence of such there would likely be a significant (near total?) run-down of the Collins sub fleet before any Australian SSNX subs were available, an approach that would call the whole rationale/ justification for nuclear subs (to deter China) into question.
Click to expand...
I meant the UK SSNX not the USN SSNX - I thought the US one was SSN(X) but perhaps its the UK using SSN(X)? Who knows, maybe navies need to actually come with cool names and stop using the same acronyms or we will have three SSNXs and then we won't know what we're talking about at all!

So my musing was the RN and RAN projects merging using whatever payload section comes from the US project - though I suspect the US will want to supply the reactor so to have as much control as possible over the technology transfer. (Personally I doubt the UK would get a good a deal as it got in 1958 as it would now.)
 
Hood said:
kaiserd said:
Hood said:
.
Click to expand...
Click to expand...
I meant the UK SSNX not the USN SSNX - I thought the US one was SSN(X) but perhaps its the UK using SSN(X)? Who knows, maybe navies need to actually come with cool names and stop using the same acronyms or we will have three SSNXs and then we won't know what we're talking about at all!

So my musing was the RN and RAN projects merging using whatever payload section comes from the US project - though I suspect the US will want to supply the reactor so to have as much control as possible over the technology transfer. (Personally I doubt the UK would get a good a deal as it got in 1958 as it would now.)
Click to expand...
I agree, from the outside there’s a lot of confusion re: these sub programs.
It appears that the next generation UK SSN may amount to the main components of the US SSN but with a few UK built sections substituted in and then all assembled in the UK.
Arguments can be had re: sovereignty and increasing dependency on the US but there is a certain logic to this approach for the UK.

The problem is that this is not happening anytime soon (the UK has to get through building all their new SSBNs first) so it appears this time scale won’t work for the Australians at all. The UK won’t be starting to replace their Astutes until we’ll into the 2040’s, the 1st US SSNX will only complete trials and enter full service in the mid 2030’s at the earliest. The Virgina class should be available sooner and with potentially fewer complications.

And isn’t Australia in a bit of a rush, given the publicly stated limited life and limited future survivability/ utility of the Collins class, or any replacement conventional sub? And if they can afford to wait for the SSNX then what about the intended deterrent value? Or are we talking about a split buy (initially Virgina’s then switching to SSNX, with the later having rather more Australian content, etc.). Or are we taking about effectively running down Australia’s independent sub capacity (the managed decline of the Collins fleet) with relatively token visits, some Australian crew members and the like re: US nuclear subs presented as a compensating capability, on the promise of rebuilding the capability with SSNX subs when they eventually arrive (a “jam tomorrow” approach)?
 
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SSN(R) is central to sustainment of submarine design and build in the UK.
 
GTX said:
Potentially relevant:

www.aumanufacturing.com.au

Austal wins new work in US submarine construction field - Australian Manufacturing Forum

By Peter Roberts Perth international shipbuilder Austal has won new work in the US submarine construction field, opening the way for it to become a component supplier to future Aukus nation submarine builds. In a brief announcement Austal said it had been awarded a time and material contract by...
www.aumanufacturing.com.au www.aumanufacturing.com.au
Click to expand...

That article seems to have been very deliberately worded to omit the fact that this work is being done at the Austal USA shipyard in Alabama, not in Australia.

Would anyone consider a submarine largely built in Alabama to be sufficiently Australian?
 
TomS said:
GTX said:
Potentially relevant:

www.aumanufacturing.com.au

Austal wins new work in US submarine construction field - Australian Manufacturing Forum

By Peter Roberts Perth international shipbuilder Austal has won new work in the US submarine construction field, opening the way for it to become a component supplier to future Aukus nation submarine builds. In a brief announcement Austal said it had been awarded a time and material contract by...
www.aumanufacturing.com.au www.aumanufacturing.com.au
Click to expand...

That article seems to have been very deliberately worded to omit the fact that this work is being done at the Austal USA shipyard in Alabama, not in Australia.

Would anyone consider a submarine largely built in Alabama to be sufficiently Australian?
Click to expand...
Alabama's not going to do that much anyway, they're doing significant work but still well short of a full boat. If the plan is to build fabricate large portions of the Aussie boats in the US and assemble in Oz, they'd certainly be involved.
 
jeffb said:
www.theguardian.com

Malcolm Turnbull says Labor has failed to answer if Aukus deal compromises Australian sovereignty

Former PM says if operation of nuclear subs depends on US then that is ‘a momentous change which has not been acknowledged’
www.theguardian.com www.theguardian.com

Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull:
“If the answer is that US Navy assistance will be required that would mean, in any normal understanding of the term, that they are not Australian sovereign capabilities but rather that sovereignty would be shared with the US.

“If that is the case then this acquisition will be a momentous change which has not been acknowledged let alone debated.”
Click to expand...
Click to expand...
Uh... like the F-35?
 
There seem close parallels here with the F111 programme which Australia stuck with despite many initial problems and which then met the RAAF requirement well.
Politically and even opertionally the RAAF might have opted for the F4 which it leased as an interim type while the bugs were ironed out of the F111.
The SSN decision is of course highly political..Just as a belligerent Indonesia dominated Australian concerns in the 60s a Xi led China does now.
 
Just put some facts into the discussion.

The Collins are still one of the quietest and most capable conventional subs out there, the requirements they were designed and built to were almost too much of a stretch, which is what led to their teething problems which have been long sorted now. End result, they are still very very good.

Irrespective of which solution is adopted some or all Collins will still need LOTE otherwise they class will start retiring in the mid 2030s and not the 2040s as required.

LOTE is not a capability upgrade per say, it is a life extension that will replace major systems that have been determined may not be supportable until the extended retirement date. The equipment selected for the life extension is, for the most part, proven MOTS from established suppliers who are supporting other navies.

There are separate capability upgrades that would occur irrespective of LOTE.
 
kaiserd said:
I agree, from the outside there’s a lot of confusion re: these sub programs.
It appears that the next generation UK SSN may amount to the main components of the US SSN but with a few UK built sections substituted in and then all assembled in the UK.
Arguments can be had re: sovereignty and increasing dependency on the US but there is a certain logic to this approach for the UK.

The problem is that this is not happening anytime soon (the UK has to get through building all their new SSBNs first) so it appears this time scale won’t work for the Australians at all. The UK won’t be starting to replace their Astutes until we’ll into the 2040’s, the 1st US SSNX will only complete trials and enter full service in the mid 2030’s at the earliest. The Virgina class should be available sooner and with potentially fewer complications.

And isn’t Australia in a bit of a rush, given the publicly stated limited life and limited future survivability/ utility of the Collins class, or any replacement conventional sub? And if they can afford to wait for the SSNX then what about the intended deterrent value? Or are we talking about a split buy (initially Virgina’s then switching to SSNX, with the later having rather more Australian content, etc.). Or are we taking about effectively running down Australia’s independent sub capacity (the managed decline of the Collins fleet) with relatively token visits, some Australian crew members and the like re: US nuclear subs presented as a compensating capability, on the promise of rebuilding the capability with SSNX subs when they eventually arrive (a “jam tomorrow” approach)?
Click to expand...
Let's hope so.

It's unlikely that SSN(X) boats will be available prior to late 2030's or even mid 2040's.

I expect this is political more than specifically about the boats. The PRC is entering precarious decades with mounting, potentially devastating, internal pressures and someone said power and pessimism is a deadly mix. Australian leadership has decided that even tighter affiliation with the US has clear advantages.

I hope Australia negotiated well.
 
Volkodav said:
Just put some facts into the discussion.

The Collins are still one of the quietest and most capable conventional subs out there, the requirements they were designed and built to were almost too much of a stretch, which is what led to their teething problems which have been long sorted now. End result, they are still very very good.

Irrespective of which solution is adopted some or all Collins will still need LOTE otherwise they class will start retiring in the mid 2030s and not the 2040s as required.

LOTE is not a capability upgrade per say, it is a life extension that will replace major systems that have been determined may not be supportable until the extended retirement date. The equipment selected for the life extension is, for the most part, proven MOTS from established suppliers who are supporting other navies.

There are separate capability upgrades that would occur irrespective of LOTE.
Click to expand...

I would second this.

The Collins class SSKs (despite the persistent bad press) are still, pound-for-pound, the best conventional boats in the world. They are stealthy, long ranged and their weapons and combat systems (thanks to the RAN being fully embedded in the Mk48 Torpedo and USN submarine Combat System programs) are right up to date and as good as they get. True, they don't have cutting edge capabilities like air-independent propulsion or Lithium-Ion batteries, but arguably they don't need them (at least in the way Australia uses its boats - When you only need to snorkel your boat for 3-5 minutes per day in 'patrol configuration' to keep the batteries charged, AIP starts to look like a lot of cost and bother for not much benefit).

As Volkodav has intimated, LOTE is not a capability improvement project per-se. It instead seeks to modernise/replace the subs powertrain and propulsion systems as well as periscopes and some habitability and other misc systems but critically won't extend the hull life of the boats by an appreciable measure. Regardless of LOTE, the Collins' will exceed the design life of their pressure hulls before full fleet replacement with AUKUS SSNs can be achieved. Even if most other systems have been replaced/modernised, subs that can't dive much below periscope depth for fear of metal fatigue in the pressure hull aren't all that useful in the long run, certainly not for full spectrum combat operations. To overcome this, leased, seconded or jointly crewed SSNs from the USN will be necessary for 'front-line' tasks where the full-spectrum of underwater operations are necessary. This leaves the the dived-out Collins boats to make up the numbers and provide at-sea/alongside training opportunities.

The best outcome I can foresee/hope for with the AUKUS submarine program is roughly as follows:

  • Collins LOTE goes ahead as planned (although perhaps only for three or four boats rather than all six - preferably the youngest boats to maximise available hull life)
  • USN and UK host RAN submariners for nuclear-specific engineering and command training (I believe this may already be happening anyway)
  • USN and UK SSNs spend time deployed to SE Pacific/Indian Ocean on the 'Australian Station' to complement Collins LOTE boats and familiarise RAN crews with operating Nuke boats in our area of operations.
  • Several of the best remaining 688i 'improved' Los Angeles class SSNs scheduled for retirement (but still with plenty of hull life left in them - there are reportedly quite a few) are refuelled/full-cycle docked at Australian expense and transferred to the RAN as an expedient to raise a credible SSN force of 3-4 boats + an alongside training boat capability asap. This would still take some years to bring to fruition, hence the need to continue with Collins LOTE to prevent a capability gap.
    • A USN Sub tender is redeployed to FBE/Fremantle to assist with Nuke maintenance until new alongside facilities are constructed (incl. a seismic-rated dry-dock!!! there's an expensive project no-one's flagged yet!)
  • The remainder of this decade is spent raising/expanding workforces and building/expanding shipyard facilities for a joint build of a co-designed 'standard' SSN for all three countries. Such a design would ideally be possessed of the following features:
    • A common 'modular' hull design with common 'back-end' (reactor & propulsion/engineering equipment) and VLS/payload module as per Virginia Block V SSN/Columbia SSBN/Dreadnought SSBN
    • 'open architecture' systems to enable plug-n-play installation of respective nations' sensors, CMS and user interfaces.
    • common, sensor agnostic 'front-end' design (torpedo room/tubes) able acceptance of all current and future tube-launched/recovered weapons and remote systems i.e. Mk48, Spearfish, 'LEMOS' decoys, mines and UUV/AUVs + the ability to host whatever bow sonar is specified by the operating navy concerned in a plug-n-play fashion - this element is perhaps the most difficult to achieve but well worth the effort to maximise the level of commonality across all three fleets.
    • Subs able to deploy/dock/recharge UL/XL-AUVs (i.e. Boeing Orca & Anduril 'Ghost Shark') and swimmer delivery vehicles for covert insertion/recovery of special forces teams.
  • As the Saab A26 SSK is designed from the outset to be 'modular', so also the new AUKUS SSN design should be. Each of the respective Navy's (USN/RN/RAN) being able to up-spec or down-spec their boats from the outset or capability insert mid-life with the minimum of fuss or expensive bespoke modifications which would inevitably blow-out refit costs and dockyard time. Enabled from the outset because of a designed-in ability to 'plug-n-play' systems or fully fitted-out 'sleds' and indeed even whole hull modules (like a VLS capability for instance). This also allows for dispersed manufacture across the defence industrial base of all three countries (Reactor modules exempted, of course), allowing greater capacity, resilience and flexibility in the supply chain.
df2u3kc-20bf151f-6c7d-47f8-87f7-1273474eb737.png Swe_A26_poster.jpg grafika_01_ENG-768x492.jpg Saab_A26_Submarine_variants_2.jpg Saab_A26_Submarine_variants_1.jpg

Image credits: Saab, @covertshores, @calamitySi via Deviantart.com
 
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jeffb said:
www.thedrive.com

Australia Could Push To Acquire Retired US Navy Los Angeles Class Nuclear Submarines

Ex-Prime Minister floats using retired U.S. or U.K. nuclear submarines to bridge the gap until Australian-built ones can enter service.
www.thedrive.com www.thedrive.com

From memory, in 2019, the US was budgeting ~$200m per 688 boat for a 24 month Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO).

SSN-688 Los Angeles-class

www.globalsecurity.org www.globalsecurity.org
Click to expand...

I believe these boats only have a certain number of 'surfaces' in them. I do not know what that number is or how it's calculated. Any enlightened readers?
 
In theory a hull could be zero timed on the work hardening repeated dive cycles impose. But it would mean heating up the hull.......and then slowly cooling back down.....
 
NeilChapman said:
jeffb said:
www.thedrive.com

Australia Could Push To Acquire Retired US Navy Los Angeles Class Nuclear Submarines

Ex-Prime Minister floats using retired U.S. or U.K. nuclear submarines to bridge the gap until Australian-built ones can enter service.
www.thedrive.com www.thedrive.com

From memory, in 2019, the US was budgeting ~$200m per 688 boat for a 24 month Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO).

SSN-688 Los Angeles-class

www.globalsecurity.org www.globalsecurity.org
Click to expand...

I believe these boats only have a certain number of 'surfaces' in them. I do not know what that number is or how it's calculated. Any enlightened readers?
Click to expand...

I don’t think it is public, but you can extend life by putting depth restrictions on the boat and minimizing the submerge/surface cycles. I’ve no idea if it is practical to pass on 668s to Australia but presumably if it is that will be mentioned at the meeting next month.
 
seapowermagazine.org

Navy Plans to Retire 48 Ships During 2022-2026 - Seapower

Navy Plans to Retire 48 Ships During 2022-2026 Navy
seapowermagazine.org seapowermagazine.org

NameFlightCommissionedPlanned RetirementApproximate Age
Chicago (SSN 721)Flight II - VLSSeptember 1986202438
Key West (SSN 722)Flight II - VLSSeptember 1987202437
San Juan (SSN 751)Improved (688I)August 1988202436
Topeka (SSN 754)Improved (688I)October 1989202435
Helena (SSN 725)Flight II - VLSJuly 1987202538
Pasadena (SSN 752)Improved (688I)February 1989202536
Newport News (SSN 750)Flight II - VLSJune 1989202637
Scranton (SSN 756)Improved (688I)January 1991202635
Alexandria (SSN 757)Improved (688I)June 1991202635

List of Los Angeles class boats coming up for retirement in the next few years. Commissioned dates exceed launch dates by typically a year or two. I assume most of the intervening time is spent alongside fixing problems identified in sea trials and most of the hulls working life starts following commission.

The approximate ages aren't very indicative of the 'true' hull life which would be a lot like airframe hours. They could in theory give a rough idea of how hard the boat has been worked, but earlier retirement could also be due to any number of other possible issues.
 
jeffb said:
seapowermagazine.org

Navy Plans to Retire 48 Ships During 2022-2026 - Seapower

Navy Plans to Retire 48 Ships During 2022-2026 Navy
seapowermagazine.org seapowermagazine.org

NameFlightCommissionedPlanned RetirementApproximate Age
Chicago (SSN 721)Flight II - VLSSeptember 1986202438
Key West (SSN 722)Flight II - VLSSeptember 1987202437
San Juan (SSN 751)Improved (688I)August 1988202436
Topeka (SSN 754)Improved (688I)October 1989202435
Helena (SSN 725)Flight II - VLSJuly 1987202538
Pasadena (SSN 752)Improved (688I)February 1989202536
Newport News (SSN 750)Flight II - VLSJune 1989202637
Scranton (SSN 756)Improved (688I)January 1991202635
Alexandria (SSN 757)Improved (688I)June 1991202635

List of Los Angeles class boats coming up for retirement in the next few years. Commissioned dates exceed launch dates by typically a year or two. I assume most of the intervening time is spent alongside fixing problems identified in sea trials and most of the hulls working life starts following commission.

The approximate ages aren't very indicative of the 'true' hull life which would be a lot like airframe hours. They could in theory give a rough idea of how hard the boat has been worked, but earlier retirement could also be due to any number of other possible issues.
Click to expand...

For the nuclear fleet, a major concern is having to refuel the boat. That's a major cost and commitment and if the boat isn't in good material condition, one that they might forgo. Not sure if that is a major consideration or not; I think 668 only gets 1-2 refuels. Core life also is usage based, not purely time based, so you can get more life out of a core by restricting speed.
 
Rules out any of the decommissioned T's too, all the cores are knackered and given the problems they had keeping them together I doubt Babcock would want to put new cores in. They could probably do a good deal on superglue though....
 
The 688i option seems a reasonably good idea. I mean - really. Even a couple of them would be an interesting "stopgap" between upgraded Collins and the full blown AUKUS nuclear attack submarine.
 
TomS said:
Pretty sure that's a fictional data sheet, so Phoenix is probably their made up name for a supersonic FC/ASW. See also under Missiles.

I like how it says this class would be built in two batches of five, and then helpfully lists 11 names.
Click to expand...
Aka 'Perseus' missile.
 
As I understand it, lifetimes for the 688 were originally 20 years. Examination of the preceding class at retirement suggested that could safely be extended to 30 years, even 33 years or longer, with refueling, on a case by case basis.

If Australia was interested in going down this route and obtaining 688 boats, they could possibly ask the US to take a couple of boats off their lists a couple of years early and make them available to Australia as training/initial capability boats.

Scranton (SSN-756) and Alexandria (SSN-757) are both 688I boats that are due for retirement in a few years and would both theoretically have a few years of life still in them. Don't know how long it would take to 'transfer' the boats though. Doubtless the US would want to modify them or strip some gear out prior to that.
 
jeffb said:
As I understand it, lifetimes for the 688 were originally 20 years. Examination of the preceding class at retirement suggested that could safely be extended to 30 years, even 33 years or longer, with refueling, on a case by case basis
Click to expand...

In 2018, the USN asked for funding to study an extension past 30 years for some 688s. I'm not sure what came of it. But assuming it worked, you could possibly run a couple of these boats out to the mid-2030s (after a couple of years of refueling overhaul).

www.defensedaily.com

Navy Looks To Extend The Life Of Five Los Angeles Subs - Defense Daily

Top Navy officials told the House Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee on Tuesday that the service plans to extend the life of one nuclear-powered Los
www.defensedaily.com www.defensedaily.com
 
bobbymike said:
breakingdefense.com

Growing signs Australia's new nuclear sub will be British design - Breaking Defense

"We need to leverage expertise from the United Kingdom and the United States to help us along our optimal pathway – and building capability with them means we are better able to shape, deter and respond within our strategic landscape," Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said.
breakingdefense.com breakingdefense.com
Click to expand...

“The point of friction that introduces with the UK [revolves around] the Australians operating with the US Navy primarily in the Indo-Pacific and their preference for things like prompt strike capabilities, including cruise missiles and potentially hypersonic missiles. The [US Navy] Virginia-class payload module can host those weapons but the [Royal Navy’s] Astute-class can torpedo launch cruise missiles but doesn’t necessarily offer prompt strike capabilities.”
Click to expand...

A bit of an aside, but the above section of the article prompts me to suggest a “far-out” idea:

With the Dreadnought-class being due to commence service in the early 2030, could retiring Vanguard-class ships be re-roled as SSNs, or even SSGNs?

I was thinking that with the musical chairs-like situation involving lending SSNs to Australia, having a few slightly sub-optimal subs in the operational pool would help matters immensely.

The Trident tubes could be mothballed to save maintenance and crew, or some could be kept in use as payload modules, akin to the VPM, using the Ohio SSGN setup.

Given the need to increase the number of rated submariners for the planned RN expansion, and Australian order, this would also allow a smoother training programme. Additionally, the reactor is the same as on the Astutes, so no big change in training or maintenance. Also, it will hew close to RN practice, and so fit with the SSN(R) design ethos.

The only problems I can see would be delays in Dreadnought necessitating a slowdown of the programme, and whether RN shore support is up to having a few big SSN/SSGNs in the mix.

Thoughts?
 

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