RAF with TSR2 etc: But what Fighters?

[Thorvic]

I got the impression that the F-111K was intended to replace the carrier Strike role East of Suez originally, using the Island bases to exert regional influence. The force would have been split with half in UK as OCU and UK based deep strike, with teh rest EoS using a joint RAAF/RAF base for regional support and maintenance.

The AFVG was intended to make up the strike shortfall in Europe with replacing the Hunter and Canberra as TSR2 and 1154 had been intended to do.

AFVG is a bit of strange program, UK literature tends to focus on the RAF strike role post TSR2, but the program was originally a Naval Interceptor/Strike fighter for both Navies, we could do with a translation of the french article in the Mirage F-1 book to understand the nature of the program.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The TSR-2 / Carrier thing is part myth, they were really cooperative capabilities, ie; ideally you would have both. The problem that the RAF had was that sometime prior to the end of the programme it was decided that TSR-2 would have no European (Jan 1965, no TSR-2 for RAFG) role and was an EoS asset, thus the numbers were reduced. The problem then became that as the EoS role was reduced so the need for theatre bombers (TSR-2 then F-111K) declined.

AFVG is strange for a number of reasons, firstly because it lasted such a short amount of time, meaning very little actual history was ever generated and secondly because despite the British trying to convince the French (and possibly the British public) that it was a TSR-2 replacement, the numbers involved, the time line of other types then under development (see earlier in this thread) as well as the capabilities for the aircraft that the British were pushing suggest it was actually a replacement for the P.1154 programme.

 

[alertken]

SLL: Can you clarify, Moore is suggesting that P.1154 was to be replaced by AFVG as a programme? No, apologies if I confused (I do so to myself). Moore reminds us of the Euro-Anglo-French thread through 1960s' policy-making: P.198: (supportive of Macmillan's application to join EEC) Anglo-French nuclear co-operation (as) quid pro quo...Pres.Kennedy reminded (Mac) "not all British nuclear secrets were his to pass on".

I have, as AFVG production offtake when the MoU was signed, 17/5/65: 200 RAF/RN (corrected, #98: 175), 125 AdlA/AN. I have no note of what RAF quantity UK asserted after chop of CVA-01, 2/66, when RN interest (is reported to have) lapsed: between then and France's AFVG chop, 29/6/67, RN was still funded to continue operate Ark+Eagle+Victorious, all just/shortly refitted, for tasks various. It was only the nuclear mission from the Indian O. that had passed to F-111K. RN wanted real F-4K, not paper swingers.

Jaguar (200 RAF B+S), airframe lead, Breguet, had been the price paid by Healey for AFVG, airframe lead, BAC. After that lapsed Healey stayed in Jaguar, but shifted to 165 "S", the combat trainer becoming Hawk, Nov.1970. So, the sequence was:
RAF: Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 replacement, 18/2/63: P.1154(RAF); instead, 9/2/65: F-4M, intended till 1974, then (signed 17/5/65 AFVG(RAF); instead, in 1970: Jaguar "S" (F-4M to replace Lightning), and that happened;
RAF: Hunter T.7/Gnat replacement: 17/5/65: Jaguar "B"; instead, 1970: Hawk (165 of the Jaguars to replace F-4M), and that happened;
RN: Sea Vixen replacement: 18/2/63: P.1154(RN); instead, 27/2/64: F-4K; 17/5/65, intended from 1974 to replace F-4K, on CVA-01, if not on residual ancients: AFVG(RN); 29/6/67-16/1/68 (when we chopped Strike carriers bar Ark): RN to muddle through with its 52 F-4K, maybe 20 at sea concurrently. Eagle was de-commissioned 1/1972, still enVixened; Victorious fortuitously burned, 11/1967; Ark did so muddle, gloriously, to 12/78.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Ken,

That is exactly my theory so as I am sure you can imagine I agree entirely. My understanding is that the RN was uninterested in AFVG, as you rightly say they preferred the Phantom. I do not remember the source but I have the RAF being assigned 100 AFVG, + the original order for Harrier (60) that is almost a perfect match for the planned P.1154 purchase.

 

[alertken]

(Correcting my #96): my note is of 175 UK AFVG, 17/5/65: entirely consistent with SLL would be c.75 RN for CVA-01 +2 more, and c.100 RAF.

I omitted the brief UKVG inter-regnum (AFVG chop, 26/6/67-17/7/68, Healey puts UK into NKF-75). My sense of that time was that this was a paper exercise to keep a team-in-being: no Minister or Marshal had any yen to buy solo-British. Dished by TSR.2's drift and cost-bloat. No R&D contracts into the equipment/avionics sectors; nor into a real engine: BSEL had been junior to SNECMA on M45G: RR had bought BSEL, 7/10/66, but had not yet declared Patchway to be Military Centre of Excellence. Dribble MinTech funding for hot rig work.

So, Q: how did maybe 100 AFVG(RAF) and some orphaned Buccaneers become 385 Tornadoes? A: because UK wanted project stature alongside FRG whose intent was 322, Luftwaffe+Marineflieger. UK's motive was only in part to equip RAF: it was also that: “We must build (up) entry into Europe via Defence” Healey,2/69 (CDG resigned 28/4/69), P380,Crossman,Diaries/3. If UK had got in earlier, F.2/F.3 would not have been invented to make up the numbers, F-4M would have longer been the Air Defence type until a couple of policing Sqdns. of F-15 might have been bought.

 

[JFC Fuller]

From the RAF perspective my understanding is that 225 Tornado became the replacement for everything that dropped bombs (Jaguar, Vulcan, Buccaneer) except Harrier (following the increase in numbers that seems to have come with flexible response) with the F-4 fleet to remain until whenever what became Typhoon entered service to shoot down Migs? Wheels start falling off long before the wall fell leaving Jaguar hanging around until Typhoon turned up and a Saudi air force with some shiny tornadoes they never really knew they needed. Then came the 165 ADV to replace dilapidated barely useful Lightning's.

RAF of 1990's:

225 Tornado IDS; replacing, in order, 57 Vulcan B.2, approximately 80 Buccaneers and approximately 80 Jaguars in the strike role- leaving 75 Jaguar GR1A/T2A and 60 Buccaneer upgraded in the late 80s as Sea Eagle AShM carriers to serve until 1995-2000-beyond.
165 Tornado ADV; replacing Lightning F.6 and 'some' Phantoms
250 MRCA; replacing, in order, 75 Jaguar GR1A/T2A and approximately 170 Phantoms K/M
96 Harrier to replace 78 Harrier
Typhoon (to replace Phantom + Tornado ADV? + Ultimately 75 Jaguar)

Certainly, Justifying a lead UK position in Panavia needed more commitment than the UK needed or could afford so larger numbers for that, absolutely.

Regarding the earlier desired 200 Phantoms,

Let us not forget the Javelin fleet which remains in service through to 1967.

Does anybody have the details of the numbers reductions on the RAF fleet resulting from the 1957 review?

I have the fighter numbers planned under Plan H and the RAF's desired numbers for the Lightning and SR.177 and Javelin prior to that (though not the official decided numbers) but I dont have the reduction resulting from the 57 review.

Plan H, to be implemented by 1955:

264 Night Fighters
484 Day Fighters
160 Auxiliary Day Fighters

C in C Fighter Command, as of 1953 wanted for 1957+:

200 Javelin (seems to have been met)
400 F.23 class fighters (ultimately Lightning- not even that many of all variant manufactured)
200 Rocket Fighters (SR.177) - Buttler has 150 planned for the RAF.

For missiles, alertken stated earlier in the thread: Bloodhound Mk.1 SAM onway for 1958 deployment as 20 Sqdns/700 launchers, some to be long-range, stainless steel nuclear-tipped Blue Envoy - what is the source for that?

 

[alertken]

UK SAGW: M S Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning,1955-1958, Clarendon,1991,P.173: 3/4/57 memo Air Minister to Defence Secretary: "By Apriil,1963 it was planned to have 13 SAGW stations with 672 launchers and 825 missiles...Stage 1 1/2 Green Flax (ak: nuke-tipped) would be deployed by the end of 1962". That memo did not survive the Sandys storm. (I can't now find my, earlier, number of 700 launchers for 1958)

I, like you, have attempted a neat table of 1950s' Plans, trying to match 1930s' Expansion Plans. I suggest we are wasting our time. Each 1930s' Plan was: UK solo-sovereign; put to Cabinet for funding, and many were indeed passed into the procurement process. 1950s' Plans were: in a context of NATO Task-sharing, NATO Forces competing for Super Priority materials, all subject to bidding for US MSP $, which included meeting some of our ambition with finished articles (Sabres, Neptunes et al et al). Just which of them had a life outside the minds of some of their Airships is not clear. $ dried in 1954; Macmillan at Defence, then Treasury lost patience with Defence and especially with Air. We never set about pouring concrete even for what was actually ordered - say Swift+Hunter, assuming some would either fail or be chopped. No bodies to maintain them post-conscription.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Ken,

I dont have the exact figures with me right now but I have roughly the same numbers for missiles but significantly less launchers. Based on my reading so far I have the notion of defending the entire UK vanishing as early as 1953, from then on the air defence network is dedicated to defending the V-Bomber bases and gets caught in a death spiral with the V-force (described elsewhere) culminating in 1960 with plans for 12 Lightning F.3 Squadrons and 12 Bloodhound squadrons at 6 sites. This also impacts the various schemes for ground based radars and control centres.

Interestingly, 200 Phantoms would nicely fill 12 Squadrons. The actual 150 F-4M order is just 6 airframes short of the 156 Lightning F.2A/F.3/F.3A/F.6 procured...

I agree we may be wasting our time trying to make a neat table, I however feel there is some merit in attempting to construct a slightly more vague time line using strategic context and economic reality to explain each major development. I am not yet a aware of a single work that attempts to do such a thing. Eric Grove did naval history a great service with Vanguard to Trident; no such thing has been achieved for the RAF (to my knowledge).

Jack Gough, 'Watching the Skys' has the 1958 review as the year of annihilation for the SAM force. He states,

Bloodhound; original order 800 missiles, cut to 300 by the 1958 review
Thunderbird; 150 missiles approved in June 1957 but cut back to 60 in early 1958

Bloodhound organisation was as follows, the 800 missile order would give 18 fire units, 2 fire units would be deployed to each site. Each fire unit consisted of one launch control post, two yellow river directors, and 18 missiles on launchers. There would be 8 reserve missiles at each site. However, I think Gough actually means 18 sites, not fire units, as the maths just does not work otherwise.

18 x 20 = 360
36 x 20 = 720 and that would give your 700 launchers, give or take

How your numbers tie with Gough I just dont know at this stage. I increasingly suspect that getting to the bottom of this particular jumble of numbers may well be impossible as it seems like the planned composition of a Bloodhound Squadron changed considerably. The first site at North Coates was built with 48 launch pads, apparently for 3 x 16 launcher squadrons (I suspect the Gough plan is a derivation of this) but later this evolved into 1 squadron consisting of 32 launchers. Using Google Earth, online photos and recollections I have found a range of configurations:

48 Launch pads: North Coates

36 Launch pads: West Raynam

32 Launch pads: Breighton, Marham, Finninley, Woolfox Lodge, Rattlesden, Dunholme Lodge, Watton, Carnaby, Warboys, Butterworth

16 Launch pads: Wyton, Barkston Heath

12 Launch pads: Wattisham, Bawdsley

There were many others, the point is that whilst the majority of sites do seem to conform to the 32 launcher paradigm there are exceptions, I would also caution against taking the 16 and 12 pad sites for granted as it is possible that there were other pads at those sites which have since been lost or that I am too ill-informed to identify.

 

[alertken]

Gough is new to me, thank you.

 

[zen]

RN wanted real F-4K, not paper swingers.

Nope they wanted a valid fighter for defence of the Fleet, after the Soviets show new anti-ship missiles, circa 1963. Range and speed of the weapons make SeaVixen far too marginal even with AEW. Upgrades might have changed that, but the basic platform was too slow.
Hence they look at Crusader but prefer Phantom (two engines, better Attack capability) and why they don't wait for anything else.
P1154 would look like an expensive Crusader. They had it forced on them.

F4K is sold as quick and cheap. They had no idea of the delays and peformance drop that could occure, though on straight line speed, the cockpit transparency is thermaly limited such as Mach 2 flight requires the piece to be replaced. That comes from an USN F4 pilot, they were'nt permitted to go over Mach 1.8 unless it was either time to get a new windscreen anyway or they where in a hot war.
Spey was necessary for the Ark Royal and Eagle, USN F4s did cross deck but where highly weight limited, especialy for launch. CVA-01 with longer stroke catapults would've not needed them and could manage with J79 powered versions.
Do remeber how much the costs of F4K increased from sales blurb, to final product.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Nope they wanted a valid fighter for defence of the Fleet, after the Soviets show new anti-ship missiles, circa 1963. Range and speed of the weapons make SeaVixen far too marginal even with AEW. Upgrades might have changed that, but the basic platform was too slow.
Hence they look at Crusader but prefer Phantom (two engines, better Attack capability) and why they don't wait for anything else.
P1154 would look like an expensive Crusader. They had it forced on them.

F4K is sold as quick and cheap. They had no idea of the delays and peformance drop that could occure, though on straight line speed, the cockpit transparency is thermaly limited such as Mach 2 flight requires the piece to be replaced. That comes from an USN F4 pilot, they were'nt permitted to go over Mach 1.8 unless it was either time to get a new windscreen anyway or they where in a hot war.
Spey was necessary for the Ark Royal and Eagle, USN F4s did cross deck but where highly weight limited, especialy for launch. CVA-01 with longer stroke catapults would've not needed them and could manage with J79 powered versions.
Do remeber how much the costs of F4K increased from sales blurb, to final product.

What were they going to wait for? After P.1154 the only things that were going to be in service before 1970 were a Crusader or a Phantom- swing-wing Vickers designs look great as line drawings but in 1964 (when the Phantom FG1 was ordered), even if they had been funded were probably still ten years away from flying in anything near an operation configuration. As for Phantom cost overruns, sure it went over estimate- do you really think Vickers swing-wing would not have?

The Phantom was not "forced" on the RN, it was simply the best option available. Unless you have a source saying it was forced?

 

[zen]

What were they going to wait for?

Suddenly your calling them competant?
They were still thinking of OR.346 in '62. AW.406 choice was 'interim'. Get something now because the wonderweapon is going to be a long time comming.

As for Phantom cost overruns, sure it went over estimate- do you really think Vickers swing-wing would not have?

Where did I say it would be any cheaper?
Where did I say it would be any sooner?

On this thread perhaps? If its here quote me.

The Phantom was not "forced" on the RN, it was simply the best option available. Unless you have a source saying it was forced?

Forced as in circumstances, not government meddling as with P1154.
The forcing is because the threat is shifting to something that needs something like an F4 or at minimum an F8 to deal with.
And yes, at the time it (F4) looked the best option and seemed cheaper, and faster to service. The fact its costs overran to more than double price per plane and began delivery in the year after it was supposed to finnish delivery is just a sign or how even the mighty US aviation industry can get it wrong. As we might say the UK MoD as well.

In retrospect one might argue the F8 'Twosader' was the simpler case for fitting a Spey and a faster to service product. This in no small part due to a twin seater turbofan powered Crusader having flown and being touted around by Vought.
Thus France rather liked the idea of the thing, though in the end stuck with single seaters.

All that said the F4 seems a more prescient and shrewd choice in terms of its capability, keeping it relevent deep into the future (when the decision was made).

Hmmm....let me see now, is'nt this the Alternative History and Future Speculation section?

 

[JFC Fuller]

Suddenly your calling them competant?

In selecting the F-4, most certainly.

On this thread perhaps? If its here quote me.

A warm drink and an early night may be appropriate.

Forced as in circumstances, not government meddling as with P1154.

By which definition every aircraft ever procured was forced, aircraft are not designed or acquired in vacuums, they are the product of circumstance- just with variances in weightings to particular circumstances.

 

[zen]

In selecting the F-4, most certainly.

Well for the RN it may well have made sense, but then the requirements to operate it helped to end the FAA's possesion of it as it did the RN of its CATOBAR carrier fleet.

Looks more like a lucky strike if we take it in the round.

A warm drink and an early night may be appropriate.

I looked for where on this thread I might have suggested any of the VG 'paper planes' (since we're now using derogatory language towards the UK aviation firms and their efforts) and strangely enough I can't find an instance of it.
Rather insulting to come up with such a glib remark, sealordlawrence, but then if your making stuff up about what other people said on a thread and thinking thats not insulting I guess you would'nt think such a remark is either.

By which definition every aircraft ever procured was forced, aircraft are not designed or acquired in vacuums, they are the product of circumstance- just with variances in weightings to particular circumstances.

I fail to see why we're going over this ground again sealordlawrence. The facts are the Soviets display new anti-ship missiles in 1963 and the conclusion is that Vixen won't 'cut it'. RN have no time to wait for 'paper planes', even if they had the money (which they did'nt). So they have to choose between the F8 and F4. They choose the F4 and price and capability is why.
That it turns out late and overbudget is also fact, and from a rough figure of 1.2 million per plane at the start, they end up paying about 3 million per plane. Had they known that and the eventual cost to the CV fleet, they might have chosen the F8

P1154 was not what the RN wanted, especialy if it detracted from what they thought they ought to be focusing on.
What about this do you so disagree with?
Do you now have perhaps, records from the periode that contradict this?

In a similar timeframe, the RAN are looking at F4s from a modernised Essex and the French are selecting the F8. If memory serves the RCN drop the fighters from Bonnie in this periode too.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Well for the RN it may well have made sense, but then the requirements to operate it helped to end the FAA's possesion of it as it did the RN of its CATOBAR carrier fleet.

No more so than any other factor. Th RN would have lost its CATOBAR fleet with or without the F-4.

Rather insulting to come up with such a glib remark, sealordlawrence,

Only if one is remarkably easily offended.

I fail to see why we're going over this ground again sealordlawrence. The facts are the Soviets display new anti-ship missiles in 1963 and the conclusion is that Vixen won't 'cut it'. RN have no time to wait for 'paper planes', even if they had the money (which they did'nt). So they have to choose between the F8 and F4. They choose the F4 and price and capability is why.
That it turns out late and overbudget is also fact, and from a rough figure of 1.2 million per plane at the start, they end up paying about 3 million per plane. Had they known that and the eventual cost to the CV fleet, they might have chosen the F8

P1154 was not what the RN wanted, especialy if it detracted from what they thought they ought to be focusing on.
What about this do you so disagree with?
Do you now have perhaps, records from the periode that contradict this?

In a similar timeframe, the RAN are looking at F4s from a modernised Essex and the French are selecting the F8. If memory serves the RCN drop the fighters from Bonnie in this periode too.

And? How does this make it any more or less forced than any other aircraft ever acquired by the RN/RAF?

And how does it justify shouting "No" at ken? You have yet to provide a single source suggesting that the RN did not want the F4.

 

[zen]

Its a factor, just one of many. Denying its a factor is no better than overblowing its importance.

Your still insulting, is it deliberate, or are you just blundering on?

Where did I say the RN did'nt want the F4?

 

[alertken]

(My recollection from those days. I am very old). When Medway (first) died, RR got on with (to be) Spey. RR had a junior reputation, in MoS, on reheat than did Bristol, ASM, which was a factor in MoS imposing B.Ol on (to be) TSR.2 and encouraging formation of BSEL. By mid-1959 RR had only modest forward business. They came up with reheated Spey-in-F-4B. CVA-01 was not then budgeted, so FAA's future would be on Ark/Eagle/Victorious. During the time of MSP-munificence, US had funded Gannets, Sea Hawks, Sea Venoms, but had not pressed various Demons on UK. We had duplicated USN types, buying Vixens and Scimitars, in part because of perceived operational issues on our mini-tops (A-4s were fine on RAN/RCN Majestics; ho-hum). RN/RR failed to interest Macmillan's Govt., 1959/60, in Spey/F-4B. RR pressed on and sold Spey civilly.

18/2/1963: V/STOL's the thing. P.1154(RN) and (RAF). RR tried hard to displace BS.100 with deflected thrust/reheated Twin Spey. The window in which Govt. succeeded in imposing P.1154(RN) was brief -18/2/63 - 27/2/64, when Minister Thorneycroft bought 52 F-4K. RN's reasons for pressing to exit P.1154 vary per the book you read. RN's reason for putting Spey in were, not to win political support for work for RR, but was the bolter case off our minitops: the assessment was that J79 was not grunty enough. RR committed to 0.5sec. slam reheat. Though CVA-01 was by then budgetted, (-02/-03 never were) E/R/V would bridge into early-1970s.

Standard F-8, presumably, was assumed to have practical issues (yes, I know FN resolved that, but somewhat later). So it was F-4K or nothing. The criticism of higher cost/lower performance, F-4K vs. F-4B is without merit if you accept the bolter issue. There was never the slightest interest in MoA in pursuing (ex-VS) swingers for RN: low volume, grotesque cost/time, distraction to the already drifting effort on TSR.2.

 

[Mike Pryce]

Standard F-8, presumably, was assumed to have practical issues (yes, I know FN resolved that, but somewhat later). So it was F-4K or nothing.

I seem to recall seeing in the P.1154 files at Kew mention of a possible Spey F-8 to meet 'bolter' needs. I doubt it went far (and only one engine vs. two, so RR would prefer the Spey F-4!).

What was clear was that there were many discussions of possible Sea Vixen replacements. P.1154 was never liked by the RN (leadership or procurement) from April 1962, when Eric 'Winkle' Brown showed up at Hawkers and made it clear he was only looking at the P.1154 as his masters bade him to. And it is clear that the RN leadership played along with Thorneycroft as the potential 'saving' of a joint service P.1154 would help pay for CVA.01.

The main issue was that there was not money for a new carrier force and the development of an all-new RN fighter. If there had been money the RN would have liked a VG, 'super fighter' as in OR.346. They looked at ways to still get this, e.g. develop a 'Mark 3' Sea Vixen to hold the line until 1972 when a new VG aircraft could enter service, but the need to keep some existing carriers meant they needed something able to fly off them.

This was where the P.1154 had a case - it could operate from all the carriers. But once the Spey promised the F-4 could do this, and the P.1154RN was already a different plane from the P.1154RAF so development costs looked high, the F-4 choice made sense, and so was ordered.

As with the Aussie Avon Sabre, putting an existing engine into an existing airframe sounded cheap but turned out not to be, but that was not understood when the decision was made.

 

[zen]

sealordlawrence your rather reading a lot into a snappy retort to a sloppy statement.

RN wanted a fleet defence fighter, with limited attack capability and drew that up in AW.406, they wanted it as soon as they could arrange. Their eyes and prejudices where on the earlier OR.346 with a preference for four hours CAP among other things.
So in the round they wanted OR.346, could'nt afford it and had to settle for something less, wrote AW.406 and in the selection, had P1154 forced on them. All the time their eyes where on longterm VG machines that were clearly beyond the timescales or budgets they had. Settling for the F4 instead. Not a bad outcome from their perspective at the time.

Ergo the error in the statement the RN wanted the F4K, they wanted it at a specific time and in a periode prior to that they did'nt, they wanted something better.
The statement ought to be "they wanted F4K in 1964 and after", what I've read suggests they wanted the VG machine in '63, because they knew what the F4 imposed, a limitation to just Eagle and Ark Royal, upgraded to handle them.

If they could have had something better they would have opted for it. We should probably be thankfull in that such an alternative never happend as we'd would've seen them looking at the F111B.

 

[Thorvic]

Well by 1964 the RN already knew the USN was looking at a Phantom replacement in the form of bigger and heavier TFX, so The Phantom was only seen as a stop gap to take them into the 70's.

Although regarding AW406 people are forgetting that after the Phantom was ordered the UK was still looking at the AFVG for both the FAA & RAF, with an eye to replacing both the Phantom & Buccaneer with a smaller more advanced aircraft. It doesn't show up that well in history as with the cancellation of CVA-01 and later the Carrier Fleet together with the RAF looking to make up the loss of the TSR2 in the strike role it tends to be rolled in as a forefather of the Tornado, but it was primarily a Naval Interceptor to begin with !.

 

[zen]

Perhaps ken should also have stated that the RN did not want the Phantom in 1940? or 2010? or 1805?

Flippancy, those dates are outside the context of this thread.

Thorvic is correct, in the context of the RN expecting CVA-01 they where looking well beyond the F4. It was an 'interim' solution, though that seems a common thread in their decision making.
But understandable in the context of how rapidly things had progressed since 1945.

 

[Mike Pryce]

One problem with this discussion is that it is based on the idea of there being some monolith called the Royal Navy that decides what it buys.

In reality there were various views within the Service, and wider views in the overall government/procurement 'system'.

These can be seen in the files at Kew, e.g. ADM1/29154 - 29156 show that in 1962 Director of Naval Air Division wanted the Vickers 583, but agreed to keep looking to see what the P.1154 could do. Then the Admiralty Board looked at the Sea Vixen with 'AI.25' radar to allow time to get the full OR.346 aircraft in the early 1970s. It was felt (1962) that the Sea VIxen with Red Top could do until the early 1970s - what really mattered was what replaced the Buccaneer!

The saga of the RN P.1154 is well known, but what kept it alive (the idea, it was never very 'substantial' as a design) were the possible cost savings. When these appeared to evaporate then the F-4 became attractive as it seemed to offer the same cost savings. In June/July 1963 the F-4 was discussed (nothing decided) by the Air Ministry as a possible Lightning replacement too, which would spread R&D with the RAF. But at the same time the Defence Research Policy Committee did a big review of all the options, with the work undertaken by RAE and MoA supply staffs, which decided the best option for the RN's needs was the Vickers 584 (not the 583 as above, but this is mentioned too).

By January 1964 another round of studies see F-4 with Spey as the most cost effective to meet the RN needs until 1975ish, especially if the US buys the Spey too. What came in 1975ish was left open - would depend on what ships were around then. But the perceived high/fast Soviet threat that drove the RN fighter requirements was not met by the P.1154/F-4, and it was not clear what could meet it (much discussion in other files of 'jump up' missiles - 70,000 feet). Interestingly, TFX/F-111B is never mentioned (while every other thing is).

This is the tip of the iceberg - there are many more files with many more discussions that excited various factions (e.g. the 'Off Shore Support Ship' which would allow P.1154RAF aircraft to operate at sea). What ultimately decided the RN on the F-4? Getting CVA.01, but not the four or five of them the navy wanted, rather a couple or three, meaning they needed older carriers to run on. Then, as now, getting the big carrier was what mattered to the Admiralty (not all of the FAA though) - the specific aircraft to fly from it came second. The Phantom was the best fit with this, and apparently as cheap as chips, and with Speys it limited the balance of payments damage (which mattered a lot back then). That it didn't turn out like that is another story...

 

[JFC Fuller]

One problem with this discussion is that it is based on the idea of there being some monolith called the Royal Navy that decides what it buys.

Not just an RN issue but defence wide. It forces one to look at the 'prevailing winds', ie who thought what and of those people who held most influence over the decision making process.

I would dispute that the F4 decision was driven by the desire to get CVA01 though, I have never seen either evidence or truly viable argument to suggest that. F4 was acquired because of a confluence of events/motivations (like all aircraft)- in combination it met the cost limitation, did not put pressure on the already stumbling industry, could get off the carrier decks and could enter service within the desired time frame.

 

[Mike Pryce]

I would dispute that the F4 decision was driven by the desire to get CVA01 though, I have never seen either evidence or truly viable argument to suggest that.

See Eric Grove's excellent article 'Partnership Spurned: the Royal Navy's Search for a Joint Maritime-Air Strategy East of Suez, 1961-63', in N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, (1996) pp.227-41.

And also DEFE13/621 which contains Thorneycroft's almost tearful review of the P.1154 RN/RAF saga.

It also makes clear (as do recent decisions) that it is the minister who ultimately decides. Thorneycroft took the Services' advice on board regarding P.1154/F-4, but did not like doing so.

As for the 'stumbling industry' (a generalisation for which I have seen no evidence/views in the files - it was well understood that different firms had different abilities), the reheat Spey added to the load, and in an area RR were known to be weak, and with a technology (reheat on a turbofan, rather than a turbojet) that was known to be risky (as P&W and others found out).

 

[JFC Fuller]

See Eric Grove's excellent article 'Partnership Spurned: the Royal Navy's Search for a Joint Maritime-Air Strategy East of Suez, 1961-63', in N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, (1996) pp.227-41.

Have seen it and I dont think i provides anywhere enough for a definitive statement that CVA01 drove the Phantom requirement. Indeed I would suggest the evidence against such a theory is extremely strong- not least the overwhelming absence of anything else that met the requirement.

It also makes clear (as do recent decisions) that it is the minister who ultimately decides. Thorneycroft took the Services' advice on board regarding P.1154, but did not like doing so.

The Minister is the decision maker but not the opinion former- his decision is the product of the evidence and opinion with which he is presented from the civil service and the services- he then makes his own judgement on such evidence and opinion but it comes from him.

As for the 'stumbling industry' (a generalisation for which I have seen no evidence/views in the files - it was well understood that different firms had different abilities), the reheat Spey added to the load, and in an area RR were known to be weak.

It is called TSR-2, not to mention Concorde, skills were not so much an issue as the sheer amount of resources, both industry and cash, that they were absorbing- industry lacked capacity to be able to realistically take on the challenge of developing something as complex as a fully operational Type 583 in addition to its other commitments.

 

[Mike Pryce]

See Eric Grove's excellent article 'Partnership Spurned: the Royal Navy's Search for a Joint Maritime-Air Strategy East of Suez, 1961-63', in N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, (1996) pp.227-41.

Have seen it and I dont think i provides anywhere enough for a definitive statement that CVA01 drove the Phantom requirement. Indeed I would suggest the evidence against such a theory is extremely strong- not least the overwhelming absence of anything else that met the requirement.

Well, Grove shows how the need for CVA.01 drove the RN's requirements, and how joint aircraft were seen as a possible threat. However, as you may want to see it boldly stated, try AIR 20/11425 where a Defence Board meeting of 1 January 1964 (not a bank holiday back then) spells it out - need to save money to pay for CVA.01, and either a joint P.1154 or Phantom would do this - latter without Spey would save even more at a cost of making Hermes unable to operate them.

It also makes clear (as do recent decisions) that it is the minister who ultimately decides. Thorneycroft took the Services' advice on board regarding P.1154, but did not like doing so.

The Minister is the decision maker but not the opinion former- his decision is the product of the evidence and opinion with which he is presented from the civil service and the services- he then makes his own judgement on such evidence and opinion but it comes from him.

Thorneycroft was well informed and had strong opinions of his own - sure, he took advice, but as the files make clear he could think, and act, for himself too.

As for the 'stumbling industry' (a generalisation for which I have seen no evidence/views in the files - it was well understood that different firms had different abilities), the reheat Spey added to the load, and in an area RR were known to be weak.

It is called TSR-2, not to mention Concorde, skills were not so much an issue as the sheer amount of resources, both industry and cash, that they were absorbing- industry lacked capacity to be able to realistically take on the challenge of developing something as complex as a fully operational Type 583 in addition to its other commitments.

Sure, 583 was possibly too much (but then it was meant to come later), but much of industry was under-employed at the time - e.g. Gloster closing down etc. The issue may well have been the poor deployment of resources, but not the lack of them.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Well, Grove shows how the need for CVA.01 drove the RN's requirements, and how joint aircraft were seen as a possible threat. However, as you may want to see it boldly stated, try AIR 20/11425 where a Defence Board meeting of 1 January 1964 (not a bank holiday back then) spells it out - need to save money to pay for CVA.01, and either a joint P.1154 or Phantom would do this - latter without Spey would save even more at a cost of making Hermes unable to operate them.

And? As stated earlier in this thread, costs aligned, as did a multitude of other factors- as demonstrated by the fact that joint P.1154 was also considered acceptable within the context of cost. That does not make CVA01 the primary or singular driving force for Phantom.

Thorneycroft was well informed and had strong opinions of his own - sure, he took advice, but as the files make clear he could think, and act, for himself too.

It was never stated that he could not or did not think or act himself. The point is that he would have been heavily influenced by both the services and the civil service and the wider discourse with which he was entangled.

Sure, 583 was possibly too much (but then it was meant to come later), but much of industry was under-employed at the time - e.g. Gloster closing down etc. The issue may well have been the poor deployment of resources, but not the lack of them.

But what was left of the Gloster team? Depending on who you believe TSR-2 employed 20,000 people, any effort at Vickers VG aircraft would have required a not too dissimilar work force and would be running up against Concorde. The Vickers VG aircraft are certainly out of the question and I have serious doubts that the Avionics industry would be able to spare the resources to provide a radar for P.1154RN in a timely fashion (without resorting to simple license production). And that is before we get to the complete lack of cash to fund such a development programme which brings us full circle to the first point.

 

[Mike Pryce]

I was about to post some more 'from the horses mouth' stuff - 'Winkle' Brown's explanation to Hawkers about why DNAD were pro-F4, how it fitted with their plans for a VG follow-up, Zuckermann's discussion of the role of the Spey, none of it in any published source.

And? As stated earlier in this thread,

But I forgot that thread posts trump archive files.....and baseless speculation trumps facts...and abruptness trumps manners.

Silly me.

 

[JFC Fuller]

But I forgot that thread posts trump archive files.....and baseless speculation trumps facts...and abruptness trumps manners.

Silly me.

No, you seem to have forgotten the requirement for proper interpretation of archive files, something quite different. If you are prepared to allow others to make judgements, as well as yourself, based on such source material please feel free to post it, direct qoutes not paraphrasing would be most appropriate.

And what baseless speculation? It is common knowledge that TSR2 was absorbing vast quantity's of cash and that the R&D programme was using a disproportional amount of industry resources. Or that Thorneycroft would have had his thought processes crafted by his environment- unless we are to assume that he made his decisions with no civil service or military input?

 

[Mike Pryce]

No, you seem to have forgotten the requirement for proper interpretation of archive files

Have I? I did say I was silly!

Please illuminate me, and your arguments, with proper archive use, so we may all learn how it's done.

I'm off to burn my three history degree certificates!

 

[JFC Fuller]

I'm off to burn my three history degree certificates!

I would save it until winter, then you maybe able to extract useful heat from the process.

Example:

AIR 20/11425 where a Defence Board meeting of 1 January 1964 (not a bank holiday back then) spells it out - need to save money to pay for CVA.01, and either a joint P.1154 or Phantom would do this - latter without Spey would save even more at a cost of making Hermes unable to operate them

does not translate to:

What ultimately decided the RN on the F-4? Getting CVA.01

As demonstrated by the fact that the P.1154 was considered suitable within the bounds of cost and Crusader was viable. That is not to say that cost was not a factor- of course it was, but Phantoms viability stretched much further than that.

 

[Mike Pryce]

AIR 20/11425 where a Defence Board meeting of 1 January 1964 (not a bank holiday back then) spells it out - need to save money to pay for CVA.01, and either a joint P.1154 or Phantom would do this - latter without Spey would save even more at a cost of making Hermes unable to operate them

does not translate to:

What ultimately decided the RN on the F-4? Getting CVA.01

As demonstrated by the fact that the P.1154 was considered suitable within the bounds of cost and Crusader was viable. That is not to say that cost was not a factor- of course it was, but Phantoms viability stretched much further than that.

Oh, it does. Anyone who knew the state of the P.1154 in January 1964, and the government, services and industry's view of its likely success at the time would see that means the F-4 is a shoe-in as the only cheap game in town that frees up the requisite money for CVA.01. Oh, historians and their crazy 'interpretation of the files' antics!

would save it until winter, then you maybe able to extract useful heat from the process.

Nah, not enough material in them for that. However, I do have a pile of Jane's magazines to burn.

Not what they used to be, Jane's. Can't get the staff, it seems.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Nah, not enough material in them for that. However, I do have a pile of Jane's magazines to burn.

Not what they used to be, Jane's. Can't get the staff, it seems.

Whilst bringing Jane's into the conversation seems like an excessive tangent, even by the standards of this thread, I do find myself in agreement.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Sealordlawrence, do you really want to argue with Mike Pryce about the P1154 program? How much original archival research have you put into this matter?

What are *your* qualifications to talk on this subject?

Be more respectful of the work of others, or face a ban.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Perhaps it would be equally appropriate not to assume that somebody lacks some form of qualification simply because they choose not to identify themselves on the internet? Or to assume that a single individual holds a monopoly on correct opinion or information pertaining to a single subject? And I will happily get into a discussion with anybody if I feel I can contribute, history is the product of discourse not monopolisation by individuals- which is why despite this exchange I maintain a healthy respect for Mr Pryce.

 

[zen]

Pull Out Distance for stopping a big heavy and fast landing machine is longer than a lightweight slow landing machine. CVA-01 is clearly designed to operate aircraft bigger, and heavier at reletively high landing speeds. Sure we might talk of trying to stop the two in the same distance, but G-load limits on the airframe (and hook) dictate the reality.
Similarly with the catapults, and if we look at the lifts as well.
Those are the facts and fits the continuation of working towards something of nearer 70,000lb induvidual aircraft weight, the designed limit for CVA-01's flightdeck.
So not the F4, nor the Buccaneer. But closer to TFX, and since the UK version is OR.346, it does'nt take a genius to see the obvious.
The recovery zone is good enough for F14, maybe they never considered the F111B, but they were clearing thinking of something bigger and heavier and of a similarly higher energy landing, than F4.

Marginal flight ops from the Ark Royal and Eagle for F4 with J79 are a fact. Hence the Spey, not a sop to industry but a necessity. You could lengthen the already overlapping with recovery zone catapults. But you'd have to seriously lower the angle of the recovery zone to give enough length to safely recovery standard USN F4s at decent weights. That or push the end of an increased sponsoned width of recovery zone to dangerously low distances from the bow.
With no active stabilisation of the sort Charles De Gaulle has, stability was at serious risk too.

So a CV for operating the F4 is going to be longer than Ark Royal, at the flightdeck and longer in the hull, but its not CVA-01.
Might do it in 450ft of recovery (angled) deck (320ft Pullout, plus two spaces (three wires) of 30ft), add in say 190ft to the bow and your looking at 640ft. Minus 70ft (to locus of minimum ship motions), and you have 3/4 of waterline length of 580 or 770ft waterline length in total and 820 to 830 at the flightdeck. LBP about 720ft.
Ark Royal too short by 30ft in the waterline and thats without the fourth wire.

TSR.2 carried a lot of next genration technology. Applicable to other aircraft, from hydraulic fluids to airframe materials. Aircraft like Type 583, 584, 585, and 589/590 are all using this same tehnical base. Beyond VG and AI radar, theres very little thats 'new' about them, you can see it in their very design. Hell 589 used TSR.2 canopy, and a Scimitar nosehweel along with parts from here and there.

'interim'. Between more defined and desired systems, a stopgap to hold the line while requriements and solutions to them where produced. Recognition of the scale of the task for anything meetiing OR.346-like capabiities means they're looking at rather longer than a finished delivery in 1968. Time is now critical circa 1963, Soviet threat of increasing deployment of new missiles makes SeaVixen invalid. Scale of AI/missile development grasped and is major delay. Minimum time to new AI radar is 1972. Missile... who knows? Signs are not good given past history.
F4/AWG.10/Sparrow covers the gap, valid long enough to handle delays in fielding new AI/missile solution.
Search for AI set, starts with CW set, ends in FICMW.... AI.24 is being born. Search for missile ends in new seeker to Sparrow, but its not what they started out wanting and does'nt handle the sort of threat orriginaly envisioned. not so much the seekers fault as the missile and platform's.
The other answer is GAR.9/AIM-54.... but too expensive!
Any problem with this description?

 

[alertken]

(SLL is no doubt not intending to be derogatory; nor is harrier - whose sharing of relevant finds would be most welcome, please.)

OT was "what fighters", and our discussion has VS swingers popping up like bad pennies. The most recent Barnes Wallis biog flatly places on Geo.Edwards "blame" for leaving his pivots out in the cold. During 1964, BAC moved VG scheming from Weybridge to Preston (having earlier dismantled VS' S.Marston team). You have all missed the context of 1964: BAC was in dire business poo.

Thorneycroft had accepted CAS Elworthy's advice to abandon TSR.2 and take fixed-price F-111, just slipping a few onto McNamara's planned >3,000 (!). VC10 had evidently not done what Flight said at its first flight, 29 June,62: it would hold 707 sales (then 550) to just 200 more: “demand has been filled.” In fact 10 went to 3 open Users (+BOAC/RAF). When 707 No.1,010 flew in ’94 only RAF still operated VC10. How many Concordes would actually happen? DC-9 was thrashing 1-11: when would a Baby-Boeing emerge?

CVA-01 was funded 7/63: its task would be Indian Ocean, and on 27/2/64 Minister Throneycroft had defined its Air Group as Buccaneer S.2/WE.177A(N), plus F-4K. Done; next: what to do instead of TSR.2 to replace RAFG Canberra B(I)6/8+free Mk.7. He settled on P.1154(RAF)/WE.177A, and /WE.177B, a new and Bigger Bang.

Wilson got in 16/10/64 and judged his position to be exactly as Cameron would, 5/2010: unaffordable. I.a, AWRE/ROF were overloaded. By 19/2/65 Healey had settled on: a Gutersloh spoiling Wing of dispersed P.1127(RAF)/WE.177A to interdict Red armour (which had a range of 20km: don't try to kill each tank, kill POL). Modest payload-range, no prob: they would be popping up from a copse. Plus lots of F-4M (intake/rear fuselage keeping Preston alive) plus B43 (releasing ROFs to attend to Polaris).

Now, from mid-1963 in the context of bouncing back from CDG's 16/1/63 non to UK-in-EEC, UK and France had been flirting variously. Moore/II has JFK reminding Macmillan that UK had few nuclear secrets which it could pass on. The choppers package and Jaguar would emerge from these contacts. Dassault was doing G-Mirages. The obvious UK partner in any such flirting was not ex-VS, not ex-V-A, not ex-EE. Buccaneer S.2 Systems, sounder finances, and VG design experience made HSAL the more credible team. A.W.59 had been bid in 1952; assets bought in ’59 included DH.127 VG/VSTOL scheme, and Folland, in ’60 hiring Weybridge’s VG designer for Fo.147. To late-64 VG HS.1170B/1171 were pursued; BAC VG effort had been in model trials of Wallis’ Wild Geese/Swallow arrows, a superseded shape, now further impugned by the shift North.

But BAC's man Knight was getting towards the end of a >2 years' investment in the sandpit. Magic Carpet would be signed 21/12/65, planning £1.5Bn, to be paid in liquid gold. That is why BAC, not HSAL, was to be sustained (no tender process) on AFVG. To qualify for design leadership Healey had to commit to buy at least as many as CDG asserted he wanted for AdlA and Aeronavale. So on-credit F-4M/free B43 would be rolled over for "AFVG(RAF)"/plus WE.177B (built when, how?); to puff up UK numbers, F-4K would be rolled off and an AFVG(RN) invented.

As soon as CDS Mountbatten retired CVA-01 and "AFVG/RN" died, 2/66. UK obfuscated about its total buy of "AFVG/RAF"; Dassault resolved that for us, 29/6/67, and again came to UK's rescue in Spring,1968. Healey and France had gatecrashed F-104G Users' replacement discussions as soon as W.Germany abandoned V/STOL AVS. France said, anyMirage will do, so were ejected; Healey said "here's AFVG know-how thrown into the common pot at no charge". W.Germany said "ah, but we've already done a licence deal with Grumman for F-111B pivot/wing centrebox". "Let's do that", said Healey and MRCA was conceived; UK would need to find a way of matching Luftwaffe+Bundesmarine's enormous asserted buy, so UK could be "equal", so a downstream fighter variant would replace Lightning. HSAL never got a whiff of any of it.

 

[Caravellarella]

I don't like the TSR2......

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[zen]

RN don't just pile on changes to P1154 for spite or to scupper the 'commonality', their trying to get enough performance to keep it valid as a fighter.

'63 undefined, 64 defined as F4K tallies with my information. Take '63 as the year they see the threat displayed. They know its comming, even if the missiles they saw are the only ones the USSR actualy has, time will tell and they can see what the future looks like.
They need a machine, as soon as reasonably possible, operable from current CVs.
To hell with CVA-01 thats a longtime in the future as far as their concerned.
P1154 might do it, but risks just pile on as they diverge from RAF, and the radar/missile issue is not satisfactorily resolved.

So we have a view here of what the minister is going to get when he talks to the RN.
P1154? Too risky.
F8? Could be, but theres issues with the missile numbers. Secondary attack is poor.
F4? does the job, and remains valid for longer (as they see it), secondary attack is good.
Wait for a new machine? Time is running out.

French move in '65 if memory serves. They've seen the danger too, and respond with the cheaper 'interim' solution.
If government had known the French would opt for F8........

Interesting to hear of the BAC issues there altertken. Explains the change in VG designs. Partial VG was an easier, less risky route, as with the Lightning variants offered, the change in location produces the more radical fully VG designs. Increases risks.

 

[Thorvic]

Plus the F-8 would be envisaged as not much more than a sea going Lightning where as the Phantom is seen as proper interceptor with a two tier missile system of Sparrow & Sidewinder and thus more capable in stopping the soviet bombers before they can get to launch their massive stand off missiles at you !