The exact A to Thread Q is: UK funded no real work on a bespoke-interceptor/fighter after 1963 (Lightning F.2A/F.6), before 1972 (Tornado ADV). The role rolled in 1965 onto F-4M and on to F-4/K(RAF)/J(RAF) because that was cheap. Why did Ministers do what they did? Start from PM
Macmillan's experience at Defence and Treasury.
PM
10/1/57-18/10/63; at Defence he had chopped Swifts, arranged to chop RAuxAF; at Treasury: “It is defence
(spend) that has broken our backs. We also know that we get no defence from it”; it is “little more than a façade” joint memo with Sec.of Def.
Monckton, 20/3/56,
Horne, Macmillan/1,P.390. However, his man
Sandys retained the
11/56 order for P1B: in all at MoD, then MoA till 27/7/60, he bought 47 F.1/1A, 44 F.2, 20 T.4, and 70 F.3, to replace (some of the) Javelins in UK/RAFG. (Why so few? We were doing all the paying; Javelins and F. Hunters enjoyed many MSP-$).
Their purpose was:
J.Amery,SecState for Air,
10/60 briefed
(by RAF) “we needed a Fighter Command to police the skies against intruders
(not) much more"
The Move to the Sandys White Paper,M.D.Kandiah/G.Staerck(Eds),ICBH/KCL Seminar 7/88 pub.2002,Pp44/5. In 10/60: "Lightning was very politically vulnerable
(Genie US nuke-armed AAM in competiton with nuke-armed Bloodhound 3 SAM: that lapsed and Red Top/Lightning) survived 'for the prevention of
(minor probing) intrusion and
(EW) jamming'"
Ministers of Defence and for Air: R.Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality,Palgrave,2010,P.127. F-2A/F-6 then followed, to include replacing Javelins in NEAF/FEAF...because the type's R&D and its general inventory infrastructure was sunk. Air Defence was (nearly) "free".
Moore, P.238/P.296 discusses overload in UK AW production, Polaris + TSR.2 WE177, whose planned numbers were reduced
4/3/63 to 53 "strategic" WE177B (
ken says: for the 48 Vulcan B.2s) and 31 "tactical" WE177A (
ken says: on TSR.2 to replace the 32 NEAF Canberra B.15/16); TSR.2/WE177 were no longer for RAFG. P.1154(RAF), R&D funded
18/2/63, was now RAFG's sole new Strike type and had no weapon.
1/9/63: what a mess for new CAS
Elworthy.
27/2/64 RN moved from P.1154 to F-4K. From
mid-1964 BAC was talking VG to Dassault.
16/10/64 Healey SecState for Defence: his
Chief Scientific Adviser believed the Aero programme to be incapable of achievement. PM
Wilson's policies included: reduction in Defence spend, and smooching France to let us into EEC. On
9/12/64 LBJ offered a 10-year-deferred credit/fixed price Defence package with hefty offsets. The wonder is that any-UK-thing survived. (
IIRC Zuckerman's Memoirs) has an RAF bid for 175 F-4D to replace P.1154 which he dubbed "a technological & economic impossibility”
SZ,P204/383: now we may bemoan that advice, but do recall the pain of the simple 1950s' programmes - (nearly) all late, over-cost and under-Spec.
Minister of Aviation
Jenkins on
9 & 19/2/65 caused RAF to receive instead 118 F-4M (
ken says: 64, RAFG strike, 24
vice Canberra PR.7) + 66 P.1127 (
ken says: vice 38Gp. Hunter FGA9/RAFG FR10).
(ken believes no nukes on P.1127 (no payload/range), RAFG Canberra Project 'E' stores rolled onto F-4M. TSR.2 (till 6/4/65) or F-111K/WE177
East of Suez. Lightning to pootle on till dotage.
Between death of TSR.2, 6/4/65, and signing the UK/France MoU,
17/5/65,
Elworthy:
- pitched F-111K/WE177 against
CVA-01/Buccaneer S.2/WE177A(N) as the
East of Suez Strike capability;
- accepted 48 deployed Jaguar 'S' as quickest/cheapest way to replace 48 Waddington/Vulcan B.1 and Cottesmore/Vulcan B.2
Yellow Sun Mk.2 covering
Saceur's Valiant Tactical Bomber Force (24x2xB-43), grounded
9/12/64;
- agreed to take (to be)
AFVG to replace Vulcans, Canberra PR9 and (to match France's asserted production offtake
the F-4Ms, which could take over Lightning's AD, "free". Sold.
After France reneged on
AFVG,
25/7/67, it was more Jaguar GR.1 that released F-4M to AD: UK redefined its 200 as 165 'S'/35 'B' and bought Hawk as the advanced trainer.