Patriot SAM replacement

[bring_it_on]

Vendor competition for lower-tier antimissile radar could begin this year - February 16, 2016


The Army is expected to move forward with a competition for a Patriot-replacement radar this year if the Office of the Secretary of Defense approves an analysis of alternatives, according to just-released budget documents and service officials.

The budget proposal for fiscal year 2017, released Feb. 9, sheds new light on one of the most closely watched efforts in the Army's portfolio: how to upgrade or replace the legacy Patriot system, and at what cost. For the first time, the service has created a separate pot of money for a Lower Tier Missile Defense Capability, away from the customary and hugely expensive general accounts for sustaining the Patriot fleet.

Officials want $35 million to integrate a new Gallium Nitride array antenna into the "baseline" Patriot, replacing the Passive Electronic Scanned Array technology with an Active Electronic Scanned Array, according to an Army budget document. Equipped thusly, the antimissile system would be able to defeat threats from a greater distance, the Army argues.

The Army plans to award one or more contracts for technology maturation and risk reduction in March 2017, according to the document. Out of the total funding, officials envision spending $26 million on that phase.

While the budget document suggests the service is going merely for a Patriot sensor modification, one key official said the proposal is meant to set a baseline and should not be understood as a programmatic signpost. That is because an analysis of alternatives of various radar-system candidates has yet to be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, according to Barry Pike, program executive officer for missiles and space.

"The AOA analysis is pretty much done from the Army's point of view, but OSD has not done everything they want to do to verify that the analysis is complete," Pike told Inside the Army in a brief interview. Once the analysis is considered sufficient, the requirements formulated in it will be used to build the final acquisition strategy, he added.

Pike allowed that the outlines of the Lower Tier Missile Defense Capability, as presented in the budget, could be seen as creating a "dichotomy," following the logic of, "'Well, Army had this concept to go do this, the requirements are going to be reshaped, which may reshape what it is that we actually end up doing.'"

He said that the Army’s missile defense strategy is centered on keeping Patriot relevant while searching for better technology at the same time. "That's where we've had this vigorous discussion on: 'Why do we need to keep Patriot modernized and updated to the threat? Can’t we just go buy this other thing?' Well, that other thing doesn't really exist to the requirements that are still being shaped because the AOA is still going on."

The analysis of alternatives considered upgrading the Patriot radar, adopting or adjusting existing offerings -- including the fire-control radar of the Medium Extended Air Defense System -- and creating a new system from scratch. While the results are tightly guarded by the Army, officials now privately say that the service is settling on a new direction.

"Things have changed since the AOA and we are pushing for a 360-degree-capable effort either through an upgrade or new build," one service source said, referring to the ability to detect threats -- and fire at them -- from all directions. "We're at the start point in the POM build and now have other wickets we must go through on our way to a milestone A” decision, which must be adjudicated by the Defense Acquisition Board, the source added. “Decisions have not been made but the AOA has shaped a revised approach."

POM is shorthand for program objective memorandum, the Defense Department's six-year spending plan.

Pike stressed that competition in the new radar program would be paramount. He said the service wants to pick “as many contractors as we can afford” for a risk-reduction phase next spring.

 

[sferrin]

""That's where we've had this vigorous discussion on: 'Why do we need to keep Patriot modernized and updated to the threat? Can’t we just go buy this other thing?' Well, that other thing doesn't really exist to the requirements that are still being shaped because the AOA is still going on.""

Sounds like the reason they passed on MEADS is because they want something better.

 

[bring_it_on]

Sounds like the reason they passed on MEADS is because they want something better.

At best what they may get is an upgraded Patriot radar with some 360 degree coverage, and other improvements. A dual radar setup, like the MEADS would have worked better, they practically admit as much but currently such a path is unaffordable.

 

[Moose]

""That's where we've had this vigorous discussion on: 'Why do we need to keep Patriot modernized and updated to the threat? Can’t we just go buy this other thing?' Well, that other thing doesn't really exist to the requirements that are still being shaped because the AOA is still going on.""

Sounds like the reason they passed on MEADS is because they want something better.

I think MEADS probably SIG's right in the sour spot where the cost of fully committng to it is ot of proportion with the performance upgrade versus continuing to develop Patriot. They don't just want something better, they feel they need more to justify the cost.

 

[marauder2048]

Sounds like the reason they passed on MEADS is because they want something better.

At best what they may get is an upgraded Patriot radar with some 360 degree coverage, and other improvements. A dual radar setup, like the MEADS would have worked better, they practically admit as much but currently such a path is unaffordable.

The Army is also looking at upgrading ~200 Sentinel A3 radars to an AESA-based A4 configuration in an attempt to increase range out beyond 130 km.

The Army has a new FMTV prime mover for the Sentinels and the IBCS test back in November used composite tracks from Sentinel and Patriot to facilitate a PAC-3 intercept.

 

[bring_it_on]

""That's where we've had this vigorous discussion on: 'Why do we need to keep Patriot modernized and updated to the threat? Can’t we just go buy this other thing?' Well, that other thing doesn't really exist to the requirements that are still being shaped because the AOA is still going on.""

Sounds like the reason they passed on MEADS is because they want something better.

I think MEADS probably SIG's right in the sour spot where the cost of fully committng to it is ot of proportion with the performance upgrade versus continuing to develop Patriot. They don't just want something better, they feel they need more to justify the cost.

That may be it. Also, MEADS adoption would also throw out any competition at this point which may raise objections. Cost is definitely a factor, as is time-frame. The way it is going MEADS may take a decade to reach full operational capability, and Raytheon can certainly make the point that they can get upgrade Patriots incrementally faster and cheaper even though the end result may not be as capable, or have as much room to grow.

As Marauder2048 said earlier, and the recent congressional opposition to JLENS may create a room for lockheed to bring in their surveillance radar which would be quite mature by the time the MEADS IOC's..

 

[fredymac]

Developments in battlefield networking and sensor fusion are probably putting a lot of decisions on hold while things settle out on what the end results will be. The Army IBCS seems to be a CEC on land and that probably portends something analogous to "distributed lethality" making its' way into consideration.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEnxh2HiJ8M

 

[sferrin]

One would hope CEC would encompass sea, land, and air seamlessly. One big pot of data with targets and assets in it wherein the system matches them up. (God help you if the enemy hacks into it of course.)

 

[fredymac]

Software based warfare is buried deep but hints of it occasionally break through. The probable use of "Suter" by Israel (or a home grown variant) shows the vulnerability that can be exploited. The US seems to be aware of this and has incorporated cyber warfare as part of Red Flag. Nerd-to-Nerd combat with the Ruskies.

http://defense-update.com/features/2008/may08/suter_v.htm

http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/503204/cyber-the-new-red-flag-battleground.aspx

 

[bring_it_on]

Long-term 'bridging strategy' eyed for Patriot-radar replacements


The Army may be looking for an eventual replacement of its Patriot sensors, but that time is considered so far in the future that modernization investments for the legacy equipment are due sooner, a senior official said.

The assessment, delivered by the head of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Lt. Gen. David Mann, last week, puts cold water on the expectation that a recent analysis of alternatives for an eventual replacement of lower-tier antimissile equipment will manifest itself anytime soon.

"We need to have a bridging strategy," Mann said at a briefing with reporters on March 22. "Patriot is going to be with us for many, many years. So, the current radar that we have, in order to be able to maximize the MSE missile and other capabilities, we need to make kind of like a bridging strategy."

MSE stands for Missile Segment Enhancement. The sophisticated but expensive interceptor can be shot from the Patriot weapon as well as the competing Medium Extended Air Defense System, which Germany is eyeing.

"We need to make some investments in terms of modernizing the current Patriot radar as we look to the future, whatever the department decides in terms of a new radar to replace it," Mann continued. "After that decision is made, it will take some time to outfit the 15 battalions that we have. So, we can't wait -- we need to make some investments right now in upgrading the current fleet as we progress to a new capability."

According to a recent request for information to industry for new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar technology, the Army intends to keep Patriot around for another 30 years or so. While the language of the request states that the service wants to "replace or upgrade" the legacy equipment, it suggests that the Army may be banking simply on purchasing what Patriot maker Raytheon is offering in the way of upgrades.

"We have not made a final decision," Mann said. "We are still looking at what everybody is proposing out there. Obviously, we are looking heavily, or very, very closely, or carefully, at the Raytheon AESA radar. But again, waiting for a final decision by the department."

The Army information request envisions technology "already developed or in development that could be utilized to upgrade or replace the Patriot radars fielded by the Army and international partners." To be considered for the business, companies must offer a technology readiness level and manufacturing readiness level of 6, respectively.

Budget documents released last month suggest that the Army is readying a competition for a Patriot-replacement radar this year if the Office of the Secretary of Defense approves an analysis of alternatives. For the first time, the service has created a separate pot of money for a Lower Tier Missile Defense Capability, away from the customary and hugely expensive general accounts for sustaining the Patriot fleet.

While the budget document suggests the service is going merely for a Patriot sensor modification, one key official said the proposal is meant to set a baseline and should not be understood as a programmatic sign post. That is because an analysis of alternatives of various radar-system candidates had yet to be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as of last month, Barry Pike, program executive officer for missiles and space, said in a Feb. 11 interview.

Mann, referring to Germany's decision to field a MEADS-based antimissile system, said U.S. and European officials should take care to ensure their equipment remains compatible.

"I think it's very very important that we emphasize the importance of being able to integrate different platforms, different capabilities onto a network," he said. "And so, we're working very closely with our European allies to make sure that we achieve that integration of whatever system our European partners decide to purchase."

MEADS maker Lockheed Martin hopes that Germany adopting the system will lead other countries on the continent to do the same.

 

[Mark S.]

Just thinking aloud if the Army can incorporate the new Air Force 3DELRR radar into the network they will have a 360 deg. sensor for detecting air and missile targets. It's unclear to me whether this radar can detect ballistic missiles as the verbiage I've seen just uses the word missiles. I suppose it could me just air breathing cruise missiles.

Both Patriot launchers and radars are on turntables. Can I assume they can rotate a few degrees to change their field of view if needed? If so won't this combined with the above give the Army a rudimentary 360 degree system without the need for 3 Patriot fire units at every site?

Mark

 

[bring_it_on]

That will definitely be one of the options looked at by Raytheon as it tries to gauge the US Army's appetite for cost. The 3DELRR offered by Raytheon operated in the C-Band so it would definitly work as a more expensive developmental option to the upgraded Patriot.

It's unclear to me whether this radar can detect ballistic missiles as the verbiage I've seen just uses the word missiles. I suppose it could me just air breathing cruise missiles.

Much like the G/ATOR, they would have to do a lot of work to turn the 3DELRR into a future Patriot replacement sensor.

From the article posted on Page -1

To assess capabilities, alternatives were weighed against the most stressing tactical ballistic missile threat to the front, according to the document.

Overall, the Army determined the baseline Patriot option had the highest operations and maintenance costs. However, the Patriot upgrades stay within the Army's cost target and would show improvements over the baseline option in addressing threats.

Replacement alternatives with X-band interceptor communication arrays were determined to be the most costly, exceeding Army cost targets. But they "have the most improvement" over the baseline Patriot, according to the slides.

G/ATOR's average procurement unit cost is between $147 million and $254.6 million, MFCR is predicted to cost $223.9 million per copy and the MFCR with a surveillance radar is estimated to cost $326.4 million.

Every option analyzed received "high risk" rankings overall of not meeting the anticipated program schedule.

The baseline Patriot and the upgraded Patriot, according to a chart within the slides, both rank as "high risk" for not meeting the schedule in the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase and the production and deployment (P&D) phase. Both would need 88 months of schedule and might need another year or two to further reduce risk.

The Patriot baseline risk in the EMD phase is driven by the time required to build three radars and P&D risk is driven by the production and calibration time for the radars and launchers. The chart notes that three to four production quality systems are needed for operational test and evaluation.

The upgraded Patriot's EMD risk is based on software development to move from a sectored field of view to a 360-degree capability.

The G/ATOR system — which would need 118 months to move through the acquisition cycle — was assessed as having high schedule risk in both the technology maturation and risk reduction phase (TMRR) and the EMD phase. The program could see schedule slippage, the Army predicts, anywhere from 14 to 18 months.

The TMRR and EMD risk for G/ATOR is due to the need to develop and integrate adjunct equipment to allow it to detect missile threats in the lower tier, the slides show.

Both the multifire control radar and the MFCR paired with a surveillance radar presented low risk in the TMRR and P&D phases, but moderate risk in the EMD phase. Both options would need 118 months to get through all three phases and could be delayed from one to five months to drive out risk.

EMD risk for the MFCR is driven by production of radars with GaN technology and also by integrating the radar into the AIAMD network.

The Army concluded that upgrades and replacement radar options take nearly the same amount of time to field. The baseline Patriot would reach initial operational capability in fiscal year 2027, upgraded Patriot in early fiscal 2028, MFCR and MFCR with surveillance capability in late fiscal '28. G/ATOR would take the longest to reach initial operational capability, according to the slides, reaching the milestone past fiscal 2029.

The study also found the Patriot AESA radar designs represent the lowest failure and reliability risk. While Raytheon is well on its way to delivering a robust gallium nitride radar, the Army notes that there's a steep learning curve in GaN technology for some vendors.

I'm assuming here that the MFCR and Surveliance in the bold portion above refers to the two MEADS radars?? I assume the risk in the MEADS sensors comes from the software, since the US Army always wanted its own software different from the other MEADS partner, even prior to MEADS termination.

 

[marauder2048]

Just thinking aloud if the Army can incorporate the new Air Force 3DELRR radar into the network they will have a 360 deg. sensor for detecting air and missile targets. It's unclear to me whether this radar can detect ballistic missiles as the verbiage I've seen just uses the word missiles. I suppose it could me just air breathing cruise missiles.

Both Patriot launchers and radars are on turntables. Can I assume they can rotate a few degrees to change their field of view if needed? If so won't this combined with the above give the Army a rudimentary 360 degree system without the need for 3 Patriot fire units at every site?

Mark

3DELRR is supposed to be IBCS compatible. Whether it can provide midcourse updates to the missile during flyout is going to depend on which vendor wins the recompete; only Raytheon's offering was in-band with respect to
current Patriot missile datalinks.

The post above about AESA upgrades for the 360 deg. Sentinel radars (which would be in-band with respect to Patriot) strikes me as one of the more interesting recent developments.

 

[bring_it_on]

The other 2 radars were in the S and L band. S-band Northrop Grumman offering shared commonality with the G/ATOR which is already doing the rounds as a potential candidate but is unlikely. Lockheed's L-band 3DELRR would seem an extremely unlikely solution given the challenges the patriot system requires. I really don't see them choosing a lower frequency than the C band GaN Patriot, or C-Band Raytheon 3DELRR.

The post above about AESA upgrades for the 360 deg. Sentinel radars (which would be in-band with respect to Patriot) strikes me as one of the more interesting recent developments.

Do you think they'll try scaling it up or just go for a dispersed sensor setup using the upgraded Patriot (no 360 degrees coverage) supplemented with longer ranged AESA Sentinel?

 

[Mark S.]

Wasn't thinking of using the 3DELRR radar for missile guidance updates. What I had in mind is using it as a surveillance sensor for initial track and cueing the existing Patriot radar. It would tell the Patriot where to look and the system would slew the antenna to the new azimuth. Missile updates would occur as they do now. That would keep integration costs down.

 

[bring_it_on]

Wasn't thinking of using the 3DELRR radar for missile guidance updates. What I had in mind is using it as a surveillance sensor for initial track and cueing the existing Patriot radar.

In that case a C band sensor helping a similar sensor would be quite pointless. Lockheed has an in-developmenet, funded UHF Surveillance radar with 360 degrees capability, and long range should the JLENS get cancelled.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPWS_zYLL24

Also, this bit from a paper on MEADS is an interesting perspective on the AOA for that system:

Sensor trade studies considered a broad range of radar operating frequencies for the MEADS sensors,fromVHFtoX-Band. Bothsingle-radaranddual-radar configuration were considered. A split function, dual-band sensor suite was determined to require the fewest end items and lowest Life Cycle Cost.
We selected UHF for the surveillance function, and X-Band for the precision tracking, discrimination, and fire control functions. The UHF band is preferable for efficient wide area search, while X-Band is capable of great precision and accuracy for tracking, and wide bandwidth for discrimination. The reference MEADS fire unit includes one UHF Surveillance Radar (SR) and two X-Band Multifunction Fire Control Radars (MFCRs); a single radar design at any compromise frequency would require more total radar units to handle the specified threat.
Figure 6 shows the MEADS ground sensors. The SR is a rotating, solid state, phased array radar,with an integrated IFF antenna above the main radars ntenna. Like wise the MFCR i sa rotating, solid state, phased array radar, but it has an optional ESM subsystem in addition to IFF. Both sensors can operate in a staring mode to cover a limited azimuth sector or a rotating mode to cover 360'. The two systems utilize a common Power/Communications Unit and Commercial Power Interface Unit (CPIU). While the two radars are very different in RF frequency, they share a common mechanical platform and digital signaVdata processor.

 

[bring_it_on]

Raytheon rolls out new radar, dubbed Patriot AESA


The new and improved Patriot radar is taking off on a road trip around the country and the first stop was here in Huntsville at the Association of the United States Army Global Force Symposium. The updated Patriot AESA radar is made of Gallium Nitride, or GaN, and is the latest update to the system which is managed at Redstone Arsenal.

"The Patriot AESA is the next generation of the Patriot radar. As the threat evolves so does the Patriot to outpace the threat," explained Douglas Burgess Director for Raytheon's Patriot AESA Programs.

"The radar is the eyes and ears of the system. it is constantly looking to see if any threats are coming and it is the first one to detect and tell the rest of the system or the operators that there is potentially a hostile threat coming their way," Burgess explained.

The GaN is a critical part of the updated radar.

"That gives us an opportunity for more power, more capability," said Burgess. "The way I like to say it is, the normal Patriot operates at 10 and with this now we can turn the volume up to 30."

Gallium Nitride is also more efficient in that less fuel is required to power the radar, making this an almost "green" upgrade as well.

The new system provides 360 degrees of rotation, ensuring full coverage of the protected area and,according to a release from Raytheon, also uses an active electronic scanning array radar.

"Instead of shining a powerful, single transmitter through many lenses, the new array uses many smaller transmitters, each with its own control. The result is a system that is not only more flexible, with an adjustable beam for many different missions, but also more reliable; it still works even if some of the transmitters do not."

The $200 million project was fully funded by Raytheon and integrating the GaN technology onto the Patriot radar has been in the works for approximately 2 years.

Raytheon officially rolled out the prototype on Tuesday at AUSA and is hoping to spur up some interest from top Army leadership, and then eventually, our partner nations. Raytheon is now beginning testing on the new radar with the hopes of potentially fielding the system in a few years.

"It really depends on the customer. It could be 2, 3, 4 years but it really just depends on the requirements that the customer has."

 

[marauder2048]

Wasn't thinking of using the 3DELRR radar for missile guidance updates. What I had in mind is using it as a surveillance sensor for initial track and cueing the existing Patriot radar. It would tell the Patriot where to look and the system would slew the antenna to the new azimuth. Missile updates would occur as they do now. That would keep integration costs down.

Gotcha; As part of the AOA, The Army looked at 3DELRR as an outright Patriot radar replacement. Since 3DELRR will be IBCS capable regardless of the winner, having 3DELRR perform initial track/cueing +handoff to Patriot is doable.

 

[bring_it_on]

PAC-3 MSE continues successful missile engagements

Lockheed Martin's PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE) successfully engaged a threat representative ballistic missile target during a 17 March demonstration of the Patriot missile defence system at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

This was the third of four planned developmental tests of the Patriot Post Deployment Build (PDB)-8 system. Developmental testing will complete in 2016 and the army's PDB-8 operational tests will begin in 2017.

During the 17 March test, a Patriot Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) system tracked and engaged the ballistic missile target, which was subsequently destroyed by a PAC-3 MSE interceptor, Scott Arnold, vice president of PAC-3 programmes for Lockheed Martin, told IHS Jane's on 22 March.

"In this particular flight test, it went up against a short range ballistic missile, which was intercepted at high altitude by the [PAC-3] MSE with a 'hit-to-kill' direct body impact," Arnold said.

The PAC-3 MSE is capable of intercepting a threat at roughly double the altitude of the PAC 3 missile, Arnold added. According to IHS Jane's Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence , the PAC-3 MSE has a reach (altitude against a ballistic missile target) of up to 148,829 ft.

The PAC-3 MSE launch was followed by the launch of a Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missile - Tactical (GEM-T) ballistic missile interceptor, both targeting a threat-representative ballistic missile target. While the PAC-3 MSE uses 'hit-to-kill' to terminate a target, the GEM-T interceptor flies close to the threat and explodes. The 17 March test demonstrated the ability to launch both missile types against a single threat.

For the most recent PDB-8 test, Lockheed Martin provided software upgrades and enhancements for both the ground equipment as well as for the missile, Arnold noted.

"We upgraded software to the fire solution computers, the launcher electronic systems, the system guidance computer, the system inertial measurement unit, the radio frequency downlink device, and the missile seeker," he said.

Lockheed Martin, which declared initial operational capability for the PAC-3 MSE in September 2015, has been cleared to offer the missile to 20 countries.

"At the flight test event [the US Army] had five current Patriot customers who came out to see the test and three prospective new Patriot buyers that witnessed the test," Arnold said. "We expect the first international [PAC-3 MSE] customer to be on board this year."

The PAC-3 MSE has a larger dual-pulse solid rocket motor, larger control fins, and an upgraded support system. Besides extending the reach of the missile, the upgrades improve the performance against missile threats, according to Lockheed Martin.

The PAC-3 MSE's continues to demonstrate its advanced capability against air breathing and ballistic missile threats. Once the US Army decides on a path forward for its Low Tier Air & Missile Defense system, introducing a 360° radar will add even greater capability to the MSE, Lockheed Martin has said.

However, the army will need to publish its Analysis of Alternatives before any talk of procuring a system can begin.

Germany has been considering the PAC-3 MSE as the primary interceptor for its Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem (TLVS) air and missile defense system, writes Robin Hughes .

However, concerns over the cost of the interceptor have delayed a German Air Force procurement commitment, with discussions ongoing at industry level on how many systems will be procured. A decision is expected later this year - and could potentially include more than originally outlined, Brigadier General Michael Grossmann told the Defence IQ Integrated Air & Missile Defence conference in London on 16 March.

TLVS is based on Lockheed Martin's Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and uses components developed by the company including the battle manager, radars, and launcher, and will fire the PAC-3 MSE. Germany's Federal Office of Bundeswehr for Equipment, Information Technology, and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) has contracted Diehl Defence's IRIS-T SL (Surface Launched) interceptor as the medium range component for TLVS.

 

[DrRansom]

High altitude PAC-3 MSE performance is probably due to the maneuvering thrusters at the nose. That would give the missile better maneuverability in the thin atmosphere.

The issue is slant-range / covered area.

 

[bring_it_on]

I guess that would also depend upon what the target is, a TBM at distance or an air breathing threat flying at mid-low altitude.

 

[marauder2048]

High altitude PAC-3 MSE performance is probably due to the maneuvering thrusters at the nose. That would give the missile better maneuverability in the thin atmosphere.

The issue is slant-range / covered area.

If GEM-T is indeed TVM rather than kinematically limited, then the range bump that the AESA-based Patriot radar provides automatically bumps the effective range of GEM-T.

 

[sferrin]

High altitude PAC-3 MSE performance is probably due to the maneuvering thrusters at the nose. That would give the missile better maneuverability in the thin atmosphere.

The issue is slant-range / covered area.

Yeah, I think that article is a bit misleading. 148,000ft (28 miles) slant range. No way is that altitude capability. And those thrusters won't help up high, if anything they would make things worse.

 

[DrRansom]

Why would the side thrusters make the PAC-3 worse at high altitudes? I thought they could turn the missile beyond aerodynamic forces, useful when pressure drops at high altitude?

I interpreted the statement as the PAC-3 MSE can make an interception at a higher altitude than a PAC-2. The PAC-2, restricted to thrust vector and aerodynamic lift, would have less turning capacity at high altitude than the PAC-3 MSE. But the PAC-2, with a larger motor, has a longer fly-out range.

 

[bring_it_on]

More on the 3delrr

Air Force anticipates software, material risks in 3DELRR development


The Air Force is tracking several risk areas in development of the Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, even as it works toward making a new contract award sometime this spring.

The Government Accountability Office released its annual review of selected Defense Department acquisition programs March 31, and included a report on the 3DELRR program. The report notes that while more detailed risk assessments will be completed once the service selects a system design, the service is assessing a number of inherent risk areas, including software development and integration and semiconductor technology.

Because 3DELRR is a software-heavy system, the program has identified its development as a high-risk area. If the design isn't adequate it could disrupt system integration and add cost and schedule delays.

"Program officials also stated that integrating the extensive amount of re-used software code contributed to the level of risk, but noted that each contractor is planning to mature and test software prior to installation and integration into the system," the report states.

The program will also incorporate a new semiconductor technology that uses gallium nitride-based modules to transmit and receive electromagnetic signals. Past systems have used gallium arsenide modules. The report states that introduction of a new material could pose schedule risks, but those risks may be balanced by the potential for greater efficiency.

"While the use of gallium nitride may present some risks for the program, as long-term reliability and performance of this material are unknown and could affect radar sensitivity and power requirements, it has the potential to provide higher efficiency with lower power and cooling demands than legacy semiconductor technology," the report states.

The Air Force awarded Raytheon a 3DELRR development contract in October 2014. Competitors Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman protested the award with GAO, and before the agency could make a ruling in the case, the Air Force opted to take corrective action and re-evaluate the proposals. The re-bid was stalled, however, when Raytheon appealed the Air Force's decision in Federal Claims Court. The court ruled in favor of the Air Force, Raytheon appealed the ruling, and its appeal was denied in October 2015.

The GAO report notes that additional development risks may be uncovered once the Air Force selects a design, but states that software development will remain a risk, regardless of who wins the contract.

The Air Force this week unloaded $16 million in research and development contracts for Gremlins, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency program that aims to create unmanned, air-recoverable munitions.

 

[sferrin]

Why would the side thrusters make the PAC-3 worse at high altitudes? I thought they could turn the missile beyond aerodynamic forces, useful when pressure drops at high altitude?

The location of the thrusters (ahead of, or close to, the CG) means if your airframe is unstable (due to aerodynamic controls losing effectiveness) there's nothing to keep the front end in front. Tail-mounted TVC can keep the pointy end in front but those side thrusters will just push it around.

I interpreted the statement as the PAC-3 MSE can make an interception at a higher altitude than a PAC-2.

How so? This is what they said:

"The PAC-3 MSE is capable of intercepting a threat at roughly double the altitude of the PAC 3 missile, "

So the MSE has double the altitude capability of the vanilla model PAC-3. The only thing they said about PAC-2 is that it uses an exploding warhead rather than hit-to-kill.

The PAC-2, restricted to thrust vector and aerodynamic lift, would have less turning capacity at high altitude than the PAC-3 MSE. But the PAC-2, with a larger motor, has a longer fly-out range.

PAC-2 doesn't have any form of TVC. IMO neither one would be stellar turners at 80,000 feet let alone almost double that.

 

[marauder2048]

Why would the side thrusters make the PAC-3 worse at high altitudes? I thought they could turn the missile beyond aerodynamic forces, useful when pressure drops at high altitude?

A large low-pressure region develops immediately downstream of the side thruster due the jet's interaction with the freestream; the resulting pressure gradient can severely attenuate or even reverse the pitching moment induced by the thruster.

There are clever ways of scheduling thruster firings to overcome this and I thought the jet interaction got better at higher altitudes.

 

[Mark S.]

Based on this: http://www.meads-amd.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/FactSheet_PAC31.pdf The max load-out of PAC-3MSE's on a launcher is 12. Also you can mix 6 of the MSE's with 8 of the standard PAC-3's. It may have been posted before but it's news to me.

For a slant range of 148,000 ft. you have an altitude capability of approximately 104,000 at a flight 45 degrees from the horizon. If the fly out is 30 degrees the altitude is 74,000 ft.

Wouldn't control effectiveness be influenced by Q? At higher speeds Q is greater and it's not linear but a second order equation. The question is does the effects of lower air density at altitude or Q govern?

 

[sferrin]

Based on this: http://www.meads-amd.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/FactSheet_PAC31.pdf The max load-out of PAC-3MSE's on a launcher is 12. Also you can mix 6 of the MSE's with 8 of the standard PAC-3's. It may have been posted before but it's news to me.

Probably running into a weight limit for the launcher as the PAC-3 MSE fits the same cell-size as the original PAC-3.

 

[bring_it_on]

There is a reduction in load out on the patriot launcher as well. I believe its 16 PAC-3's vs 12 MSE's with the mix being on the patriot launchers. MEADS launcher carries 8 MSE rounds.

 

[DrRansom]

How so? This is what they said:

"The PAC-3 MSE is capable of intercepting a threat at roughly double the altitude of the PAC 3 missile, "

Whoops.... Thanks for the clarification.

 

[marauder2048]

Wouldn't control effectiveness be influenced by Q? At higher speeds Q is greater and it's not linear but a second order equation. The question is does the effects of lower air density at altitude or Q govern?

To grossly oversimplify, the pitching moment induced by the side thruster is a function of ambient pressure; there's amplification of the pitching moment (generally positive but can be negative) at higher ambient pressure (lower altitude) because of a high pressure region that forms upstream of the thruster jet. That amplification drops off as ambient pressure drops off and is not offset by the thruster force which is actually increasing with decreasing ambient pressure. Hope that makes sense.

In any event, here's some nice 1080p footage of PAC-3 MSE in flight.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFnC-6NipxM

 

[Mark S.]

marauder,

Thanks. I understand.

Mark

 

[bring_it_on]

Old video that showcases Raytheon's early concepts to transform Patriot and IBCS into an integrated 360 degree capability

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pPw6hhK53EA

 

[marauder2048]

On the old material front, does anyone have imagery for the Patriot Anti-Cruise Missile (PACM) project which was a PAC-2 with an active, Ka-band seeker, divert thrusters and an aimable kinetic energy rod warhead?

Apparently PACM had two successful intercepts against cruise missile surrogates back in 1999.

 

[bring_it_on]

What I can gather on the Patriot Anti‐Cruise Missile is that it was a retrofit planned that added a new, active seeker onto existing PAC-2's with perhaps additional modifications, for an affordable cost. Here is an old Defense Daily article on it:

Raytheon's (RTNA/RTNB) Patriot anti-cruise missile (PACM) program has cleared its first funding hurdle, as the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) last week agreed to add $60 million in FY '00 to fund improvements to 200 older Patriot and Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missiles for cruise missile defense.

The SASC approved the $60 million increase for PACM production contingent upon two successful flight tests of the missile to be conducted this July.

Ed Franklin, vice president of Raytheon Systems Company's Air and Missile Defense division in Bedford, Mass., told Defense Daily last week in a telephone interview that Congress was leaning toward funding PACM. Other industry sources, however, said that there was significant opposition in the Senate Appropriations Committee to the full $60 million addition.

PACM must now clear the other defense committees, including the SAC, the House Armed Services Committee and the House Appropriations Committee, and the conferences between the House and Senate for FY '00 defense funding.

The Army has directed Raytheon not to jeopardize funding for the PAC-3 program which involves Lockheed Martin (LMT), Raytheon, and Boeing (BA). DoD budget limits, scheduling problems for the test flight program, and cost overruns have caused the Pentagon to reduce its objective number of PAC-3 missiles from 1,200 to 560--thus increasing the unit cost of the missile from $1.2 million to more than $2 million, an industry source said.

PAC-3 is to be able to counter theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Despite the cost growth, PAC-3 has recorded one successful "hit to kill" intercept. Earlier Patriots, by contrast, have a "blast fragmentation warhead" which would be used in the PACM program. Boeing, which builds the PAC-3 seeker, and Lockheed Martin, which builds the PAC-3 missile, believe the "blast fragmentation warhead" is unproven against cruise missiles. The companies also contend that, if anything, the Army should use a congressional add of $60 million to help the service to buy back PAC-3 missiles to reach the objective number of 1,200.

Raytheon has built six PACM seekers at its plants in Bedford, Quincy and Andover, Mass. Assuming such seekers are installed on 500 of the older Raytheon-built Patriots, the cost per seeker is estimated to be between $400,000 and $700,000--the latter being the government's estimate and the former being Raytheon's estimate.

"PACM has a number of key features which enhance effectiveness in countering the advanced cruise missile threat," according to a report last month to Congress from the Army's Air and Missile Defense Program Executive Office in Huntsville, Ala. "The 16-inch diameter of the current Patriot missile makes room for a relatively large radar antenna. The aperture (area) of the antenna directly relates to the ability of the radar to detect small radar cross section targets."

The PAC-3 missile has a smaller 10-inch diameter, meaning the PACM seeker could not be installed on that missile.

"The Patriot Weapon System has highly effective techniques to defeat electronic countermeasures," according to the Army report to Congress. "PACM retains all the potential for this demonstrated capability while supplementing it with the significant added benefit of an active radar seeker. PACM is a far more capable cruise missile killer than any fielded version of Patriot."

Asked whether PACM's technology permits it to counter cruise missiles more effectively than PAC-3, Franklin replied that Raytheon believes PACM represents a "significant" improvement to PAC-3 against cruise missiles but that details on such an improvement were classified.

The Army and Raytheon negotiated on a series of flight tests this summer, talks which resulted in a determination that the Army should, as a risk reduction measure, first conduct a test using a standard PAC-2 missile and the upgraded PAC-3 radar and software, Franklin said. In July, the PACM missile is to be tested with the PAC- 3 radar.

"We're confident on the software and the radar. We're very confident on the missile," Franklin said. "But we only have four PACM missiles. You ought to be prudent in the way you build up to these tests."

Asked whether PACM was a threat to the PAC-3 program, Franklin replied, "I would be less than realistic if I said you couldn't view this as a threat. It's not intended to be a threat. That's clearly not our intent. We view it as a very smart way of upgrading the Patriot inventories. It doesn't take the place of a PAC-3. It's not a hit-to- kill missile. I view PACM as an adjunct of PAC-3."

Post PACM tests, Raytheon offered to put an active Ka band seeker, replace the warhead and create a HTK variant of the PAC-2 with other upgrades as well. That is a concept we should be looking at now given the PAC-2 inventory..

Raytheon proposes upgrade for Patriot

Raytheon has proposed adding a new front end to older MIM-104 Patriot air-defence interceptor missiles in the US Army's inventory to increase their lethality and give them a 'hit-to-kill' capability comparable to the service's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile, writes Michael Sirak.

The concept would incorporate an active Ku-band seeker and thruster on to the existing PAC-2 missile as part of its service-life extension programme (SLEP), replacing its passive seeker and blast-fragmentation warhead.

These new components, company officials say, would give the missile the ability to manoeuvre in the terminal phase of its flight to collide with and destroy incoming ballistic or cruise missiles as well as aircraft and unmanned air vehicles. This enhanced lethality over blast-fragmentation warheads, they say, is especially important against weapons of mass destruction warheads.

The concept leverages the PAC-2's greater kinematic range and keep-out altitude over the PAC-3, the company says. An active seeker would also allow the PAC-2 to receive in-flight target updates from distributed sensors to enable over-the-horizon 'engage-on-remote' scenarios.

David Hartman, Raytheon's business development manager for theatre missile defence programmes, said the company believes the concept, known as 'PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill', could be done quickly and affordably. A PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill interceptor would be about a quarter of the cost of the PAC-3 missile, he noted. The upgrades would also include software modifications.

Together with the PAC-3, Raytheon says the PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill missile would comprise a more potent Patriot fleet than the US Army currently envisions for the remainder of the Patriot's service life to 2028. The army's current SLEP will upgrade PAC-2 and PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEMs) to the PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile+ configuration. This variant, which retains a blast-fragmentation warhead, integrates improved warhead fusing and a surface acoustic oscillator to improve performance against cruise missiles.

The US Army and the Office of the US Secretary of Defense have been briefed on the PAC-2 Hit-to-Kill concept. Army officials, while acknowledging the concept's promise, are hesitant to embrace it because of the funding challenges they already face in fielding the PAC-3, which is manufactured by Lockheed Martin. Although the service requires about 2,200 PAC-3 missiles, it has funding for only 1,120 units in its future budget.

"PAC-2 [Hit-to-Kill] is a good idea and I admire the competition Raytheon is doing. But I don't have money to develop that," said Shelba Proffitt, acting Programme Executive Officer for Air and Missile Defense. "I am very happy with the PAC-3 . . . if I had money, I would buy PAC-3, which is developed and proven." The PAC-3 missile is moving into its operational testing phase after a highly successful developmental testing stage. The army has already received 16 PAC-3 low-rate initial production missiles.

Hartman said the new seeker is a derivative of the dual-band variant Raytheon developed under the Patriot Anti-Cruise Missile concept, which it pursued to give legacy Patriot missiles capabilities against robust cruise missiles so that the army could retain its PAC-3s to counter ballistic missiles. The army chose not to adopt this design.

 

[sferrin]

If they turned PAC-2 into a hit-to-kill weapon, and repackaged the front end, they could probably squeeze a not insignificant amount of fuel into the freed up space.

 

[bring_it_on]

^ That was my thinking as well. The longer ranged AESA radar, and the integration thanks to dispersed AN/MPQ-64A3's netted through IBCS could open up long range opportunities against air-breathing threats. Don't know when the next major upgrade is due for the PAC-2's but this was and still is a solid proposal While magazine capacity, and ballistic missile defense is driving decisions and rightly so, there will be a point in time when the Patriot system would have to consider the stress posed by very stealthy UCAV's, stealthy cruise missiles, stealth fighters and perhaps even stealth bombers. Knowing that decisions made over the next 5 years will take a decade or more to show up (taking MEADS as an example) they better get working on this now!. While ballistic missiles will continue to stress Patriot and THAAD, given their modernization trajectory it won't be surprising to see stealthy UCAV's and even stealthy long range strike bombes coming out of China.

Of course, since then Raytheon has come out and said that they are working on an advanced capability interceptor, but shared nothing else about it. They could also leverage the SM6 seeker and lower cost further. I just find it tough to believe that given the budget, they can barely fund a radar upgrade and perhaps new or heavily modified launchers when they have a lot of technology in place to revamp the entire system including a clean sheet radar, and deeper integration with other ABM elements (TPY-2's). What is worrisome is that ex-Patriot users like Germany by adopting MEADS haven't really shown any intention to getting a long range interceptor to replace the outgoing PAC-2 capability with their legacy patriot. What happens with MEADS deploys in the future and the footprint is the IRIS-T and PAC-3MSE? The Advanced Threat Interceptor proposal from Raytheon could be a bridge weapon that could work with both the MEADS and upgraded-Patriots since there is a common long term requirement to upgrade all spheres of IAMD.

"We are looking at some options for a partner for LCI; we currently have joint ventures with Rafael for Stunner and have considered Deihl and the IRIS-T. We have also looked at [co-opting] our own AMRAAM and AMRAAM-ER for Next-Generation Patriot. We have not made any decisions yet," he said. Beyond LCI, Glaeser note that Raytheon is looking at developing an Advanced Threat Interceptor (ATI) to better tackle high-altitude threats.

 

[Mark S.]

By adding propellant and going with a HTK warhead to the PAC-2 airframe will it become a THAAD junior? If so it may compete for funds for that system. IT might enhance BMD by making more firing units available for destroying MRBMs.

 

[bring_it_on]

By adding propellant and going with a HTK warhead to the PAC-2 airframe will it become a THAAD junior? If so it may compete for funds for that system. IT might enhance BMD by making more firing units available for destroying MRBMs.

It wouldnt become a THAAD junior (THAAD is a high altitude system) or threaten it since it would still cover altitudes that the THAAD doesn't, and the fact that it would cover the entire spectrum of the AMD threat (Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Manned / Unmanned Aircraft) while THAAD is purely an ABM system.