Patriot SAM replacement

[marauder2048]

Thing is, from an offensive standpoint you can go REALLY cheap. Imagine an SRBM/IRBM/MRBM with, say, a 3,000lb payload that chucks out SDB equivalents. You could make the booster dumb as a post, really cheap. All it has to do is have enough accuracy to get the truckload of RVs into the basket where the terminal guidance could take over. Think what it would take to intercept a dozen RVs. And that's just one missile.

Maybe the "SDB equivalents" is throwing me, but wouldn't this imply a low altitude, relatively low velocity submunition dispersal? It would seem you could play roughly the same trick on the defense with an ATACMS
that puts a cluster of parachute retarded MHTKs in the basket.

 

[bobbymike]

Thing is, from an offensive standpoint you can go REALLY cheap. Imagine an SRBM/IRBM/MRBM with, say, a 3,000lb payload that chucks out SDB equivalents. You could make the booster dumb as a post, really cheap. All it has to do is have enough accuracy to get the truckload of RVs into the basket where the terminal guidance could take over. Think what it would take to intercept a dozen RVs. And that's just one missile.

Maybe the "SDB equivalents" is throwing me, but wouldn't this imply a low altitude, relatively low velocity submunition dispersal? It would seem you could play roughly the same trick on the defense with an ATACMS
that puts a cluster of parachute retarded MHTKs in the basket.

Just read that as 'a lot of little precision warheads'

 

[Grey Havoc]

All of which are illegal under the idiotic CCM treaty, unfortunately. So until sane governments get back into office and that piece of badly written rubbish is junked, such an option won't be available to NATO.

 

[sferrin]

Thing is, from an offensive standpoint you can go REALLY cheap. Imagine an SRBM/IRBM/MRBM with, say, a 3,000lb payload that chucks out SDB equivalents. You could make the booster dumb as a post, really cheap. All it has to do is have enough accuracy to get the truckload of RVs into the basket where the terminal guidance could take over. Think what it would take to intercept a dozen RVs. And that's just one missile.

Maybe the "SDB equivalents" is throwing me, but wouldn't this imply a low altitude, relatively low velocity submunition dispersal? It would seem you could play roughly the same trick on the defense with an ATACMS
that puts a cluster of parachute retarded MHTKs in the basket.

Just read that as 'a lot of little precision warheads'

This. Think Mach 6 - 7 SDBs deployed from a ballistic missile. Obviously they wouldn't have the maneuverability of SDBs (though if you made them boost-glide warheads RVs . . .), and they'd have to have completely different aerodynamics; something more appropriate for hypersonic reentry. Throw a dozen of these on the front end of a conventional IRBM. 3 of them could throw 36 at Okinawa. Consider that policy is to launch 2 interceptors at each target and that's 72 THAADs you've just soaked up with 3 relatively cheap ballistic missiles. Pretty much the entire battery.

 

[DrRansom]

sferrin raises a good point about sub-munitions. Ballistic missiles have the capacity to throw more targets at a missile defense than can be defended by interceptors. Which causes more problems for a campaign level scenario, where a missile battery will have to defend a target for days to weeks. That puts a premium on any defensive strategy which doesn't require using any interceptors at all. Hence, there should be investigation other passive defensive strategies like mobility / dispersion / decoys.

bring_it_on - the US military has consistently failed to destroy mobile missile launchers of any type. Saddam kept his SCUDs operational in Gulf War 1 and managed to pull of missile launches in Gulf War 2. NATO failed to defeat outdated Serbian air defenses in Allied Force and, consequently, had an effective decrease of air power in that conflict. Libya saw SCUD attacks even after Allied air superiority. From this experience, I believe that mobility is a very valuable defensive technique. As the US needs a way to defend bases and forces while using as few missiles as possible, see above, mobility should be investigated.

 

[marauder2048]

sferrin raises a good point about sub-munitions. Ballistic missiles have the capacity to throw more targets at a missile defense than can be defended by interceptors. Which causes more problems for a campaign level scenario, where a missile battery will have to defend a target for days to weeks. That puts a premium on any defensive strategy which doesn't require using any interceptors at all. Hence, there should be investigation other passive defensive strategies like mobility / dispersion / decoys.

bring_it_on - the US military has consistently failed to destroy mobile missile launchers of any type. Saddam kept his SCUDs operational in Gulf War 1 and managed to pull of missile launches in Gulf War 2. NATO failed to defeat outdated Serbian air defenses in Allied Force and, consequently, had an effective decrease of air power in that conflict. Libya saw SCUD attacks even after Allied air superiority. From this experience, I believe that mobility is a very valuable defensive technique. As the US needs a way to defend bases and forces while using as few missiles as possible, see above, mobility should be investigated.

How do mobility, dispersion and decoys help you defend a fixed site from cruise missile attack? The Serbs (for example) had all of the above and negligibly attrited the cruise missile salvos.
Especially if the CMs are carrying a large number of dumb, area-effect submunitions you have to kill them before they can dispense which requires continuous OTH surveillance.

There are only a handful of known, cost-effective ways to do this none of which involve mobility (unless you trivially count AWACS), dispersion and decoys.

The fractionated ballistic missile payload threat has a complementary counter: the fractionated kill-vehicle. If the RVs have active or passive seekers you can counter them non-kinetically
with decoys and the like but that would be more of a last-ditch thing for leakers.

 

[sferrin]

The fractionated ballistic missile payload threat has a complementary counter: the fractionated kill-vehicle.

Still going to be murder on cost. Each KKV of an MKV costs more than a (relatively) simple SDB/RV. Also those mini-KKVs have a limited divert capability. Depending on when the attacking missile dispersed it's RVs they could be spread out too far for one MKV to cover. Also, now you've replaced your PAC-3 or THAAD with something big enough to carry an MKV and that's going to cost too.

If the RVs have active or passive seekers you can counter them non-kinetically with decoys and the like but that would be more of a last-ditch thing for leakers.

If they're using GPS/intertial that might be tough to do. Sure, you could take out the eyes of those collecting targeting data but that won't help against fixed targets.

 

[marauder2048]

The fractionated ballistic missile payload threat has a complementary counter: the fractionated kill-vehicle.

Still going to be murder on cost. Each KKV of an MKV costs more than a (relatively) simple SDB/RV. Also those mini-KKVs have a limited divert capability. Depending on when the attacking missile dispersed it's RVs they could be spread out too far for one MKV to cover. Also, now you've replaced your PAC-3 or THAAD with something big enough to carry an MKV and that's going to cost too.

I'm not convinced on the exchange ratio cost advantage for the attacking RV; it has to surive separation, carry a real payload and survive re-entry to low altitude possibly including ground penetration. The KKV cost drivers
would be primarily in guidance (could be cheap semi-active) and lateral/axial propulsion. The defending missile can be less costly (smaller payload, shorter range) than the offensive missile but as you point out it would be
larger than PAC-3 or THAAD but they are both moving to larger missiles anyway assuming THAAD-ER becomes a reality.

 

[sferrin]

I'm not convinced on the exchange ratio cost advantage for the attacking RV; it has to surive separation, carry a real payload and survive re-entry to low altitude possibly including ground penetration.

We're not talking ICBM range so the re-entry requirements wouldn't be anywhere near as tough. Separation isn't really an issue as it's been done for over half a century. And the payload only has to be large enough to do the job. If you're killing an aircraft shelter, considering your KE value as well, you're not going to need much. Consider that an SDB will do it. Now make it hit at Mach 6-8 and your required size goes down. I wouldn't be at all surprised if they could get the weight down to 150 - 200 pounds per unit including the structure necessary to hold them in place during boost. If you're going after a soft target you could make them smaller and put more of them on the missile.

The KKV cost drivers
would be primarily in guidance (could be cheap semi-active) and lateral/axial propulsion. The defending missile can be less costly (smaller payload, shorter range) than the offensive missile but as you point out it would be.

PAC-3s are about $5 million, SM-3s $17 million or so and the Block IIAs something like $30 million.

 

[DrRansom]

marauder - you move the radars around so they're harder to destroy before the main attack approaches. For example, a possible attack could use IRBMs to hit defensive radars and crater the runway, then cheap cruise missiles fly in to destroy the rest of the base.

As for the rest of your comments, you are too fixated on the idea of using interceptors against incoming missiles. Interceptor missiles simply cost too much to be bought in bulk, the bulk necessary to sustain a military force throughout a conflict. Decoys / dispersion / electronic warfare are necessary as a first method of defense, not last. Worse, we don't even know if interceptors are capable against the most advanced attacking missiles.

Can interceptors reliably shoot down hypersonic gliders? In a major raid against an airbase, a few hypersonic gliders would work wonders as a highly reliably SEAD, clearing the way for less technologically demanding weapons. The advances in missile technology are not in favor of interceptors; hence the rapid push to EM railgun and lasers. In this situation, passive defense measures may be the most reliable method.


sferrin - a PAC-3 costs $5mil? That's a pretty nasty cost, as I thought those would be the budget option against sub-munitions. Against cruise missiles or stand-off PGMs, which may cost around $1 million, ridiculous. The problem gets worse, as every military branch now has to worry about cruise missile attacks against any base, from CONUS up to the front line. Are there enough Patriot batteries to cover the major possible targets?

 

[TomS]

All of which are illegal under the idiotic CCM treaty, unfortunately. So until sane governments get back into office and that piece of badly written rubbish is junked, such an option won't be available to NATO.

The treaty doesn't apply at all to:

1) Weapons with submunitions weighing more than 20 kg, regardless of any other features.

2) Weapons with submunitions weighing more than 4 kg, as long as the weapon has less than 10 submunitions and those submunitions are individually guided and contain electronic self-destruct and deactivation mechanisms.

So a bus dispensing SDBs is in no way covered by the CCM -- the submunitions would weigh much more than 20 kg, and if you used a smaller submunition, they'd all fall under the second clause anyway.

All the CCM deals with are small, dumb submunitions dispensed in large numbers

 

[bring_it_on]

What we need with the MSE is large scale production. With a string of announcements of Patriot and/or MEADS selections/upgrades I guess we may well get to that level in a few years (by 2018) when the program enters full rate production.

sferrin - a PAC-3 costs $5mil? That's a pretty nasty cost, as I thought those would be the budget option against sub-munitions. Against cruise missiles or stand-off PGMs, which may cost around $1 million, ridiculous. The problem gets worse, as every military branch now has to worry about cruise missile attacks against any base, from CONUS up to the front line. Are there enough Patriot batteries to cover the major possible targets?

If your threat is that from cruise missiles, particularly the nasty ones that fly low and have stand-off range then you go after them using an affordable interceptor, not something that is designed to intercept tactical ballistic missiles and air-breathing threats. A SLAMRAAM, or AMRAAM-ER should do the trick at a 1/3 or so cost since that missile is smaller and has economies of scale going for it. FY16 AMRAAM costs around $1.5 Million. If you can make it hit-to-kill and develop something like a boosted CUDA, or buy the Stunner you can probably get below the $1 Million threshold. For shorter ranged, faster cruise missiles, you have the PAC-2/3/MSEs, and of course the enemy has to get to launch position where your air-assets come into play as well. The Israelis are doing this already.

 

[DrRansom]

MSE with full scale production just imposes a cost constraint on the US. If a cruise missile can be shot down by a $500k Stunner, buying Stunners for anti cruise missile role saves the US $4.5 million. That money can be pushed into buying offensive weapons, which are very much lacking in the Army. Heck, I've wondered if the Iron Dome interceptor can be used for anti-cruise missile missions. Shift all the cost and technology to the radar and engagement system then use the cheapest weapon possible to shoot them down.

 

[bring_it_on]

MSE with full scale production just imposes a cost constraint on the US. If a cruise missile can be shot down by a $500k Stunner, buying Stunners for anti cruise missile role saves the US $4.5 million. That money can be pushed into buying offensive weapons, which are very much lacking in the Army. Heck, I've wondered if the Iron Dome interceptor can be used for anti-cruise missile missions. Shift all the cost and technology to the radar and engagement system then use the cheapest weapon possible to shoot them down.

I was just adding a similar thing into my reply as you were typing. The US has looked at these sort of weapons, and we have a study here that looks at even cheaper low-cost interceptors. With Hit-To-Kill, you can bring size and cost down as the Stunner has showed, particularly if it can be standardized (or components of it) with a larger missile program. The CUDA concept looks promising to me for such a role and the stunner essentially does that with a dual mode seeker. You can go even cheaper for even cheaper munitions.

The IBCS essentially allows you to do this, and if you go back a few pages you'll see that Raytheon has plans to offer different interceptors at different price points. Cheaper integration of nodes especially when the interface is Army/DOD owned should make this much faster, cheaper and increase flexibility.

Another thing to look at the cost curve once higher rate production takes over. Compare the LRIP PAC-3 MSE cost to the 100+ SM6 (?) cost in the FY16 budget -

http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/15-F-0540_SM-6_SAR_Dec_2014.PDF

 

[marauder2048]

I'm not convinced on the exchange ratio cost advantage for the attacking RV; it has to surive separation, carry a real payload and survive re-entry to low altitude possibly including ground penetration.

We're not talking ICBM range so the re-entry requirements wouldn't be anywhere near as tough. Separation isn't really an issue as it's been done for over half a century. And the payload only has to be large enough to do the job. If you're killing an aircraft shelter, considering your KE value as well, you're not going to need much. Consider that an SDB will do it. Now make it hit at Mach 6-8 and your required size goes down. I wouldn't be at all surprised if they could get the weight down to 150 - 200 pounds per unit including the structure necessary to hold them in place during boost. If you're going after a soft target you could make them smaller and put more of them on the missile.

The KKV cost drivers
would be primarily in guidance (could be cheap semi-active) and lateral/axial propulsion. The defending missile can be less costly (smaller payload, shorter range) than the offensive missile but as you point out it would be.

PAC-3s are about $5 million, SM-3s $17 million or so and the Block IIAs something like $30 million.

Those RV velocities strike me as being much closer to the ICBM range. Do you have full specs on the SS-20 RVs for comparison (or another MIRV'ed IRBM of your choice)?

Some of SM-3's costs are driven by shipboard basing; TDACS is very expensive but mandated by the prohbition on liquid fuels.

There are other ways to drive down costs but in any event the Army is going to need to start contemplating MRBM/IRBMs to hedge against a Russian INF breakout (de facto or de jure).
Finding a way to easily switch between offensive and defensive payloads should be another avenue of exploration.

 

[sferrin]

I'm not convinced on the exchange ratio cost advantage for the attacking RV; it has to surive separation, carry a real payload and survive re-entry to low altitude possibly including ground penetration.

We're not talking ICBM range so the re-entry requirements wouldn't be anywhere near as tough. Separation isn't really an issue as it's been done for over half a century. And the payload only has to be large enough to do the job. If you're killing an aircraft shelter, considering your KE value as well, you're not going to need much. Consider that an SDB will do it. Now make it hit at Mach 6-8 and your required size goes down. I wouldn't be at all surprised if they could get the weight down to 150 - 200 pounds per unit including the structure necessary to hold them in place during boost. If you're going after a soft target you could make them smaller and put more of them on the missile.

The KKV cost drivers
would be primarily in guidance (could be cheap semi-active) and lateral/axial propulsion. The defending missile can be less costly (smaller payload, shorter range) than the offensive missile but as you point out it would be.

PAC-3s are about $5 million, SM-3s $17 million or so and the Block IIAs something like $30 million.

Those RV velocities strike me as being much closer to the ICBM range.

ICBMs are more like Mach 23 - 25 (and slowing as they get into the denser lower atmosphere). By comparison Pershing II was about Mach 8 for 1100 mile range. That also accounts for the huge difference between the HTV-2 flying at Mach 20 (launched via Minotaur/Peacekeeper) and the US Army's much slower maneuvering RV program.

 

[marauder2048]

MSE with full scale production just imposes a cost constraint on the US. If a cruise missile can be shot down by a $500k Stunner, buying Stunners for anti cruise missile role saves the US $4.5 million. That money can be pushed into buying offensive weapons, which are very much lacking in the Army. Heck, I've wondered if the Iron Dome interceptor can be used for anti-cruise missile missions. Shift all the cost and technology to the radar and engagement system then use the cheapest weapon possible to shoot them down.

Stunner is more like 3X that price, couldn't handle the same target set and has no loadout benefit. AI3 and MHTK do all of what Iron Dome offers on cost or perf but with greater loadout.

 

[marauder2048]

I'm not convinced on the exchange ratio cost advantage for the attacking RV; it has to surive separation, carry a real payload and survive re-entry to low altitude possibly including ground penetration.

We're not talking ICBM range so the re-entry requirements wouldn't be anywhere near as tough. Separation isn't really an issue as it's been done for over half a century. And the payload only has to be large enough to do the job. If you're killing an aircraft shelter, considering your KE value as well, you're not going to need much. Consider that an SDB will do it. Now make it hit at Mach 6-8 and your required size goes down. I wouldn't be at all surprised if they could get the weight down to 150 - 200 pounds per unit including the structure necessary to hold them in place during boost. If you're going after a soft target you could make them smaller and put more of them on the missile.

The KKV cost drivers
would be primarily in guidance (could be cheap semi-active) and lateral/axial propulsion. The defending missile can be less costly (smaller payload, shorter range) than the offensive missile but as you point out it would be.

PAC-3s are about $5 million, SM-3s $17 million or so and the Block IIAs something like $30 million.

Those RV velocities strike me as being much closer to the ICBM range.

ICBMs are more like Mach 23 - 25 (and slowing as they get into the denser lower atmosphere). By comparison Pershing II was about Mach 8 for 1100 mile range. That also accounts for the huge difference between the HTV-2 flying at Mach 20 (launched via Minotaur/Peacekeeper) and the US Army's much slower maneuvering RV program.

I was thinking Mach 6 - 8 *terminal* RV velocities.

 

[sferrin]

Regardless, an RV launched by an IRBM is going to impact with much more kinetic energy than a subsonic SDB.

 

[marauder2048]

Regardless, an RV launched by an IRBM is going to impact with much more kinetic energy than a subsonic SDB.

Well that's the understatement of the day

Just trying to get a sense of the interceptor's axial and divert requirements to counter your threat.

 

[bring_it_on]

Pentagon budget 2017: Army's request will fund Lower Tier Missile Defense capability studies - Janes

 

[sferrin]

Looks like they're talking about just the radar. And here I was hoping for a mini-HEDI.

 

[fredymac]

Modernization upgrades may keep Patriot in operation until something truly different in concept (or price) comes along.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ix4kse6ZRBo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dymCjQD0B3Y
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHRvyaN9gjI

 

[Void]

Geez that is sad.

They had MEADs and they just threw it away, and will now spend all this money to upgrade the archaic Patriot.

 

[marauder2048]

Geez that is sad.

They had MEADs and they just threw it away, and will now spend all this money to upgrade the archaic Patriot.

The wrinkle in all of this is the new Polish government resuming negotiations with Lockheed on MEADS for the Wisła competition.

 

[sferrin]

Geez that is sad.

They had MEADs and they just threw it away, and will now spend all this money to upgrade the archaic Patriot.

I take it you are unaware they use the same missile?

 

[bobbymike]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/gan-enabled-patriot-radar-upgrade-raytheon

 

[Void]

I take it you are unaware they use the same missile?

I am not unaware.

But the missile is a fairly small part of the system. Sticking in a new missile in an ancient SAM system does not make it new.

There is a reason it costs about $200 million a year just to support each battery. And it's not the missiles.

 

[sferrin]

I take it you are unaware they use the same missile?

I am not unaware.

But the missile is a fairly small part of the system. Sticking in a new missile in an ancient SAM system does not make it new.

You keep saying ancient. Do you honestly believe the system hasn't been upgraded over the years? Furthermore MEADS is inferior in some regards due to it's lack of a long range missile. It would take more batteries to provide the same amount of coverage.

 

[bring_it_on]

There are three components for the Patriot system upgrade. The first was the introduction of the MSE. That happened recently with its induction. The second was getting the IBCS contracted and developed. IBCS is just a few years away from IOC, and Northrop Grumman has really opened the system and has created an architecture that the Army owns allowing them to compete various enhancement and interoperability initiatives such as getting JLENS integrated, getting the Sentinel integrated as has been demonstrated. The third phase was always to upgrade the sensor. The MEADS approach would have been the best perhaps with a fixed x-band radar to accompany a UHF radar. That approach would also be the most expensive. While the GaN Patriot does offer a relatively low-risk path to upgrade it is still an upgrade when many believe that they need to pursue a totally new sensor. The current AOA is looking at that, and a few pages back there is a defensenews article that that discusses the options. The GaN patriot would still have to compete going forward. Lockheed Martin will most offer an X-Band radar, also using GaN with Northrop Grumman offering a version of their GATOR. Raytheon has in the past looked at least 2 configurations for a 360 degree upgrade (artwork posted earlier) while they have also considered a clean sheet X-band design also utilizing GaN that they now are offering for AN/TPY-2 production. By the end of this CY we should know a lot more about what direction the Army takes but eventually it would depend upon the next POTUS and what resources are projected over the next 5-10 years.

You keep saying ancient. Do you honestly believe the system hasn't been upgraded over the years? Furthermore MEADS is inferior in some regards due to it's lack of a long range missile. It would take more batteries to provide the same amount of coverage.

Thats a minor problem since a long range interceptor for the MEADS is only a function of investment. The problem with MEADS is acquisition cost and getting it to be compatible with IBCS which the Army, rightly sees as its future architecture. The best option, provided availability of funds would be to pick up elements of the MEADS such as surveillance radar which lockheed has designed around commonality with the FCR. You can then look to integrated the PAC-2 with the FCR or develop a new interceptor which would be required for the 2030's anyways. Patriot replacement isn't projected to be in service till the second half of the 2020's anyways if not early 2030's.

 

[marauder2048]

The RFI for a GaN based AESA Patriot radar replacement/upgrade went out on Friday. They are looking at L, S, C, or X frequency bands which I found interesting given the three different bands offered by the three competitors for 3DELRR (which is supposed to award this month). Might necessitate some MRFDL modifications; PAC-3 MSE supports at least X-band and C-band.

 

[bring_it_on]

RFI: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=3f1a8cff92f6fb867108ab02efb3a424&tab=core&_cview=0

LTPO-GSE requests information on AESA Antenna radar technology already developed or in development that could be utilized to upgrade or replace the PATRIOT radars fielded by the US Army and International Partners. LTPO-GSE will assess industry responses for AESA Antenna upgrades to the existing PATRIOT radar and/or responses to replace the existing PATRIOT radar with an AESA Antenna based radar. The maturity of the AESA Antenna technology must be at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or higher and manufacturing processes must be at a Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) of 6 or higher, or have the ability to reach a TRL/MRL of 6 or higher within eighteen (18) months after award of a technology maturation and risk reduction type contract. The objective of this RFI is to assess current, gallium nitride (GaN) based AESA Antenna capabilities within the US defense electronics industrial base, particularly as they relate to existing and future PATRIOT radar specifications and capabilities. The key objective for a potential PATRIOT radar replacement or upgrade to AESA Antenna technology is to reduce overall radar Operation & Support (O&S) cost out to FY40 while maintaining and/or improving radar performance against emerging threats. Goals of the PATRIOT 30 year strategy are to reduce the PATRIOT radar O&S cost and to extend the service life of PATRIOT legacy missiles to 40 years.


Responses to this RFI will be in the form of yes or no to the specific questions, listed below, with a brief justification or rationale not to exceed 200 words per question.


All responses are to be unclassified.


1. Has the respondent received a TRL 6 or higher rating for GaN-based AESA and Transmit and Receive (T/R) technology in one or more of the following frequency bands L, S, C, or X?


2. Has the respondent received an MRL 6 or higher rating for GaN-based AESA and T/R technology in one or more of the following frequency bands L, S, C, or X?


3. Does the respondent have an active facility security clearance that allows generating, processing, storing, sending and receiving of CLASSIFIED information/data and the ability to development/test hardware and software at the Secret or higher level? Please provide your companies active Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code.


4. Does the respondent have in place the infrastructure and ability to support a large scale development and production for AESA technology?


5. Does the respondent have demonstrated experience in exporting AESA technology that was originally developed for US Department of Defense Military applications?

6. Does the respondent have experience or capability in design, development and demonstration of receiver, exciter and waveform generator technology at a TRL6 or higher in one or more of the following frequency bands L, S, C, or X?


7. Does the respondent have experience and the capability/infrastructure to perform calibration/alignment of AESA antennas in one or more of the following frequency bands L, S, C, or X?

 

[sferrin]

Thats a minor problem since a long range interceptor for the MEADS is only a function of investment.

The same could be said about just about any short coming of any system. That nobody has even speculated about a longer range missile for MEADS suggests one isn't in the cards anytime soon. In the meantime the Patriot system has both the longer ranged PAC-2 and the missile from the MEADS system.

 

[bring_it_on]

Thats a minor problem since a long range interceptor for the MEADS is only a function of investment.

The same could be said about just about any short coming of any system. That nobody has even speculated about a longer range missile for MEADS suggests one isn't in the cards anytime soon. In the meantime the Patriot system has both the longer ranged PAC-2 and the missile from the MEADS system.

The interceptor development cost however, is much less than the cost to develop new radars, and other equipment. However, the biggest problem is that IBCS is the cornerstone of air-defense systems for the US Army going forward, and MEADS uses its own management elements which are not owned by the Army. The Army would need a new interceptor anyways going forward to eventually replace the Pac-2 in the 2030s and beyond unless they choose to stick with existing interceptors for a long long time. The biggest problem with MEADS radars is the cost, even though the X band and UHF band radars share commonality. At best they'll most likely upgrade the existing patriot radars..They have however conceded that an X-band FCR is the best from a technical stand-point, and I guess even better when accompanied with a Surveillance radar.

Acquiring MEADS as is, is probably not an option anymore given the money invested in the IBCS, and the fact that it will most likely IOC around the same time MEADS does, buying some of the sensors could have been but now appears unlikely.

On the investment portion for MEADS, the US which would have been the system's largest operator, isn't even buying it and the others barely have enough cash to finish development of the baseline and add a cheaper interceptor (IRIS-T) for a while. Its rather unfortunate given the money spent and the potential.

 

[marauder2048]

Thats a minor problem since a long range interceptor for the MEADS is only a function of investment.

The same could be said about just about any short coming of any system. That nobody has even speculated about a longer range missile for MEADS suggests one isn't in the cards anytime soon. In the meantime the Patriot system has both the longer ranged PAC-2 and the missile from the MEADS system.

The interceptor development cost however, is much less than the cost to develop new radars, and other equipment. However, the biggest problem is that IBCS is the cornerstone of air-defense systems for the US Army going forward, and MEADS uses its own management elements which are not owned by the Army. The Army would need a new interceptor anyways going forward to eventually replace the Pac-2 in the 2030s and beyond unless they choose to stick with existing interceptors for a long long time. The biggest problem with MEADS radars is the cost, even though the X band and UHF band radars share commonality. At best they'll most likely upgrade the existing patriot radars..They have however conceded that an X-band FCR is the best from a technical stand-point, and I guess even better when accompanied with a Surveillance radar.

Acquiring MEADS as is, is probably not an option anymore given the money invested in the IBCS, and the fact that it will most likely IOC around the same time MEADS does, buying some of the sensors could have been but now appears unlikely.

On the investment portion for MEADS, the US which would have been the system's largest operator, isn't even buying it and the others barely have enough cash to finish development of the baseline and add a cheaper interceptor (IRIS-T) for a while. Its rather unfortunate given the money spent and the potential.

They've demonstrated MEADS element (LFS and FCR) integration with IBCS. JLENS got a reprieve in the FY2017 budget but if it doesn't enter series production then LFS would be a reasonable substitute.

 

[bring_it_on]

Thanks Marauder2048, do have any writeup on MEADS, IBCS demonstrations?

 

[marauder2048]

Thanks Marauder2048, do have any writeup on MEADS, IBCS demonstrations?

Please refer to the November 2013 update.

 

[bring_it_on]

...

 

[Moose]

Drop-in replacement. Bu-dum tish

 

[bring_it_on]

Not related to the Patriot, but the USAF's decision could impact how the three manufacturers position themselves for the eventual RFP. Decision on the 3DELRR is expected by end of March.