Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

[NeilChapman]

I don't agree with nearly all of what Kadija Man said but I also don't think it is fair to label him (or her) a troll just because you don't agree with he said.
I also don't think anything he said was particularly offensive or beyond the pale of reasonable discussion.

This website needs to be able to accommodate more than one perspective, especially in what are intended as "discussion" topics; just like the outside world a bit of tolerance goes a long way.
Otherwise this just becomes another internet echo chamber.

I agree that reasoned discussion is the key. Arguments need to be reasoned and substantiated.

 

[sferrin]

I don't agree with nearly all of what Kadija Man said but I also don't think it is fair to label him (or her) a troll just because you don't agree with he said.

Wasn't labeling them a troll because of their opinion. I suspect they're trolling because it beggars belief that, considering how Russia and China are treating their neighbors, as well as historical precedent, that anybody could honestly believe that laying one's head on the block could end well. They would quite literally be putting the life of the country at the mercy of those with a track record of showing anything but. If they're honestly sincere then I apologize. I would question what they base their beliefs on though.

 

[RyanC]

US had the world's largest stockpiles and after May 1945 had access to large quantities of the German nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.

Actually, it was the UK who had the German nerve agents. the CCS/JCS recommended that filled German aerial bombs with nerve agents be held for possible use in the Far East.

 

[RyanC]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe.

When the atomic bombings brought the war to a swift close in Aug and Sep 1945, the CAPF was disbanded.

 

[NeilChapman]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe.

When the atomic bombings brought the war to a swift close in Aug and Sep 1945, the CAPF was disbanded.

A blogged review of a book about Gen Hoffmeister.

http://madpadre.blogspot.com/2008/01/what-im-reading-soldiers-general-bert.html

 

[marauder2048]

US had the world's largest stockpiles and after May 1945 had access to large quantities of the German nerve agents Sarin and Tabun.

Actually, it was the UK who had the German nerve agents. the CCS/JCS recommended that filled German aerial bombs with nerve agents be held for possible use in the Far East.

The US had captured 23,000 tons of GA (Tabun) fill aerial bombs and 6,000 tons of GA fill 105mm artillery projectiles.

20,000 tons of GA fill aerial bombs were immediately allocated for use in the Far East but the artillery projectiles had to be
drained and their contents transferred to 4.2 inch mortar shells which may or may not have been accomplished in time for OLYMPIC.

 

[marauder2048]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula

"Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan" -> transfer of US landing craft (and other vessels) that helped facilitate Soviet amphibious operations at Sakhalin and the Kurils.

 

[Rickshaw]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe.

When the atomic bombings brought the war to a swift close in Aug and Sep 1945, the CAPF was disbanded.

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

 

[NeilChapman]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe.

When the atomic bombings brought the war to a swift close in Aug and Sep 1945, the CAPF was disbanded.

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

There you are. We were afraid you'd left us.

Are you back to this narrative that the US sidelined Australian troops to seek primacy in the world? After which...

" US Government agencies were created and took control of the world's economy. American attitudes increasingly became and remain amongst some Americans a case of "Well we're doing all the fighting, so we should reap all the rewards..."'

What's it going to take for you to decide the US is not the evil empire you were portraying yesterday?

---

If you'd like I'm willing to PM with you concerning US-Australian relations. It seems like that's the core of your issue.

We seem to be way off topic from Nuclear Weapons

 

[marauder2048]

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

In offensive operations, the Australians were almost completely dependent on US logistical, naval and air support which competed with other (much larger) US operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific theaters.

Such competition would have been a non-issue for DOWNFALL which would have been the only operation.

 

[Bill Walker]

Allies were sidelined and prevented from contributing to the defeat of Japan.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/canadianarmypacificforce.htm

The Canadian Army Pacific Force was raised in 1945 as a field force intended to participate in the last phase of The War Against Japan, an anticipated Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands in the last phase of the Second World War. The CAPF was based on an infantry division structure, however, to increase operability with the Americans, certain units bore US organizational structures and names. As well, Canadian units went into training with US weapons to ease logistical concerns.

Major General Bert Hoffmeister was named to command the division, and the three Infantry Regiments (the equivalent of a Canadian brigade) had battalions bearing the name of those infantry battalions that had fought with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe.

When the atomic bombings brought the war to a swift close in Aug and Sep 1945, the CAPF was disbanded.

And don't forget Tiger Force, a joint RCAF/RAAF/RNZAF Bombing Group, roughly equivalent in size to an RAF Bomber Command Group. Training of the Canadian squadrons in Canada, recently brought home from the UK, was under way when the war ended. Canadian Lancaster production was being converted to Lincoln production at this time, in anticipation of another year or more of war. Also, many RCN assets were being transferred to the Pacific at this time. All the Canadian contribution were volunteers, and the size of the commitment was much smaller than Canada's contribution in Europe, largely because the Canadian public had little stomach left for war. Unlike the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand, Canada had little or no history of involvement in Asia or the western Pacific, but the intent was to be involved in the invasion of Japan.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

In offensive operations, the Australians were almost completely dependent on US logistical, naval and air support which competed with other (much larger) US operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific theaters.

The logistics and combat support relationship wasn't so simple. It was integrated not dependent. Lend Lease worked in both directions and Australia supplied as much as it gained. The things Australia supplied US forces in the Pacific were not things the US couldn't source from their homeland (food, repair, etc) but since Australia was closer to the action this supply saved shipping. Shipping capacity was one of the main limitations during WW2 for the Allies. The further you have to ship stuff with a finite supply of ships means the longer it takes to build up your forces and logistics for a campaign.

As to combat support (air, amphibs, navy, etc) Australia had most of this stuff and the few things it didn't have (carriers) it had the option of acquiring from the UK but chose not to keep integrated with US forces. So if Australia wanted to conduct independent operations it could have. But we kept our Navy integrated with the USN (the first ship hit by a Kamikaze was HMAS Australia at one of the Phillipines air-sea battles) and the Army/Air Force under MacArthur's SW Pacific Command.

Such competition would have been a non-issue for DOWNFALL which would have been the only operation.

Australia didn't want to compete with US operations we wanted to be a part of them. But we were left out. An Australian division was meant to be landing at Leyte and then later on Okinawa. But US high command kept dropping them from the ORBAT. This was greatly resented and seen as a political move to hog the final victory despite the shared burden and blood of the REAL victory: the turning of the tide.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There you are. We were afraid you'd left us.

Please don't accept that particular source of opinion as represenative of Australian thinking on whatever issue is at question.

Are you back to this narrative that the US sidelined Australian troops to seek primacy in the world? After which...

The US achieved global primacy in 1916 when all the other great powers or potential great powers became either dependent on its financial sector to survive (UK, France, Italy, Russia, China) or faced inevitable destruction (Germany, Austria-Hungry, Turkey) from the weapons (built in America) that American money supplied. Ironically the only country in a similar financial and economic position as the USA in 1916 (though at a much smaller scale) was Japan. Though the Japanese leadership at this time strongly acknowledged the primacy of America's global position. Something the next generation of Japanese leadership would bet against to their eventual dismay.

What's it going to take for you to decide the US is not the evil empire you were portraying yesterday?

Unfortunately this phenomon is only countered through an actual objective understanding of analysis of history and the contemporary state of the world. But most people are bombarded with a simplistic, post-modern inspired (ie the strong are always evil), subjective understandings of history and the world via the mass media (including the Big Bull Shit (BBS) Industry: the liberal arts communities of most high education) that preaches the "evil empire" nonsense (as part of a wide catalogue of other nonsense).

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Hmmmm. Maybe. But I can't think of any examples where intentionally weakening one's self has resulted in everybody else doing the same. No matter how "enlightened" we might want to think humanity is there are always predators and prey. One sees that at every level of life, from the animal kingdom, to the playground, to entire countries on the world stage. To think that, somehow, it would be different this time, when all of human history shows the opposite, displays a dangerous lack of awareness. If an individual wants to move to a dangerous neighborhood and then take all the locks off their house and throw a "gun free zone" sign in their front yard that's one thing. To try to impose that on an entire country. . .yeah.

The practice of applying the scientific method to the study of society is only very new but it is already providing startling confirmation of what has been generally held as wise insight for some time. By the scientific method I mean its actual definition including verifiable and repeatable experimentation analysed by mathematics. Most social “science” to date has just been opinion (in many cases very informed opinion) that seems to be a good explanation of why we do the sh#t we do. Of course this scientific understanding of society, Cliodynamics (sure a dumb name but so was Aeroplane until we got used to it), is highly unpopular with the people who have been making a living of using their opinions to influence understanding of human society.

Anyway Cliodynamics is demonstrating that the key issue in the success of human societies over other human societies is cooperation. And that our past 10,000 years of warfare driven human competition has provided the evolutionary razor to develop our highly cooperative societies we have today.

In effect evolution drives out predators from within societies. Because those societies that have high internal predation just can’t succeed against those that do. Which of course should ring huge alarm bells for anyone interested in the long term success of American society. But not in competition with Russia, China, India, Iran or “Arabia”. These societies have even worse internal predation than America.

 

[NeilChapman]

There you are. We were afraid you'd left us.

Please don't accept that particular source of opinion as represenative of Australian thinking on whatever issue is at question.

I certainly don't. There is a very deep, long and respectful relationship between the United States and Australia at a political level. Probably even more so at the personal level.

I'm originally from the Pacific Northwest of the US. That same "can do", "get it done", "big sky", "personal responsibility", adventurous attitude is what I've found with most Australians I've had the pleasure of meeting.

This is why that particular source is perplexing. It almost seems as if this source is not originally from Australia.

Are you back to this narrative that the US sidelined Australian troops to seek primacy in the world? After which...

The US achieved global primacy in 1916 when all the other great powers or potential great powers became either dependent on its financial sector to survive (UK, France, Italy, Russia, China) or faced inevitable destruction (Germany, Austria-Hungry, Turkey) from the weapons (built in America) that American money supplied. Ironically the only country in a similar financial and economic position as the USA in 1916 (though at a much smaller scale) was Japan. Though the Japanese leadership at this time strongly acknowledged the primacy of America's global position. Something the next generation of Japanese leadership would bet against to their eventual dismay.

Achieving global primacy, then recognizing and acting in a positive way on the responsibility of that position is much different than the seeking for nafarious purposes as suggested by that source.

What's it going to take for you to decide the US is not the evil empire you were portraying yesterday?

Unfortunately this phenomon is only countered through an actual objective understanding of analysis of history and the contemporary state of the world. But most people are bombarded with a simplistic, post-modern inspired (ie the strong are always evil), subjective understandings of history and the world via the mass media (including the Big Bull Shit (BBS) Industry: the liberal arts communities of most high education) that preaches the "evil empire" nonsense (as part of a wide catalogue of other nonsense).

Amen brother.

It's important to engage these incorrect conclusions with a reasoned, objective approach. The goal is to encourage the rejection of subjective understandings to be part of a positive solution to the difficult problems facing us our childrens' futures.

Thank you for your insightful input Abraham.

 

[NeilChapman]

Hmmmm. Maybe. But I can't think of any examples where intentionally weakening one's self has resulted in everybody else doing the same. No matter how "enlightened" we might want to think humanity is there are always predators and prey. One sees that at every level of life, from the animal kingdom, to the playground, to entire countries on the world stage. To think that, somehow, it would be different this time, when all of human history shows the opposite, displays a dangerous lack of awareness. If an individual wants to move to a dangerous neighborhood and then take all the locks off their house and throw a "gun free zone" sign in their front yard that's one thing. To try to impose that on an entire country. . .yeah.

The practice of applying the scientific method to the study of society is only very new but it is already providing startling confirmation of what has been generally held as wise insight for some time. By the scientific method I mean its actual definition including verifiable and repeatable experimentation analysed by mathematics. Most social “science” to date has just been opinion (in many cases very informed opinion) that seems to be a good explanation of why we do the sh#t we do. Of course this scientific understanding of society, Cliodynamics (sure a dumb name but so was Aeroplane until we got used to it), is highly unpopular with the people who have been making a living of using their opinions to influence understanding of human society.

Anyway Cliodynamics is demonstrating that the key issue in the success of human societies over other human societies is cooperation. And that our past 10,000 years of warfare driven human competition has provided the evolutionary razor to develop our highly cooperative societies we have today.

In effect evolution drives out predators from within societies. Because those societies that have high internal predation just can’t succeed against those that do. Which of course should ring huge alarm bells for anyone interested in the long term success of American society. But not in competition with Russia, China, India, Iran or “Arabia”. These societies have even worse internal predation than America.

Interesting concept. A professors dream - lots of research to undertake. Thanks for including the article.

It seems like there are a huge number of variables to consider.

 

[Rickshaw]

There you are. We were afraid you'd left us.

:

Are you back to this narrative that the US sidelined Australian troops to seek primacy in the world? After which...

" US Government agencies were created and took control of the world's economy. American attitudes increasingly became and remain amongst some Americans a case of "Well we're doing all the fighting, so we should reap all the rewards..."'

What's it going to take for you to decide the US is not the evil empire you were portraying yesterday?

The US is not an "evil empire" and I've never used those words, so, please don't try attempting to erect a strawman characterisation of my attitude towards the USA.

I don't hate the USA, I find it interesting how blind many Americans are to the motivations behind what the USA does, that's all. All my life I have read and watched the USA moving consistently to ensure that it is the top most nation in the world's pecking order. Is that "evil"? I'm sure from the perspective of most Americans it isn't perceived as such. The process whereby so much of the world's aspirations and worth is trampled by Washington is quite deplorable IMO but to describe it as "evil" is IMO a bit excessive. What do you think?

 

[Rickshaw]

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

In offensive operations, the Australians were almost completely dependent on US logistical, naval and air support which competed with other (much larger) US operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific theaters.

I'd suggest your characterisation of Australia's logistics as being "almost completely dependent on the US" as being non-sensical. By 1944, Australia had the largest proportion of it's effective manpower in uniform compared to all other combatants (approximately a seventh of the total population - 1 million out of 7 million). So much so, that the troops had to be demobilised in 1945, to keep the civilian economy going.) Our industries were producing all the small arms, artillery and aircraft that we required. What we lacked was ships to carry our troops forward, which the US was not willing to provide because it favoured the use of it's own troops because Australia was not willing to remain acquiescent in the Allied conferences and potential treaty discussions. Washington (and London) could not accept that Australia was a free and independent nation, not a colony of the British Empire. We had faced down Churchill in 1941-2 over the misuse of Australian troops in Malaya and Burma. We had faced down Washington when Australia and New Zealand signed the ANZAC Pact in 1944. Washington retaliated by sidelining our forces to meaningless campaigns in the Islands to our North against Japanese forces which had been bypassed.

 

[Rickshaw]

There you are. We were afraid you'd left us.

Please don't accept that particular source of opinion as represenative of Australian thinking on whatever issue is at question.

I certainly don't. There is a very deep, long and respectful relationship between the United States and Australia at a political level. Probably even more so at the personal level.

I'm originally from the Pacific Northwest of the US. That same "can do", "get it done", "big sky", "personal responsibility", adventurous attitude is what I've found with most Australians I've had the pleasure of meeting.

This is why that particular source is perplexing. It almost seems as if this source is not originally from Australia.

I don't claim to represent anybody other than myself. I have long studied American politics and foreign policy. I don't claim to be perfect but I have more knowledge than many here appear to credit me with, yourself included. I would suggest that your knowledge of Australians is rather limited if you find my viewpoint unusual.

Are you back to this narrative that the US sidelined Australian troops to seek primacy in the world? After which...

The US achieved global primacy in 1916 when all the other great powers or potential great powers became either dependent on its financial sector to survive (UK, France, Italy, Russia, China) or faced inevitable destruction (Germany, Austria-Hungry, Turkey) from the weapons (built in America) that American money supplied. Ironically the only country in a similar financial and economic position as the USA in 1916 (though at a much smaller scale) was Japan. Though the Japanese leadership at this time strongly acknowledged the primacy of America's global position. Something the next generation of Japanese leadership would bet against to their eventual dismay.

Achieving global primacy, then recognizing and acting in a positive way on the responsibility of that position is much different than the seeking for nafarious purposes as suggested by that source.
[/quote]

It all depends upon perspective, I would suggest and by the way, the word you're looking for is "nefarious". A word I have not used and so, again I'd ask you to please not create a strawman argument which I have not used.

The US acts out of self-interest, tempered to some degree by a belief that it's self-interest is what the world needs. In reality, as experience has shown, US self-interest is not necessary good for the rest of the world. I am sure the people of Indo-China, Iraq, Afghanistan and most of Latin and Southern America would question that.

 

[marauder2048]

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

In offensive operations, the Australians were almost completely dependent on US logistical, naval and air support which competed with other (much larger) US operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific theaters.

I'd suggest your characterisation of Australia's logistics as being "almost completely dependent on the US" as being non-sensical. By 1944, Australia had the largest proportion of it's effective manpower in uniform compared to all other combatants (approximately a seventh of the total population - 1 million out of 7 million). So much so, that the troops had to be demobilised in 1945, to keep the civilian economy going.) Our industries were producing all the small arms, artillery and aircraft that we required. What we lacked was ships to carry our troops forward, which the US was not willing to provide because it favoured the use of it's own troops because Australia was not willing to remain acquiescent in the Allied conferences and potential treaty discussions. Washington (and London) could not accept that Australia was a free and independent nation, not a colony of the British Empire. We had faced down Churchill in 1941-2 over the misuse of Australian troops in Malaya and Burma. We had faced down Washington when Australia and New Zealand signed the ANZAC Pact in 1944. Washington retaliated by sidelining our forces to meaningless campaigns in the Islands to our North against Japanese forces which had been bypassed.

I'm not trying to denigrate the fighting qualities of the Australian armed forces just pointing out that it had very few long range bombers, long range recon aircraft, long range fighters,
long range troop and transport aircraft, LSTs, AKAs, APAs, LCIs, LVTs, destroyers, cruisers, minesweepers, submarines, merchantmen etc.
All of the above are rather vital to successful offensive operations in the Pacific.

Given that shipping was in short supply even for the better provisioned Central Pacific Area, there's no conspiracy needed to explain the paucity of shipping available for operations in the Southwest Pacific
Area.

And just to put things in perspective: to support Downfall, the US was deploying, just from the ETO, the equivalent of the entire Australian army at its maximum (1942) size during WWII.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

just pointing out that it had very few long range bombers, long range recon aircraft, long range fighters, long range troop and transport aircraft, LSTs, AKAs, APAs, LCIs, LVTs, destroyers, cruisers, minesweepers, submarines, merchantmen etc.

In overall numbers sure. But in a ratio of the above to divisions it was about the same as US forces. Australia was NOT deficient in the kind of enablers needed to launch an amphibious assault in WWII. Which is why were able to successfully conduct a multi division amphibious assault across multiple points on Borneo from national resources.

And just to put things in perspective: to support Downfall, the US was deploying, just from the ETO, the equivalent of the entire Australian army at its maximum (1942) size during WWII.

Yes the USA was and is bigger than Australia. But the point is not that Australia was unable to launch offensive operations in the later part of the war but was not able to deploy land and air forces against the Japanese heartland. This was because the Australian Army and RAAF were not included in the operational orders of battle. The RAN was because it was integrated with the USN and Admiral Nimitz didn’t mind using ships under the White Ensign (even if he had to supply them like the BPF). But General MacArthur in command of air-land forces kept things all Stars & Stripes (only after he had a surplus of forces) even if it meant deploying green American divisions rather than veteran Australian divisions.

 

[Rickshaw]

I'm not trying to denigrate the fighting qualities of the Australian armed forces just pointing out that it had very few long range bombers, long range recon aircraft, long range fighters,

If you look, you'll find the USAAF and USN also lacked those aircraft for most of the Pacific war. The RAAF was re-equipping with B-24 Liberators. It had Mosquito recce aircraft and Catalina flying boats. We were the fifth largest air force in the world in 1945, with several thousand aircraft at our disposal. What we lacked were bases from which to operate them in range of the Japanese home islands.

long range troop and transport aircraft, LSTs, AKAs, APAs, LCIs, LVTs, destroyers, cruisers, minesweepers, submarines, merchantmen etc.

Most of Macarthur's amphibious forces up until late 1943 were manufactured in Australia. In 1945, we were able. utilising primarily our own resources to conduct a multi-divisional amphibious assault on Borneo.

You appear to believe that the Australia forces of 1945 were like the Australian forces of 1939. They weren't. They were well equipped and extremely capable. The Japanese feared Australian forces whenever they encountered them.

All of the above are rather vital to successful offensive operations in the Pacific.

Yes and what we lacked, we lacked not because we couldn't operate them but because they were purposefully denied to us by our Allies. A fact that many here appear unwilling to understand.

Given that shipping was in short supply even for the better provisioned Central Pacific Area, there's no conspiracy needed to explain the paucity of shipping available for operations in the Southwest Pacific
Area.

We weren't asking for separate operations. We were asking to be included in joint operations.

And just to put things in perspective: to support Downfall, the US was deploying, just from the ETO, the equivalent of the entire Australian army at its maximum (1942) size during WWII.

And why redeploy them from Europe when you had a much larger Australian Army available, already, in the theatre?

Because they were American and denying Australia a place in the operations meant it was possible to deny Australia a place in the treaty negotiations.

Wilson had learnt his lesson in 1918 - keep those rowdy, unruly, Australians out!

 

[marauder2048]

just pointing out that it had very few long range bombers, long range recon aircraft, long range fighters, long range troop and transport aircraft, LSTs, AKAs, APAs, LCIs, LVTs, destroyers, cruisers, minesweepers, submarines, merchantmen etc.

In overall numbers sure. But in a ratio of the above to divisions it was about the same as US forces. Australia was NOT deficient in the kind of enablers needed to launch an amphibious assault in WWII. Which is why were able to successfully conduct a multi division amphibious assault across multiple points on Borneo from national resources.

Actually, the Borneo Campaign (which had to be drastically scaled back because MacArthur could not secure adequate shipping) proves my point.
Just look at the Naval forces for "Oboe Two", the Balikpapan invasion, which consisted of one USN amphibious task group, one USN covering group and one USN escort carrier group which were augmented by a handful of Australian ships. "Oboe One" and "Oboe Six" look little different and the composition of the air forces is even more lopsidedly USAAF.

Yes the USA was and is bigger than Australia. But the point is not that Australia was unable to launch offensive operations in the later part of the war but was not able to deploy land and air forces against the Japanese heartland. This was because the Australian Army and RAAF were not included in the operational orders of battle. The RAN was because it was integrated with the USN and Admiral Nimitz didn’t mind using ships under the White Ensign (even if he had to supply them like the BPF). But General MacArthur in command of air-land forces kept things all Stars & Stripes (only after he had a surplus of forces) even if it meant deploying green American divisions rather than veteran Australian divisions.

As Borneo demonstrated, Australian forces were almost completely dependent on USN and USAAF assets for offensive operations with the added and undesirable quirk of using equipment and weaponry that was incompatible logistically. For a protracted campaign, like Downfall, that added logistical complexity would tend to undermine the advantage of having more experienced units which is precisely why the Commonwealth Corps were to be outfitted with US equipment.

 

[bobbymike]

Actual discussion of nuclear weapons - Dr. Mark Schneider of National Institute of Public Policy.

http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2016/05/05/russias-nuclear-superiority/

 

[marauder2048]

And why redeploy them from Europe when you had a much larger Australian Army available, already, in the theatre?

Because they were American and denying Australia a place in the operations meant it was possible to deny Australia a place in the treaty negotiations.

Wilson had learnt his lesson in 1918 - keep those rowdy, unruly, Australians out!

I'm happy to address your individual points about Australia's military contribution and offensive capability but let me return to your central claim:

Yet, at the same time Australian troops had steadily been sidelined from 1944. The US wasn't interested in them going forward to Japan until the realities of the supposed casualty rates for Coronet and Downfall hit home.

From Australia's official Second World War Histories (Volume VI - The New Guinea Offensives) we have this succinct (and non-conspiratorial) estimate of the situation :

By mid–1944 Australia’s military strength was, for the time being, almost spent, having borne the main burden of the fighting on land in the South–West Pacific from the outset.

Rest, refit, replacement and retraining would preclude major Australian participation in most operations until Borneo.

 

[Rickshaw]

Rest, refit, replacement and retraining would preclude major Australian participation in most operations until Borneo.

Date of invasion of Borneo - 1 May - 21 July 1945
Planned date for Operation Olympic and Coronet - October 1945

One significantly predates the other. Borneo was a sideshow. Olympic and Coronet was the main event.

Why was the second largest, most experienced force in the Pacific theatre employed on a sideshow instead of the main event?

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/what-if-israel-didnt-have-nuclear-weapons-15666

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-us-bankrolls-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-ambitions

It years past we'd be building a few gibbets

 

[sferrin]

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-us-bankrolls-iran%E2%80%99s-nuclear-ambitions

It years past we'd be building a few gibbets

x2

 

[sferrin]

http://nypost.com/2016/05/05/playing-the-press-and-the-public-for-chumps-to-sell-the-iran-deal/

"In an astounding New York Times piece by David Samuels, senior White House officials gleefully confess they use friendly reporters and nonprofits as public relations tools in the selling of President Obama’s foreign policy — and can do it almost at will because these tools are ignorant, will believe what they’re told, will essentially take dictation and are happy to be used just to get the information necessary for a tweet or two.

Their greatest triumph, according to Samuels, was selling a misleading narrative about the nuclear deal with Iran — the parameters of which were set a year before the administration claimed and which had nothing to do with the fact that a supposedly more accommodating government had risen to power.

The mastermind of the Obama machine is Ben Rhodes, a New Yorker who joined the Obama campaign as a speechwriter in 2007 and has risen to become the most influential foreign-policy hand in the White House."

Reminds me of the contempt shown with Obamacare. Lie to the useful idiots and they lap it up, eager to rubber stamp whatever His Highness decrees.

 

[RyanC]

Washington (and London) could not accept that Australia was a free and independent nation, not a colony of the British Empire. We had faced down Churchill in 1941-2 over the misuse of Australian troops in Malaya and Burma. We had faced down Washington when Australia and New Zealand signed the ANZAC Pact in 1944. Washington retaliated by sidelining our forces to meaningless campaigns in the Islands to our North against Japanese forces which had been bypassed.

Ahem.

 

[bobbymike]

http://csis.org/event/us-nuclear-policy-post-2016-conference

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/05/06/us-nuclear-force-must-modernize-deter-russia-and-china-general-says/84022832/

The Pentagon stopped thinking about nuclear deterrence more than 20 years ago said Lt. Gen. Stephen "Seve" Wilson. The U.S. needs a credible, ready and resilient nuclear force

 

[Jemiba]

Please have a look a the title of this thread and then just stay with it !
It's not about the US political system, or the way elections are run there.
Would it be, this thread would be purely a political one ... and then it would be closed!

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/06/politics/saudi-israel-officials-talk-nuclear-u-s-/index.html

 

[bobbymike]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-vs-russia-struggling-undersea-nuclear-supremacy-16116

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/these-russian-nukes-are-better-americas-15926

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/9/vladimir-putin-shows-off-russias-military-might-de/#disqus_thread

 

[bobbymike]

Navy plans to spread lead Ohio Replacement procurement cost over three years

May 09, 2016

The Navy plans to finance the putative procurement cost of the lead ship of the Ohio Replacement Program across three years -- 2021, 2022, and 2023 -- an approach that brings total procurement spending on the first boat in the new ballistic missile submarine class, when advanced procurement beginning in FY-17 is factored in, to seven years.

The Navy, in a draft version of its FY-17 long-range shipbuilding plan, details for the first time in a public document how the service plans to structure its budgets beginning in 2021 to pay for the lead boat. The service also lays out similar plans to incrementally fund the second boat in the fleet over two years.

"To minimize overall impact to other department programs, the Navy is pursuing an incremental funding profile for the lead OR SSBN over the three year period, FY-21 to FY-23, with resources aligned 41 percent (FY-21), 35 percent (FY-22), 24 percent (FY-23)," the draft report states. Inside Defense obtained a copy of the document, first reported by Politico.

In April, the Navy provided Congress a report estimating the lead Ohio replacement submarine would cost $8.8 billion -- excluding non-recurring engineering costs for detail design, the one-time cost to research, design development and test a new product. When these development costs are factored in, the total tab is estimated to be $14.5 billion, according to the Navy report.

The procurement figures in the Navy's draft report account for the lead-ship end cost without non-recurring engineering costs. The service's FY-17 budget proposal includes a $3.6 billion placeholder in FY-21 to pay for the lead boat; a sum equal to 41 percent of $8.8 billion. That would imply plans to spend $3.1 billion in FY-22, 35 percent of $8.8 billion, under a second year of incremental payments and $2.1 billion in FY-22, 24 percent of $8.8 billion, for the third year of incremental payments.

The plan to spread ship procurement cost -- normally budgeted in full the year the vessel is purchased -- over multiple fiscal years appears to have been approved by the White House Office of Management and Budget, which late last year granted the Navy an increased allowance to budget for the lead boat in FY-21, Navy acquisition executive Sean Stackley told Congress on April 6.

"We don't have a huge spike associated with the first boat in the class," Stackley told the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee last month. "The dollars in '21 with the lead boat -- it's about $3.6 billion in 2021. OMB has provided relief of about two-thirds of that."

The Navy, according to the draft report, plans to again employ incremental funding to finance the second Ohio Replacement boat, spreading the cost for the second submarine across FY-24 and FY-25.

"Once serial production of the OR SSBN begins in FY-26, each successive OR SSBN is planned to be fully funded in the year in which the Navy intends to contract for the vessel," the draft report states.

In addition to the lead ship procurement costs outlined in the draft report, the Ohio Replacement program requires advanced funding. The service's FY-17 budget request includes the first of four years of advanced procurement funding for the new strategic deterrence submarine, including $773 million in FY-17 and $787 million in FY-18 for detailed design work on the new boat.

In FY-19, advanced procurement costs grow to $2.7 billion that include $1.7 billion for nuclear propulsion equipment, $621 million for plans, $215 million for hull, mechanical and electrical work, and $200 million for long-lead items.

In FY-20, the total advanced procurement funding is $1.3 billion, including $514 million for hull, mechanical and electrical work, $100 million for long-lead materials and $613 million for plans.

 

[bobbymike]

Nukes Are “A Big Bill”

—John A. Tirpak

5/12/2016

Modernizing the nuclear triad is going to cost “$12-$15 billion a year” for a decade or more and will likely crowd out a lot of other crucial programs if the nation doesn’t commit to spending a lot more on defense, Pentagon acquisition, technology, and logistics chief Frank Kendall said Tuesday. Addressing a seminar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Kendall said the nuclear bow wave “really starts to hit” in fiscal year 2021, when virtually all nuclear replacement programs will be underway. They include the new Air Force B-21 bomber and Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, a new Air Force ICBM to replace the Minuteman, and a replacement for the Ohio-Class nuclear ballistic submarines and their Trident missiles. Kendall said the nuclear modernization effort is one of the top two issues he’ll bequeath upon his successor: the other is “how to do well at acquisition.” Kendall said his slow-and-steady improvements to the acquisition system—codified in the “Better Buying Power” guides, now in their third iteration—have yielded great savings and sharply reduced program slippage and overages. The challenge for his successor, he predicted, will be in accelerating the process without losing the checks and balances necessary to keep things fair, supervised, and on track.

 

[Rickshaw]

Could you please provide a link to where you found that information in future. It would be appreciated.

 

[RyanC]

Now this is something I can get behind for nuclear modernization.

(found by our good friend FLATERIC, don't know if it's been posted up on SPF yet).