Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

[sferrin]

I'm not comfortable with this. If someone pops a nuke, it should be clearly understood that our response is going to be nuclear, be painful and involve very little proportionality. Having a wide range of options especially involving sub-kiloton weapons seems to be an invitation to use these things "After all, it's just a little one!" It also would seem to facilitate for tit-for tat brinkmanship that is all the more likely to give the impression that the aggressive party can win such a situation.

It's not about "we'll only use a little one". Small nukes have been around forever. For most of the time since nuclear weapons were invented, almost every strike weapon came in a nuclear version. They even had nuclear artillery yet somehow nobody was tempted to release the nuclear genie. I don't think any country is stupid enough to think that "well, it was only a little one" would prevent an adversary from using nuclear weapons themselves. What having a varied arsenal does do though is give you options in the event you need them, provides more of a deterrent as you now have a real, usable, force, and allows you to keep your industrial base proficient.

 

[bobbymike]

China and Indian SSBNs too noisy to provide 2nd strike assurance?

http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/how-china-and-indias-noisy-nuclear-subs-contribute-to-instability-in-asia/

 

[bobbymike]

This is a very sobering report. At the end of the Cold War we underestimated the Soviet arsenal by TENS OF THOUSANDS of warheads so anytime I here claims of "Don't worry about China's [totally opaque and unknown] nuclear weapons programs they only have 300 warheads" I just shake my head at the potential delusion.

Russia has 6 times (China 3-4 times) as many people employed in the nuclear weapons sectors. Russia has the production capacity to produce TODAY 1000 warheads/year TO OUR 40.

Whatever side of the nuclear debate you are on these should present some level of concern about the future of our capacity to affect deterrence.

http://www.lanl.gov/discover/publications/national-security-science/2014-december/_assets/doc/NSS-december2014-rethinking_the_unthinkable.pdf

 

[Triton]

"Report: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could become the world’s third-biggest"
By Tim Craig August 27

Source:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/report-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-could-become-the-worlds-third-biggest/2015/08/26/6098478a-4c0c-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — A new report by two American think tanks asserts that Pakistan may be building 20 nuclear warheads annually and could have the world’s third-largest nuclear stockpile within a decade.

The report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center concludes that Pakistan is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities because of fear of its archrival, India, also a nuclear power. The report, which will be released Thursday, says Pakistan is far outpacing India in the development of nuclear warheads.

Analysts estimate that Pakistan has about 120 nuclear warheads, while India has about 100.

In the coming years, the report states, Pakistan’s advantage could grow dramatically because it has a large stockpile of highly enriched uranium that could be used to quickly produce low-yield nuclear devices.

India has far larger stockpiles of plutonium, which is needed to produce high-yield warheads, than Pakistan does. But the report says India appears to be using most of its plutonium to produce domestic energy.

Pakistan could have at least 350 nuclear weapons within five to 10 years, the report concludes. Pakistan then would probably possess more nuclear weapons than any country except the United States and Russia, which each have thousands of the bombs.

“The growth path of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, enabled by existing infrastructure, goes well beyond the assurances of credible minimal deterrence provided by Pakistani officials and analysts after testing nuclear devices,” the report states.

Pakistani military officials were not available to comment on the report when it was made available to journalists Wednesday.

Western officials and analysts have struggled for years to get an accurate assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Several Pakistani analysts questioned the findings of the report, saying it is based on a faulty assumption that Pakistan is using all of its existing stockpiles of fissile material to make nuclear weapons.

Mansoor Ahmed, a nuclear expert at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, said he suspects that a more accurate assessment of Pakistan’s capability is that it can develop no more than 40 to 50 new warheads over the next several years.

Ahmed, however, doesn’t dispute that Pakistan’s military is seeking to expand its nuclear capabilities.

“This report is overblown,” said Ahmed, who was recently named a nuclear security fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. “However . . . what the world must understand is that nuclear weapons are part of Pakistan’s belief system. It’s a culture that has been built up over the years because [nuclear weapons] have provided a credible deterrence against external aggression.”

France has about 300 warheads and the United Kingdom has about 215, according to the Federation of American Scientists. China has approximately 250.

The report was written by Toby Dalton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Nuclear Policy Program, and Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center.

Pakistan is believed to use plutonium as well as highly enriched uranium to create nuclear warheads. Dalton noted that Pakistan recently added a fourth plutonium production reactor at its Khushab Nuclear Complex.

“We assume, maybe correctly, maybe inaccurately, with the fuel coming out of the four reactors, they are processing it as rapidly as possible to get the plutonium out,” Dalton said.

India and Pakistan, which have fought three major wars, became declared nuclear powers in 1998. Since then, Western leaders have been increasingly alarmed about the potential for a nuclear exchange between the rivals.

India has adopted a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons. Pakistani leaders have repeatedly declined to take a similar stance, saying they might be forced to resort to using the weapons should India’s larger army ever invade Pakistan.

India views nuclear weapons “as a political tool, a prestige item, not something you use on a battlefield,” Krepon said. In Pakistan, he said, nuclear weapons are seen as “things you have to be willing to use” to guarantee stability.

But Krepon and Dalton said there is still time for Pakistan to slow down the development of its nuclear arsenal. If it does, they said, the international community should consider what steps it can take to recognize it as a responsible nuclear state.

 

[Triton]

"B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes"
Posted on Jun.15, 2011 in NATO, Nuclear Weapons, United States by Hans M. Kristensen

Source:
http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/06/b61-12/

 

[Triton]

"General Confirms Enhanced Targeting Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb"
Posted on Jan.23, 2014 in NATO, Nuclear Weapons, United States by Hans M. Kristensen

Source:
http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/01/b61capability/

...General Schwartz’s answer was both clear and blunt: “Without a doubt. Improved accuracy and lower yield is a desired military capability. Without a question.”

When asked whether that would result in a different target set or just make the existing weapon better, General Schwartz said: “It would have both effects.”

General Schwartz said that the B61 tail kit “has benefits from an employment standpoint that many consider stabilizing.” I later asked him what he meant by that and his reply was that critics (myself included) claim that the increased accuracy and lower yield options could make the B61-12 more attractive to use because of reduced collateral damage and radioactive fallout. But he said he believed that the opposite would be the case; that the enhanced capabilities would enhance deterrence and make use less likely because adversaries would be more convinced that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

..."Nuclear capable aircraft may have many advantages. Accuracy (as compared to other systems) is not one of them,” the Joint Staff argued in 2004 during drafting of the Doctrine for joint Nuclear Operations. Test drops of U.S. nuclear bombs normally achieve an accuracy of 110-170 meters, which is insufficient to hold underground targets at risk except with very large yield. The designated nuclear earth-penetrator (B61-11) has a 400-kiloton warhead to be effective. Therefore, increasing the accuracy of the B61 to enhance targeting and reduce collateral damage are, as General Schwartz put it at the conference, desired military capabilities.

Increasing the accuracy broadens the type of targets that the B61 can be used to attack. The effect is most profound against underground targets that require ground burst and cratering to be damaged by the chock wave. Against a relatively small, heavy, well-designed, underground structure, severe damage is achieved when the target is within 1.25 the radius of the visible crater created by the nuclear detonation. Light damage is achieved at 2.5 radii. For a yield of 50 kt – the estimated maximum yield of the B61-12, the apparent crater radii vary from 30 meters (hard dry rock) to 68 meters (wet soil). Therefore an improvement in accuracy from 100-plus meter CEP (the current estimated accuracy of the B61) down to 30-plus meter CEP (assuming INS guidance for the B61-12) improves the kill probability against these targets significantly by achieving a greater likelihood of cratering the target during a bombing run. Put simply, the increased accuracy essentially puts the CEP inside the crater.

Cratering targets is dirty business because a nuclear detonation on or near the surface kicks up large amounts of radioactive material. With poor accuracy, strike planners would have to choose a relatively high selectable yield to have sufficient confidence that the target would be damaged. The higher the yield, the greater the radioactive fallout.

With the increased accuracy of the B61-12 the strike planners will be able to select a lower yield and still achieve the same (or even better) damage to the underground target. Using lower yields will significantly reduce collateral damage by reducing the radioactive fallout that civilians would be exposed to after an attack. The difference in fallout from a 360-kiloton B61-7 surface burst compared with a B61-12 using a 10-kiloton selective yield option is significant.

No U.S. president would find it easy to authorize use of nuclear weapon. Apart from the implications of ending nearly 70 years of non-use of nuclear weapons and the international political ramifications, anticipated collateral damage serves as an important constraint on potential use of nuclear weapons. Some analysts have argued that higher yield nuclear weapons are less suitable to deter regional adversaries and that lower yield weapons are needed in today’s security environment. The collateral damage from high-yield weapons could “self-deter” a U.S. president from authorizing an attack.

... For NATO, the improved accuracy has particularly important implications because the B61-12 is a more effective weapon than the B61-3 and B61-4 currently deployed in Europe.

The United States has never before deployed guided nuclear bombs in Europe but with the increased accuracy of the B61-12 and combined with the future deployment of the F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter-bomber to Europe, it is clear that NATO is up for quite a nuclear facelift.

Once European allies acquire the F-35A Lightning II it will “unlock” the guided tail kit on the B61-12 bomb. The increased military capability of the guided B61-12 and stealthy F-35A will significantly enhance NATO’s nuclear posture in Europe.

Initially the old NATO F-16A/B and Tornado PA-200 aircraft that currently serve in the nuclear strike mission will not be able to make use of the increased accuracy of the B61-12, according to U.S. Air Force officials. The reason is that the aircraft computers are not capable of “talking to” the new digital bomb. As a result, the guided tail kit on the B61-12 for Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian and Turkish F-16s and Tornados will initially be “locked” as a “dumb” bomb. Once these countries transition to the F-35 aircraft, however, the enhanced targeting capability will become operational also in these countries.

The Dutch parliament recently approved purchase of the F-35 to replace the F-16, but a resolution adopted by the lower house stated that the F-35 could not have a capability to deliver nuclear weapons. The Dutch government recently rejected the decision saying the Netherlands cannot unilaterally withdraw from the NATO nuclear strike mission.

 

[Orionblamblam]

The Dutch parliament recently approved purchase of the F-35 to replace the F-16, but a resolution adopted by the lower house stated that the F-35 could not have a capability to deliver nuclear weapons.

That's silly. A Piper Cub could be used as a nuclear delivery system.

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-says-finds-unexpectedly-high-uranium-104622948.html

Unexpectedly. Right. Sure.

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-administration-close-last/2015/09/28/id/693777/

One would be forgiven for wanting to use very foul language.

 

[sferrin]

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-administration-close-last/2015/09/28/id/693777/

One would be forgiven for wanting to use very foul language.

x2.

 

[Brickmuppet]

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-administration-close-last/2015/09/28/id/693777/

One would be forgiven for wanting to use very foul language.

x2.

This report does not give me the warm fuzzies, but I'm not sure that it is crippling.
ISTR that all the enrichment facilities are old and have environmental and safety issues and are expensive to run. This might save some money in the short run and gives us an excellent excuse to build a better facility down the road later. Additionally, we have a lot of "pits", the warhead cores, lying around that can be recycled. It is my understanding that the last generation of U.S. nuclear weapon designs (which were tested but never put into production) were intended to recycle old warhead cores from the Poseidon missile. We should be able to renew the stockpile without an enrichment facility.


I should note that the above is all the polish I have and this buffalo chip still isn't quite buffing out.

 

[sferrin]

It's not just the facility, you lose your expertise and supply chain. Of all the poor decisions over the years regarding our defense industrial base, this will be by far the most noticed on the world stage. You can be sure China and Russia won't be so blind. And the fact that we're at the same time giving official approval for Iran to go whole hog with uranium enrichment defies belief. As the saying goes, "you can't make this $hit up".

 

[bobbymike]

It's not just the facility, you lose your expertise and supply chain. Of all the poor decisions over the years regarding our defense industrial base, this will be by far the most noticed on the world stage. You can be sure China and Russia won't be so blind. And the fact that we're at the same time giving official approval for Iran to go whole hog with uranium enrichment defies belief. As the saying goes, "you can't make this $hit up".

I don't understand how this can be done by administrative fiat by the DOE? Something that can possibly be very impactful on national security should need congressional approval. Could DOE shutter the national labs as well?*

* not saying they will but could they?

Many have said the greatest loss of freedom has come from government being so large Congress has largely given the details of lawmaking to the so-called 'administrative state' (the executive bureaucracy). For example Obamacare had several hundred instances of wording in the legislation of "the Secretary [of HHS] shall or may or must" complete some aspect of implementation of the law. This has resulted in the original 2000 page legislation now has, IIRC, over 70,000 pages of rules and regulation (with much more to come apparently)
===============================================================
Must read article in a truly frightening way;

http://www.lanl.gov/discover/publications/national-security-science/2014-december/rethinking_the_unthinkable.php

 

[bobbymike]

Some selected 'snips' from reports I've recently read.

 

[Grey Havoc]

A bit more food for thought, albeit finger food: http://nypost.com/2015/10/03/syria-is-obamas-watergate/

 

[kaiserd]

While it is quite possible that insufficient focus has been given to maintaining the US nuclear weapon infrastructure it appears that some contributors going too far in the conspiracy theory/ blinkered Anti-Obama bias direction.

Would I be correct that any alleged lack of focus/ funding for this infrastructure was across Presidents and Congress controlled by both US parties?

Would I be correct that none of these issues have yet impacted the viability of the US deterrent?

Would I be correct that the Russian activity really has more to do with their preceding period of utter neglect and their own perceived weakness versus massively superior conventional capacity?

Don't get me started on the Syria deal; most the rest of the (informed) world considers the anti-deal proponents as lunatics or as a cynical Republican political ploy.

 

[sferrin]

While it is quite possible that insufficient focus has been given to maintaining the US nuclear weapon infrastructure it appears that some contributors going too far in the conspiracy theory/ blinkered Anti-Obama bias direction.

Would I be correct that any alleged lack of focus/ funding for this infrastructure was across Presidents and Congress controlled by both US parties?

Would I be correct that none of these issues have yet impacted the viability of the US deterrent?

Would I be correct that the Russian activity really has more to do with their preceding period of utter neglect and their own perceived weakness versus massively superior conventional capacity?

Don't get me started on the Syria deal; most the rest of the (informed) world considers the anti-deal proponents as lunatics or as a cynical Republican political ploy.

See post #1 of this topic.

 

[stealthflanker]

Is it possible to build nuclear or thermo nuclear device that smaller than davy crockett ? while still have yield of say 1 Kiloton.

 

[kaiserd]

Apologies if I have not been sufficiently clear in my post above.

I was not looking to be political in my post - however I was referring to the increasing political nature of the comments above referring to Obamacare (how is relevant to this discussion) and to a link to a piece likening the Syria deal, linked to the Iranian deal, to Watergate (grounds for impeaching a President?).

My reference to how the Iran deal (reference to Syria deal in the first text a typo) is perceived in the wider world was not meant to suggest that any of the participants here are "lunatics", are Republicans or are not being genuine about what they believe.
However I thought it useful to give a wider perspective than was being presented by other comments.

I am an Irish citizen and I believe that the US nuclear deterrent has helped keep me, my family, my country, my continent and my world safer in the face of potential Soviet agression.
I equally believe in the need for its continued existence and for the logic of the triad.
The US needs an effective, robust but not excessive nuclear deterrent. I would agree that the maintenance of your nuclear infrastructure has been perhaps too low a priory but there is a need to keep perspective on this. Short of some kind of revolutionary technical development to keep abreast of arbitrary comparisons versus the Russian ongoing revamp of their nuclear forces is not very illuminating.

I also believe that the world would be better off if Iran dosen't have the bomb and that Assad is a mass murdering criminal.

In both issues potential Hawks may need to be more realistic about the limits of US military budgets, US political will (across the board and not just when people trying to win primaries), US power in general, and the limits of military means as an instrument of achieving your desired ends.

 

[sferrin]

Apologies if I have not been sufficiently clear in my post above.

I was not looking to be political in my post - however

See post #1 in this thread.

 

[bobbymike]

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-adds-111-warheads-under-arms-treaty/

Schneider, now a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, said Russia is now at the highest level of deployed nuclear warheads since the New START treaty went into force.

“For the last three reporting periods—18 months—Russia has moved from below New START limits in deployed warheads and deployed delivery vehicles to above them,” said Schneider.

“In all three limited categories—deployed warheads, deployed delivery vehicles and deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles—Russia is above its entry into force numbers from 2011”.

But I guess we are under it early because ‘business-like’ implementation of the treaty is a way the administration can appear to be doing something, and they have a base of left-wing support which demands we go lower still, and faster,” Moore said.

Russia has been building up its forces steadily, he added.

“Its raid of Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian to targets in Syria is another sign that, along with New START warhead numbers, its nuclear-capable systems, strategic warheads, and overall nuclear capability at all ranges and with all types of weapons is building up, not down.”

Russia has now deployed more than 100 nuclear warheads in its strategic arsenal above the limits set by the New START arms treaty limits—two years before it must meet treaty arms reduction goals.

New START nuclear warhead and delivery system numbers made public Oct. 1 reveal that since the 2010 arms accord went into force, Moscow increased the number of deployed nuclear warheads by a total of 111 weapons for a total of 1,648 deployed warheads. That number is 98 warheads above the treaty limit of 1,150 warheads that must be reached by the 2018 deadline of the treaty.

At the same time, U.S. nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers have fallen sharply and remain below the required levels under the New START pact.

The United States during the same period of the Russian increases cut its deployed nuclear arsenal by 250 warheads.

The Russian increases and U.S. cuts bolster claims by critics who say the arms treaty is one-sided in constraining U.S. forces while the Russians appear to be ignoring the treaty limits as part of a major strategic forces buildup of missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Additionally, nuclear analysts say recent actions and statements suggest Russia may be preparing to jettison the New START treaty.

“Russia may pull out of the New START before it requires any Russians reductions,” said former Pentagon nuclear policymaker Mark Schneider. “Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s department of security and disarmament issues, Mikhail Ulyanov, said so in 2014 and 2015.”

 

[kaiserd]

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-adds-111-warheads-under-arms-treaty/

Schneider, now a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, said Russia is now at the highest level of deployed nuclear warheads since the New START treaty went into force.

“For the last three reporting periods—18 months—Russia has moved from below New START limits in deployed warheads and deployed delivery vehicles to above them,” said Schneider.

“In all three limited categories—deployed warheads, deployed delivery vehicles and deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles—Russia is above its entry into force numbers from 2011”.

But I guess we are under it early because ‘business-like’ implementation of the treaty is a way the administration can appear to be doing something, and they have a base of left-wing support which demands we go lower still, and faster,” Moore said.

Russia has been building up its forces steadily, he added.

“Its raid of Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian to targets in Syria is another sign that, along with New START warhead numbers, its nuclear-capable systems, strategic warheads, and overall nuclear capability at all ranges and with all types of weapons is building up, not down.”

Russia has now deployed more than 100 nuclear warheads in its strategic arsenal above the limits set by the New START arms treaty limits—two years before it must meet treaty arms reduction goals.

New START nuclear warhead and delivery system numbers made public Oct. 1 reveal that since the 2010 arms accord went into force, Moscow increased the number of deployed nuclear warheads by a total of 111 weapons for a total of 1,648 deployed warheads. That number is 98 warheads above the treaty limit of 1,150 warheads that must be reached by the 2018 deadline of the treaty.

At the same time, U.S. nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers have fallen sharply and remain below the required levels under the New START pact.

The United States during the same period of the Russian increases cut its deployed nuclear arsenal by 250 warheads.

The Russian increases and U.S. cuts bolster claims by critics who say the arms treaty is one-sided in constraining U.S. forces while the Russians appear to be ignoring the treaty limits as part of a major strategic forces buildup of missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Additionally, nuclear analysts say recent actions and statements suggest Russia may be preparing to jettison the New START treaty.

“Russia may pull out of the New START before it requires any Russians reductions,” said former Pentagon nuclear policymaker Mark Schneider. “Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s department of security and disarmament issues, Mikhail Ulyanov, said so in 2014 and 2015.”

A few points.

My understand that the START treaty specifies maximum not minimum numbers, hence references to "below required numbers" isn't correct and potentially betrays the bias of the article.

Secondly the logic of the various quotes aren't consistent; if US numbers are already below START maximums how is the treaty, and not underlying US policy, constraining US numbers?

To not retread the same argument its still appears facile to get into arbitrary arguments about matching Russian warhead numbers (for example) when the issue is if your nuclear forces are sufficiently robust and effective, or not.

 

[bobbymike]

US unilateral disarmament continues while Russia continues to modernize with large MIRV capable 5th generation ICBMs, SLBMs building from active warhead production lines next generation warheads.

 

[kaiserd]

US unilateral disarmament continues while Russia continues to modernize with large MIRV capable 5th generation ICBMs, SLBMs building from active warhead production lines next generation warheads.

How do the figures quoted represent "US unilateral disarmament"?
Numerically doesn't appear to be much difference in US/Russia capacities, as I've stated above any indication the US nuclear arsenal is no longer sufficient, survivable and effective?

 

[sferrin]

US unilateral disarmament continues while Russia continues to modernize with large MIRV capable 5th generation ICBMs, SLBMs building from active warhead production lines next generation warheads.

How do the figures quoted represent "US unilateral disarmament"?
Numerically doesn't appear to be much difference in US/Russia capacities, as I've stated above any indication the US nuclear arsenal is no longer sufficient, survivable and effective?

The newest US ICBM is about a decade older than the oldest Russian ICBM. Our newest deployed ICBM was built in 1977. We don't build ICBMs anymore. Our newest nuclear bomb, the B61, was designed in 1963. As soon as we finish trashing the B83s it will be our only nuclear bomb. We don't build nuclear bombs anymore either. Our newest nuclear warhead was built in the 80s. We don't build nuclear warheads anymore. Our last nuclear warhead production line was shut down in the 80s. Do you need more?

The common problem I see amongst the "don't we have enough?" crowd is that they don't understand that missiles, bombs, and warheads, are machines and subject to degradation over time just like any other. How many are driving cars or watching televisions that were designed in 1963? They also don't understand that it takes time, an industrial base, and a skilled workforce to replace them. I doubt there is a single person in the workforce today who has actually helped design a nuclear bomb that made it into service in the US. Very few have even helped design an ICBM or SLBM in the US, and those numbers get smaller every day. To not be able to see the HUGE, systemic, problem we have in the area of nuclear forces in the US indicates a complete lack of awareness of the situation.

Seems to be sadly appropriate. Russia scrapping 17 of the "outdated" mobile ICBMs. Topols. Built in 1988. More than a decade newer than our newest deployed ICBM.

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_Set_to_Scrap_17_Outdated_Topol_Missile_Launchers_by_2017_999.html

 

[Triton]

"Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile"
by William J. Perry and Andy Weber October 15

Source:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruise-missile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html

William J. Perry was U.S. secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Andy Weber was assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs from 2009 to 2014.

Because they can be launched without warning and come in both nuclear and conventional variants, cruise missiles are a uniquely destabilizing type of weapon. President Obama can lead the world to a stabler and safer future by canceling plans for a new U.S. nuclear-capable cruise missile. Moreover, taking such a step — which would not diminish the formidable U.S. nuclear deterrent in the least — could lay the foundation for a global ban on these dangerous weapons.

Two years ago, when Britain decided not to pursue a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, Philip Hammond, then-British defense secretary and now-foreign secretary, explained the problem well: “A cruise-based deterrent would carry significant risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. At the point of firing, other states could have no way of knowing whether we had launched a conventional cruise missile or one with a nuclear warhead. Such uncertainty could risk triggering a nuclear war at a time of tension.”

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the destabilizing nature of nuclear cruise missiles and prioritized the elimination of ground-launched versions in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Similarly, in 1991, President George H.W. Bush unilaterally ordered all sea-launched Tomahawk nuclear cruise missiles taken off surface ships and attack submarines and put into storage. There they sat unused until Obama formally retired and directed their dismantlement in 2011.

The Defense Department’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report stated that a decision would be made “whether and (if so) how” to replace the current air-launched cruise missile. This missile will reach the end of its operational life in about 2030, and the only bomber that can deliver it — the B-52 — dates to 1955. The vastly superior B-2 stealth bomber carries not the cruise missile but two types of nuclear gravity bombs, the B61 and megaton-plus B83.

The Obama administration deserves great credit for increasing investment in B-2 sustainment, command and control, and a costly but vital program to extend the life of the B61 nuclear bomb. The extended B61 will replace four existing models, including the tactical version deployed to Europe in support of NATO, and allow for the retirement of the very high-yield B83. With these efforts, the B-2 and B61 will provide the core capability of the bomber leg of the strategic air-land-and-sea nuclear triad for decades to come. The Air Force has also prioritized procurement of 80 to 100 next-generation stealth bomber aircraft, which will be called the Long-Range Strike Bomber, or B-3.

One of us (William J. Perry) led the Defense Department’s development and procurement of the current air-launched cruise missile and the B-2 stealth bomber in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At that time, the United States needed the cruise missile to keep the aging B-52, which is quite vulnerable to enemy air defense systems, in the nuclear mission until the more effective B-2 replaced it. The B-52 could safely launch the long-range cruise missile far from Soviet air defenses. We needed large numbers of air-launched nuclear cruise missiles to be able to overwhelm Soviet air defenses and thus help offset NATO’s conventional-force inferiority in Europe, but such a posture no longer reflects the reality of today’s U.S. conventional military dominance.

With the updated B-2 and B61 expected to remain in service for many decades, and the planned deployment of new B-3 penetrating bombers with B61 bombs starting in 2025, there is scant justification for spending tens of billions of dollars on a new nuclear air-launched cruise missile and related warhead life-extension program. The old Cold War requirement for such a capability no longer exists. We can, and should, maintain an extremely effective bomber leg of the triad without it.

Some have argued that a new nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile is needed to allow future presidents the “flexibility” to engage Russia or China in limited nuclear war. That is Cold War thinking, and it is dangerous. Such “tactical” use of nuclear weapons would be a grave mistake. As Bush told the nation in 1991 when he announced his path-breaking Presidential Nuclear Initiative: “We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now is the time to seize the opportunity.”

We therefore urge President Obama to cancel the current plan to develop and buy 1,000 to 1,100 new nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles. Such strong U.S. leadership, coupled with a challenge to the other major nuclear powers to eliminate or, in the cases of China and India, forgo deployment of this extremely destabilizing class of weapons, would reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use and be a historic practical step in the direction of a world without nuclear weapons.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Oh for the love of Mike!

 

[kaiserd]

US unilateral disarmament continues while Russia continues to modernize with large MIRV capable 5th generation ICBMs, SLBMs building from active warhead production lines next generation warheads.

How do the figures quoted represent "US unilateral disarmament"?
Numerically doesn't appear to be much difference in US/Russia capacities, as I've stated above any indication the US nuclear arsenal is no longer sufficient, survivable and effective?

The newest US ICBM is about a decade older than the oldest Russian ICBM. Our newest deployed ICBM was built in 1977. We don't build ICBMs anymore. Our newest nuclear bomb, the B61, was designed in 1963. As soon as we finish trashing the B83s it will be our only nuclear bomb. We don't build nuclear bombs anymore either. Our newest nuclear warhead was built in the 80s. We don't build nuclear warheads anymore. Our last nuclear warhead production line was shut down in the 80s. Do you need more?

The common problem I see amongst the "don't we have enough?" crowd is that they don't understand that missiles, bombs, and warheads, are machines and subject to degradation over time just like any other. How many are driving cars or watching televisions that were designed in 1963? They also don't understand that it takes time, an industrial base, and a skilled workforce to replace them. I doubt there is a single person in the workforce today who has actually helped design a nuclear bomb that made it into service in the US. Very few have even helped design an ICBM or SLBM in the US, and those numbers get smaller every day. To not be able to see the HUGE, systemic, problem we have in the area of nuclear forces in the US indicates a complete lack of awareness of the situation.

Seems to be sadly appropriate. Russia scrapping 17 of the "outdated" mobile ICBMs. Topols. Built in 1988. More than a decade newer than our newest deployed ICBM.

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_Set_to_Scrap_17_Outdated_Topol_Missile_Launchers_by_2017_999.html

I agree that the US nuclear weapon infrastructure (people, plant, design capabilities etc) have been somewhat neglected. I do recognise that you need to build new and re-build existing nuclear weapons to maintain the capability. I'm not part of the bandwagon you appear to be lumping me in with; clearly the US will have to spend more on this infrastructure and clearly there could be issues re lack of concurrency and experienced staff.

However going back to my central point, why the fixation with number of warheads versus the Russians?
Using that as the end all and be all measure is a bit perplexing; I've already noted my understand of the important measures in my previous comments above.
I repeat where from the warhead numbers quoted above is there any evidence of US unilateral disarmament?

Re: the posted article above with notable individuals proposing cancelling the future stealthy nuclear armed cruise missile I'd be as hawkish as the next guy; a lack of such a weapon would greatly weaken the deterrent role of the future bomber (for the length of its operational life) for a disproportionately small cost saving (always presumed this cruise missle would not necessarily look to be overly ambitious, an equivalent of a nuclear armed JASSM). Such a cruise missile could also extend the deterrent operational effectiveness of the B2 and give greater flexibility to the airborne deterrent. There should also be a lot of scope for commonality and leveraging with contemporary conventionally armed cruise missiles.

 

[bobbymike]

From recent reports you might find interesting.

 

[marauder2048]

"Mr. President, kill the new cruise missile"
by William J. Perry and Andy Weber October 15

Source:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruise-missile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html

Incredible! That Bill Perry is still alive and adjudicted to be of sound mind.

 

[marauder2048]

However going back to my central point, why the fixation with number of warheads versus the Russians?

Because of the deeply flawed New START treaty (which never would have been ratified if Congress hadn't been wilfully deceived on Russia's INF violations)
which focuses on numbers rather than capabilities e.g. mobility, throw-weight. IOW, it's a purely political grandstanding treaty since any technically competent, politically unchained
US negotiators would have made the elimination of mobile missiles a cornerstone of their negotiating stance.

It also highlights the paralyzing effect of treaties; too much political capital invested in them to risk by walking away from them over material and or flagrant violations.

 

[bobbymike]

However going back to my central point, why the fixation with number of warheads versus the Russians?

Because of the deeply flawed New START treaty (which never would have been ratified if Congress hadn't been wilfully deceived on Russia's INF violations)
which focuses on numbers rather than capabilities e.g. mobility, throw-weight. IOW, it's a purely political grandstanding treaty since any technically competent, politically unchained
US negotiators would have made the elimination of mobile missiles a cornerstone of their negotiating stance.

It also highlights the paralyzing effect of treaties; too much political capital invested in them to risk by walking away from them over material and or flagrant violations.

And a silly continuation of the completely disproven "If we lead the world will follow" disarmament doctrine plus making the Russians feel good as they could no longer afford to maintain their huge arsenal. At the time the US and Russia had 'reset' relations what did it matter if the US had a few hundred more warheads we were 'friends' after all. I mean France and Britain weren't demanding parity with their arsenals.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Incredible! That Bill Perry is still alive and adjudicted to be of sound mind.

Indeed.

 

[bobbymike]

Former Defense Secretary Says Eliminate ICBMs

—Otto Kreisher

12/7/2015

​Former Defense Secretary William Perry urged the elimination of the ground-based ICBM leg of the nuclear deterrent triad and opposed production of the nuclear-armed Long Range Standoff missile, which will replace the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), calling both “uniquely destabilizing.” Speaking at a Dec. 3 defense writers’ breakfast in Washington, D.C., Perry said because of “deteriorating” US-Russian relations, “we are now facing the kinds of dangers we faced in the Cold War,” with the threat of “a nuclear event,” and “we’re now at the precipice, the brink, of a nuclear arms race.” Perry, however, supported buying the Long-Range Strike Bomber and a replacement for the Navy’s Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines to modernize the other two legs of the triad. The Air Force has started development of the LRSO to ensure the continued viability of the bomber leg. Ironically, as Defense Secretary from 1994-97, Perry cancelled the B-1 bomber program and approved production of the original ALCMs to counter the threat to the B-52s from Soviet anti-air missiles. Perry said he opposes the ICBMs because “under any reasonable definition of deterrence, they are not needed,” and they are destabilizing because any threat of an attack triggers the “use it, or lose it” mentality.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So no ICBMs, no LRSO. I know how this works. They 'say' they support something, in this case SSBN(X) and LRS-B but are just waiting until any cot overruns and they the "we can't afford it" stories start emerging.

This is unilateral disarmament and its mentality is dangerous IMHO.

 

[Grey Havoc]

A pretty apt cartoon, via the Washington Times:

 

[Brickmuppet]

A question regarding North Korea's recent test;
I've seen some speculation (albeit not from official sources) that it was not necessarily a fizzle and the fact that the last three tests were in the same ballpark indicates that the low yield was deliberate for some reason. One reason for this is the fact that small nukes are hard to do and the consistency of the last three detonations indicates a deliberate choice, which in turn would indicate some level of sophistication.

The rationale for pursuing such small devices is unclear, but three ideas come to mind.
1) They could just be trying to maximize the number of bombs for a given level of fissionables. The down side of this is that such small bombs have limited effectiveness without super precise targeting.

2) Another idea is that they could be pursuing low yield tactical nukes for use in the event of an invasion, perhaps hoping (as the Russians seem to) that a nuke detonated against invaders on their own soil would not necessarily invite a massive retaliation. This would also allow for something like the SADM for commando raids and (less likely) selling to terrorists. It would be consistent with both the small yield and the claim that fusion was happening if it was something in the ballpark of a W-54 or small artillery round with fusion boosting.

3)Third is the one I've actually seen speculated about and that is that this was a fusion bomb as claimed, but it had a very small secondary and was actually an enhanced radiation weapon intended to maximize EMP. This would give the DPRK a genuine strategic counter-value capability despite the minimal throw weight of their missile force. Additionally, this would retain its effectiveness even if their achievable CEP was measured in states or provinces rather than meters.
There is more on that here in a long, detailed breathless and even more rambly post than this comment.
http://glasstone.blogspot.com/2016_01_01_archive.html

There is more on publicly available info regarding maximizing nuclear EMP here:

http://www.futurescience.com/emp/super-EMP.html

I don't know enough to evaluate either link, but I do note that neither of them is attempting to sell me Faraday cages or storable food.

Of course the notion that a nation that can't feed itself and is using slave labor to put together a nuclear bomb might bollox it repeatedly the exact same way should not be utterly dismissed. It would seem logical however, that if the North Koreans wanted to impress us with the size of their 'splodies then building something along the lines of Little Boy would be a risk free way to do so. Yet they're consistently producing these small yields.

Anyway. I'm curious what others here think.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/02/04-new-start-turns-five-pifer

Should have stayed at START levels 1200 launchers 6000 strategic warheads IMHO.

 

[sferrin]

Not much of a "bright spot" considering most of Russia's systems are brand new while ours are decrepit. (And never mind China's. We should never enter another nuclear arms treaty with Russia only.)

 

[bobbymike]

I've posted these before but needs a repost.

Notice Russia's warhead production capability plus will be completely modernized by 2021. What's the significance of 2021? New START expires expect a Russian 'breakout' as Putin withdraws from treaty increases deployed warheads to 5000. China will announce policy of parity and rapidly increase deployed warhead numbers.

 

[marauder2048]

I've posted these before but needs a repost.

Notice Russia's warhead production capability plus will be completely modernized by 2021. What's the significance of 2021? New START expires expect a Russian 'breakout' as Putin withdraws from treaty increases deployed warheads to 5000. China will announce policy of parity and rapidly increase deployed warhead numbers.

I suspect the US has very little insight (recent defectors notwithstanding) into Chinese nuclear weapons capabilities and intent.