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Exclusive video of Northrop Grumman employees reacting to award:
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=np6vAuS0KNs
Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
Airplane said:Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
What makes anyone think that the new bomber is a big airplane? Hm? The USAF has publicly stated at one time they would prefer to net even call it a new bomber. Likewise the USAF has said it will not be a large aircraft; it will not be a heavy bomber like the B2, and will have an entirely different mission(s) (it will be multi-role); it will not have the same payload. And I am not referring to comments made this year; I am referring to interviews circa 2010.
I retract my earlier statement about believing it will be super stealth with Mach 1.2-.3 dash. I think it will be more like a scaled up FB-23 v2.0 than anything else. Lengthwise longer than a B-2, but volumetrically smaller.
Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
galgot said:Airplane said:Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
What makes anyone think that the new bomber is a big airplane? Hm? The USAF has publicly stated at one time they would prefer to net even call it a new bomber. Likewise the USAF has said it will not be a large aircraft; it will not be a heavy bomber like the B2, and will have an entirely different mission(s) (it will be multi-role); it will not have the same payload. And I am not referring to comments made this year; I am referring to interviews circa 2010.
I retract my earlier statement about believing it will be super stealth with Mach 1.2-.3 dash. I think it will be more like a scaled up FB-23 v2.0 than anything else. Lengthwise longer than a B-2, but volumetrically smaller.
So would be kind of a F-111 class striker airplane ? but subsonic ?
sferrin said:galgot said:Airplane said:Flyaway said:If the big new hanger at Area 51 is for this aircraft we can forget seeing it for many years.
What makes anyone think that the new bomber is a big airplane? Hm? The USAF has publicly stated at one time they would prefer to net even call it a new bomber. Likewise the USAF has said it will not be a large aircraft; it will not be a heavy bomber like the B2, and will have an entirely different mission(s) (it will be multi-role); it will not have the same payload. And I am not referring to comments made this year; I am referring to interviews circa 2010.
I retract my earlier statement about believing it will be super stealth with Mach 1.2-.3 dash. I think it will be more like a scaled up FB-23 v2.0 than anything else. Lengthwise longer than a B-2, but volumetrically smaller.
So would be kind of a F-111 class striker airplane ? but subsonic ?
That's what he thinks it will be. It's not what it'll be, he's just guessing like the rest of us.
Airplane said:Yeah, you're right let's disregard comments made by a USAF officer involved in the program. The writing has been on the proverbial wall for 6 years now about the "bomber". It'll end up being more like a big FB-XX than a small twin engine B-2.
AeroFranz said:Too small of an airplane won't have the legs to traverse the long distances associated with the Pacific without extensive tanker support (which is a liability in the A2/AD scenario), much less to loiter and stick around. You could do much worse than a subsonic flying wing planform if these were indeed the requirements. My money's on a smaller B-2 (actually more like the early planform with less trailing edge serrations), smaller payload, pure flying wing or cranked kite. Lots of benefits to going to two engines, although a larger number of smaller diameter engines might be easier to bury for signature.
LowObservable said:Exclusive video of Northrop Grumman employees reacting to award:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=np6vAuS0KNs
The bid selection process that culminated in the Oct. 27 bomber development and production award to Northrop Grumman also was carefully crafted to ensure the Pentagon prevails if the losing bidder — a Boeing-Lockheed Martin team — challenges the decision in court.
Analysts also caution Air Force leaders to not set unrealistic expectations by being so emphatic about the “affordability” of the bomber.
Current cost projections are $21.4 billion for the engineering and manufacturing development phase and $51.1 billion for procurement of 100 aircraft in 2010 dollars. When the effects of inflation and other costs are included — such as the roughly $2 billion in development costs already incurred — the total program cost will likely be more than $100 billion in then-year dollars, wrote defense and budget analysts Todd Harrison and Andrew Hunter, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“With a total then-year cost roughly double what some have been reporting, there could be sticker shock in Congress,” they noted....
The Air Force is working on a “classification guide” regarding what information can be released about the Long-Range Strike Bomber, and when, according to USAF acquisition chief William LaPlante. “We’ve just started that review,” LaPlante said in an Oct. 30 telephone interview, but he hopes to release some additional information on the secret bomber program “around the time we have to send the SAR [Selected Acquisition Reports] to Congress;” roughly when the Fiscal 2017 President’s Budget is sent to Capitol Hill. “My intent,” he added, was to release “in public form some of what we said to Congress” just before Northrop Grumman was announced as the winner of the program last week. The announcement included no details about the bomber’s design, nor did it disclose any information about Northrop Grumman’s industrial team. The SAR itself, which gives overall costs on the program, may be classified, he noted. Once completed, the classification guide will be “frequently updated,” LaPlante also asserted. On previous classified projects, such as the F-117 stealth attack jet, heavy secrecy was estimated to add a premium of 10 percent on program cost. LaPlante said the number of test articles in the program—which he had previously said would be a releasable figure—is still considered too sensitive to discuss. During a meeting with reporters on Oct. 21, he said the LRS-B test fleet would be comparable to that of the KC-46 program, which will have four test airplanes.
we know that the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office managing the acquisition saw the LRS-B program as a way of advancing the application of new stealth technologies, not only in survivability but also in producability and maintainability. Northrop Grumman has advanced the state of the art in all- aspect stealth aircraft from modernizing the B-2, developing the stealthy X-47B unmanned aircraft (a candidate to help solve the U.S. Navy’s long-range strike dilemma), and working other programs.
We also knew before the recent announcement that the LRS-B program was designed to combine the very best practices in integrating advanced propulsion, imbedded antennas, self-defense systems, electronic and communication suites, and manufacturing techniques. Northrop Grumman brought to the competition not only corporate expertise in these areas, but also extensive expertise in the subsystems so critical to stealthy aircraft.
The company not only owns and maintains the B-2, but builds the radars and communications systems for the low-observable F-22 and F-35. Manufacturing and integrating systems that rely on electronic emissions compatible with stealth raises many challenges, but Northrop Grumman has decades of successful experience to leverage. Savvy observers noted that Lockheed Martin comes to Northrop Grumman for that expertise.
Northrop Grumman also has an ace up its sleeve in the manufacturing capabilities inherent in the company. Northrop Grumman not only has a factory designed to build B-2 bombers, but that factory is producing F-35 stealth fuselages today on an award-winning automated assembly line.
Ian33 said:
Northrop bird is rumoured by insiders to have air to air self defence missile capability.
sferrin said:Ian33 said:
Northrop bird is rumoured by insiders to have air to air self defence missile capability.
Let's hope it they look like little flying saucers. ;D (Though I'd guess something like Raytheon's Quick Kill or LM's Cuda.)
Boeing Co (BA.N) may decide as soon as Thursday whether to protest the U.S. Air Force's selection of Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N) to develop and build a next-generation long-range strike bomber amid signs that a challenge could be an uphill battle, according to sources familiar with the issue.
Boeing spokesman Todd Blecher said the company had not yet decided whether to challenge the contract award, which could be worth $80 billion to the winning bidder over the next decades. "We continue to evaluate our options," he said.
Boeing, which had teamed with Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N), has agonized over the decision since receiving a briefing from the U.S. Air Force on Friday, according to sources familiar with the issue, who said company executives were stunned by the loss.
The stakes were high, but neither Boeing nor Lockheed were willing to proceed with a protest if their case looked weak, for fear of annoying the Pentagon and the Air Force, according to two sources familiar with the issue.
A protest would also delay work on the new warplane that U.S. Air Force officials say they need to start replacing the current aging fleets of B-1 and B-52 bombers, the sources said.
The Air Force last week selected Northrop to develop and build the new bomber.
Boeing and Lockheed immediately said they wanted answers on how the competition was scored with regard to price and risk.
Under federal law, companies have 10 days after an agency debrief to file with the U.S. Government Accountability Office, an arm of Congress that rules on federal contract protests. In order to trigger a stop-work order, protests must be filed within five days of a required briefing, according to the GAO.
The GAO then has 100 days to evaluate the case.
Loren Thompson, a defense consultant with close ties to Boeing and Lockheed, said challenging the bomber award could be difficult given that the program was highly classified. The decision would ultimately hinge on how the Air Force evaluated the price and risk of the competing bids, he said. The fact that the deliberations had stretched out for days indicated it was not an obvious - or easy - decision.
He said Boeing could also mount a political battle against the contract award, but faced some hurdles. "It's a secret program, it's a high priority for the Air Force, and Northrop wants to build the bomber in California, a very powerful state," he said.
Sources familiar with the issue said both companies had concerns about the use of historical bomber data to determine the pricing of the new plane since it did not give credit for innovations and new advanced manufacturing techniques implemented since the B-2 bomber two decades ago.
Relying on historical data also affected projected life cycle costs for the planes, the sources said.
Air Force officials have said only that Northrop's bomber represented the "best value for the nation" and would cost $511 million per plane, on average, in 2010 dollars, well below the program's cost cap of $550 million per plane.
Read more at Reuters
sferrin said:Ian33 said:
Northrop bird is rumoured by insiders to have air to air self defence missile capability.
Let's hope it they look like little flying saucers. ;D (Though I'd guess something like Raytheon's Quick Kill or LM's Cuda.)
TomS said:sferrin said:Ian33 said:
Northrop bird is rumoured by insiders to have air to air self defence missile capability.
Let's hope it they look like little flying saucers. ;D (Though I'd guess something like Raytheon's Quick Kill or LM's Cuda.)
Or maybe just a couple of AMRAAM or AIM-9X. This program doesn't have the budget to develop its own AAM.
The losing players in the $80 billion Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program bid are spinning a narrative of “bet the company” low-ball costs.
It might be argued that the major contractor on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter along with the KC-46 prime are qualified to recognize an unrealistic bid when they see one, but it will be hard to prove underbidding in the face of two independent reviews, one by the Air Force and the other by the Pentagon’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) directorate. Particularly so for Lockheed Martin, whose bosses were complaining not long ago that CAPE’s estimates of F-35 costs were ludicrously high.
The counterargument may be that the LRS-B is different from earlier Pentagon programs, and this difference gave Northrop Grumman the chance to pull the odd rabbit out of its hat.
The Pentagon not only set a goal for average procurement unit cost (APUC)—none of this “unit recurring flyaway” stuff, which leaves out spares, support equipment and other things essential to putting rubber on the ramp—but it has been made a key performance parameter. It has teeth: The development contract includes fixed-price incentive options for the first 21 production bombers in five low-rate initial-production batches.
Cost goals are often illusory; by the time they are found to be unrealistic, it’s economically prohibitive for the customer to change course. But the APUC goal for LRS-B (originally $550 million in 2010 dollars, based on a 100-aircraft run) has a few things going for it.
The LRS-B specification resulted from a vigorous scrubbing of requirements. The bomber went from the “Battlestar Galactica” Next-Generation Bomber to part of a family of systems.
Rather than conducting a competitive demonstration program—an approach that hasn’t always done well at anticipating and fixing snags—the Pentagon funded both teams through preliminary design review. The F-35 PDR, which started the process of unearthing the weight explosion that led to a redesign, took place about 16 months into the program.
Air Force procurement chief William LaPlante compares the project to the Lockheed F-117. The F-117 also emerged as an alternative to a bigger, more sophisticated but unaffordable aircraft and was run by small industry and government teams.
The F-117 and LRS-B used mature technology where possible while focusing on what was new, risky and essential. The F-117’s signatures—aerodynamics and propulsion integration—were revolutionary, but its engines, sensors, cockpit displays, navigation system and landing gear were off-the-shelf.
Winning LRS-B likely meant concentrating on two areas. One would have been the combination of low-maintenance stealth with aerodynamic and propulsion efficiency. The other would have been open architecture, to ensure that the slow-paced platform program can keep up with the state of the art in other technologies, from gallium nitride radio-frequency electronics to laser weapons.
Open architecture is essential to LRS-B strategy; it is the bridge between what the customer wants and what he’s willing to accept at initial operational capability to keep APUC down. LaPlante has clarified that he does not expect open architecture to lead to competition between primes for successive block upgrades; instead, he envisions direct competition among subsystem suppliers, underpinned by the knowledge that a new widget—designed to an open, government-owned standard—will play well with others.
The team with the better open-architecture plan will have had a big advantage in LRS-B. But what about production experience? Critics of the decision note that Boeing and Lockheed have built thousands more aircraft recently than has Northrop.
That they have, but building hundreds of aircraft per year was of little value in the LRS-B bidder’s resume, if—as LaPlante has suggested—the production rate is seven or eight per year. The goal is stability rather than volume: A high rate would strain the budget for its active years but would be hard to sustain beyond the first batch.
At such low rates, keeping overheads low and managing a lean supply chain will be as important as worker hours-per-pound of airframe. Making it easy for skilled, adaptable humans to do the job could work better than investing billions into tons of heavy tools and automated assembly systems. That sounds very unlike the Boeing 787 or Lockheed F-35—and more like Northrop Grumman’s Scaled Composites subsidiary, which may have been one of its secret weapons.
Making this work will be a challenge. Spiral development has all too often become death-spiral development, as cost overruns eat the funding that was intended for system improvements. But even at this point, and through a fog of secrecy, LRS-B looks like a different kind of program—and nobody can say that the old ways have been working well.
Flyaway said:Didn't the airforce a while back indicate that the B-3 wouldn't be doing all its own electronic warfare in order to keep costs down, does that mean that this task has been offloaded to another dedicated airframe?
Sundog said:Flyaway said:Didn't the airforce a while back indicate that the B-3 wouldn't be doing all its own electronic warfare in order to keep costs down, does that mean that this task has been offloaded to another dedicated airframe?
Yeah, the RQ-180 reportedly among them