The Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program and the Oct. 27 source selection cannot be understood without looking at LRS-B’s roots.
The program started after then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled a much more ambitious bomber project, the Next-Generation Bomber (NGB), in April 2009. The major differences between the two concern cost and risk, driven by the Pentagon’s desire to break the pattern of massive overruns and delays in major acquisition programs.
The NGB started after the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (released in early 2006) canceled the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program. J-UCAS had been designated as the next U.S. Air Force strike program, and there was no money for both J-UCAS and a bomber. But as J-UCAS had progressed, there had been tension between the Navy version, which had to fit on an aircraft carrier, and the Air Force’s desire for a “global strike enabler” with greater range and payload. By late 2005, Northrop Grumman was briefing a so-called X-47C for the Air Force that would have had a 172-ft. wingspan and a 10,000-lb. bomb load.
The demise of J-UCAS was the start of three programs: the Navy’s X-47B UCAS-D, intended to prove carrier compatibility; an unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, largely sponsored by the CIA (the competition was won by the Northrop Grumman RQ-180); and the Next-Generation Long-Range Strike (NGLRS) analysis of alternatives, which in the course of 2006 generated the NGB requirement.
By 2008, industry executives were expecting an NGB request for proposals (RFP) in late 2009 and a program start in fiscal 2010, with initial operational capability (IOC) in 2018. That did not happen.
There were several reasons for Robert Gates’s decision to cancel the NGB, including the 2008 economic crisis, but the most important was concern over the NGB’s cost and risk. The NGB was a very ambitious concept, as Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne had indicated in an October 2006 speech: “To reduce support packages, it will contain robust electronic attack and suppression of enemy air-defense systems. With fused sensor suites . . . the Next-Generation Bomber will provide global situational awareness on targets, threats and blue forces for positive identification and non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.”
In short, the NGB would be a fully autonomous system capable of detecting, locating and striking moving targets with no outside support, while carrying both offensive and defensive weapons. It was expected to have the stealth and aerodynamic performance needed for long loiter times over hostile territory.
Gates’s decision was not the end of the road; the Air Force was left free to make a case for a less risky alternative while considering other approaches to long-range strike. Writing this year in Aviation Week & Space Technology, Wynne’s successor, Michael Donley, underscored the changes in thinking: “In 2010, the Air Force and DoD reviewed over 28 studies conducted since 1995,” Donley wrote. “We focused on setting affordable, realistic and achievable requirements up front.”
Most importantly, “we took a ‘family of systems’ approach, recognizing that the bomber did not have to do everything itself and would be part of a larger joint portfolio of ISR, communications, electronic warfare and weapon programs and capabilities essential to long-range strike,” he wrote. The LRS-B would be a penetrating, not highly persistent bomber, used in conjunction with the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) nuclear and conventional strategic cruise missile, an RQ-180-type ISR asset and new electronic attack means.
The use of new technology was rigorously restricted in the LRS-B. “We looked at mature technologies from a variety of current programs and made informed trade-offs up front to control costs and technical risk,” Donley said. As Lt. Gen. Arnold Bunch, Jr., military deputy for Air Force acquisition, said last week: “If you’re simultaneously designing a new sensor or a new weapon, it’s complicated. You end up with nested ACAT 1 [Acquisition Category 1] programs or one Acquisition Category 1 program [the largest in the Pentagon] within another.” One lesson in this respect has been the Joint Strike Fighter’s much-delayed Autonomous Logistics Information System, which program director Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan has compared to an ACAT 1 program.