NGAD / F/A-XX - General Discussion and Speculation

Pardon me, did a re-read.

When creating a promising fighter, we are faced with a contradiction: on the one hand, it is required to ensure a cruising supersonic speed of at least 1,830 km / h, for which the wing sweep of 42-50 degrees looks optimal. On the other hand, basing on an aircraft carrier, taking off with a catapult, and landing at a vertical speed of 6 m/s imply a moderate wing sweep of 20-35 degrees. Which sweep should I choose for the NGAD fighter?
NGAD is USAF, so 42-50.

FAXX is USN, so I still think swing wings are a possibility. Or someone has found some really good tricks to make greater sweep play nice on carrier landing.



The NGAD, F/A-XX and the "European six" projects are conceptually very close, the best solution would be to combine them into one project. I assume that common sense and financial difficulties will force to do this.
Strongly disagree, since FAXX needs to happen very soon so replace the Super Hornets.

Combining all the projects would greatly delay getting them completed.



A promising fighter is being created within the framework of the general outline of the development of the armed forces. The project does not exist by itself. The first requirement is to replace the F-22, which means that the new car must surpass the Raptor in most parameters, otherwise there is no point in spending money on its creation. Cruising speed F-22 1500 - 1800 km/h. Take it and provide it.
Yes, that's NGAD and arguably what GCAP is supposed to be.



The second task is to replace the F/A-18E/F, and this is work from the deck of an aircraft carrier and strike operations with clusters of bombs hanging under the wings. The French also need a carrier-based fighter for a new aircraft carrier, which could help them join the alliance.
I'm quite sure that FAXX and SCAF will use internal weapons bays. They may also have "beast mode" options for carrying more bombs at the expense of less fuel.

But France will resist buying FAXX even if it otherwise perfectly matched their requirements as a matter of national pride and keeping Dassault running.



In regards to these catapult and arrestor-gear limits these refer to the Nimitz-class CVNs but what about the EMALS catapult system and electromechanical arresting-gear used by the Ford-class?
While I believe that EMALS can throw a heavier aircraft than steam cats, steam cats are going to remain in service till 2050 or 2060(!). The last Nimitz-class, GHWBush, was commissioned in 2009. Since Super Bugs aren't likely to stay in service till 2050, let alone 2060, the FAXX has to be designed around the steam cat weight limits.

The AAG isn't capable of catching aircraft much heavier than the older stuff on the Nimitz, what it can do is safely catch lighter aircraft like UAVs.
 
Yes, it is. The problem is that the place we're talking about them operating is inside a foreign nation's airspace.

Can't have drones overhead all the time like we've been doing with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Russia or China could legitimately say "these American drones in our airspace are an act of war" and be 100% correct, with the nukes to back up their statement that the US has declared war on them.

So the supersonic drones are needed to get overhead before the mobile ICBMs are away from their bases, to watch them arrive at their dispersal areas.

This operational need for both supersonic and subsonic recon drones was identified clear back in B-2 days.
Why are you not using overhead for 99% of that? Given the distances involved across the pacific theatre I doubt a supersonic CCA is going to be so significantly more effective, or survivable, than subsonic CCA. I also don't think the scenario is realistic unless we are talking a direct nuclear confrontation.
The Russians don't have the assets in space, which means they're not losing anything by using nukes to take out mass numbers of satellites via radiation kills. Assuming that they're not doing anything kinky with nuclear shaped charges aka Casaba Howitzers.

The Chinese are far enough behind the US in terms of large numbers of space assets that they might be willing to consider sacrificing their existing satellites in order to depopulate the US constellations.
If we look at military satellites then the differences are not that great. In 2023 the US had 253, the Chinese 157 and the Russians 110. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-satellite-by-country and that likely just covers the declared ones. All three rely pretty heavily on their constellations for difference uses. The real difference is when we include commercial sats where the US has a clear lead but that will reduce in coming years.

I could not see the Russians completely trashing their orbital constellations that continue to provide them with a modicum of early warning against nuclear attack. There are other means means to interdict other than a basic kinetic strike or a blanket EMP.
 
I also want to amend my thoughts a bit on the potential size, well, weight of FAXX.

Again, I'm reverse-engineering from carrier limits, but I'm starting from the ~55,000lbs landing weight limit that Tomcats had. I'm further going to assume that the USN wants to be able to land with all the expensive missiles still onboard. I'm still assuming the bays are sized for AGM-158s width wise, and I'm also stretching them slightly to allow for internal carriage of AIM174s. LRASMs are ~2800lbs each, so 4 of those makes 11,200lbs of antiship, and a pair of AMRAAMs or Meteors makes for an even 12,000lbs. Let's give the plane 3000lbs of fuel remaining, so it's not quite as much pucker-factor as the Tomcat's "gotta make the trap on the first try or you're hitting the tanker right after your bolter."

55 - 12 - 3 = 40klbs empty weight

And an MTOW of twice the empty weight is 80,000lbs. 2x Empty weight seems to check out for a whole lot of fighters, going clear back to the Teen series. Amusingly, 80klbs is a little lighter than an F-22!

80 - 40 - 12 = 28klbs fuel weight.

The F-22 has a fuel capacity of 18klbs, so assuming similar fuel burn a plane with 28klbs of fuel should have a combat range about 27% farther than an F-22. The Subsonic-only combat range of an F-22 is 595nmi, and 127% of that is 760nmi.

My current mental image for this is a plane that looks a lot like an F-22 through the weapons bays, just a lot wider. If we're assuming bays able to hold 4x AGM-158s in parallel, well, we're talking about a block that is ~135" or so wide. In comparison, the weapons bay of the F-22 is about 80" wide. That 135" number is 4x25" wide weapons, plus 5" space to reach around weapons to attach them, plus a 5" gap between the two weapons bays to make the doors smaller and therefore faster to open. Since fitting AIM-174s inside means we're stretching the weapons bay sections about 2 feet, we conveniently now have space to stick AMRAAMs into the side bays instead of just AIM-9Xs.
 
Why are you not using overhead for 99% of that? Given the distances involved across the pacific theatre I doubt a supersonic CCA is going to be so significantly more effective, or survivable, than subsonic CCA. I also don't think the scenario is realistic unless we are talking a direct nuclear confrontation.
What part of "hunting mobile ICBMs" as the mission being talked about implies anything short of a direct nuclear confrontation?


If we look at military satellites then the differences are not that great. In 2023 the US had 253, the Chinese 157 and the Russians 110. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-satellite-by-country and that likely just covers the declared ones. All three rely pretty heavily on their constellations for difference uses. The real difference is when we include commercial sats where the US has a clear lead but that will reduce in coming years.
And how many more did the US launch in 2024?

64 just between January and June, and about 75 more between July and December. Call it roughly 140, bringing the US total to 390ish.


I could not see the Russians completely trashing their orbital constellations that continue to provide them with a modicum of early warning against nuclear attack. There are other means means to interdict other than a basic kinetic strike or a blanket EMP.
Yet the Russians are (alleged) to have developed a nuclear-tipped ASAT. Which indicates that they're willing to lose their stuff in crossing orbits if they use it.
 
What part of "hunting mobile ICBMs" as the mission being talked about implies anything short of a direct nuclear confrontation?
Our conversation started based on my comment to an article talking about CCAs supporting B-21s. I have never discussed a direct nuclear confrontation. You took it there without giving me that context.
And how many more did the US launch in 2024?

64 just between January and June, and about 75 more between July and December. Call it roughly 140, bringing the US total to 390ish.
Sure launches have increased but many of those are replacing older constellations. I don't think the active numbers correspond directly to an increase. Either way, the increase of US satellites does not logically imply that Russia will simply walk away from all their space based assets.
Yet the Russians are (alleged) to have developed a nuclear-tipped ASAT. Which indicates that they're willing to lose their stuff in crossing orbits if they use it.
If it does exist a nuclear ASAT doesn't wipe out all satellites across all orbits.
 
Our conversation started based on my comment to an article talking about CCAs supporting B-21s. I have never discussed a direct nuclear confrontation. You took it there without giving me that context.
1) it's a strategic bomber, I would have thought that going directly to the strategic mission would have been obvious.

2) My bad, I did forget to include that piece immediately.


But if we ignore the nuclear warfare mission then the supersonic CCA is much less necessary.


Sure launches have increased but many of those are replacing older constellations. I don't think the active numbers correspond directly to an increase. Either way, the increase of US satellites does not logically imply that Russia will simply walk away from all their space based assets.
Most of 100 of those are Starshield. Which is an increase. There's also a dozen or so that aren't officially USGov, but belong to a company in the DC area that is contracted to do SIGINT.


If it does exist a nuclear ASAT doesn't wipe out all satellites across all orbits.
One wouldn't.

The question is, how many satellites would cross through the radiation bubble that is trapped by the earth's magnetic field while it remained strong enough to wreck them?

Which then gets to how many nuclear ASATs are needed to take down all US assets.
 
Seven Reapers shot down in six weeks over Yemen totaling over $200m, and this is not against a sophisticated adversary. CCAs are just not going to be cheap enough to make sense.

They are if they are shooting down an equivalent number of aircraft. Remember CCA is part of the NGAD program, air dominance. It is not intended as a SEAD platform, at least at this juncture. It is intended to carry BVR AAMs. If it fails to kill a significant number of opponent aircraft, then the concept did not work. But on the other hand I am quite sure the USAF would trade an FQ-44 for a J-15, let alone a J-20.
 
The F-22 & F-35 have different datalinks and now if other datalinks such as E-7, B-21 etc must also be integrated costs will spiral. This was pointed out by Defense News journalists in a post from jsport, CCA's defensive measures you mention will also become an ever spiraling cost. A contractor's motivation is for spiraling capability and thus cost.

It seems likely CCA is only paired with F-35 initially. It presumably will need some kind of MADL capability for this. It’s likely B-21 and E-7 already will have those formats anyway, but in any case it is unclear if either will ever have to directly talk to CCA.

I also expect that there will be a communications relay version of CCAs that handles format/waveform translations and maintains a satellite link to facilitate long range control of CCAs when possible, with direct fighter control eventually becoming a fallback mode.
 
Why are you not using overhead for 99% of that? Given the distances involved across the pacific theatre I doubt a supersonic CCA is going to be so significantly more effective, or survivable, than subsonic CCA. I also don't think the scenario is realistic unless we are talking a direct nuclear confrontation.

I agree that overhead assets likely are the primary ISR asset for penetration bombing, conventional or nuclear. These additionally are likely supported by very high endurance HALE VLO UAVs (eg “RQ-180”) and locally based MALE UAVs (eg RQ-170). If there is a super sonic reconnaissance platform, it is completely disconnected from NGAD, CCA, and the B-21 programs and it would receive instructions from and offload data by satellite.

If we look at military satellites then the differences are not that great. In 2023 the US had 253, the Chinese 157 and the Russians 110. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-satellite-by-country and that likely just covers the declared ones. All three rely pretty heavily on their constellations for difference uses. The real difference is when we include commercial sats where the US has a clear lead but that will reduce in coming years.

I could not see the Russians completely trashing their orbital constellations that continue to provide them with a modicum of early warning against nuclear attack. There are other means means to interdict other than a basic kinetic strike or a blanket EMP.

Those numbers are very out of date for the U.S. and PRC (Russia is in distant third place). Half of all Chinese launches are military in nature; over two hundred military satellites were launched by the PRC in 2023-24. And the U.S. has recently begun spamming its proliferated architecture into space - the NRO launched nearly 180 satellites for this constellation alone using nine F9s inside the last year, and SDA has ten launches scheduled to deliver 170 satellites starting this summer, with about 200 more on contract scheduled for launches to begin late 2026. And that ignores all other NRO and spaceforce launches, as well as commercial launches that are contracted to DoD or will be part of the future ready reserve.

I think permanently neutralizing constellations of this size is simply impossible without a nuclear weapon. Jamming their links maybe possible in some geometries, but laser cross links mean that this would likely only disrupt local uplinks or downlinks, not the flow of data satellite to satellite.
 
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1) it's a strategic bomber, I would have thought that going directly to the strategic mission would have been obvious.

2) My bad, I did forget to include that piece immediately.


But if we ignore the nuclear warfare mission then the supersonic CCA is much less necessary.

I do not see why long endurance subsonic UAVs could not be used either ahead of time or via local basing. In any case, none of this has anything to do with CCAs: strategic reconnaissance is far outside that program’s goal. I am not sure even tactical reconnaissance is inside CCAs requirements; it primarily is an adjunct to the air dominance program and as such I would expect it to eschew most A2G related missions.

Most of 100 of those are Starshield. Which is an increase. There's also a dozen or so that aren't officially USGov, but belong to a company in the DC area that is contracted to do SIGINT.

See above post; both the U.S. and PRC are filling space with military assets as fast as they can.

One wouldn't.

The question is, how many satellites would cross through the radiation bubble that is trapped by the earth's magnetic field while it remained strong enough to wreck them?

Which then gets to how many nuclear ASATs are needed to take down all US assets.

A nuclear ASAT strike would indiscriminately affect most LEO satellites, including the vast constellations of the U.S. and China. It is not inconceivable to me that Russia would go this route if it felt existentially threatened, but it likely would be a precursor to nuclear war and it certainly would have a pronounced, acute effect on the sino-Russo relationship.
 
They are if they are shooting down an equivalent number of aircraft. Remember CCA is part of the NGAD program, air dominance. It is not intended as a SEAD platform, at least at this juncture. It is intended to carry BVR AAMs. If it fails to kill a significant number of opponent aircraft, then the concept did not work. But on the other hand I am quite sure the USAF would trade an FQ-44 for a J-15, let alone a J-20.
Any CCA that does not put the hunt for Critical Mobile Tgts including SEAD is pointless. PCA will always a better way to keep fighter waves at bay & at distance. The farther away a threat fighter is engaged the better thus a missile too large to fit in large numbers on CCA or a fighter.
 
...the lower is the chance of success.
Storm breaker is known for instance, for possessing MMV, IR, and laser guidance. Cost is no longer such a prohibition to multi sensor fusion. Misses r less likely.
 
Storm breaker is known for instance, for possessing MMV, IR, and laser guidance. Cost is no longer such a prohibition to multi sensor fusion. Misses r less likely.
Misses are likely simply b/c we're adding time on target. It brings uncertainty even if target doesn't react.

Best shot is point blank, against unaware target. Like the famous f-22 trolling of Iranian f-4.
 
I do not see why long endurance subsonic UAVs could not be used either ahead of time or via local basing. In any case, none of this has anything to do with CCAs: strategic reconnaissance is far outside that program’s goal. I am not sure even tactical reconnaissance is inside CCAs requirements; it primarily is an adjunct to the air dominance program and as such I would expect it to eschew most A2G related missions.
Does "finding and tracking targets so that another part of the system-of-systems can destroy it shortly" count as strategic reconnaissance? I mean, it's looking for strategic targets, but not on strategic timescales. We're talking a few hours from "sensorcraft overhead spotting and tracking targets" till "B-21 overhead and blowing things up."

Because as I said before, subsonic and supersonic recon craft (I believe drones, but not sure since 1980s/1990s) were an intended part of the B-2 program, likely cancelled as part of the Peace Dividend.

As to why they cannot be used ahead of time, they'd be flying into Russian, Chinese, or DPRK airspace, something that is an act of war. At best you'd have the subsonic drones pulling Chrome Dome orbits, waiting for war to be declared before entering the ADIZ. Because how many countries would allow the scout for a strategic bomber to be based on their soil? And how many countries would the US trust to keep an extremely VLO HALE drone hidden?



A nuclear ASAT strike would indiscriminately affect most LEO satellites, including the vast constellations of the U.S. and China. It is not inconceivable to me that Russia would go this route if it felt existentially threatened, but it likely would be a precursor to nuclear war
Oh, absolutely. Nukes going off in orbit would blind all sorts of early warning systems and therefore very likely be considered an attack on the US.


and it certainly would have a pronounced, acute effect on the sino-Russo relationship.
Agreed. I suspect that China would order however many divisions they have in Manchuria to march north and take Siberia.
 
Any CCA that does not put the hunt for Critical Mobile Tgts including SEAD is pointless. PCA will always a better way to keep fighter waves at bay & at distance. The farther away a threat fighter is engaged the better thus a missile too large to fit in large numbers on CCA or a fighter.

There are completely different platforms that work towards that mission. Again, CCA is part of NGAD, as in “air dominance”.
 
Storm breaker is known for instance, for possessing MMV, IR, and laser guidance. Cost is no longer such a prohibition to multi sensor fusion. Misses r less likely.

The bigger issue for A2A guidance is kinematics.
 
Does "finding and tracking targets so that another part of the system-of-systems can destroy it shortly" count as strategic reconnaissance? I mean, it's looking for strategic targets, but not on strategic timescales. We're talking a few hours from "sensorcraft overhead spotting and tracking targets" till "B-21 overhead and blowing things up."

Because as I said before, subsonic and supersonic recon craft (I believe drones, but not sure since 1980s/1990s) were an intended part of the B-2 program, likely cancelled as part of the Peace Dividend.

As to why they cannot be used ahead of time, they'd be flying into Russian, Chinese, or DPRK airspace, something that is an act of war. At best you'd have the subsonic drones pulling Chrome Dome orbits, waiting for war to be declared before entering the ADIZ. Because how many countries would allow the scout for a strategic bomber to be based on their soil? And how many countries would the US trust to keep an extremely VLO HALE drone hidden?

I am not trying to get into semantic battle; my point was that nothing you are discussing is a requirement or goal of the CCA program, which is an A2A focused platform.

You would not need aircraft in hostile air space shape time, you would only need them there before the bombers arrived. For China, that’s almost a half day, even for an aircraft on alert.
 
The bigger issue for A2A guidance is kinematics.
Sure, and size still matters in a bad way for CCA.

This extended reach could significantly complicate an adversary’s attack planning and force them to commit additional resources to overcome the expanded defensive bubble. However, the operational use of the SM-6 in an A2A role also presents a few challenges. The missile’s large size limits the number that can be carried by fighter aircraft, and its integration requires modifications to existing platforms. Reports released so far indicate that an F/A-18 can carry two of these missiles simultaneously. Perhaps this number can be reasonably expanded to four missiles, but that still contrasts unfavorably with the now-retired F-14’s load of six Phoenix missiles.
 
However, the operational use of the SM-6 in an A2A role also presents a few challenges. The missile’s large size limits the number that can be carried by fighter aircraft, and its integration requires modifications to existing platforms.
Back to my dedicated A2A3 conops.

Air 2 Air Arsenal Aircraft
 
Back to my dedicated A2A3 conops.

Air 2 Air Arsenal Aircraft
Yes, likely a PCounter Air (PCA) technical requirement argues in that direction exists somewhere in the five sided funny farm, but gov capture argues for CCA. Train in the wrong direction has likely left the station.
 
Yes, likely a PCounter Air (PCA) technical requirement argues in that direction exists somewhere in the five sided funny farm, but gov capture argues for CCA. Train in the wrong direction has likely left the station.

I question the life span of a B-1 platform against opposing long range weapons of equivalent capability, even ignoring the fact that they are an exhausted, irreplaceable force.

On the flip side, the U.S. could make a couple hundred CCAs a year from practically any single manufacturer.
 

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