MiG-29 Avionics

Thank you I was truly not aware that the MiG-29AS radar had been upgraded to such specification.
I believe it’s reasonable to think the “S” could be for Slovakia.
Yes, but It is only reasonable if one does not take the time to truly understand the history & design of the aircraft as a whole.

As the Ukrainians have correctly reported, the MiG-29s that were handed over by the Russian Federation to clean up debt coming out of the total economic collapse of the Soviet Union. This means the that the MiG-29S were not originally produced as specific export but to the Soviet/Russian Federation standard that was pulled from Russian Air Force inventory. Therefore, S will not represent the country of Slovakia.

The Russian Federation had promised MiG-29S which were the 9-12S & 9-13S. They were the most advanced MiG-29 at the time (just as the Ukrainians correctly point out) & last fighters ever produced by the Soviet Union.

However, Russian Federation Export law will not allow the transfer of the N019M Topaz with full domestic capabilities. The Mig-29 in batch 2 that were approved for Slovakian transfer, which were 9-12S base models would be handed over without the Topaz and instead Rubin until the export approved N019ME can be serial produced and provided.

This is why they were initially referred/reported as Mig-29A by the Slovaks (Topaz is the principal upgrade). However, they were not truly 9-12A either, since they still had all the hallmarks & lesser upgrades of 9-12S such as the additional drop tank capability, as this Polish open-source reports, a dedicated site to cataloguing historical paint schemes of the MiG-29 of both domestic & export use.

"Second batch of MiGs are from Russian air force inventory as debts payment. It's not version 9-12A!"

I agree, those are modifications that belong to product index 9-12S. That also means that these special "9-12A" had come with the SOS-3M-3 limiter giving it an increase from 26° degrees of instantaneous angle of attack to 28° degrees, like that which was also implemented in the 9-13S, as well as the SD, SM, SMT, SMT-2 etc.

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Note how they also report the MiG-29A in question had come from Russian Air Force inventory as well not from MiG-MAPO.

When the Russian Federation did carry out the upgrade to the Topaz in the early 2000s alongside the Letecké Opravovne Trenčín A.S (Translated: Trenčín Aircraft Repair A.S) the S was added to the designation to signify upgrade completion & reflect the capability to the S standard provided by the renamed MiG RSK of the Russian Federation.

Lastly, to avoid any potential misinterpretation, A.S in the Slovakian company Letecké Opravovne Trenčín A.S, is akciová spoločnosť. Which simply means Joint-stock company.

The MiG 29AS does not laughably mean MiG-29 Joint Stock company.

Almost everywhere online refers only to NATO and cockpit upgrades, and even after your informed me I cannot find any other authoritative sources besides the one you mention mentioning the radar.
NATO integration as a capability is predominately highlighted because it involves the most important topic that remains a top story in the global news cycle as it will determine the entire fate and destiny of the Ukrainian people as we know it: Ukraine's potential membership in the NATO alliance.

You likely just heard of the MiG-29AS existence because you only ever mention in its transfer to Ukraine and the first sources on any search engines are news reports regarding it.

Now the reason the R-27ER & the N019M Topaz are not mentioned these days or in what you are able to find is simple, the capabilities are irrelevant & they are not worth mentioning.

The R-27ER & the N019M Topaz (both products of the Soviet Union) are now operationally obsolete in modern aerial combat & this war has proven it. The R-27ET however, still remains highly combat effective for the foreseeable future. Especially as advancements in passive IR/UV optical sensors continue to improve at an alarming rate. Ukraine has stopped any boasting of their own domestically produced R-27ER and rather highlights it now as the very reason they need the F-16 and the Aim-120. SARH missiles are obsolete. There is no reason to mention them. No amount of R-27R & ER will give Ukraine peer to peer parity with the Russian Federation's advanced passive & active capabilities in the domain of combat aviation.

I am sorry but in your attached pictures I still do not see anything that convinces me the N-019 does not use what could be called a gimbal.
The attached pictures were not intended to convince you of anything. They are provided to show others that the actual Cambridge, Meriam Webster, Collins definitions of the word "gimbal" vs the definition you claim to operate under are not remotely related. That using names as certification, not their real definitions to co-sign for a flawed logic is not acceptable.

from Cambridge to Merriam Webster, to Collins and even howstuffworks.com all show that gimbal is a versatile word to describe something on a pivot. Something that rotates on an axis for any purpose or reason driven by any force.
Without acknowledgment that the very foundation of what you know about these radars may be flawed. You only limit yourself from understanding the aircraft you claim to love & the ability to identify the technologies within. This principle applies to all things btw.

This horse is dead. Please move on from it.
 
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That memo is for a specific info dump given in 1980, it doesn't give the complete picture.

The most extensive documentation was on Sapfir-23 and Zaslon because he had the most access to them, but he also compromised the N019, N001 and others.
 
The maximum azimuth is used during STT track. During search, the maximum azimuth is 65 degrees. If you lock someone at edge of gimbal limit in search in left or right direction, you could turn an additional 5 degrees with STT before the lock is dropped
EDIT: spelling error fixed
I’m beginning to realize I was initially correct. The NO-19 radar does do +/-70 degrees in azimuth. The pages from combat employment manual that mention 65 degrees are all for search modes, not track.

I thought it odd that so much technical literature, The PowerPoint that Overscan translated, the weapon complex manual, 3rd party sources all agreed on 70 degree azimuth limits, but let myself trust the combat employment manual over those without realizing the limits for track mode are in a different page.
 

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I’m beginning to realize I was initially correct. The NO-19 radar does do +/-70 degrees in azimuth. The pages from combat employment manual that mention 65 degrees are all for search modes, not track.

I thought it odd that so much technical literature, The PowerPoint that Overscan translated, the weapon complex manual, 3rd party sources all agreed on 70 degree azimuth limits, but let myself trust the combat employment manual over those without realizing the limits for track mode are in a different page.
Just one question. The second picture IMG_9558 seems to be picture from some Polish language instruction for MIG. Do you have scan of this document? Is it possible to share it ?
 
Just one question. The second picture IMG_9558 seems to be picture from some Polish language instruction for MIG. Do you have scan of this document? Is it possible to share it ?
It is a maintenance document that details expected specifications of different systems and allowable tolerance before needing overhaul. Let me see what I can do, I’ll ask the person who shared it with me.

I also posted a page from it on the last page showing the radar is required to be accurate within 15’ (minutes). I didn’t realize but same information is in weapon complex 9.12B manual
 

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I’m beginning to realize I was initially correct. The NO-19 radar does do +/-70 degrees in azimuth. The pages from combat employment manual that mention 65 degrees are all for search modes, not track.

I thought it odd that so much technical literature, The PowerPoint that Overscan translated, the weapon complex manual, 3rd party sources all agreed on 70 degree azimuth limits, but let myself trust the combat employment manual over those without realizing the limits for track mode are in a different page.

Its N019 not NO-19.

I haven't revisited the documents my recollection is +-70° azimuth,+60°/-40° elevation is the physical limit of the antenna, with the lower values (+-65° azimuth, + 56°/-36 ° elevation) are the maximum selectable values.
 
Its N019 not NO-19.

I haven't revisited the documents my recollection is +-70° azimuth,+60°/-40° elevation is the physical limit of the antenna, with the lower values (+-65° azimuth, + 56°/-36 ° elevation) are the maximum selectable values.
Noted, and yes that would seem to be the case. I see -45 degrees thrown around also, but -40 degrees seems to be the correct value for negative elevation in track, and as up said -36 for search mode as needed by delta H and stabilization.
 
I’m beginning to realize I was initially correct. The NO-19 radar does do +/-70 degrees in azimuth.
I want you to be correct, I truly do.

But unfortunately, here you have taken a long-established primary source, the combat employment manual of the Mig-29 (9-12), the first production line of the fighter and placed around it several pages taken from secondary independent commercial publications that have no authority or relation to the designer, manufacturer or the Air Armies of the VVS & the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.


The pages from combat employment manual that mention 65 degrees are all for search modes, not track.

This is false. Just read the material..
The manual states Automatic Tracking is limited to 65 degrees. :)


"7. The angular dimensions of the automatic tracking zone are ±65° in azimuth and from +56° to -36° in tilt (Fig. 7).



“FIG. 7. ANGULAR DIMENSIONS OF THE AUTO-FOLLOWING ZONE"

Screenshot 2025-02-04 033442.png




"FIG. 5. LIMITS OF DISPLACEMENT OF THE VIEWING AREA RELATIVELY TO THE LONGITUDINAL AXIS OF THE ANTENNA"
Screenshot 2025-02-04 024412.png

The radar is severely limited technologically. In particular, extremely poor boresight performance.

So limited in fact, that the radar is incapable of VIEWING, SEARCHING & TRACKING its full azimuth & must the divide 130 degrees into three zones.
Within each viewing zone is a search & track SCAN SECTOR where the mechanical drive system rotates the beam within. The (3) viewing zones are exclusively operated by analog switch on Control Panel PSR-31. They are not engaging automatically & they do not track into the next. The Ts100 has no capability over the analog N019 & N001 azimuth viewing.

"The pilot controls the position of the viewing zone in azimuth and elevation. In azimuth, the zone is discretely shifted to the extreme left or right position using the ZONE switch on the radar control panel, providing viewing of space within +65° relative to the longitudinal axis of the fighter (Fig. 4)."
Screenshot 2025-02-04 053313.png
"FIG. 4. DISPLACEMENT OF THE VIEWING ZONE IN AZIMUTH RELATIVELY TO THE LONGITUDINAL AXIS OF THE AIRCRAFT WHEN CHANGING THE POSITION OF THE "ZONE" SWITCH (display of the azimuth size of the zone on the HUD screen)"

You fail to understand the difference between viewing zones and scan sectors. The center VIEWING ZONE is observed at 70 degrees while search & track has remained at 65 degrees within. The left zone & right zone are 65 degrees, and ALL scan sectors remain 65 degrees. Even the Ukrainian source reflects this.
 
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I want you to be correct, I truly do.

But unfortunately, here you have taken a long-established primary source, the combat employment manual of the Mig-29 (9-12), the first production line of the fighter and placed around it several pages taken from secondary independent commercial publications that have no authority or relation to the designer, manufacturer or the Air Armies of the VVS & the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.




This is false. Just read the material..
The manual states Automatic Tracking is limited to 65 degrees. :)


"7. The angular dimensions of the automatic tracking zone are ±65° in azimuth and from +56° to -36° in tilt (Fig. 7).



“FIG. 7. ANGULAR DIMENSIONS OF THE AUTO-FOLLOWING ZONE"

View attachment 758315




"FIG. 5. LIMITS OF DISPLACEMENT OF THE VIEWING AREA RELATIVELY TO THE LONGITUDINAL AXIS OF THE ANTENNA"
View attachment 758298

The radar is severely limited technologically. In particular, extremely poor boresight performance.

So limited in fact, that the radar is incapable of VIEWING, SEARCHING & TRACKING its full azimuth & must the divide 130 degrees into three zones.
Within each viewing zone is a search & track SCAN SECTOR where the mechanical drive system rotates the beam within. The (3) viewing zones are exclusively operated by analog switch on Control Panel PSR-31. They are not engaging automatically & they do not track into the next. The Ts100 has no capability over the analog N019 & N001 azimuth viewing.

"The pilot controls the position of the viewing zone in azimuth and elevation. In azimuth, the zone is discretely shifted to the extreme left or right position using the ZONE switch on the radar control panel, providing viewing of space within +65° relative to the longitudinal axis of the fighter (Fig. 4)."
View attachment 758331
"FIG. 4. DISPLACEMENT OF THE VIEWING ZONE IN AZIMUTH RELATIVELY TO THE LONGITUDINAL AXIS OF THE AIRCRAFT WHEN CHANGING THE POSITION OF THE "ZONE" SWITCH (display of the azimuth size of the zone on the HUD screen)"

You fail to understand the difference between viewing zones and scan sectors. The center VIEWING ZONE is observed at 70 degrees while search & track has remained at 65 degrees within. The left zone & right zone are 65 degrees, and ALL scan sectors remain 65 degrees. Even the Ukrainian source reflects this.
I have little reason to believe that the all the images you have posted are for track. From reading the material, which I have done many times, it seems to only be for search. The one with Figure 7 may say “auto tracking” and “auto following” upon translation, but upon looking at the context and all other sources I think the translation is doing some deceiving. For example tracking a target in TWS, or following the horizon and PSR-31/Delta H commands, which is mentioned many times in the previous section.

Why would the scale of the antenna rhombus on the HUD (specifically mentioned as STT/track mode, and from the same combat employment manual you reference) otherwise be +/-70 degrees? Why would the weapon complex textbook, certainly affiliated with MiG, from the red banner academy of Zhukovsky, give the azimuth limits of +/-70 degrees every chance it gets including both internal radar measurements and information passed to ILS-31? Why would a Polish manual from the Krakow museum explicitly used by maintenance personal say the azimuth limits are required to be +/-70 degrees? If by Ukrainian source you possibly mean the PowerPoint from Kiev National Aviation Academy that Over Scan translated, it also says +/-70 degrees. These are not “secondary commercial sources” as you claim.

Yes it does say the “scan sector” is limited 65 degrees from the nose, and covers a 50 degree arc, in “search” mode however not track. It is not “scanning” in STT. Your images display the search sectors and bars, which do not exist in track/STT, even if I ignore context from the descriptions.

So many other sources repeat it, you say it is “observed” but not measured? I have only spoken of internal measurements of the radar, and information passed to ILS-31.

In addition, I do not know what the radar “being limited” has to do with it being “incapable of tracking along its full azimuth.” I do not believe a radar being able to use its full azimuth as measured both inside the radar and as information sent to the HUD is some black magic that the Soviet Union was incapable of doing in the 80s.

The information I have read and presented seems to affirm this from multiple sources, so I believe it, whatever some may think of its technology. I have also shown two sources of its ability to accurately aim its radar antenna within 15 minutes of an arc, if you think that “innacurate” for a 3.5 degree beam width monopulse antenna it is your opinion and you are welcome to it.
 
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I have little reason to believe that the all the images you have posted are for track
I respect that. Always question what honestly does not make sense to you & we both will only get more efficient I make mistakes, I have made them in regard to this very subject. I will provide what I am able in detail to your concerns so which image?

So, the Ukrainian source is proving itself more correct as I go through all what overscan has provided in detail. there are still some unrelated radar inconsistencies (minor) I have not went over.

However, the Ukrainian source says view zone never tracking, as well as every source you provided. All say viewing. Not a single one has said search & tracking. Remember, 70 degrees azimuth tracking is still entirely a theory many hold because secondary sources fail to clarify the differences or know themselves. That is why they are called secondary sources. The primary source & the combat employment manual approved by the VVS clarifies the difference and function of both & does not mention the center view zone azimuth in reference to screen scales. Why would they need two? Because it will only generate confusion and distraction to what matters as it does here.


Why would the scale of the antenna rhombus on the HUD (specifically mentioned as STT/track mode, and from the same combat employment manual you reference) otherwise be +/-70 degrees?

FIG. 20. RADAR CAPTURE. SCREEN SCALES IN AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION:
for a rhombus a = +70°; for a sighting ring a = +459

FIG. 21. TP OVERVIEW. SCREEN SCALES FOR TARGET MARKING:
in azimuth - ±30°; elevation angle - +15°


Because when the radar complex captures a target within its scan sector to the maximum 65 degrees azimuth, the rhombus, a larger scale appears on the HUD & the target is within, the edges of the rhombus are obviously going to stretch beyond the 65 degrees scan sector, therefore the view zone is placed at 70 degrees allowing full viewing of the rhombus and all other screen scales & indicators showing appropriately within the view zone.
antenna rhombus on the HUD

When you use language like "antenna rhombus" it gives off the energy you are attempting to ever so slightly alter what the scale actually represents on HUD to fit a narrative.
By calling it an "antenna rhombus" & had I agreed without a second thought as most people do, you created you own facts & I just gave it legitimacy.
It's actually brilliant if you are intending to deceive. Because yes, the Radar
Capture Screen Scale
does give obvious indication of where the "antenna" might be pointed, it is not what the scale actually represents. The Rhombus will appear circled around a target as to confirm its capture in the radar complex, a "track."

It is excellent choice of words. However, this antenna does not point, at least not all of it. Only the main reflector mechanically tilts and rotates to scan & steer the beam. This type of radar complex is not referred in this way. & why I provided it translation above.

Yes it does say the “scan sector” is limited 65 degrees from the nose, and covers a 50 degree arc, in “search” mode however not track. It is not “scanning” in STT. Your images display the search sectors and bars, which do not exist in track/STT, even if I ignore context from the descriptions.
When a fully mechanically scanned & steered radar conducts any search & track function, it follows a physical track powered by the mechanical drive to both scan & track. They all follow specific mechanical overlapping tracks to scan volume and track a target depending on mode. This design originally developed & fielded in the 60s (very formidable at the time) will obviously lead to a longer time to acquire, latency, poor target discrimination and lack of precision. Especially in dynamic conditions like close quarters & dogfights. Do you ever wonder why the IRST is used for the gun only? Why the R-27R and ER in the Su-27SK is limited to roll rate of no more than 50 degrees to be able to launch? while the IR variations retain full launch performance. Latency of the antenna and the hybrid analog design. Even the AWG-9 had latency, and it was immensely more digitized than the N019 Rubin.

The N019 is a parabolic mirror scan radar, it does not have ability to utilize phase shifts & electronically steer any way instantly with rapid beam agility in multiple patterns and engage in beamforming. The Ukrainian source provides a glimpse in the the N019 process. Screenshot_9-2-2025_91849_.jpeg
 
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I will provide what I am able in detail to your concerns so which image?
As mentioned, the one titled “Figure 7” of the combat employment manual.

Because when the radar complex captures a target within its scan sector to the maximum 65 degrees azimuth, the rhombus, a larger scale appears on the HUD & the target is within, the edges of the rhombus are obviously going to stretch beyond the 65 degrees scan sector, therefore the view zone is placed at 70 degrees allowing full viewing of the rhombus and all other screen scales & indicators showing appropriately within the view zone.

This seems to me an assumption on your part, and not an adequate reason for why when we have so many other primary non commercial sources giving better reasons for the HUD rhombus scale to be in +/-70 degrees.

When you use language like "antenna rhombus" it gives off the energy you are attempting to ever so slightly alter what the scale actually represents on HUD to fit a narrative.
By calling it an "antenna rhombus" & had I agreed without a second thought as most people do, you created you own facts & I just gave it legitimacy.
It's actually brilliant if you are intending to deceive. Because yes, the Radar
Capture Screen Scale
does give obvious indication of where the "antenna" might be pointed, it is not what the scale actually represents. The Rhombus will appear circled around a target as to confirm its capture in the radar complex, a "track."

It is excellent choice of words. However, this antenna does not point, at least not all of it. Only the main reflector mechanically tilts and rotates to scan & steer the beam. This type of radar complex is not referred in this way. & why I provided it translation above.

I do not know why you are so concerned with trying to find deception in my words where there are none. I say “antenna rhombus” because that is how it is described, a rhombus placed on the HUD to show the deviation of the antenna. I am not deceiving, only trying to use the terms that make most sense. I don’t know what else you would call it beyond “antenna deviation indicator.”

The Rhombus will appear circled around a target as to confirm its capture in the radar complex, a "track."

I do not know why you would say this part either. In no mode is the rhombus directly circling the target, but only showing the direction and degree the main antenna is pointed. It would only “circle” the target when the MiG-29 directly points at the target with the target in the center crosshairs. As far as I am aware, there is no mode where the MiG-29 9.12/9.13 might directly circle a target unless pointed directly at it. One of the many improvements the Su-27 made in HUD symbology. You can see so here
View: https://youtu.be/kbVQIsUPX1o?si=Ztw_74ZaMDcAr_iK


Do you ever wonder why the IRST is used for the gun only?
Radar can be used for the gun. I do not know why you would think this. It may be very useful for it but the case is far from “only.” Is there some interview or some other thing in your head making you think this? I have not read it in any manual or interview or document I have gone through.


Why the R-27R and ER in the Su-27SK is limited to roll rate of no more than 50 degrees to be able to launch?

As you say, that is a launch limitation. What makes you think it has to do with radar and not just making sure the missile leaves correctly and doesn’t hit the aircraft?

For MiG-29, I do know that The datalink commands rely on accurate Cartesian coordinates, and the roll of the aircraft is updated at 18-20 hz. So roll speed needs to be limited during datalink control so that the Cartesian coordinates of the datalink commands don’t have an outdated roll value. For MiG-29 this was 60 degrees per second, and 30 degrees per second for missiles made before 1986. To quote the MiG-29 manual “В связи с тем что информация по крену при радиокоррекции обновляется с частотой 18—20 Гц, сигналы радиокоррекции правильно выдаются только при угловой скорости вращения истребителя не более 60°/с (при применении ракет выпуска до июля 1986 г. — не более 30°/с). По этой причине не обеспечивается наведение ракеты Р-27ЭР на цель в инерциально-корректируемом режиме при выполнении истребителем противоракетного маневра типа «кадушка».”


Latency of the antenna and the hybrid analog design.

Oh. I don’t see what that has to do with the antenna or radar design at all, just the speed the computers are updated with new gyroscopic roll information, or the physics of an AKU/APU pylon launching a R-27R/ER from Su-27SK without hitting the aircraft. But okay.
 
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Nothing you provided states search and track 70 degrees.

Everything you have ever posted states VIEWING 70 degrees.
there are view zones, 3 of them. That is why its called a zone switch.

Nothing you have ever posted agrees with you. VIEWING zone(s) does mean single target track. This is entirely your own personal interpretation and inability to accept what manual says & depicts in picture. You even resort to questioning the validity of the written Cyrillic script of the Russian speaking people.

Nothing matters until you provide a single source, ANY source that says AUTOTRACKING @ 70 degrees for each viewing zone & why.
 
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I do not know why you would say this part either. In no mode is the rhombus directly circling the target, but only showing the direction and degree the main antenna is pointed. It would only “circle” the target when the MiG-29 directly points at the target with the target in the center crosshairs. As far as I am aware, there is no mode where the MiG-29 9.12/9.13 might directly circle a target unless pointed directly at it. One of the many improvements the Su-27 made in HUD symbology. You can see so here

Actually, according to my best knowledge, big circle - is something different than in western systems, where - there is somehow like "target box" that depicts where exactly target is.
In Soviet systems - this is more like steering circle, where pilot should put crosshair according to the steering commands.

This ensures proper interception of target. Position of big circle , in horizontal axis depends on deviation of heading of plane from heading optimal , to intercept.
Deviation of circle from in vertical axis - depends of height difference between actual plane height and optimal one. Optimal one - is somehow set to be about 2km above target, or similar somehow arbitrary set condition. This way pilot, if wants to intercept target, he (she) must place crosshairs in the center of steering circle, and follow position of circle.
Once there is time to launch missiles, there is generated command "GORKA" - what can be loosely translated as "hill" command for maneuver in vertical axis , up or down, and fire missile.
There is one exception, when use gun, this circle, marks actual position of target. Encircled them, like probably saw in Su-27 HUD...
There is also mode for shooting (with gun) without visual contact: there are two pointers, one for rough direction, the second for precise.

Why there is such arrangement ? Why there is no "target box" while using missiles , including short range missiles? This is for sure not due to technical limitations, as while using gun, it is possible.
Maybe because similar approach was used in older systems (Mig-23, 25 what then even dates back to even older approaches , with radar based interceptions.. I do not know, probably - this is from some, lets say, limitations of people who design system, who had to be engineers and scientists , not pilots.

One more think, there is also "small circle" . This is used while ground command guidance, and marks directly set pitch and azimuth.
Of course there is also rhombus -its deviations is proportional to direction to target.

And actually I do not know whether scan limits are 70, 67.5 or 65. I thought that maybe the right is somewhere in the middle, like :
mechanical scan limits are 65 deg, but this marks the axis of array. But as beamwitdh is about ~3 degree or 3.6?, radar can see and track slightly wider. With mechanical scan limits let say 65 deg, I think it would be possible to positioning using mono-pulse technique within 67.5. But not 70...
Maybe some solution is:

It is a maintenance document that details expected specifications of different systems and allowable tolerance before needing overhaul. Let me see what I can do, I’ll ask the person who shared it with me.
"details expected specifications of different systems and allowable tolerance"

From document - it is stated 70 deg (+/- 0...-3deg tolerances)...

Within each viewing zone is a search & track SCAN SECTOR where the mechanical drive system rotates the beam within. The (3) viewing zones are exclusively operated by analog switch on Control Panel PSR-31. They are not engaging automatically & they do not track into the next.
Actually viewing zones are operated manually from control panel, but only in manual mode. When scanning zone is controlled from GCI via datalink, there are different: the shapes , bar arrangements, scan speed, depending on aspect and distance to target.
And the center of scan zone is not fixed, but changes, and is provided by GCI. This way target is always in the center of scanning zone.

And I can bet that viewing zones are for scanning only. Once target is locked and tracked, there are no limits other than from radar physical scan limits.
This could be totally ridiculous , for example in fast dynamic close combat fight to change zones manually ...
Just for example - radar and IR can be slaved to HMS without any limits.

I found no evidences that mechanical scanning is arranged into some two layers - fast - with scan limits somehow limited to let say +/- 25 deg and +/- 2 bars , and the whole zone view is somehow, slowly moved.
Latency of the antenna and the hybrid analog design. Even the AWG-9 had latency, and it was immensely more digitized than the N019 Rubin.

The N019 is a parabolic mirror scan radar, it does not have ability to utilize phase shifts & electronically steer any way instantly with rapid beam agility in multiple patterns and engage in beamforming.

All in all, despite many limitation of radar and its technology, exact stabilization ("it is gimbal" or not.. ) etc, radar was robust enough to seamlessly track its target despite own and targets maneuvers,in dynamic , close combat environment, within scan and and angular speed limits... And those parameters (scan and speed limits) were more or less the same as in other design in its times, while scan and tracking zone is even slightly better than in western counterparts of this time. (for example +/- 60 deg on F-15)

And yes, N-019 is "parabolic mirror scan radar", but of course this parabolic mirror is not moving at all, and moving is only flat plate to reflect and direct focused beam - details everywhere in this topic.
Soviets mastered this technique, much better than anyone else: I mean Europeans, with its bulky, heavy desings like in Viggen and Tornado ADF, and to some degree in Mirage 2000 (RDM).
While US did big step further with planar arrays at least decade earlier than anyone else.
 
actually viewing zones are operated manually from control panel, but only in manual mode
I agree, and stated a few times actually and most recent in reference to a "zone switch". In the MiG-29 product indexes of the Soviet Union it is a three-position toggle switch that only the pilot must manipulate.

All in all, despite many limitation of radar and its technology, exact stabilization ("it is gimbal" or not.. ) etc, radar was robust enough to seamlessly track its target despite own and targets maneuvers,in dynamic
How so? Stabilization is not synonymous with latency. The lack of roll rate is due to latency. It is the very nature of any hybrid analog design. not so much its mechanical drives systems that's any precision. Though it does have an effect on precision and mobility & target discrimination compared to temporary Gimbal systems. Its antenna type matters significantly. It is a design that prioritizes & does achieve a highly uniform gain over its entire angular coverage. but comes at the cost of "On-axis" (boresight) performance.

Latency is still noticeable in sensor fusion today in contemporary technology. Like I said it affected the AWG-9.

And yes, N-019 is "parabolic mirror scan radar", but of course this parabolic mirror is not moving at all, and moving is only flat plate to reflect and direct focused beam - details everywhere in this topic.

Yes, and you bring up a point, not only is the "Twist reflector" is responsible for functioning to its very name, It was limited as it is reliant on reflections cast by the paraboloid operated within its domain, it is also responsible the entire mechanical function of the beam at the same time. The radar simply had a very tough life. That is apparent.

I found no evidences that mechanical scanning is arranged into some two layers - fast - with scan limits somehow limited to let say +/- 25 deg and +/- 2 bars , and the whole zone view is somehow, slowly moved.
Not sure what you mean here
 
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This is getting tiresome, can we move on?

Yes, the N019 did not have a wide sector scan. It was not really expected to find its own targets without help - it was supposed to be directed by GCI. In GCI mode, the scan sector is automatically set for the pilot. However once it was locked on in STT mode it would track to the antenna limits.
 
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You even resort to questioning the validity of the written Cyrillic script of the Russian speaking people.
I don’t believe any people are immune to sometimes explaining things in confusing ways, use words not easily understood or translated, or even word and spelling errors. You can see yourself how many manuals have either typos or show records of corrections for typos and mistakes. It is a matter of having to deal with so much documentation that there will be mistakes, misinterpretations, and things that are clumsily explained.

Nothing you provided states search and track 70 degrees.

Everything you have ever posted states VIEWING 70 degrees.
there are view zones, 3 of them. That is why its called a zone switch.
Nothing matters until you provide a single source, ANY source that says AUTOTRACKING @ 70 degrees for each viewing zone & why.
Because I have been trying to say it might only be 70 degrees for track, not search. Look, I have posted all the sources I have come across. If you would like to bring any sources forward or any evidence go ahead. But I am done. I have done what I can. If you wish to disprove it, the burden of proof is on you to show how this view is wrong. Not for me to continue to provide evidence until one just happens to be “agreeable” to you. If there is nothing new to provide I suggest we follow OverScan’s recommendation to close this unless there is some new piece of evidence that would shed light on this in ways our previous efforts haven’t.

EDIT: @overscan (PaulMM) Also, I meant to quote you but couldn’t after I posted and forgot. The scan zone also moves smoothly in TWS mode when a target is acquired and follows the target, similarly as it does in GCI guidance. But I guess it’s more of a hybrid mode as the scan view selection is still manual before a target appears and is either automatically or manually selected by the TDC.

Actually, according to my best knowledge, big circle - is something different than in western systems, where - there is somehow like "target box" that depicts where exactly target is.
In Soviet systems - this is more like steering circle, where pilot should put crosshair according to the steering commands.

Yes I didn’t really mention the steering circle as it’s outside what we were debating, but yes. It is my understanding it is based on proportional navigation principles and will set up intercept for tail or head on depending on selected radar mode, and that the deviation of it vertically will also change depending on the pilots selection of the delta H knob. Articulating so that it will maintain the selected altitude difference, and have you point at the target’s interception point just before entering the max range of the selected missile. Is that what you have understood also?

It appears to take the place of the Radar antenna rhombus for IRST mode. I assume you have come to similar conclusion?

There is one exception, when use gun, this circle, marks actual position of target. Encircled them, like probably saw in Su-27 HUD...
There is also mode for shooting (with gun) without visual contact: there are two pointers, one for rough direction, the second for precise.

Why there is such arrangement ? Why there is no "target box" while using missiles , including short range missiles? This is for sure not due to technical limitations, as while using gun, it is possible.
I can’t believe I forgot the gun! Thank you. After analyzing the differences between the Su-27 and MiG-29 HUDs, I counted as many as 12 differences! And almost every single one wasn’t just a difference, but an improvement or addition. And as you say, the “target marker” is there in gun mode. The best conclusion I can come up with is that MiG-29 was rushed to service, and many shortcuts needed to be taken. By the time of introduction and maturity of Su-27, they must’ve had both the time, manpower, and money to introduce these things that many would expect in any 4th gen like a target marker in all modes.

I mean seriously, if we ignore the pitch ladder difference the additions and differences I can note are

  1. Target marker with missile or no weapon selection
  2. Notch/closure marker
  3. interception cue in IRST
  4. More GCI intercept cues
  5. Right HUD border scale with HUD area and radar/IRST elevation cue on +/-60 degree scale
  6. Antenna marker coordinates stabilized to true coordinates rather then in reference to artificial horizon silhouette
  7. Locked Target Altitude
  8. Locked Target Speed
  9. R-27 Flight Time
  10. Hemisphere mode selection PPS/AUT/ZPS shown without datalink
  11. Nav mode descent rate
  12. Landing mode AOA scale
  13. Speed in 5 kmh increments rather then 10
  14. Barometric Altitude in 10m increments rather then 100m
  15. Radar altitude increments in 5m instead of 10m above 100m, increments of 1 meter below 100m instead of 10
And so many of these are likely not because of different systems (like the additional intercept cues likely being related to the more sophisticated multiple datalink systems), but could theoretically be possible with 9.12/9.13! All I can think is that for MiG-29 9.12/9.13, they simply must not have had the developmental resources. As you said, there is even the smaller circle for ILS guidance! Just unused in all but one use case!

I heard from someone who used to do maintenance on MiG-23MLA in Cuba, has quite a large collection of documents on it and was modeling it for a simulator up until recently that it’s HUD circle would switch from “steering cue” to actual target marker once within 8 km.

You would think such things could also be updated. After all it shares the C100/C101 processor with Su-27. But it must not have been considered a big enough issues over its lifetime. Very curious.

I suppose, whether in search or close combat modes, one could just flip down the trigger and enter gun mode to get a quick idea without needing to precisely put the nose on it!
 
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The best conclusion I can come up with is that MiG-29 was rushed to service, and many shortcuts needed to be taken. By the time of introduction and maturity of Su-27, they must’ve had both the time, manpower, and money to introduce these things that many would expect in any 4th gen like a target marker in all modes.
I do admire the optimism, especially in the unknown regarding these things. However, you need not jump to conclusions. The history has already been written and widely discussed long before you or my time actually.

The N001 it was never intended to be a sort of upgrade building upon the N019. Not in the slightest. They are not even developed by the same OKB. The N001 was developed by NIIP Tikhomirov. Both fighters were developed alongside each other in the same exact program.
The VVS launched the Prospective Frontal Fighter (PFF) programme in 1969. It was originally conceived to replace all of the second- and third-generation tactical fighters and fighter-interceptors, such as the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, Su-15 and Su-17, operated by both the VVS and A-PVO (Aviatsia Protivo-Vozdushnoy Oborony – Aviation of the Soviet Air Defence Forces).
The rather stringent PFI specification issued by the VVS called for an operating altitude of between 100 and 59,166ft (30 and 18,000m), while the top speed at low altitude was set at 809kts (1,500km/h) and at high altitude it was to be 1,348kts (2,500km/h). Low- and high-level combat radiuses were set at 500 and 1,700km (270 and 917nm) respectively. MiG, Sukhoi and Yakovlev experimental design bureaux took part in the first stage of the PFI competition, submitting their conceptual designs. Yakovlev was eliminated at the beginning, while MiG and Sukhoi remained in the game, in what was expected to become a head-to-head competition. After the first two presentations of the competing concepts, OKB MiG’s leadership suggested subdividing the PFI programme into two – a heavy and a lightweight design respectively. The VVS and leaders from the Soviet aviation industry warmly welcomed this.

The Flanker took longer to enter serial production for several reasons I am too lazy to go over and too lazy to recite the rest of the history in my own words so I will continue copy paste the nearest thing in regard & most on point.

As for the N001.

The design goal of the N001 radar was to outperform the APG-63 of the F-15 Eagle. Initially, the design specifications of the N001 radar were very ambitious, in addition to the use of digital computers, the Sukhoi N001 radar will also use a phased array antenna similar to the N007/RP-31 Zaslon radar of the MiG-31. in addition to outperforming the APG-63 in the ability to attack several targets at once, the Myech will also have a longer range of 200 Km while the APG-63 variant before the APG-63V1 for the F-15C only has a range of 161 Km. In addition, with this radar, it is possible to integrate the R-33 (AA-9 Amos) missiles commonly installed in MiG-31 fighters to the Su-27. Thus, the Su-27 can also destroy several targets at once from a distance of 120 Km, further than the AIM-7 Sparrow of the F-15 which only has a range of 30-40 Km.
However, the above specifications turned out to be very difficult and even too ambitious to realize due to the limitations of manufacturing technology in the Soviet electronics industry in the 1970s to early 1980s. At the same time, the same problem was also experienced by the MiG N019 "Rubin" radar development team from the Phazotron design bureau for the MiG-29 fighter. The solution taken by the team from the Phazotron design bureau was to redesign where they again used an inverse cassegrain antenna based on the MiG-23ML's Sapfir-23ML radar but by embedding the Ts-100 digital processor.
In May 1982 the design team of NIIP Tikhomirov decided to take the same step as the Phazotron design team, namely, to redesign the Sukhoi N001 radar.
This redesign process was basically to "copy" the MiG-29's N019 radar using an inverse Cassegrain antenna similar to the MiG-29 but physically enlarged according to the geometry of the nose of the Su-27. The rest of the N001 was similar to the N019, even using the same Ts-100 radar processor and transmitter. The transmit power of the N001 and N019 was the same, which was about 4 kilowatts at peak power with a duty cycle or "time when the radar emitted a signal" of 25%.
The process of redesigning the N001 was finally completed in 1983, resulting in a radar that unfortunately did not meet expectations in the initial design. The range of the redesigned N001 only reached 140 Km for large targets such as bombers (RCS of 16 square meters). The target in the form of its own fighter with an RCS of 2.5-3 square meters could be detected at a distance of 88-90 Km.
Another feature of the Sukhoi N001 radar is its ability to track ten targets at once, but can only attack one of them with a semi-active guided R-27R missile.
In addition to the performance that was not as good as initially desired, the N001 also had a reliability problem where the early production N001 radar had a very short service life aka MTBF - Mean Time Before Failure. Only 5 hours of flight. As a result, when the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker entered the official service of the Soviet Air Force in 1986, the Sukhoi N001 radar was still not accepted into the official service until 1991 when finally the reliability problem was resolved.

At that time, the MTBF of the Sukhoi N001 radar could finally be extended to 100-200 hours, the same as the average radar of the western bloc at that time.

Both radars are not the original intended designs but are merely the result of a decision made out of desperation in the face of Soviet dissolution. No one took shortcuts. It's quite the exceptional accomplishment I might add. Either this or both fighters would have entered service with no radar at all. The Su-27 technically did.

I heard from someone who used to do maintenance on MiG-23MLA in Cuba, has quite a large collection of documents on it and was modeling it for a simulator up until recently that it’s HUD circle would switch from “steering cue” to actual target marker once within 8 km.
I believe this.
You would think such things could also be updated. After all it shares the C100/C101 processor with Su-27. But it must not have been considered a big enough issues over its lifetime. Very curious.
NIIP Tikhomirov did update because Sukhoi were the ONLY designer who were awarded the government contracts to so. Not Mikoyan and the entire domestic production of new units both N019M and 9-13S halted. They had to rely on export market. Mikoyan went on many airshow tours even in the US. Yak even teamed up with Lockheed to develop & potentially export of the Yak-141

As soon as the Russian federation could ditch the Cassegrain design they did and continued to sell them for export them & offer the few upgrades they can manage due to the limitations of the design of course. It is a modified sapfir-3ML antenna at the end of the day no matter what you do to it. The Russian Federation did the best anyone could do in their situation.

NIIP Tikhomirov proposed two stages of improving the N001 radar capability, where in the first stage a new mode of operation was added, namely ground mapping and integration with precision munitions such as KAB-500 and 1500 guided bombs and RVV-AE/R-77 missiles.
The integration process of the first stage above is carried out by modifying the N001 radar by adding a bypass channel. The function of this channel is to pass data from the radar to the digital processing system if a new mode of operation such as mapping or firing the R-77 missile is selected. If the old mode of operation is selected, the radar will process the data using the old radar hardware. In addition to the addition of the bypass channel, the radar processor was also replaced, where the Ts-100 was replaced by the BTsVM-486-6 "Baguet" digital processor.
The second phase of the modernization of the N001, also known as the "Pero", is more radical, namely by replacing the inverse Cassegrain antenna with a phased array antenna and adding supporting hardware in the form of BSC or Beam Steering Controller and the addition of new operating modes. Thus, the N001 resulting from this modification will have performance comparable to the N011M Bars radar. However, to reduce the cost of using the pregrade, the Phased Array Antenna used in this second stage uses a completely different system from the N011M.


The newly established MoD determined they can no longer afford to continue producing two fighters in tandem coming out of a total economic collapse and chose the fighter that had the better chances of fulfilling both the needs of the VKS and V-PVO.
They awarded the domestic contracts to Sukhoi while MiG MAPO could only rely on export market.

NIIP Phazotron did not receive new contracts right out of the collapse & state this in their own written history of the OKB/NIIP. The N019 Rubin & their last Soviet contract for the MiG-29 is the serial produced replacement the N019M Topaz. Both radars are designs never intended for the fighter in the first place. the N019 was always intended to be a slotted array like that in the F-16 or F-18. The best radar currently to represent this original specification is the Mig-29 SMT-2 which has a radar called the FGM-129 (It's just new-generation Phazotron NO10M Zhuk-ME).

(Update because I forgot the exact dates that NIIP Phozotron received no new government contracts)
1992-2010
1740245063806.png
 
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Differences between N019 and N001 are primarily due to different intended missions. MiG-29 was a VVS only fighter, intended for short range air defence over the battlefield. N019 was intended to operate with GCI assistance, and its design is optimised for fire control - locking onto and shooting down theatre targets given to it by GCI. Capabilities to locate its own targets without help are somewhat mediocre.

Su-27 was intended for both VVS and PVO use, including autonomous operations in areas with limited GCI coverage and interception of strategic assets, so N001 was always intended to have a higher performance radar (MiG-31 class, with R-33 missiles even). In the end, it wasn't as much of an improvement over N019 as intended primarily due to major issues with the intended computers and antenna which resulted in adapting some major components from N019.
 
Both radars are not the original intended designs but are merely the result of a decision made out of desperation in the face of Soviet dissolution. No one took shortcuts. It's quite the exceptional accomplishment I might add. Either this or both fighters would have entered service with no radar at all. The Su-27 technically did
Is having to ditch your intended radar design because it was too technologically complex for the time and essentially upgrade an older design in order to get a new weapon into service not exactly what a shortcut is?
 
I still don't understand how they managed to produce N007 for MiG-31, but scaled down variant for Su-27 wasn't possible.
 
I still don't understand how they managed to produce N007 for MiG-31, but scaled down variant for Su-27 wasn't possible.
My understanding is that for starters, N-007 was very heavy, from 1000 to 1500kg depending on source, of which the antenna was 300kg. On the other hand i've never found weight figures for the N-001 except a single post on paralay.com that said 575kg, though i think i've seen a much higher figure of either 863 or 963 kg somewhere (can't recall which), but i suspect that the 1500kg and 963kg figures refer not only to the radar itself, but all the back boxed associated with it, cockpit instrumentation, missile control boxes and so on.

So even in a best case scenario a scaled down N-007 might weigh 750-800kg (not good for Su-27 given the already present weight issues of the avionics), while the range might decrease a bit to basically N-001 level (say 150km vs bomber, 100km vs fighter). The advantage would have been the near instantaneous PESA beam scanning as well as probably the ability to fire at 2-4 targets at once with R-33s (on the other hand, R-27ER has more or less same range as R-33 no?).
 
I still don't understand how they managed to produce N007 for MiG-31, but scaled down variant for Su-27 wasn't possible.
For 1980s AC tactics(SARH combat), fighter, as opposed to interceptor, absolutely needed mechanical scan. +-60 deg view is a major tactical handicap.
It only became allowable with next gen ARH missiles(with much more advanced intercept algorythms) and datalink proliferation.

With Zaslon array it probably was impossible(for much the same reason AESAs don't really get proper gimbal). Mech iirc tried to go for something like Bars - electronic scan for one axis.
 
My understanding is that for starters, N-007 was very heavy, from 1000 to 1500kg depending on source, of which the antenna was 300kg. On the other hand i've never found weight figures for the N-001 except a single post on paralay.com that said 575kg, though i think i've seen a much higher figure of either 863 or 963 kg somewhere (can't recall which), but i suspect that the 1500kg and 963kg figures refer not only to the radar itself, but all the back boxed associated with it, cockpit instrumentation, missile control boxes and so on.

So even in a best case scenario a scaled down N-007 might weigh 750-800kg (not good for Su-27 given the already present weight issues of the avionics), while the range might decrease a bit to basically N-001 level (say 150km vs bomber, 100km vs fighter). The advantage would have been the near instantaneous PESA beam scanning as well as probably the ability to fire at 2-4 targets at once with R-33s (on the other hand, R-27ER has more or less same range as R-33 no?).
Per Radio electronic manual total N-001 weight is put at 550 kg, but doesn’t say how much is antenna.

I agree with Ainen that the issue was not PESA technology but downscaling it in a way that kept the weight low while still achieving significant enough performance Improvement over the cassegrain coherent mechanical scan radars. You can see with early Bars radars of Su-27M variants where the increased weight required the use of canards to help move the center of pressure forward along with center of gravity to maintain neutral to negative stability. And of course this canard solution adds not only weight on top of the radar but significant drag decreasing performance despite improving aerodynamics in many other ways.

All this together adds to the multitude of reasons why the Su-27/33/35 family was the main focus of modernization and development rather then MiG-29, as we have previously discussed. Even today I believe all MiG-35 built for Russia are still using the mechanical scan Zhuk radar rather then the Zhuk AESA, as the resources for AESA are needed elsewhere.

R-27ER is very similar to R-33 in terms of range. Available graphs I’ve seen show the R-27ER doing better at lower altitude.

Both have a 60 second power supply, and while I believe ER has a higher top speed the 33 benefits from its nearly twice as long lasting rocket motor in terms of being able to maintain its top speed.

I believe R-33 has achieved higher range shots in real life of 120 km vs 98 km for ER, but I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s due to the speed and altitude advantages of the MiG-31 and being used against high and fast targets. I would think given equal speed and altitude R-27ER would beat it

For example, graphs for the R-27AE, which I have only heard of changing the seeker, gives a maximum range of 130 km, 10 km beyond R-33.

I’ll attach a few, but we need to be aware that the height vs range graphs are typically for near or max TAS shots, and the circular graphs with different aspects are for lower speeds below Mach 1. The circular graphs for IR missiles are also not taking into account seeker acquisition limits.

Sources are different manuals and a Russian 1993 book

I also uploaded a picture of R-73 seeker acquisition ranges against F-15 size target at different heights and speeds.

There is also a graph of different IR missiles I uploaded that includes R-60M compared with other IR missiles including AIM-9L, taking into account both limits of ballistics in the rear hemisphere and seeker limits in all. The yellow region around R-60 shows expanded seeker limits when target is in afterburner.

I added my own estimate of R-73 in red taking into account its range limits given and the more pessimistic estimates of its seeker acquisition.

This way you can estimate the ranges of all the air to air missiles MiG-29 9.12/9.13 and S upgrades may use, with the exception of seeker limitations of the 36T IR seeker head of R-27T/ET missiles.

We must also take into account that the DLZ of any aircraft using the R-27 would also take into account the 150 m/s of closure needed to detonate the proximity fuse.
 

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Per Radio electronic manual total N-001 weight is put at 550 kg, but doesn’t say how much is antenna.

I agree with Ainen that the issue was not PESA technology but downscaling it in a way that kept the weight low while still achieving significant enough performance Improvement over the cassegrain coherent mechanical scan radars. You can see with early Bars radars of Su-27M variants where the increased weight required the use of canards to help move the center of pressure forward along with center of gravity to maintain neutral to negative stability. And of course this canard solution adds not only weight on top of the radar but significant drag decreasing performance despite improving aerodynamics in many other ways.

All this together adds to the multitude of reasons why the Su-27/33/35 family was the main focus of modernization and development rather then MiG-29, as we have previously discussed. Even today I believe all MiG-35 built for Russia are still using the mechanical scan Zhuk radar rather then the Zhuk AESA, as the resources for AESA are needed elsewhere.

R-27ER is very similar to R-33 in terms of range. Available graphs I’ve seen show the R-27ER doing better at lower altitude.

Both have a 60 second power supply, and while I believe ER has a higher top speed the 33 benefits from its nearly twice as long lasting rocket motor in terms of being able to maintain its top speed.

I believe R-33 has achieved higher range shots in real life of 120 km vs 98 km for ER, but I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s due to the speed and altitude advantages of the MiG-31 and being used against high and fast targets. I would think given equal speed and altitude R-27ER would beat it

For example, graphs for the R-27AE, which I have only heard of changing the seeker, gives a maximum range of 130 km, 10 km beyond R-33.

I’ll attach a few, but we need to be aware that the height vs range graphs are typically for near or max TAS shots, and the circular graphs with different aspects are for lower speeds below Mach 1. The circular graphs for IR missiles are also not taking into account seeker acquisition limits.

Sources are different manuals and a Russian 1993 book

I also uploaded a picture of R-73 seeker acquisition ranges against F-15 size target at different heights and speeds.

There is also a graph of different IR missiles I uploaded that includes R-60M compared with other IR missiles including AIM-9L, taking into account both limits of ballistics in the rear hemisphere and seeker limits in all. The yellow region around R-60 shows expanded seeker limits when target is in afterburner.

I added my own estimate of R-73 in red taking into account its range limits given and the more pessimistic estimates of its seeker acquisition.

This way you can estimate the ranges of all the air to air missiles MiG-29 9.12/9.13 and S upgrades may use, with the exception of seeker limitations of the 36T IR seeker head of R-27T/ET missiles.

We must also take into account that the DLZ of any aircraft using the R-27 would also take into account the 150 m/s of closure needed to detonate the proximity fuse.
Many thanks for the details, so we finally have a sourced figure for N-001 weight. Any chance you can post the manual screenshot showing the 550kg figure? And are my N-007 weight figures accurate? Since we are on MiG-29 avionics topic, the weight of the N-019 is 350kg, is that accurate?

Regarding the MiG-35, i think from a recent video there is at least a test bird with a single large MFD, new HUD, and likely AESA radar under the white radome, which to me it seems to be a tad smaller than the regular Zhuk MSA radome seen on the serial MiG-35Ss delivered to VKS to date.
View: https://x.com/MrFrantarelli/status/1868594899899285788
 
Many thanks for the details, so we finally have a sourced figure for N-001 weight. Any chance you can post the manual screenshot showing the 550kg figure? And are my N-007 weight figures accurate? Since we are on MiG-29 avionics topic, the weight of the N-019 is 350kg, is that accurate?

Regarding the MiG-35, i think from a recent video there is at least a test bird with a single large MFD, new HUD, and likely AESA radar under the white radome, which to me it seems to be a tad smaller than the regular Zhuk MSA radome seen on the serial MiG-35Ss delivered to VKS to date.
View: https://x.com/MrFrantarelli/status/1868594899899285788
I wouldn’t know anything more then you about N-007.

The Ukrainian university PowerPoint that OverScan translated gives 270 kg for N-019 radar.

I’m sure I have other sources with weight, but they are not in the obvious places.
 

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I wouldn’t know anything more then you about N-007.

The Ukrainian university PowerPoint that OverScan translated gives 270 kg for N-019 radar.

I’m sure I have other sources with weight, but they are not in the obvious places.
That's very, very interesting, many thanks. Wonder why i recall the 350kg figure, or maybe it was 360kg, could have been on Overscan's old russian avionics site. Iirc the weight of the N-019M was given as 385kg, but all these figures come from memory.
 
That's very, very interesting, many thanks. Wonder why i recall the 350kg figure, or maybe it was 360kg, could have been on Overscan's old russian avionics site. Iirc the weight of the N-019M was given as 385kg, but all these figures come from memory.
You’re correct, Overscan’s avionics list gives 350 kg but for N-019M, saying it is slightly lighter then the original because of the 19kg Ts101M compared to 32 kg Ts100. If I find another source I’ll post it.
 
Is having to ditch your intended radar design because it was too technologically complex for the time and essentially upgrade an older design in order to get a new weapon into service not exactly what a shortcut is?
No because a shortcut is a path that leads to the original desired destination, but requires less resource such as time, distance travelled cost etc. Why it's called a shortcut. They did not arrive at the intended destination with the Flanker and Fulcrum's fire control radars until the turn of the century.

However, if we are talking about a road to achieving radar capability for these aircraft, yeah that was a shortcut absolutely.

Also, it was not too complex for the Soviets why they were unable. They were more than capable I think and the zaslon is a good example as well as all the other radars they developed but could not enter serial production.

Su-27 was intended for both VVS and PVO use, including autonomous operations in areas with limited GCI coverage and interception of strategic assets, so N001 was always intended to have a higher performance radar (MiG-31 class, with R-33 missiles even). In the end, it wasn't as much of an improvement over N019 as intended primarily due to major issues with the intended computers and antenna which resulted in adapting some major components from N019.
The Su-27 and Mig-29 share design philosophy only because they are two aircraft split from one program. If it was not for Mikoyan's suggestion to split the program to develop two aircraft, one specially designed to satisfy the frontal aviation role for the VVS & long range aviation role for the A-PVO there would be no Su-27 or MiG-29 as we know it, but they would have gone through a similar experience that McNamara's placed on the NAVY & Airforce with the TFX program.

Both the Flanker and Fulcrum were still developed under TsAGI program guideline/directive. Like the aerodynamic integral fuselage, & specific leading edges that are the primary reason why these aircraft can fly at angle of attack beyond lift in the dynamic regime.

The Flanker was designed exclusively for the A-PVO and served in that branch exclusively until the collapse. It was very barebones & specialized for the air intercept role in the A-PVO. It entered service with missing capabilities compared to the SK. The new Russian MoD made the decision to continue forward with only one aircraft coming out of economic collapse. There are several reasons they chose the flanker, but not because it was better than the Fulcrum at its specialized role.

Sukhoi did not work with the VVS to develop their aircraft. Mikoyan did not work with the A-PVO to develop theirs.

The Su-27 primary mission was of strategic importance, primarily combat air patrol & intercept over the vast remote territories of the USSR. Where the Soviet Union's greatest aviation threats lie, the American strategic bomber. Supersonic High altitude and low altitude terrain following Strategic/tactical bombers. They were an existential threat to the entire Soviet Union for many years. The Su-27 is not an interceptor designed specifically to compete with F-15 by name, it can of course. In a first strike strategy these aircraft would likely never see each other.
 
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Which account of the Su-27 development process have you read to form this opinion? It doesn't accord with the account written by Ildar Betretdinov and a bunch of former Sukhoi engineers for instance.
 
Yeah I, I remember in Su-27 book mentions regular comparisons with F-15 during development process. If they were developing a PVO bird, they wouldn't have bothered.
 
The PFI requirement was literally "Anti F-15" and there were ongoing complications to the radar and seeker requirements due to trying to make one unified fighter for both VVS and PVO (VVS and PVO typically used different radar wavelengths historically).
 
Which account of the Su-27 development process have you read to form this opinion? It doesn't accord with the account written by Ildar Betretdinov and a bunch of former Sukhoi engineers for instance.
What Development process? What does the development process mean? & why does it matter? Was the F-16 developed one way and entered service doing something entirely different upon serial production & deployment? Absolutely.
Did it ever cross the mind of the original designers of the YF-17 that the aircraft would ever end up in the NAVY as a dual role, multirole carrier borne fighter & strike platform & even serve as an aerial tanker? Not a chance.

Did Sukhoi traditionally specialize in interceptors and large fighter bombers? Yes.
Who developed a fighter that ultimately replaced the MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-7, and Su-17? Mikoyan & the MiG-29.
Who specialized in frontline fighters that make up the backbone of the entire Soviet Union's tactical fighter element?? Mikoyan & the MiG-29.

What interceptor did the Su-27 replace in PVO service? The only branch it initially entered service with. The Su-15. What was the Su-15's role in the PVO?
What was the greatest existential aviation threat to the Soviet Union & Russian speaking people that the Americans devoted heavily in their doctrine of a first strike strategy & the Nuclear Triad? Strategic bombers, specifically the Rockwell's B-1 lancer, Boeing's B-52 Stratofortress. You have any idea how terrified the USSR was of the B-1 lancer alone? The Russians come to the US every single year to evaluate & reconfirm that the nuclear delivery capabilities are still removed from each aircraft in our B-1 squadrons. There is only one aircraft in the Soviet Union with the range capability to patrol and defend against this strategic threat that encompassed the entirety of the continent, the Su-27. The R-27ER and ET was specifically chosen for this very primary role while still in development.

The existence F-14 and LATER the F-15 only signaled the need for a next generation. Communist do think the way westerner's do & find enjoyment in petty competition. The F-15 did not even have a name when they started development of the Su-27.

Are you aware the VVS rejected the prototype that ultimately became the Su-27? It lacked the performance they demanded.
SU-27(T-10S) FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR An analysis of the performance of the T10-1 and T10-3 aircraft achieved during the prototype flight tests showed that they did not meet the requirements specified by the decree of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
All the VVS required was that the performance would be greater than the F-15. The Su-27 continued to fail in this requests & its why the aircraft took 8 to develop.
The VVS, which was the customer for the fighter, required that the Su-27 should have very high performance exceeding that of western series-produced and prototype aircraft. These included the F-15A, the mainstay of the USAF. The customer did not make any allowances for the weight of electronic equipment and the engine specific fuel consumption necessary to meet the specified requirements. The General Designer agreed with the VVS and the Ministry of Aircraft Industry. The OKB understood that the problem could not be solved by simply increasing fuel capacity. Innovative and bold solutions were required. Almost eight years were spent on the development of the aircraft's aerodynamic and structural configuration. There was no additional time to search for a new, more advanced aerodynamic arrangement. The situation was so serious that the General Designer and the Chief Designer appealed to the design staff for a brainstorming session to generate daring ideas for consideration.

Since you asked. Who writes of these things? To form my opinion? Well, unfortunately my answers are not found in rare pretty hardcover books written in the Cyrillic & cost if I remember correctly $300-$400 by no named men who writes about American dual role prototypes in their dedicated Su-27 book.

I'll just give you one simple easily obtainable book to check out. Written by a renowned author and legendary figure in Soviet Aviation literature as well as other well documented authors, named engineers at Sukhoi etc.

Vladimir Antonov, Yefim Gordon, Nikolai Gordyukov, Vladimir Yakovlev and Vyacheslav Zenkin

Sukhoi Design Bureau President and General Designer Mikhail Simonov
Boris Rybak, Vladimir Antonov (of Sukhoi, who co-contributed the sections for the Su-24, SU-25, SU-27, and T-4 aircraft and the various new civil conversion programs); Costas Cavathas and Faithon Karaiossifidis of PTISI Magazine; Nikolay Gordyukov (of Sukhoi, who contributed the sections describing all piston-engined aircraft and the firstgeneration of Sukhoi jets built up to 1949, as well as all sport aircraft); Reuben Johnson (who contributed several translations and provided other miscellaneous information); Tony Landis; Neil Lewis of Midland Publishing Ltd.; Richard Pawloski; Chris Pocock; Pavel Plunsky (of Sukhoi, who co-contributed the sections describing the Su-24, Su-25, Su27, T-4 aircraft and new civil conversion programs); Jim Stevenson; Katsuhiko Tokunaga; Vyacheslav Zenkin (of Sukhoi, who contributed the sections describing the Su-7, Su-17, T-1, T-3, Su-15, Su-24, Su25, SU-27, T-4 aircraft and new civil conversion programs). Two men played a special role in this project: Vladimir Yakovlev who wrote the sections describing the history of the Design Bureau and who also wrote the biographies of company principles including Pavel Sukhoi and Yefim Gordon--a co-author of this work--who also played a key role in coordinating the developmentof the text and providing a large number of excellent and rare photographs from his extensive personal collection. Other engineers from Sukhoi who made noteworthy contributions include Vladimir Barkovsky; Nikolay Venediktov; Michael Guschin; Sergey Glazunov; Sergey Yelisiratov; Vladimir Moskalenko; Alexander Pimenov; Oleg Kazmin; Valentin Simonov; Lyudmila Gavrilova; Nasokin (Head of the Documentary Film Laboratory); Yuri Zhivchlkov (Head of the Photo Laboratory); Vladimir Mysin (color print photographer); Georgy Vyurkov (color print photographer); Yuri Neverov (photos and drawings); Valeri Suslov (black and white print photographer); and Anatoly Morgunov (designer).


The PFI requirement was literally "Anti F-15" and there were ongoing complications to the radar and seeker requirements due to trying to make one unified fighter for both VVS and PVO (VVS and PVO typically used different radar wavelengths historically).
I am interested in this tactical "anti F15" doctrine that was quoted along with the engineer's names you mentioned. The radars were made by two entirely different OKB and is not relevant to the aircraft' assigned primary role upon entering service.

Again, the VVS rejected the prototype of the Su-27 deeming it inferior in performance. the VVS was the ONLY client at the time that is why the program is called...............the Prospective Front-line Fighter (PFI) Program.

Mikoyan offered to split the project in two phases & left Sukhoi to do what it only knew how to do best develop interceptors and magically won the second phase of the program for heavy fighter the PVO.

The better fighter for the VVS was the Mig-29 it & always was the better fighter of the program that satisfied all cost to produce serial units in a war time economy & had insane dogfight performance. the MiG-29 is so aerodynamically perfected, extremely departure resistant & supermaneuverable without thrust vectoring & without digital flight controls. There is no other aircraft like it in the entire world.


SU-27AIRSUPERIORITYFIGHTER The entry into operational service--with the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense Force--of the Su-27 fighter-interceptor was a result of both internal and external factors. An internal factor was that the Sukhoi Design Bureau had traditionally developed fighter-interceptor aircraft, such as the Su9, Su-11 and Su-15. However, certain other factors had caused the Bureau to move away from the design of fighter-interceptors. The last in the line of interceptors, the Su-15TM high-speed fighter-interceptor, had been filled with powerful armament and an efficient, for that time, avionics system. Unfortunately, it had not been developed further despite its excellent grow1h capabilities (which is a very important feature of a fighter weapons system).

A new interceptor, a successor to the Su-15, had not been created either. There were two reasons for this. The first is that the Design Bureau was engaged in the development of the Su- 24 tactical bomber, and, in addition, great efforts were being made to design a close support attack aircraft, later known as the Su-25. Much attention was also given to updating of the Su- 17 fighter-bomber. The second reason was the development of the T-4 ("100"). This was a technologically sophisticated aircraft, large by Sukhoi standards.

Because of these reasons, the capabilities of the Sukhoi Design Bureau which could have been used to design a follow-on fighter were limited. Sukhoi's competitor, the Mikoyan Design Bureau, had such capabilities. The great efforts made by the latter bureau were a success and it delivered the MiG-25 fighter- interceptor.
The external factor which caused the Sukhoi Design Bureau to develop a new generation fighter was that the USA, simultaneously with the design of the excellent naval fighter, the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, designed a specialized heavy fighter that later was designated the F-15 Eagle. These efforts did not go unnoticed by the Sukhoi Design Bureau specialists. They began a discussion about what kind of fighter should be designed, a specialized plane or a multi-role plane to counter the new-generation aircraft which were under development abroad.

The result was a decision to develop a dedicated, i.e. a single purpose, fighter. Aircraft companies had learned a lesson from the creation of the F-4 and F-111 fighter-bombers which were conceived as aircraft capable of two roles: one as an efficient air combat vehicle and the other as a

heavy and pinpoint strike bomber. However, the state-of-the-art of aeronautical engineering at that time did not allow the combination of these two missions in one vehicle. Neither of these aircraft could effectively execute both tasks. Both the F4 and the F-111 eventually became strike aircraft. The first became a good fighter-bomber, with limited air combat capabilities, and the second proved to be a good bomber.
The lessons learned from the creation of the third generation of tactical aircraft (the SU-15, SU-17, MiG-23, F-5E, F-4, F111 and Mirage F.1) led aircraft manufacturers to the conclusion that the next-generation fighter should be dedicated to a single mission. All efforts should be directed toward improving air combat and air-to-aircapabilities. In the autumn of 1969, a small group of OKB project department specialists began the development of an aircraft which later became known as the Su-27 fighter-interceptor.
 

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I haven't gone through this in a while, but it seems to all add up still VVS did not like what Sukhoi was offering. Everyone liked the MiG-29 a lot & Mikoyan suggested to split the program. The F-15 & F-16 are only mentioned because The author notes that the development of the American fighters was constantly in aviation news & at the forefront of their minds etc. Of course, that and being a major doctrinal shift by the Americans fighter design (understandably) and interest in the energy maneuverability theory & Supermaneuvrability was all the rage in the late 70's so they all share similar aerodynamic technologies, borrowed and stolen from each other. It just does not mean they were meant to compete one with the other specifically & directly.

As I said prior the Su-27 never went into service with the VVS, actually ever. I have to follow up on the exact date they were implemented in the VKS. It was not a frontal aviation asset in the Soviet Union but served under the PVO patrolling the vast territories of the Soviet Union hunting for American strategic bombers. Only when the new Russian MoD took power did they decide solely on the Su-27. While the Mikoyan would have to survive on export sales.
Tsagi's requirements are noted by this author and so far, none refer to the F-14, F-15 & F-16 or YF-17 as being primary mission of either Flanker or Fulcrum

Neither in this TsAGI review of the original concept & subsequent investigations etc. (you can disregard highlighter) I am not sure how to post the whole file if anyone interested in the dynamic regime (supermaneuvrability) from TsAGI pov.
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None of what you are saying is backed up by any source. VVS units were getting Su-27S's from late 1985.

831 IAP re-equipped with the MiG-15 (1949), MiG-17 (1951), MiG-21PFM (1966), MiG-21SM (1968) and MiG-21bis (1973). In 1977 it transferred to Myrhorod air base, and in 1985 became the first frontline VVS unit to convert to the new Su-27. Its first six Su-27s arrived on November 10, 1985 and operational conversion was completed on October 27, 1986.

1970, the VVS want an "anti-F15". PFI program is explicitly an F-15 counter with requirements based on F-15 +10%, but it is also expected to be able to replace the Su-15 in the PVO. F-16 doesn't exist at this time.

1971, first show of designs. All big. Mikoyan's looks like a warmed-over MiG-25 down to the poor rearward visibility. Work continues.

1972, Mikoyan with the support of GosNIIAS and TsAGI have looked at the US LWF competition and now propose a lightweight but still pretty conventional design. Design conference ensues.

GoSNIIAS suggests splitting the program into two. TsAGI recommends proceeding with the smaller design only (note: TsAGI are initially implacably opposed to Sukhoi's 'integral' layout initially).

The customer, represented by the Deputy Commander of the VVS, A N Yefimov, disagrees. "He who sees furthest enjoys an indisputable advantage. That's the way life goes. The F-15 can only be opposed by an anti-F-15 aircraft".

Agreement is reached that there is merit in continuing to develop both lightweight and heavy designs. Over 1972-1973, the designs are refined and the doctrine for a "high/low" mix is developed.

3rd May 1973, a resolution is drafted which establishes the development of the MiG-29 and Su-27. The MiG-29 will be used by the VVS. The Su-27 will be used by both the VVS and the PVO.

MiG-29 now looks like a mini Su-27 and TsAGI are now extolling the 'integral layout'.

Source:

Su-27 Fighter - Beginning of Story

Pavel Plunsky (Sukhoi)
Vladimir Antonov (Sukhoi preliminary design, drew first Su-27 configuration)
Vyacheslav Zenkin (Sukhoi, later deputy chief designer of the Su-35)
Nikolai Gordyukov (ex-Sukhoi?)
Ildar Bedretdinov (Author)
 
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30 years ago, in the summer of 1977, the T-10 airplane, which was supposed to become, but never became, the prototype of the now famous Su-27, took to the air for the first time. And the first flight of the T-10C, the prototype of this fighter, was a little over 26 years old in the same days. Georgy Byushgens, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, recalls how the famous Su was created and the complexities of the design work on it. In those distant years, he was the first deputy director of the Zhukovsky Central Aviation Institute.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

FOLLOWING THE EAGLE

- I'll start a bit from afar,” Georgy Sergeevich began his story. - Somewhere in the late 60's we had information that the Americans were creating a new maneuverable and supersonic fighter, which is now known as the F-15 Eagle. They worked very intensively on it, and in 1972, I think, the first flight of this airplane took place. By that time we had already received some information materials about it. But it was far from complete. The appearance of the Igla was unknown to us. Nevertheless, TsAGI began preliminary studies of this type of combat vehicle.

And it should be said that in 1967 we produced the MiG-23 fighter with variable wing geometry. It had just been put into production. And here is a new task - to understand what is the F-15, what are its advantages and what we can and should oppose it. First of all, in relation to the MiG-23. This work involved not only us, TsAGI, but also the Ministry of Aviation Industry - its head at the time was Pyotr Vasilyevich Dementiev, the military, leading designers, design bureaus. The Minister convened a scientific and technical council.

I, as a representative of TsAGI, reported our concept. It was based on the scheme of a trapezoidal wing with a deflected toe. We discovered a very interesting thing. If we make a sharp root swell on the wing, a kind of pointed profile, a powerful vortex is induced there. In this vortex, a rarefaction is created, which is located above the wing. It induces a tremendous lift force. One and a half times more than usual. That's the effect we've proposed to weaponize.

And in order for the wing to work at high angles of attack, we proposed to make deflectable spouts on the rest of the wing. That is, to adjust the profile so that it flowed from the nose without breaking off the flow. And we succeeded. As a result, if we omit other technical details that are clear only to experts, with a large lift force we have as sharply reduced drag. This means that at the same thrust that we had before, at high angles of attack, we received more lift and even greater maneuverability, could easily change the flight path at very high speeds.

TsAGI proposal to use this effect in the creation of new fighters repeatedly sounded and at meetings of the Presidium of the Ministry. At these reports, in addition to Dementiev, were present Air Force Chief Air Marshal Pavel Kutakhov, his deputies and, of course, the general designers - Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi, Artem Ivanovich Mikoyan, and when he was gone, Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev. Based on the discussion of that concept, we decided to apply to the government with a request to prepare a decision to start work on a new maneuverable fighter. We were supported by the Military-Industrial Commission under the USSR Council of Ministers. Its chairman at that time was Leonid Vasilyevich Smirnov.

The MIC issued a relevant decision, and our minister issued an order instructing three general designers, Mikoyan, Yakovlev and Sukhoi, to make a proposal on the design of the future fighter. It turned out to be something like a competition between them.

TsAGI then worked very actively with MiG, offering them the very wing that we had developed. And they accepted it. And Sukhoi had its own vision of the new wing. They came to their decision, which seemed doubtful to us. This doubt was the following. If we formed the same vortices only in the central part of the wing with the swell, then the deflected toe protected the rest of the wing from tears. And they decided to make a sharp edge on the entire wing, that is, to specifically form vortices and tears. When going to large angles of attack, as it was later discovered, there was shaking and oscillations of the entire airplane. All this was confirmed during flight tests.

But before that, Sukhoi persistently defended their, in my opinion, erroneous position. In the picture, which I give you, schemes of projects that were discussed at scientific and technical meetings. The first one is the Mikoyan-Belyakov airplane, proposals on our joint concept, then the Yakovlev fighter, which did not pass the tender because the engines were separated. And if one of them suddenly stopped, the airplane could not keep its balance in flight. And the third picture is the Sukhoi project. Its wing is called “gothic”. It is without mechanization of the sharp front curvilinear edge, which formed a stall.

TWO-PERSON COMPETITION

- At all these meetings, we argued a lot about whose project was better,” says the academician. - But we never came to an agreement. Each of the general managers went their own way. TsAGI began intensive work with their models in wind tunnels. The best situation was with the Mikoyan Design Bureau. The idea of a sharp central swell and deflected noses on a trapezoidal wing with a straight edge, in my opinion, they were brilliantly implemented. We tested the “MiG” model at various modes in the wind tunnel for several thousand hours.

And we have unique wind tunnels. There is a working part of more than two meters. We could put a very large model there, on which all the details of the real flight of a maneuverable fighter, stall modes, performance of aerobatics┘ The power of our wind tunnels, for example T-128-th, is more than 100 thousand kilowatts.

- What does 100,000 kilowatts mean for a wind tunnel? - I asked the academician.

He explained it to me using a very simple example.

- Do you have a kettle at home?

- Yes, I do.

- So the kettle has a power of 500 watts, half a kilowatt. And there are 200,000 kettles here. A whole power station. It worked for us and for Mikoyan and Sukhoi fighters.

- And although Sukhoi was developing a different concept,” continued Georgiy Bushgens, ”TsAGI specialists still helped him.

In 1977, the Sukhoi T-10 fighter was the first to take to the air. It was piloted by test pilot Vladimir Ilyushin. He flew in and said: “You know, it's no good. The slightest increase in the angle of attack - and such a shaking starts, which is unacceptable for a fighter maneuver. We have to do something.”

That was the middle of '77. A few months later, in October, the MiG-29 took off. The test pilot on it was Alexander Fedotov. He came back to the airfield and said: “Everything is very good”.

- There was a significant weight difference between the T-10, or Su-27, and the future MiG-29,” the NVO journalist noted.

- Yes, there was a difference. MiG-29 is somewhat lighter, it is designed for engines of lower thrust, about 7.5 tons, and Su-27 is heavier, it has a thrust of 10-12 tons. For each engine. So the airplanes differed in terms of weight. There were disputes over that too.

- What kind of disputes?

- The fact is that the general designers had different concepts for creating fighters. And not only in terms of the wing. Belyakov, for example, believed that it was necessary to make a lighter machine. Sukhoi believed that a heavier one should be made. Why? Probably because, as I understand, the territory of our country is large, and it is necessary to have a machine with a longer range, longer flight time, to protect a larger space. One of the generals focused on frontline operations, which are shorter in length and require a shorter flight range. The other swung toward operational-strategic operations. He needed more powerful machines. And from the very beginning, the Air Force did not know what kind of machine they needed, they were choosing which one would be better.

At some point we suddenly found out very clearly what a supersonic and maneuverable fighter F-15 Eagle was. We became aware of its real parameters.

- How did you find out?

- Well, first intelligence got the information. And then the Americans published it themselves. Then they showed this airplane at the Le Bourget exhibition. I have a photograph of Rostislav Belyakov standing in front of the Igla. We even encouraged him: make it so that Americans would consider it an honor to be photographed near your plane┘.

At a regular meeting with Minister Dementiev, the question arose: why make two airplanes? And which one should be favored? Marshal Kutakhov and his deputies judged and argued - and they already knew that one was going well and the other was having difficulties - but they did not express their opinion. And then Gleb Lozino-Lozinsky, Deputy General Designer from the Mikoyanov company, came up and said: “Comrades! Let's make two airplanes after all. One will serve the front zone, and the other - to make deeper raids”.

The military liked this proposal. The more the better for them. And everyone else liked this proposal too. Then Minister Dementiev asks: “Well, how many should be made of one and the other? It is very important for me to know this so that the factories start preparing tooling and how I can load them┘”

That was the system then. The airplane was still being made, designed, had not yet undergone flight tests, and the factories were already preparing the series. Fittings for it, blanks and so on. But none of those present could answer the minister's question at once.

True, some scientists - these were representatives of the GosNIIAS (State Research Institute of Automatic Systems, headed by Academician Yevgeny Fedosov) - scratched their heads and said: “Two-thirds of the Su-27, i.e. the heavy ones, should be made, and one-third of the light ones, the Mig-29. Out of the total number.”

I raise my hand and say, “It's strange that we make more battleships than cruisers.”

Dementiev remarks: “Yes, comrades, you've said something unbelievable here. Think about it for a while and then tell us”.

At the next meeting, representatives of GosNIIAS proposed: “We have calculated and came to the opinion that in combat conditions need exactly two-thirds of light and one-third of heavy”.

Dementiev supported them: “This is more like the truth.”

As a result, it was decided to produce both machines. The MiG-29 went straight to production, but the Sukhoi was a mess. The question arose: what to do? And at the end of 1977, and the first flight of the T-10, I remind you, was in the middle of the year, a mock-up committee met. We had such a procedure - handing over the preliminary design, presenting it to the customer. It is exactly what takes place at such a commission. The military - generals, colonels, industry representatives - gather and discuss whether or not to accept the proposed “product”.

I did not speak at that mock-up commission. Mikhail Simonov reported on the Su-27 project, although Evgeny Ivanov was the General Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau at that time, and Simonov was the chief designer of this vehicle. He was still at the Design Bureau at that time, and then he went to work for the Ministry. And I did not speak because I realized that I would not be able to approve the work of the Design Bureau, and if I started to say something against it, there would be problems. It is not excluded that they will decide to close the project. And before the meeting, I approached the head of the commission and suggested that he accept the preliminary design, approve the layout, and the wing to redesign in accordance with the recommendations of TsAGI.

Such a decision was formulated.

GEOMETRICALLY SIMILAR

In the same days, Sukhoi issued a brief report on Vladimir Ilyushin's test flight of the T-10. I received this report as an official document and when I saw the pilot's conclusion that the airplane was not suitable in the configuration in which it was designed, I reported to my superior that I was going to the Minister of Aircraft Industry and would insist that an order be issued to redesign the wing. Director of TsAGI Georgy Petrovich Svishchev agreed with me, and I went.

Petr Vasilyevich Dementiev had died by that time, and the Minister was already Vasily Alexandrovich Kazakov. I went to him and said: “So and so, you can't produce such a car.”

He said: “Are you crazy? I have slipways at my factory. We have already started to make billets. And you say it's no good. Can you imagine what will happen?”

I insist: “Vasily Alexandrovich, you can't do otherwise. You'll produce an airplane that will be unusable.”

He immediately called Ivanov, who was the general designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau. He arrived, and Kazakov asked him: “Do you agree with TsAGI's point of view? Do you agree to redesign the wing?”

Ivanov twisted around a bit, fidgeted and said, “What can we do, Vasily Alexandrovich, we have to redesign┘”.

Some time later, it was the beginning of '78, Kazakov issued an order that it was necessary to redesign the wing in accordance with the recommendations of TsAGI. And we made a decision: to take as a basis what had been done on the MiG-29 as already tested and start work on the Su-27 redesign.

- One fighter is lighter, the other is heavier, how can they have the same wing? - I ask the academician a question.

- It's geometrically similar. Only on a different scale. But the formation is practically the same. The profiles are the same, the deflected spouts, the swells┘.

This work on redesigning the wing, associated with the development of the entire airplane, lasted almost 3.5 years. Of course, other things were also done during this process. They are described in some books in some detail. Oleg Samoilovich, then Deputy General Designer of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, a very clever designer, told us a little about it. He was considered Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi's right hand. They made great efforts to “squeeze” the volume of the fuselage. For this purpose, for example, they had to transfer from the engines, which were made at the firm of Arkhip Mikhailovich Lyulka, all kinds of auxiliary mechanisms - dynamos, pumps for hydraulics - located on the upper part of the fuselage, under the body of the machine.

- I remember, Simonov, - inserted a replica of the journalist, - so narrated the reaction of Lyulka to this proposal: “You, Mikhail Petrovich, come home and tell your wife to throw her tits on the back┘”

- Yes. At that meeting, where Simonov's proposal was made, this drama with Arkhip played out. Lyulka was a strong, wiry man, he first refused all the proposals, and then he was, as they call it, pressed. Especially since his fuel consumption was high, and he was also pressed on this parameter.

- Was Simonov already the general designer at that time?

- No, Simonov was still the chief designer and continued to work on the Su-27. The first version of this airplane with a “gothic” wing, as we have already mentioned, took off in mid-1977. The General Designer, I repeat, was already Yevgeny Ivanov at that time. At the end of 1979, when Silaev, who was Kazakov's deputy, left for another ministry, Simonov was appointed Deputy Minister of Aircraft Industry. And he left the firm. Nikolai Kolchin, a very good guy, was appointed chief designer of the Su-27. We worked with him. Our joint work ended with the first flight of the new, redesigned airplane only in early 1981. Simonov was not at the firm at that time.

- But as deputy minister, Simonov must have supervised this work?

- Probably. He was deputy minister for light aircraft. And apparently he did not leave his airplane without attention. But what I want to emphasize is that all these years I never saw Simonov in our institute. All TsAGI contacts were first with Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi, then, when he died, with Ivanov and his assistants - Kolchin, Samoilovich, Chernov (he later died tragically in a car accident)┘ Even after the first flight, which took place in 1981, TsAGI's research on the Su-27 continued. I will tell you why.

Academician Büschgens takes a model of the Su-27 in his hands and shows it:

- Here is where the sharp swell ends, and this is the deflecting nose. It turns out that the place of their convergence affects the stability of the airplane, the efficiency of its control. And to answer the question of where to choose the point of convergence of the swell and toe can only be answered after serious research. Theoretically it is impossible to determine this. Only in a wind tunnel. And the stability of the path affects the ability of the fighter to keep a given course. Deviation of the toe by, say, 15-18 degrees affects the stability of the machine at high angles of attack. And the details of this mode have to be figured out in the tube.

There are a lot of such interactions, cross-influences. Here, for example, the air intake. To build it correctly is also a whole epic. The task of air intakes at high speeds, when you go beyond the speed of sound, is to slow down the air flow to sonic speeds. The engine just doesn't work in supersonic flow. And the intakes have to act like that to slow down the airflow when needed. And not just to slow down, but to slow down with the least loss of speed so as not to add drag and not to reduce thrust. And all this requires an elegant approach, appropriate theory, calculations and tests, experiments. Thousands of hours in the wind tunnel and special tubes.

When the pilot increases the angle of attack, he must know how the engine will work in this mode. If he decides to go into a dive, to negative angles of attack, how will the air intake work here? And how will it react to the glide? In short, the search for answers to these questions requires gigantic work. And it is going on. No designer with his fantasies can come up with anything here, because this is a whole separate science, on which we have a very large laboratory (the number of its employees used to exceed a thousand people, now there are about 250). Special equipment, and so on and so forth....

DESIGN FAIRY TALES AND PATENT TALES

- In some newspapers,“ notes Academician Büschgens, ‘one can read that ’employees of the Sukhoi Design Bureau used to come to TsAGI at night, when no one was present and the Institute's management had gone home, and blow their models in our pipes”. But these are fairy tales. The work on testing the new look of the Su-27, as I have already said, lasted more than three years, you can't do anything here at night, no stranger can get in here, he will just be detained by the security guard┘.

Besides, to put a model in the tube, you have to go through a rather long procedure. We have a special set of measurements: what is the profile of the model, what is its height, width - all its geometry is “run” through the computer. All this is reproduced and controlled. We cannot put a “cat in a bag” into the pipes - it is extremely expensive. I told you the capacity of the pipes - 100 thousand kilowatts. The test program is approved by the authority, the leading engineer passes the head of the laboratory, the latter comes to me. The queues were enormous, there were so many design bureaus, so many people who wanted to conduct our research - it was impossible to do it secretly.

- This is a newspaper, a simplified approach,” I try to defend my colleagues' publications.

- It is possible to simplify,” Georgy agrees, ”but to a certain extent. You can't distort the essence of the case. The work has been going on for years, not overnight. Those people who give journalists distorted information distort the truth for a purpose, and newspapers and their readers are the victims of these distortions.

Why does this happen?Because victory has many parents, only defeat is an orphan. During the work on the Su-27, its designers, chief designers and even the general designer changed many times. Various conflicts took place between them. Someone came, someone left. Someone died. I have already named some names. After the death of Yevgeny Ivanov, Mikhail Simonov was appointed to the position of general designer. And all the work on developing the geometry and contours of the Su-27, which has already become one of the best fighters in the country, was formalized in the form of a patent.This patent officially included me from TsAGI, the head of the second department Vitaly Mikeladze (unfortunately, he recently died) and the lead designer on the aircraft - he carried out all this research work - Georgy Yakimov, a doctor of science, by the way... From the OKB side, there were all the participants in the work on the geometry and appearance of the final version of the Su-27. Among them are Evgeny Ivanov, Valery Nikolaenko, Leonid Bondarenko, Vladimir Antonov, Leonid Chernov, Oleg Samoylovich, Mikhail Simonov, Stanislav Kashafutdinov (he represented SibNIA).
This 1996 patent protects the geometry of the Su-27 fighter, which determines its flight and technical characteristics and piloting performance. At the same time as this patent, patents (in the same composition) were issued in the USA, Germany, Great Britain, France and other countries. That same year, the authors transferred the ownership of their patent to the Sukhoi Design Bureau Directorate.A few months later, an application was filed and at the end of 1998, Mikhail Simonov and his colleagues issued a new patent "for a utility model". Other names appeared there. "Our geometry was used," says the academician, "but without references to our patent, although the new one contains many additional details on the design, instruments, and weapons. And then a third patent for the Su-27 appeared with the same geometry, but in the name of Simonov alone.“No one is going to deny his personal role and that of his colleagues in the creation of the design, defense weapons, organization of technologies and the entire production,” Georgy Byushgens told me. “But why ignore the participation and role in this work of others who created the foundation for the success of the Su-27 in the form of the aerodynamic configuration, why keep silent about the role of TsAGI?”
 
1970, the VVS want an "anti-F15". PFI program is explicitly an F-15 counter with requirements based on F-15 +10%, but it is also expected to be able to replace the Su-15 in the PVO. F-16 doesn't exist at this time.
You are arguing on emotion.

1970 you say....The F-16 did not exist at this time???? Really?

Neither did the F-15....

The first flight of the pre-production prototype McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, YF-15A-1-MC 72-0280, on its first flight near Edwards Air Force Base, California, 27 July 1972. (U.S. Air Force).

27 July 1972: McDonnell Douglas Chief Experimental Test Pilot Irving L. Burrows made the first flight of the prototype YF-15A-1-MC Eagle, 71-0280, at Edwards Air Force Base, California.
1742015655636.png

None of what you are saying is backed up by any source. VVS units were getting Su-27S's from late 1985.
You mean the one thing I said I had to go and get back on to confirm on? Yeah, good job. So that alone totally invalidates everything I said thus far, oh darn ;)

It does not matter whatsoever if the VVS happened to get Su-27 here and there before the dissolution. They chose the Mig-29 because it is the better fighter. That is why it served the VVS and represents the entirety of the Soviet Union's tactical fighter element.

The Su-27 was rejected and spent 7-8 years in development. Of course Sukhoi obsessed over the F-15. The aircraft the Flanker would ultimately fail to "compete" with in every single conceivable way.

If the Flanker's primary mission was "anti-F-15" as you swear it is. Then you must admit that the Su-27 was the biggest failure of all fighter designs to ever be serial produced & upgraded.

Agreement is reached that there is merit in continuing to develop both lightweight and heavy designs. Over 1972-1973, the designs are refined and the doctrine for a "high/low" mix is developed.
Let me get this straight...

You first said TsAGI requirements & VVS requirements that were "anti F-15" before there ever was a F-15...... Mcdonell Douglas only had the contract for a year....

Now you are saying some agreement was made.... No..... Mikoyan simply had all the initiative and offered a RADICAL proposal to divide the program. What was a losing bitter Sukhoi going to do? In your book all they do is complain. I'm not joking read the book.

Your own sources are not agreeing with you. The PFI existed before the F-15 ever got off the drawing board and F-16 too. The F-14 barely had its first flight December of that year.

I even highlighted the pages for you last time. You still did not read it.

According to O.S. Samoylovich, the initiative for this proposal belonged to the Mikoyan Design Bureau: “The MiG Design Bureau came up with a radical proposal to divide the topic into two subtopics: a heavy PFI anti-F-15 and a light PFI anti-F-16.” Otherwise, Oleg Sergeevich’s account of events coincides with what is given in the memoirs of Academician E.A. Fedosov:

This isn't a real program requirement I hope you are aware. Mikoyan decided to run the program now. A competing manufacturer? Why suggest this "radical proposal" if it was program requirement since the get-go?

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new maneuverable and supersonic fighter, which is now known as the F-15 Eagle. They worked very intensively on it, and in 1972, I think, the first flight of this airplane took place
We have a winner!

The first flight of the pre-production prototype McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, YF-15A-1-MC 72-0280, on its first flight near Edwards Air Force Base, California, 27 July 1972. (U.S. Air Force).
 
I'm not sure if you are being deliberately obtuse or have trouble reading.
You mean the one thing I said I had to go and get back on to confirm on? Yeah, good job. So that alone totally invalidates everything I said thus far, oh darn ;)
You said the VVS didn't receive Su-27 before the USSR collapsed. You were wrong. They wanted them ASAP and got then at the same time as the PVO.
It does not matter whatsoever if the VVS happened to get Su-27 here and there before the dissolution. They chose the Mig-29 because it is the better fighter. That is why it served the VVS and represents the entirety of the Soviet Union's tactical fighter element.
No. They accepted a high-low mix of MiG-29 and Su-27, as per the modified PFI program requirements, with MiG-29 being more numerous. The PVO obviously just got Su-27.

The Su-27 was rejected and spent 7-8 years in development. Of course Sukhoi obsessed over the F-15. The aircraft the Flanker would ultimately fail to "compete" with in every single conceivable way.
The Su-27 wasn't rejected, if anything Sukhoi had to talk the Air Force and Ministry in allowing the redesign as it was going to mean costly rework for the production factories. It was heavily redesigned to resolve various issues with the prototype. The Bedretdinov Su-27 books go into some of the reasons, its a lot more complicated than "Sukhoi design bad".
If the Flanker's primary mission was "anti-F-15" as you swear it is. Then you must admit that the Su-27 was the biggest failure of all fighter designs to ever be serial produced & upgraded

Erm... Why? Its a pretty decent opponent for an F-15. Don't understand where you are going with this.

You first said TsAGI requirements & VVS requirements that were "anti F-15" before there ever was a F-15...... Mcdonell Douglas only had the contract for a year....
That's... how things work. Did you expect the USSR to twiddle its thumbs waiting for F-15 to enter service in 1975 and then suddenly jump up and say "oh bugger, we need to start working on a counter for the F-15?"

Sukhoi had a file on the FX program long before the Su-27 started. On 1 July 1969, when the submissions for the F-15 were submitted, all three design proposals were labelled F-15. Here's a Rockwell Proposal brochure:

Rockwell F-15 binder.jpg

No matter which design won, it would be to the "F-15".

Sukhoi and the VVS were paying close attention to the F-15 program and December 1969, when the US Air Force selected the McDonnell-Douglas to build the F-15, then Chief Designer Oleg Samoilovich was relieved that Rockwell didn't get the contract, because their analysis was it was going to be easier to beat the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 design.

Contract award of the F-15 in December 1969 was the direct catalyst to start the PFI program.
Now you are saying some agreement was made.... No..... Mikoyan simply had all the initiative and offered a RADICAL proposal to divide the program. What was a losing bitter Sukhoi going to do? In your book all they do is complain. I'm not joking read the book.


Your own sources are not agreeing with you. The PFI existed before the F-15 ever got off the drawing board and F-16 too. The F-14 barely had its first flight December of that year.
The basic design goals of the F-15 program and the winning design were known to the USSR when the PFI program started. The initial purpose of the PFI program was to design a fighter to match or beat the F-15. All sources agree on this.

I even highlighted the pages for you last time. You still did not read it.

According to O.S. Samoylovich, the initiative for this proposal belonged to the Mikoyan Design Bureau: “The MiG Design Bureau came up with a radical proposal to divide the topic into two subtopics: a heavy PFI anti-F-15 and a light PFI anti-F-16.” Otherwise, Oleg Sergeevich’s account of events coincides with what is given in the memoirs of Academician E.A. Fedosov:

This isn't a real program requirement I hope you are aware. Mikoyan decided to run the program now. A competing manufacturer? Why suggest this "radical proposal" if it was program requirement since the get-go?
The radical proposal was to split the existing "anti-F-15" PFI program, designed to counter the F-15, into heavy and light programs.

Memories differ on whether it was Mikoyan or GosNIIAS that first mentioned the idea in the design conference, but this is splitting hairs as Mikoyan was working hand-in-glove with GosNIIAS. General Dynamics got the YF-16 designation after contract award in early 1972.

Up to this point PFI was a heavy fighter requirement ONLY - the range and avionics capability required could not be met by a smaller airframe.

The split outcome suited Mikoyan. They got to compete with Yakovlev's awful Yak-45, basically a guaranteed win, for the larger VVS production run, and the cheaper, lighter weight design accorded better to their historic preferences and strengths.

Sukhoi got to compete with the similarly awful Yak-47 for a similarly guaranteed win. The outcome suited them a little less, they were confident on winning over Mikoyan's large PFI design, and this seemed like a way Mikoyan got to win anyway.

In the end, after the Cold War ended the VVS chose to keep buying the Su-27 and not the MiG-29. Seems to undermine the "MiG-29 Stronk!" argument.
 
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30 years ago, in the summer of 1977, the T-10 airplane, which was supposed to become, but never became, the prototype of the now famous Su-27, took to the air for the first time. And the first flight of the T-10C, the prototype of this fighter, was a little over 26 years old in the same days. Georgy Byushgens, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, recalls how the famous Su was created and the complexities of the design work on it. In those distant years, he was the first deputy director of the Zhukovsky Central Aviation Institute.

Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

FOLLOWING THE EAGLE
There's a lot of opinion in that account, which is 100% "TsAGI invented everything and I love Mikoyan cos they listen to me", like most of GS Bushgens writings.

Its untrue that the USSR knew nothing about the Eagle's capabilities until 1973. Even before contract award in 1969, there were articles on the F-15. Broad parameters like Mach 2.5 top speed and a requirement for better agility were public. Various magazines posted artist's impressions and articles before and after contract award. That's leaving to one side any potential espionage.

According to Sukhoi's account, which is supported by the timeline, in 1971 or so, TsAGI were indeed looking at trapezoidal wings with leading and trailing edge flaps. They were not looking at LERX, or an integral layout.

After the 1971 design conference, when Bushgens said the integral design was not recommended, TsAGI went away and started testing their existing variable camber wing with root extensions, and also wind tunnel testing the integral layout.

By late 1972/1973, working with Mikoyan, TsAGI had validated the LERX and integral layout as the best solution, but paired with the trapezoidal variable camber wing instead of the ogival wing of the T-10. Mikoyan adopted TsAGI's recommended configuration.

The MiG-29 prototype configuration was indeed very trouble free, nobody can deny that.

If you read the Bedretdinov book, with the repeated changes in chief designer and other uncertainties, the T-10 configuration was still being debated and refined when the T-10 prototype construction started, and it was certainly an immature design with some major flaws. Sukhoi had looked at the trapezoidal wing as an option. Not all Sukhoi engineers think the T-10 was irredeemable, but it suited the newly installed Mikhail Simonov to "sweep clean" with his redesign.

That is to say, this article is the TsAGI/Mikoyan position. The Su-27 book by Sukhoi designers presents the Sukhoi position. Generally, the Sukhoi book has the better sources listed. Mikoyan and TsAGI like to start the story in 1973, and gloss over the earlier stage.
 
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