Messerschmitt Me 309 Development & Politics by Dan Sharp and Calum E. Douglas

This is a fantastic book which I have just read, and also re-read a lot! I've learnt a lot about the Me 309, the Me 209 and Willy Messerschmitt! There are many fascinating facts in this book. Without going into detail I'd just want to congratulate the two authors and recommend this book wholeheartedly! I would now love to see Dans and Calum´s take one the Messeraschmitt Me 210 story in a similar book! I know there have been at least one previous book dedicated to this interesting story (in German), but an English-language book following the same concept as the Me 262, the Me 309 and the Me 328 books would be great! Just saying!
 
Got the book today, just started it.

Without wishing to be too spoilery, you just KNOW this is going to be a stark lesson in aircraft development gone wrong when THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE BOOK is about the relevant air force's Chief of Procurement committing suicide.
 
OK, I'm a good part of the way in, and all I can say is, what a sh*tshow. What a complete and utter f****** sh*tshow.

I'm getting confused, scratching my head, trying to figure out what the hell is going on. And this is not Dan and Calum's problem; this is the actual events.

I must have said the words W T F in full three or four times already and I don't think I'm even halfway through. I will probably say it five or six times again before I'm done. Again, this is NOT Dan and Calum's problem. They are doing an excellent job telling the story of how Messerschmitt, Junkers, Daimler and the RLM between them did a... not so excellent job. :p

If you want to read about an aircraft development process that was so convoluted and messed up it makes TSR.2's story seem trouble-free by comparison, READ THIS BOOK.
 
Done.

An excellent monograph by Dan and Calum, the latter of whom is naturally on board because of one of the defining problems with this aircraft - the powerplant. The takeaway I got is that it and the cooling and lubrication system associated with it were central to the airplane's woes. That the Bf109 airframe was at the end of its development potential and something more was needed was made clear enough, and the question I was left with is whether an existing powerplant would have got a superior airframe into the air in time to have some benefit.

The big surprise for me was finding out that this project died a natural death as a production concern as early as 1943. As a boy, I read and re-read Hitler's Luftwaffe (by Bill Gunston and Tony Wood) and related works, and this (along with the related Me-155, which is touched on in these pages) had for better or worse stuck in my inner child's mind as one of the Luftwaffe's might-have-beens that the chaos of the Reich's collapse prevented from having a chance to shine.

This is shown to be far from the truth: the chaos was very clearly there from the start, and while the lack of strategic materials which prevented the Germans from developing their existing aero engines to new heights (as Rolls-Royce did with the Merlin and the subsequent Griffon) was ultimately a woe imposed upon them by the enemy, their inability to set global priorities for both airframe and propulsion system and see to it that they were carried out (to say nothing of other matters that I don't want to spoil) was inherent in their own system (as the book itself covers).


The only real criticism I have is that it was sometimes easy to lose track of which year things were happening in, and mentioning it more often might have helped in this regard. I'm sure it will be much clearer on a second reading, which I'm sure will happen sooner rather than later. That aside, I consider the money well spent.

My next book of Dan's will be Me-262 Development and Politics, both as a comparison (I think some of the same organizational issues in the German procurement process will present themselves as did here) and as a contrast, since the Me-262 did actually see production, squadron service and a fair amount of combat despite being a revolutionary (i.e. jet) type. Then I'll read the Me-328 volume as the final exemplar - a revolutionary aircraft which, like the 309, didn't make the cut.
 
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Is there any analysis about performance aspects of the Me-309 based on the limited testing data? For example, guesses as to why the rate of climb fell so behind the Bf-109G?

I intend to pick up the book, I'm just dwelling on the basic question of if (engine woes aside) the basic design had significant potential or not.
 
Hi, i am new here and I love Douglas Colum last book and his Youtube.
The calculated speed was almost 900 km/h. Even with the planned DB603 engine with 2000Hp it was unrealistic after all. Was the calculation wrong, or did the designers lie to the Luftwaffe? Anyway, I don't like the political conclusions in book very much.
The Me 309 was slow. In reality, she never even reached 700 km/h. Its climb rate was worse than the G-6 without the MW50. Its flight characteristics were not good. Engine reliability was poor. In the end, the power was only around 1500-1800hp. The armament was no better than that of the 109 G/K.
The Luftwaffe really wanted the Me 309, but the plane didn't really show anything even in a few prototypes. It seems to me that the book looks for the sensation behind the scenes and ignores the weak performances and poor flight characteristics. Yes, Me-309 was technicaly interesting, but ......

By the way, "Secret Horsepower Race" by Colum Douglas is probably the best thing I've read on aero engines. The Me-309 book didn't really appeal to me, sorry.
 
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TempCz said:
Hi, i am new here, but i love Douglas Colum last book and his Youtube.
The calculated speed was almost 900 km/h. Even with the planned DB603 engine with 2000Hp it was unrealistic after all. Was the calculation wrong, or did the designers lie to the Luftwaffe? Anyway, I don't like the political conclusions in book very much.
The Me 309 was slow. In reality, she never even reached 700 km/h. Its climb rate was worse than the G-6 without the MW50. Its flight characteristics were not good. Engine reliability was poor. In the end, the power was only around 1500-1800hp. The armament was no better than that of the 109 G/K.
The Luftwaffe really wanted the Me 309, but the plane didn't really show anything even in a few prototypes. It seems to me that the book looks for the sensation behind the scenes and ignores the weak performances and poor flight characteristics. Yes, Me-309 was technicaly interesting, but ......

By the way, "Secret Horsepower Race" by Colum Douglas is probably the best thing I've read on aero engines. The Me-309 book didn't really appeal to me, sorry.
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What are the political conclusions you didn't like?
 
LSS: Willy Messerschmidt deliberately canceled (almost sabotaged) a promising project and wanted to push the Me 209/Me155.
 
TempCz said:
LSS: Willy Messerschmidt deliberately canceled (almost sabotaged) a promising project and wanted to push the Me 209/Me155.
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You think 1) the Me 309 wasn't promising and Messerschmitt was right to deliberately try and get it cancelled in favour of the Me 209?

Or 2) you think Messerschmitt didn't deliberately try to get the Me 309 cancelled in favour of the Me 209?
 
I think both Willy and LW really wanted the Me 309. The 309 was supposed to replace the 109. But the 309 didn't work. In the end, she couldn't do anything extra and in many ways she was worse than Bf. There was a huge desire to re-arm the Me 309, but that aircraft disappointed its creators and the Luftwaffe. Not a single prototype could beat the Bf109 G/K or the FW190.
It was reasonable to cancel this project.
 
TempCz said:
I think both Willy and LW really wanted the Me 309. The 309 was supposed to replace the 109. But the 309 didn't work. In the end, she couldn't do anything extra and in many ways she was worse than Bf. There was a huge desire to re-arm the Me 309, but that aircraft disappointed its creators and the Luftwaffe. Not a single prototype could beat the Bf109 G/K or the FW190.
It was reasonable to cancel this project.
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I think the conclusion of the book, if it really has one, is that the Me 309 never really reached the point where its performance could be accurately assessed one way or another. Willy Messerschmitt did not allocate the resources necessary to complete the prototype series and as such a full programme of testing never happened and the type was cancelled in favour of the Me 209 (which promised the same performance as the Me 309, but would've just been easier to build). Was he just short of resources? Well, he was somehow able to find enough resources to design and build the Me 264 during this period - a fairly massive undertaking.

On p143 of the book, we quote a memo written by Willy Messerschmitt on March 20, 1943, following a meeting with Goering where he had strongly criticised Messerschmitt: "The Reichsmarschall then turned to the 209 and claimed to be aware that this new aircraft was being developed because the performance of the Me 309 had failed to meet demands. I corrected this and explained that the performance of the 309 corresponded very well with the performance projected and that with the same equipment and armour the 209's performance is no greater than that of the 309.
"The company has therefore decided to use the 209 instead of the 309, since this is essentially developed from the 109 and thus considerable capacity is saved, which the Ministry could not create for the 309 and the lack of which would have made it impossible to deliver the 309." This memo can be found at the Imperial War Museum, reference FD4355/45 Vol. 4/681.

You say that not a single prototype Me 309 could beat the Bf 109 G/K or the Fw 190. However, prior to cancellation, there was only ever one Me 309 prototype. The Me 309 V2 did fly prior to cancellation but was wrecked on landing after that one, single, flight. And the Me 309 V3 made its first flight just as the whole programme was about to be cancelled.

So we're really just talking about the Me 309 V1 prototype. It's reasonably clear from the test logs that Me 309 V1 was intended for nosewheel and stability testing, rather than speed trials. Based on Beauvais' account of flying it, the retractable radiator - a key feature in determining its speed - was unfinished. He doesn't say one way or another but it would appear that it was locked in the 'down' position during his tests. He never attempted any speed tests. The Me 309 V1 was never tested against the Bf 109 K or the Fw 190.

The Me 309 V1's engine was a DB 603 prototype. It frequently ran rough and had other difficulties and could not, I don't think, be regarded as representative of the performance that might be expected from the fully-developed series production model 603 - or indeed the 213, which the production model 309 would also have supposedly been able to accommodate.

If you discount the performance of the Me 309 V1 (was the performance of the Bf 109 V1 representative of the type's eventual performance?) you're assessing calculated performance projections. It's worth bearing in mind that the Me 309 production model, by October 1942, was being expected to carry 254kg of armour (the Luftwaffe had demanded this extra armour). The original build description of August 1941 had specified 96kg of armour.

Take a look at the graph below (produced by Calum and for some reason not included in the book). The Me 309 was expected to carry nearly as much armour as a B-24 bomber. Imagine a production model Me 309 fitted with a DB 603 LA, 96kg of armour, fully developed retractable radiator (retractable for limited duration, with supplemental evaporative cooling) for an aerodynamically clean profile during combat. It still wouldn't have been able to out-turn a 109 but I would guess that, in terms of raw speed, it would definitely bring something extra.

But Willy Messerschmitt, having gone through the arguments between Augsburg and Regensburg over who would build the Me 309, believed there wasn't enough productive capacity available to establish production lines for a whole new type. Therefore, he made arrangements to create a fighter that could do the same job as the production model Me 309 but using as many existing 109 parts as possible - hence the 155 'normal fighter' and then 209. When the design of the latter was sufficiently mature, he briefed Galland on it and persuaded the Ministry to accept it as a replacement for the 309.

How much armour was the 209 expected to carry? 71kg. You can guess how that made its performance stats look compared to those of the Me 309 carrying 254kg of armour. Once a demand for extra armour has been made, it's difficult to get it rescinded. But starting again with a 'new' type, you can 'reset the clock' on how much armour it has.

Me 309 armour graph.png
 
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Thank you for the detailed answer. I can agree with that.
But what really interests me is the calculated speed of the Me 309 from the beginning of development, which is also in the book. Almost 900km/h? How could they have expected this? Even with the Db603 2000HP, it was impossible to reach this speed at all.
 
TempCz said:
Thank you for the detailed answer. I can agree with that.
But what really interests me is the calculated speed of the Me 309 from the beginning of development, which is also in the book. Almost 900km/h? How could they have expected this? Even with the Db603 2000HP, it was impossible to reach this speed at all.
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The Me 309 programme was, as the book points out, founded on the technology, test results and calculations of the (original) Me 209 programme - it was going to be a speed machine. Presumably those August 1941 performance figures, which I have no doubt Messerschmitt very quickly came to regret publishing, were based on calculations which combined Daimler-Benz's very optimistic power output stats with what might be achieved in a fighter based on the record-breaking Me 209's aerodynamics.
 
One thing I would say about this book and its narrative is that there are no clear-cut 'heroes' or 'villains' to it. The key figures, particularly Messerschmitt, have their own agendas and their own reasons for pushing those agendas.

The book presents, in chronological order, pretty much every shred of primary source material that it is possible to scrape from the various archives where such material still exists. The goal was to accurately describe what happened with the Me 309 in as much detail as the surviving evidence allows. And as with my books on the Me 262 and Me 328, it has deliberately been made possible for you, the reader, to interpret that evidence in a number of ways.

It could, as you originally asserted TempCz, be argued that Willy Messerschmitt genuinely did want to get the Me 309 built and into production all along (although I think this position becomes increasingly difficult to justify later on as the lack of work on the prototypes and the active briefing by Messerschmitt personnel against the 309 really starts to take effect).

You could argue that the RLM's failure to dissolve other areas of Germany's aviation industry and feed their constituent parts - personnel, facilities, tools, equipment etc. - to Messerschmitt early on was to blame for the company's failure to press ahead with Me 309 development. Messerschmitt himself clearly argued this and would do so again with the Me 262 (see my Me 262 book!).

Love it or loathe it, though, this book does at least present you with all the sources that it's possible to present, in a way that no other authors have even attempted before. You can, ultimately, view the sources we've dished up however you please - because there is just about enough detail there to facilitate that. You could even, using the endnote references, go and see those original sources for yourself in the archives cited.
 
Predictably, as usual, I blame nearly everything on engine problems. :D;)

That's my little joke, I`ll just add that with the problems they had with engines (especially the "new" ones which were supposed to
rescue them like the 603 (actually a diesel from the 30`s!) and the 213 (amazing but far too late), I would just add to what Dan
has said above that I regard almost any serious attempt at a new fighter with transformative performance as being
effectively impossible, in other words, even if Messerschmitt and/or Tank had got everything right I still think they
would have got nowhere.

The long nose 190 was pretty good but far too late to do much, and the versions with 2-stage supercharged 213`s
which might have actually caused a serious problem for the Allies were about 1 year too late to do so.

Having said all that, the RLM behaved like a half mad half rudderless ship, its incredible the Germans
"achieved" as much as they did. People who say Germans cant bend rules or improvise have no
idea what they`re talking about, if they were not masters of improvisation they`d have
been out the war by late 1943 with the leaders they had. Just because rule bending isn't
the natural tendency of most Germans does not mean they could NOT manage to do so
very effectively when they had to.

Messerschmitt definetly did some strange things, but, with the RLM as it was I dont think
anyone had a chance.
 
As a small sidestep pertinent to the topic: the Germans failed to produce the equivalent of the P-51. By that I mean a fighter that with relatively "low" power (=power that wasn't beyond the DB 605A or the Jumo 211J) achieved high performance while retaining easy handling and relatively low stalling/landing speed + high load carrying capacity* through aerodynamic "finesse". All German fighters and fighter projects seem to have been designed with fanatical obsession of minimal wing area in mind with willingness to sacrifice everything else for it.

*After all, the maximum practical bomb load for the 109 was 250 kg while the P-51 handled 2 x 1000 lbs. quite easily.
 
Pasoleati said:
As a small sidestep pertinent to the topic: the Germans failed to produce the equivalent of the P-51. By that I mean a fighter that with relatively "low" power (=power that wasn't beyond the DB 605A or the Jumo 211J) achieved high performance while retaining easy handling and relatively low stalling/landing speed + high load carrying capacity* through aerodynamic "finesse". All German fighters and fighter projects seem to have been designed with fanatical obsession of minimal wing area in mind with willingness to sacrifice everything else for it.

*After all, the maximum practical bomb load for the 109 was 250 kg while the P-51 handled 2 x 1000 lbs. quite easily.
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Messerschmitt was obsessed with wing loading. I can see why, and its easy to point out the problems now, but in many ways this WAS pointing the way to the future. Late British "super props" like Hawker Fury went to even higher wing loadings than the 109.

Of course, if you have nearly 2500hp you can have a big heavy fighter with high wing loading and not care about the negatives, the Germans never had that position of comfortable excess of power, perhaps except for a very brief period when the 190 arrived. I think Messerschmitt was a very clever and astute engineer, but possibly lacked a couple of other subtle personal characteristics desirable in a top level administrator of a major company. (I would add that there are very dubious things to be found out, about almost any top designer once you start digging !!! Including the British)
 
Why did the Luftwaffe want 254 kg of armor on the Me-309? We're they trying to make it somewhat resistant to .50 caliber MG fire? That might help if they could reach the bombers but doing so would be harder with a notable performance penalty increasing time to get to altitude, and less of an ability to fight against the latest P-47 or P-51 escorts.
 
pathology_doc said:
OK, I'm a good part of the way in, and all I can say is, what a sh*tshow. What a complete and utter f****** sh*tshow.

I'm getting confused, scratching my head, trying to figure out what the hell is going on. And this is not Dan and Calum's problem; this is the actual events.

I must have said the words W T F in full three or four times already and I don't think I'm even halfway through. I will probably say it five or six times again before I'm done. Again, this is NOT Dan and Calum's problem. They are doing an excellent job telling the story of how Messerschmitt, Junkers, Daimler and the RLM between them did a... not so excellent job. :p

If you want to read about an aircraft development process that was so convoluted and messed up it makes TSR.2's story seem trouble-free by comparison, READ THIS BOOK.
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This book review is so clever it has gone 360 Deg right round the factual clock, right through silliness then back to being correct again, and so I think must be described as "bait-click" and not "click bait". :) My congratulations.
 
Calum Douglas said:
This book review is so clever it has gone 360 Deg right round the factual clock, right through silliness then back to being correct again, and so I think must be described as "bait-click" and not "click bait". :) My congratulations.
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Point taken, but I would argue in that case that it mirrors the 309's development from the moment Willy Messerschmitt started to have second thoughts: from difficult but honest development to slapstick farce (as he contrived to make no progress behind the backs of the RLM) to the documented finality of cancellation.
 
Calum Douglas said:
Having said all that, the RLM behaved like a half mad half rudderless ship, its incredible the Germans
"achieved" as much as they did.
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This is the impression I got from Secret Horsepower Race.
Calum Douglas said:
(I would add that there are very dubious things to be found out, about almost any top designer once you start digging !!! Including the British)
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See the Typhoon's rear-fuselage problems. Even Sydney Camm wasn't immune from having terrible things happen to his airplanes, but he at least got the Sabre Tempest into squadron service and shooting down V-1's by the end of the war, whereas Supermarine never really got a developed Spitfire into service that wasn't overshadowed by a lash-up variant thrown together to take the next big thing Rolls-Royce had to offer. Mk III - cancelled in favour of the V series. Mk VIII - overshadowed in production by the IX. F.21 - overshadowed by the XIV and barely made it into squadron service by the end of the war.
 
pathology_doc said:
This is the impression I got from Secret Horsepower Race.

See the Typhoon's rear-fuselage problems. Even Sydney Camm wasn't immune from having terrible things happen to his airplanes, but he at least got the Sabre Tempest into squadron service and shooting down V-1's by the end of the war, whereas Supermarine never really got a developed Spitfire into service that wasn't overshadowed by a lash-up variant thrown together to take the next big thing Rolls-Royce had to offer. Mk III - cancelled in favour of the V series. Mk VIII - overshadowed in production by the IX. F.21 - overshadowed by the XIV and barely made it into squadron service by the end of the war.
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I've been rather critical of Camm recently - since he does not appear to have really 'designed' any aircraft beyond the 1920s, being more of a manager of the people who did the actual designing (in common with some of the major German 'designers' of the period - particularly Willy Messerschmitt and Kurt Tank, who were basically chief executives of large complex organisations with everything that entailed).
However, I've recently begun to have a little more interest in Camm. I wonder whether his reputation for being 'difficult' and 'outrageous' - e.g. tearing up a drawing he didn't like right in front of the poor designer who'd just spent hours making it - is based on a handful of incidents. And during regular everyday office work, he actually, mostly, knuckled down and was just a functioning, even capable, manager.
 
How heavy were the Me 309 V1 and V4? How much would a combat-ready aircraft weigh? The test pilot complained that the Me 309 was overloaded. And that was about V1. Later variants should have extra pointless armor.
Compared to Fury, I don't think it's accurate. She weighed 210 kg/m2. Similar to FW190D, Mustang, P-47, later 109.
Me 309 250kg/m2+?
 
TempCz said:
How heavy were the Me 309 V1 and V4? How much would a combat-ready aircraft weigh? The test pilot complained that the Me 309 was overloaded. And that was about V1. Later variants should have extra pointless armor.
Compared to Fury, I don't think it's accurate. She weighed 210 kg/m2. Similar to FW190D, Mustang, P-47, later 109.
Me 309 250kg/m2+?
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How heavy was the Me 309 V1? It varied depending on the tests being carried out. It was, after all, an experimental test mule and not a pattern aircraft for the production model.
On July 22, 1942, it was 3,600kg. On July 24, 1942, it was 3,542kg. On July 30, 1942, it was 3,700kg. On August 11, 1942, it was 3,670kg etc.
How heavy was the Me 309 V4? I don't think that information is known. It appears only to have been flown once, in April 1943, long after the Me 309's cancellation and does not seem to have been part of any test programme - contrary to what you might have read elsewhere.

I can't recall a test pilot complaining that the Me 309 was overloaded. Could you tell me which pilot that was and what page the reference is on?
 
This weights is for loaded with full fuel and ammo or for not full plane?

Test pilot Beavais, Rechlin 20.11.42 - 23.11.42
 
TempCz said:
This weights is for loaded with full fuel and ammo or for not full plane?

Test pilot Beavais, Rechlin 20.11.42 - 23.11.42
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Those are take-off weights for test flights. The Me 309 wasn't armed, so no ammo. The quantity of fuel was sometimes recorded. Since you're curious, the best thing to do would be to use the endnote references in the book, find the documents, and have a look.

Beauvais' report is published in the book but I can't seem to find the reference to the aircraft being overloaded in it. Could you tell me the page number, paragraph and line where that statement is made?
 
newsdeskdan said:
does not appear to have really 'designed' any aircraft beyond the 1920s, being more of a manager of the people who did the actual designing (in common with some of the major German 'designers' of the period - particularly Willy Messerschmitt and Kurt Tank, who were basically chief executives of large complex organisations with everything that entailed)
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The same can be said for Sir William White, Director of Naval Construction for the most prolific part of the late 19th and early 20th Century. Most of the detail work was done by others, but he was the one who bore ultimate responsibility and over whose signature the plans went out to the yards... right up to the point where, as DNC, he took responsibility for the complete f***-up that happened to the Royal Yacht* and at one stroke trashed his reputation and ended his career a broken man.

Of the other British 'great names':

Roy Chadwick (Avro): Died in an air crash during early Vulcan development.
Reginald Mitchell (Supermarine): Died of cancer during early Spitfire development.
Sydney Camm (Hawker): Died of natural causes aged 72, having retired as Chief Designer.
Frederick Handley-Page: Died 1962 of natural causes, the last Handley-Page bomber having primarily been designed by Gustav Lachmann. Handley-Page was wound up as a company in 1970, having refused to take part in the Great Merger (Per Wikipedia, the refit of the Victor B2 into a tanker was deferred out of spite until after HP wound up).

* People kept adding this and that decorative item, to the point where the topweight got out of hand. On floating out, the ship fell over in the dock.
 
The highest speed of the Me 309 that can be found in the book as 50 km/h higher than the Bf 109G. So according to the G version it would be between 670-700 km/h. Whether this is a calculated or measured speed is unknown, but I think it is a calculated speed. But speed and performance are not very interesting for me in the Me 309 story. What is interesting is nicely written by pathology_doc.

The takeoff weight of the Me 309 can be nicely derived from the chapter "Talking down the 309, where it says that the original 1941 configuration got heavier by 774 kg ( page 113, third paragraph). The original 1941 takeoff configuration ( page 155, without GM-1) is 3,460 kg, +774 kg is 4,234 kg. However, the book also gives a higher takeoff weight, I think 4,260 kg. I am writing about the intended light fighter version. The weight of production aircraft could vary, depending on the armour and armament carried. Perhaps the wing would be modified and the fuselage lengthened...
 
wasp850 said:
The highest speed of the Me 309 that can be found in the book as 50 km/h higher than the Bf 109G. So according to the G version it would be between 670-700 km/h. Whether this is a calculated or measured speed is unknown, but I think it is a calculated speed. But speed and performance are not very interesting for me in the Me 309 story. What is interesting is nicely written by pathology_doc.

The takeoff weight of the Me 309 can be nicely derived from the chapter "Talking down the 309, where it says that the original 1941 configuration got heavier by 774 kg ( page 113, third paragraph). The original 1941 takeoff configuration ( page 155, without GM-1) is 3,460 kg, +774 kg is 4,234 kg. However, the book also gives a higher takeoff weight, I think 4,260 kg. I am writing about the intended light fighter version. The weight of production aircraft could vary, depending on the armour and armament carried. Perhaps the wing would be modified and the fuselage lengthened...
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Where the Me 309's speed is concerned, it all has to be calculations for the reasons I've outlined above. Messerschmitt never really reached the point of being able to test its top speed because he didn't build enough prototypes for performance testing to take place. The Me 309 V1 was needed to trial the type's novel mechanical features - nose wheel, propeller etc. - which needed to be sorted out before they could get to the performance tests.
But all that aside, if you're Galland and you're presented with a choice between two designs with equal calculated performance, but one of them needs all bespoke parts and the other is 50% existing parts, which will you choose?
Of couse, if you're Milch and seven months later you're presented with a choice between two designs with equal calculated performance, but one of them is 50% existing parts and the other is 90% existing parts, you pick the Fw 190 (neu) aka Ta 152.
And then you make Messerschmitt build the Me 262 instead, which he has successfully managed to avoid doing up to that point.
 
pathology_doc said:
The same can be said for Sir William White, Director of Naval Construction for the most prolific part of the late 19th and early 20th Century. Most of the detail work was done by others, but he was the one who bore ultimate responsibility and over whose signature the plans went out to the yards... right up to the point where, as DNC, he took responsibility for the complete f***-up that happened to the Royal Yacht* and at one stroke trashed his reputation and ended his career a broken man.

Of the other British 'great names':

Roy Chadwick (Avro): Died in an air crash during early Vulcan development.
Reginald Mitchell (Supermarine): Died of cancer during early Spitfire development.
Sydney Camm (Hawker): Died of natural causes aged 72, having retired as Chief Designer.
Frederick Handley-Page: Died 1962 of natural causes, the last Handley-Page bomber having primarily been designed by Gustav Lachmann. Handley-Page was wound up as a company in 1970, having refused to take part in the Great Merger (Per Wikipedia, the refit of the Victor B2 into a tanker was deferred out of spite until after HP wound up).

* People kept adding this and that decorative item, to the point where the topweight got out of hand. On floating out, the ship fell over in the dock.
Click to expand...

Camm didn't just retire as chief designer. He had been on the board of directors at Hawker since 1935.
I'm not sure, if Chadwick had lived, that we would have got the Vulcan. It owed a lot to Chadwick's replacement as Technical Director at Avro, William Farren - formerly the RAE's first director and Winkle Brown's boss.
 
newsdeskdan said:
Where the Me 309's speed is concerned, it all has to be calculations for the reasons I've outlined above. Messerschmitt never really reached the point of being able to test its top speed because he didn't build enough prototypes for performance testing to take place. The Me 309 V1 was needed to trial the type's novel mechanical features - nose wheel, propeller etc. - which needed to be sorted out before they could get to the performance tests.
But all that aside, if you're Galland and you're presented with a choice between two designs with equal calculated performance, but one of them needs all bespoke parts and the other is 50% existing parts, which will you choose?
Of couse, if you're Milch and seven months later you're presented with a choice between two designs with equal calculated performance, but one of them is 50% existing parts and the other is 90% existing parts, you pick the Fw 190 (neu) aka Ta 152.
And then you make Messerschmitt build the Me 262 instead, which he has successfully managed to avoid doing up to that point.
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I agree with you, I meant it more for some people who want to know the speed of Me 309 without further context, they simply want a number, the answer the book offers for them as well. But the number doesn't show anything about the Me 309, the reasons you gave several times and are nicely stated in the book. It is a nice book.
 

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