I think Seamaster was a nuclear highspeed bomber, not ASW. Admittedly the difference now is minimal, although I'd expect the 'backseaters' to have a view, as at least the seamaster gave everyone a bang seat.Not quite. The USN's Martin P6M Seamaster for example was killed off by the perceived need to pour money into covering rather large Polaris program cost overruns.As it turned out only the RAF wanted such a fast ASW aircraft, everyone else went for props (Atlantique, Orion, Il38).
Seamaster was nominally an offensive minelayer. The USN rationalized that as a "sea control" role, the idea being to mine Soviet naval bases and bottle up their subs and surface ships in the early stages of a conflict. But it was clearly designed around delivery of large nuclear weapons. The "minelaying" mission was pretty much a fig leaf to get around the directives limiting the USN to sea control, rather than strategic nuclear strike. It was never an ASW patrol aircraft.
While they did use the minelaying role to help obfuscate the Seamaster's nuclear strike role, the United States Navy treated the aircraft's mine warfare capabilities quite seriously as well. Memories were still fresh of the mauling the navy had received in the Korean War from sea mines, so being able to freely & rapidly deploy both conventional and atomic sea mines across whole theaters was rightly considered vital to help counter sortieing Eastern Block naval forces (including their own mine warfare forces!).
Fair point. They were also very aware of the analysis in the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which showed how effective mine warfare had been in crippling Japanese coastwise shipping.
"atomic sea mines"??Memories were still fresh of the mauling the navy had received in the Korean War from sea mines, so being able to freely & rapidly deploy both conventional and atomic sea mines across whole theaters was rightly considered vital to help counter sortieing Eastern Block naval forces (including their own mine warfare forces!).
The Baker shot of Operation Crossroads was a test of one such mine. With the idea behind them being that you only need a handful to lovk down an area, say a Strait."atomic sea mines"??Memories were still fresh of the mauling the navy had received in the Korean War from sea mines, so being able to freely & rapidly deploy both conventional and atomic sea mines across whole theaters was rightly considered vital to help counter sortieing Eastern Block naval forces (including their own mine warfare forces!).
That seems like a bad idea for a whole bunch of reasons. Do you have evidence that they exist/existed in reality or as a serious proposal? I can almost see a rationale for the Soviets to think about such a weapon to deliver a knockout blow to a USN carrier, but what use would the US have for them?
You also only needed to consider blocking a relatively small number of major fleet bases and connecting seaways if your enemy was expected to be the USSR.The Baker shot of Operation Crossroads was a test of one such mine. With the idea behind them being that you only need a handful to lovk down an area, say a Strait."atomic sea mines"??Memories were still fresh of the mauling the navy had received in the Korean War from sea mines, so being able to freely & rapidly deploy both conventional and atomic sea mines across whole theaters was rightly considered vital to help counter sortieing Eastern Block naval forces (including their own mine warfare forces!).
That seems like a bad idea for a whole bunch of reasons. Do you have evidence that they exist/existed in reality or as a serious proposal? I can almost see a rationale for the Soviets to think about such a weapon to deliver a knockout blow to a USN carrier, but what use would the US have for them?
With them being effective on both surface and subsurface threats.
The subsurface part was a biggy since beforehand you need hundards per kilometer to keep a sub out. But with nukes you only need one per 500 to few thousand meters depending on yield. Have the nuke in the center of a web of sensors? A sub will a bad time...
The threat of nuclear mines was also one of the initial drivers for the development of minehunters in place of minesweepers. Clearing nuclear mines by sweeping means you very quickly run out of minesweepers. And possibly ports.You also only needed to consider blocking a relatively small number of major fleet bases and connecting seaways if your enemy was expected to be the USSR.
So instead of a bunch of moderately costly but expendable mines, you use a bunch of less expensive sensors and one fabulously expensive atomic weapon that you can't afford to have fall into enemy hands. I can't think of anyway to link the sensors to the mine other than acoustically or via cable. The former would make it easy to detonate the mine (easy unless it's just offshore a city you're fond of) once the first sensor is examined. The latter would make it easy to locate the mine once the first sensor is found.The Baker shot of Operation Crossroads was a test of one such mine. With the idea behind them being that you only need a handful to lovk down an area, say a Strait."atomic sea mines"??Memories were still fresh of the mauling the navy had received in the Korean War from sea mines, so being able to freely & rapidly deploy both conventional and atomic sea mines across whole theaters was rightly considered vital to help counter sortieing Eastern Block naval forces (including their own mine warfare forces!).
That seems like a bad idea for a whole bunch of reasons. Do you have evidence that they exist/existed in reality or as a serious proposal? I can almost see a rationale for the Soviets to think about such a weapon to deliver a knockout blow to a USN carrier, but what use would the US have for them?
With them being effective on both surface and subsurface threats.
The subsurface part was a biggy since beforehand you need hundards per kilometer to keep a sub out. But with nukes you only need one per 500 to few thousand meters depending on yield. Have the nuke in the center of a web of sensors? A sub will a bad time...
Not necessarily. There are a fair number of ways to rig a sensor network's topology to make an opponents life quite miserable for example, and that is even before you get to things like active booby-traps.The former would make it easy to detonate the mine (easy unless it's just offshore a city you're fond of) once the first sensor is examined. The latter would make it easy to locate the mine once the first sensor is found.
I'm not sure that the the nuclear mine would be more costly. Tactical nuclear weapons were frequently justified on cost. We tend to underestimate just how expensive even relatively unsophisticated conventional munitions can be. The nuclear mine could combine the same or a even a less advanced sensor package as that in the conventional weapon with a vastly more effective explosive charge and thus achieve a higher kill probability per mine. Hence fewer mines required to deter an opposing fleet.<snip>
So instead of a bunch of moderately costly but expendable mines, you use a bunch of less expensive sensors and one fabulously expensive atomic weapon that you can't afford to have fall into enemy hands. I can't think of anyway to link the sensors to the mine other than acoustically or via cable. The former would make it easy to detonate the mine (easy unless it's just offshore a city you're fond of) once the first sensor is examined. The latter would make it easy to locate the mine once the first sensor is found.
Temperature changes also cause friction because of unequal expansion between the airframe, which is aluminum, and the control system, which is basically steel. In aircraft traveling below Mach 2, the temperature change 18 due to altitude. The temperature differential ranges from over +120°F (+48.9°C) on the ground to -85°F (-65°C) at high altitudes. The Martin Seamaster, for example, could not fly higher than 25,000 feet because unequal expansion would lock the control system. At one time the Convair 880 had a dual cable consisting of an aluminum tubing over a spring. This system would also lock up at high altitudes. Aircraft flying at Mach 3 or higher, such as the B-70, A-11, and SST have a different temperature problem because of aerodynamic heating. At Mach 3 the skin temperature of the aircraft rises to over 500°F (260°c). Typically, the fuselage of the SST and B-70 grows 12 inches at sustained Mach 3 speeds.
It does depends on which version of the P6M.Pretty sure this isn't entirely true. I'm looking through Martin P6M Seamaster by Piet and Raithel, and it discusses test flights as high as 35,000 feet with no mention of thermal expansion problems, just the flutter and vibration issues that plagued the type throughout testing. The P6M was also supposed to test in-flight refueling at up to 30,000 feet, but didn't get past some preliminary trials before the plane was cancelled.