Believing the civilian Seamaster to be a airliner was an error on my part. Wikipedia only speaks generically about adapting the aircraft for the civilian market which I presumed meant cargo and passenger configurations of the SeaMaster design.
Abraham Gubler said:Its pointless posts like this that are ruining this board.
Stargazer2006 said:I surely wasn't aware that this board was "wasted", until you mentioned it. Sharing an opinion is never a "waste" when there is no attempt to push it and when it is not offensive. This is not an intranet board for professional, this is an internet forum (mind the Latin meaning of that word) where non-professional enthusiasts, some "enlightened", some not, can come and discuss the aircraft they like, not necessarily with the notion that every word they type has got to be 100% useful, relevant and serious, and certainly not on the basis that it will be scrutinized from a professional's point of view.
fredgell said:Orionblamblam said:If you've found anything on the SeaMistress (the larger plane in the background), I'd love to see it...
Dont recognise the seamistress reference but the picture looked awfully familiar
Try "NASA TN D-529"
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?Ne=20&N=4294888984+211
The tunnel models and drawings for 500,000lb heavy lift flying boat.
Regards
Fred
Aerodynamic and hydrodynamic tests have been made of a 500,000- pound high-subsonic multijet logistics transport seaplane design con- . forming to the transonic area rule. The aerodynamic results show that acceptable stability and performance characteristics can be obtained on a high-subsonic-speed flying boat. Reasonable lift-drag ratios can be obtained up to Mach numbers of about 0.90. Additional improvements in lift-drag ratio and longitudinal stability characteristics can be obtained by small refinements in the area distribution. The hydrodynamic behavior of this design was determined to be generally satisfactory. Preliminary tests indicated that afterbody suction forces introduced some longitudinal take-off instability and high-speed resistance great enough to preclude take-off without afterburning. How-ever, the addition of a small auxiliary step to the afterbody slightly of the main step improved the stability and reduced the resistance to the point where satisfactory take-offs could be made without afterburning.
Test conducted at NASA Langley Research Center's Tow Tanks. Two configurations of transonic seaplanes were assembled for the test.
Landing tests of the DR-77 hydro-ski seaplane with and with shock absorber ski struts. This test shows the effect of a shock absorber ski strut on the calm and rough water landing behavior of a 1/24 scale model. The area of the hydro-ski was 100 square feet and the deadrise angle 0 degrees. This test was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center in the Tow Tanks in the 1950s.
The Martin P6M Seamaster was developed under the US Navy's Seaplane Striking Force concept, which focused on the development of jet-powered seaplanes that could be used to perform minelaying, conventional and nuclear strike, and photoreconnaissance missions. First flown on 14 July 1955, eventually eight test aircraft and eight P6M-2 production versions were built. With the advent of the Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile, the Navy lost interest in a seaplane-based nuclear deterrent. All of the Seamasters were scrapped. The P6M is also notable as the last major aircraft production program of the Martin Aircraft Company.
flateric said:Triton, these are Richard C. Knott drawings, scanned from Bill Trimble's "Attack From The Sea"
Martin Model 331-6 is scanned from Stan Piet / Al Raithel's Martin P6M SeaMaster book
all three authors are members of the forum
in your search of interesting materials you are starting to cross thin line of copyright issues
bercr said:Unfortunately the link is now broken, http://www.alternatewars.com/Archives/P6M/P6M.htm, i don't know if there is another link to access the photos ?
The U.S. and its allies would be well advised to prepare for a broader set of military contingencies: "What is more apt to occur [than a general war with the Soviet Union] are local wars which both the Free World and the USSR will take great pains to prevent expanding into general war. This means precise delivery of weapons suitable under the circumstances existing. It will mean the quick positive delivery of sufficient force but not in excess of that required for a particular situation. It will mean accepting something less than unconditional surrender."31
Burke believed that the navy held the key to both these strategic challenges. A sea-based nuclear force would be much less vulnerable than the Strategic Air Command's land-based bombers and missiles and could achieve the same deterrent effect as the larger SAC force because its weapons would be harder to target and destroy. This would permit the Defense Department to shift resources from the general nuclear war mission into preparations for limited and local conflicts. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that the United States was forced into a nuclear war, the relative invulnerability of sea based missiles would mean that they could be withheld and used selectively, freeing the U.S. from the "use it or lose it" doomsday scenarios which dominated Air Force nuclear war planning. This strategy of "finite deterrence, controlled retaliation" was the fruit of Burke's years as a strategic planner, and provided the context for many of his most important decisions as CNO.32
Long before "finite deterrence" was fully articulated, Burke took the first steps toward creating the tools which would make it possible. Only two months after taking office, in October 1955, Burke moved to aggressively implement a tasking from the National Security Council, and directed the Navy to proceed as rapidly as possible to achieve a sea-based intermediate range ballistic missile. Burke's directive ran counter to the advice of many of his top subordinates in OPNAV, who argued that such a project was too technically complex and too expensive to be justified. Confident that the technical difficulties could be overcome, he appointed Rear Admiral William F. Raborn to head a Special Projects Office that would work jointly with the Army in developing a liquid fueled missile to be fired from converted merchant ships. The next summer, while the successful development of ballistic missiles was still far from assured, Burke directed the Navy staff to investigate a "minimal target system, the threat of destruction of which would deter the USSR." Burke would use the resulting study in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to argue against the escalating requirements of the Air Force for thermonuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union, as well as for the bombers (and later intercontinental ballistic missiles) to deliver them.33
In the fall of 1956, as a result of progress made in developing solid fuel propulsion and lighter nuclear warheads, the Navy split its Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, now-codenamed Polaris, off from the Army and looked to development of a submarine based missile force. In January 1957, breaking with the long-standing practice of treating naval nuclear forces as threats against only "targets of naval interest," Burke directed that the developing Polaris system be considered a "national" deterrent system. That November, the Polaris development schedule was accelerated so as to produce a deployed submarine armed with 1200 mile missiles by 1961. Finally, in early 1958, Burke released a long range concept for "The Navy of the 1970 Era" that called for 40 ballistic missile submarines to serve as the navy's deterrent to all-out war, while 15 attack carriers would be used as the service's "primary cutting tool" to forestall or fight in limited conflicts.
By 1959, Burke clearly was looking to Polaris as a potential replacement for most of SAC's bomber and missile force, but at a much reduced cost for the nation as a whole. A study of alternative targeting, which had the potential to move the nation's war plans away from a largely preemptive massive first strike effort aimed at Soviet military and civilian targets across the board, toward an exclusively retaliatory target list of highest priority targets only was underway in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the "alternative undertaking" was adopted as the nation's primary strategy in war, finite deterrence might become a reality. The first Polaris submarine, USS George Washington, with its 16 ballistic missiles, was on track to its first deployment in the fall of 1960, thereby setting the stage for development of a controlled retaliation strategy.
The cost to the navy of implementing Burke's alternative to national nuclear strategy was high, however. The service's annual budget hovered at $11 to 13 billion through 1961, far short of the $16 to 17 billion Burke calculated would be needed to produce a modernized U.S. fleet by the 1970s. This meant that many promising programs, including the Triton and Regulus II cruise missiles and the P6M Seamaster long range jet seaplane had to be cancelled. The necessity of such trade-offs troubled Burke. A 1957 study projected that Navy force levels would fall to 693 ships by 1971, far short of the 927 required for wartime missions, if funds were committed to the development of Polaris, to making all future construction submarines nuclear powered, and to introducing nuclear power into all future aircraft carriers and some surface combatants.34 Nevertheless, the CNO was determined to press forward with the effort to broaden national military strategy.
31. Burke to Mountbatten, 4 February 1958.
32. A detailed assessment of Arleigh Burke's role in the making of nuclear strategy is contained in this author's essay, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, 7, Spring 1983, 3-71.
33. Vice Admiral R.E. Libby, Memorandum to Op-00, Subject: Proposals Relative to Atomic Operation Concept, Serial BM00043-57, 1 May 1957, File A16-10, Atomic Warfare Operations, Box 8, Chief of Naval Operations Op-00 Files (hereafter Op-00), 1957, NHA.
34. Rear Admiral R.E. Rose, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Inadequacy of $1.5 billion Shipbuilding Funds Level, Serial 0041P03, 13 September 1957, A1(1) Unlabelled Folder, and Rear Admiral Rose, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Impact of Polaris Program on Shipbuilding and Conversion Program, Serial 034903B1, 13 December 1957, A-1(1) Shipbuilding and Conversion Programs Folder, both in Box 1, Op-00, 1957, NHA.
http://www.history.navy.mil/bios/burke_rosen2.htm