M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS Developments

About bloody time, I suppose Biden has stopped listening that self-deterring coward Jake Sullivan.

I suspect more that now that this move is tied to the election being over - all domestic constraints are done. In fact the Trump victory might have influenced the decision: it potentially creates more complications for him, while at the same time Russia does not want to antagonize a new administration until it is blatantly hostile. Biden can leave this little policy nugget for Trump to deal with, and Putin has to be careful not to set a bad tone with a new president that might potentially benefit him.
 
In fact I suspect Biden will leave a lot of foreign policy land mines for the new administration - a lot of weapons transfers, a lot of relaxed engagement ROEs for US weapons, and likely a lot of dual use contracts for missile components that tech are not arms transfers.
 
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Estonia is skeptical about LM's ability to deliver additional HIMARS within reasonable time.
The closest alternative would be the K239 Chunmoo, AFAIK using the same rocket pod form factor and loading mechanism.
Another alternative is the PULS, which mechanically can also accept HIMARS-compatible munitions, but the loading mechanism is different.
But neither of these alternatives is particularly available, with an order log for both.

I guess there's a lesson to be learnt here: If you think you can start buying equipment only when a crisis has started, you'll find out you'll have to wait in line.
 
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We've been admonished to avoid politiks, but the words "hell" and "handbasket" keep coming to mind : (
 
Denying access to the GPS M-codes and US intelligence doesn't stop the M270s/HIMARS from being used it just degrades the missiles accuracy.
 
Denying access to the GPS M-codes and US intelligence doesn't stop the M270s/HIMARS from being used it just degrades the missiles accuracy.

MCode is not active and nothing in Ukrainian inventory would have it anyway. I am not sure what the GMLRS failure mode is sans P code, but I assume it uses the civilian signal alone. I suspect the bigger problem is the denial of US intelligence for targeting.
 
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The point is, as Eric Prince relates below, that Russian EW is very effective and that GPS guidance for US and Western made weapons is now a bit of a crap shoot anyway.
View: https://x.com/Geopoliticaleco/status/1894443834811293992?t=pBlkHR576zKaQjkJDBtHkg&s=09

In a static battle using decades old munitions without air superiority…yeah, GPS guidance is going to fall short. I think more modern munitions with better hardening, thickened with munitions with terminal sensors and some HOJ, would cut through either side’s ECM rather readily. And of course it is a lot harder to see up effective ECM in a fluid battlefield or against a foe who can easily strike a couple hundred clicks behind the lines en mass.

As for supporting Ukraine - the war already has disposed of ten thousand Russian armored vehicles, tens of millions of stockpiled rounds of artillery, and generally decimated the Russian army in at least the classical sense of the word for an incredibly low investment on NATOs part. I think Russia could be forced to the bargaining table via an opened US commitment that forced Russia to face the exhaustion of its economy and equipment reserves, but apparently the war on woke is more of a priority.
 
I think more modern munitions with better hardening, thickened with munitions with terminal sensors and some HOJ, would cut through either side’s ECM rather readily.

IIRC a US company (I can't remember which one it is) mass-produces inexpensive HOJ seekers that can be fitted on the likes of JDAM, SDB-I and GMLRS rounds.
 
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I wonder what effect that will have on exports...
IMO - None.
Ukraine is a special case as urgency dictates that delivery of arms takes precedent over terms of service. Buy it and deal with it later.

But to everyone else, all possible restrictions are very well known and the only surprise may be that the US acts on a listed restriction.

In the end it's mostly a matter of how you negotiate a contract. I'm feeling a lot of the pre-2025 European acquisitions were more of the sort "yeah just deliver so we can cross it off, we're not gonna use it anyway".
But if you really try to negotiate you can remove some restrictions.
 
The point is, as Eric Prince relates below, that Russian EW is very effective and that GPS guidance for US and Western made weapons is now a bit of a crap shoot anyway.
I keep hearing that but I still see plenty of rounds hitting home.
 
There's mention on wiki of MMW seekers for Excalibur shells too, so it would seem crazy if they hadn't considered such options for MLRS rockets.

6 SADARM munitions were also intended to be carried in one version, but there's no mention of that on the M270 wiki page.
Sounds expensive.
 
Not as expensive as an S-400/500 radar being taken out from 150km away with an MLRS rocket. Not as expensive as missing due to jamming with an ordinary GPS version either.
I don't think that those extended-range gmlrs are, nor The S-500 is, available in large numbers, atm, if at all. Russia might have one or two such systems, but I haven't been keeping track of Lockheed's stuff.
 
Not as expensive as an S-400/500 radar being taken out from 150km away with an MLRS rocket. Not as expensive as missing due to jamming with an ordinary GPS version either.
Hard to make work with existing GMLRS concept (sealed packs coming from factory).
 
Hard to make work with existing GMLRS concept (sealed packs coming from factory).

The Ukrainians do have their own rocket and missile industry so I doubt it would be hard to design and build replacement rockets for spent M270/HIMARS rocket-pods.
 
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I keep hearing that but I still see plenty of rounds hitting home.

Accuracy is not black and white; reductions in precision disperse fire but do not make guidance fail completely. The weapon will guide outside of effective jamming range and fall back on INS once satnav is denied. Weapon placement will very with intensity of jamming, the receiver resistance to said jamming, accuracy of the inertial system, and the initial accuracy of the satellite guidance in the first place. And of course just luck. And effectiveness will vary with warhead size and target type.

Reports that indicate GPS/GLONAS guidance has been defeated are simplistic; what actually is happening is that specific weapons with low HE payloads or sub par accuracy (especially mediocre INS), or both, are being degraded to the point they are unreliable. And even that will be situational, depending on local ECM conditions.

None of this should be extrapolated to NATO weapons in general; most everything being used is very out of date in terms of ECM resistance and NATOs ability to locate and engage satellite jamming likely far exceeds that of either side.
 
I don't think that those extended-range gmlrs are, nor The S-500 is, available in large numbers, atm, if at all. Russia might have one or two such systems, but I haven't been keeping track of Lockheed's stuff.

The baseline GMLRS-ER rockets only just entered production, as did PrSM. Neither has an active seeker yet, though certainly PrSM has one in development/testing.

There are also a slew of more jam resistant munitions as well, including those employing SABR Y/M receivers. MCode usage in general will enhance resistance in general once it becomes operational, though not all weapons use it. GPS III will also have a ‘spotlight’ capability in a few years once enough satellites are in orbit. Likely none of this will be ever be provided to Ukraine, however.
 
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Canadian Lockheed Martin customers are disturbed by the US downgrading of Ukraine's HIMARS and are starting to discuss non-US alternatives:
Well, there's PULS and K239, and I think that's all on the platter since anyone among the biggies in NATO buying Turks seems abit out of the ordinary.

The opinion piece just rings full of Gripenitis though.
 
Well, there's PULS and K239, and I think that's all on the platter since anyone among the biggies in NATO buying Turks seems abit out of the ordinary.

The opinion piece just rings full of Gripenitis though.

Can't comment on the G&M piece since its behind a paywall. For Ottawa, the K239 Chunmoo makes the most geopolitical sense (especially since the ROK wanting Canadian LNG shipments).

OT: Does anyone know if Poland has export rights for its locally-made Homar-Ks? (A UOR purchase from Poland would be handier for equipping the RCA component of the Multinational Brigade Latvia.)
 
Canadian Lockheed Martin customers are disturbed by the US downgrading of Ukraine's HIMARS and are starting to discuss non-US alternatives:

Are they somehow under the illusion that other suppliers couldn't do the same? The hazard of not growing your own.
 
As equally threatening as "NATO move east".

To be fair, the sanctions are quite real and the reasoning quite fabricated. Canada represents less than 1% of drug smuggling, and cv perhaps an only slightly larger percent illegal immigrants, far less than the 1/3 or so that simply fly to the U.S. and overstay visas. The goal seeto be hurting anyone with domestic politics that do not align with the current administration, not practical security.

As such I suspect ROK artillery business will be quite booming; Eastern Europe was leaning that way for reasons of production anyway. The total lack of reliability of the U.S. likely cements that shift.
 

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