Indirect gun fire anti-tank is plenty proven with decent showing of sensor fuzed, laser guided and dumb HE. You don't need a new vehicle, just buy more ammo for the artillery branch now that modern war have shown ammo needs are plain massive.
A report from the Army Science Board recommends moving beyond the M1 Abrams to new, smaller tanks and uncrewed vehicles.
www.thedrive.com
I read the report, and it is clear to me that they are inflating the value of tanks massively, talking up threats like T-14 sabot duels and claiming tank on tank kills, probably from padding using cherry picked data 2014 Ukraine campaign, in which Ukraine lacks modern ATGM with tandem HEAT or top attack capability. With the ongoing war not being over one can just throw up data that don't line up when most reasonable inferences would not agree with many assertions within the document.
The recommandations also reflects a complete lack of imagination where requirements are set reactively after threats have clearly established themselves.
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If you ask me what the maneuver branch is about, it is not this trite talk of mobility protection firepower. All combat vehicles regardless of type have all three characteristics and all have classical tradeoffs. Actually, what maneuver is about is closing with enemy, doing things which requires closing with the enemy.
Well, precision large caliber fires no longer requires closing with the enemy and it is anti-synergy to spend much effort for maneuver forces to focus on this. The maneuver force should focus on what it can do.
A few tasks where the future maneuver force have advantage over standoff forces
1. Counter low observable targets (mines, drones, infantry in cover)
2. Increase tempo of warfare by converting concealment based warfare to firepower-defense centered warfare
3. EW Domination
4. Responsive fires
5. Support shorter range forces (eg. electrical aircraft)
Responsive fires:
From a conventional vehicle design perspective, a networked gun mortar with fire on the move FCS, guidance + variable powder charges provides the best immediate fire support against land targets on a formation level. Such systems is available off the shelf. While high velocity tank gun shell flight time is less, the enemy will avoid line of sight with such guns, while it is far more difficult to avoid low response time indirect fire with trajectory changing munitions. High velocity-only low elevation indirect fire guns due to trajectory reasons have either dead zones or have to be too far to the front, resulting in poor availability of rapid response fires.
Against aerial targets, DEW, autocannons and missiles are all useful and have to be incorporated to maneuver formations. The demanding requirements of air defense means that such systems will necessarily have the best response time and be most expensive. Also, large high velocity high elevation guns can also be used against aerial targets and should be a design consideration.
EW Domination
All the talks about EW, everything is left as fuzzy and nothing about who and what force structure would win the EW war. Well, simple:
Heavy vehicles with high power output, large antennas close to the point of conflict relying on active/passive defenses will overpower light platforms with low power output, smaller antennas far from the point of conflict relying on concealment to survive.
If you are fielding 60ton vehicle fleets, it is logical that you'd add 60ton EW vehicles as well. Forget killing targets directly, the maneuver force brings the EW hammer and dominate the front, and the drone force run rampant and defeat the enemy. The rest of the maneuver force just protect the EW box.
Countering low observable threats
Decades of warfare experience have shown that with access to aerial observation and precision long range fires, threats from tanks to pickups can be eliminated at range. Threats like mines, IED, pop up infantry and drone attacks can not be defeated by long range fires.
The maneuver force ought not to focus on things like detecting tanks at 20km, far beyond normal line of sight, but on sensing of obscured threats. Powerful ground and cover penetrating sensors is what is what would bring value to the maneuver force.
The threat poised by well concealed warheads combined with smart delivery platform means that all parts of the vehicle is under threat, but by small warheads. Instead of frontal armor, vehicle system robustness is what will determine survivability.
Supporting short range forces
Electric vehicles can be designed to have very low costs with drawbacks of poor range. Support forces near the front enables the usage of such vehicles. UAV/UGV support vehicles with rapid rearm/resupply capability can enable high sortie rates.
Increasing the tempo of operations
The ability of protected maneuver forces to close with the enemy enables the use of low cost, low mass vehicles for the last stretch with high sortie rate, result in increase combat tempo.
Instead of a catapult aircraft force 50km from the front, a multicopter force staging 5km from the front can result in rapid defeat of a inferior opponent force. This tactical tempo advantage combined with interdiction and other shaping can cause dislocation of enemy forces resulting outsized advantage.