The Initial Engine Development Program (IEDP) Request for Proposal (RFP) came out in mid-1968. The military’s proposal defined commonality as using the same core (the high spool), which is the more expensive engine spool from a development effort viewpoint. The Air Force and Navy engines could have different low spools. This was a cost-saving gesture in view of the escalating situation in Vietnam that was gobbling up military resources at a fierce pace.
The Air Force oversaw the engine development. The common core would be in the Air Force F100 engine with one low spool and the Navy’s F401 engine with a different low spool to provide a greater thrust level. The winner of the IEDP would develop two separate engines. The Navy’s VFX became the F-14, and shortly thereafter the Navy bowed out of the F401 engine program. This departure left the Air Force with a bigger share of the development cost, putting a strain on the Air Force’s budget.
When the IEDP RFP appeared in 1968, Allison, General Electric, and Pratt & Whitney were participating in advanced technology component programs with the Air Force Aero Propulsion Laboratory at Wright Field. The new RFP called for an 18-month demonstrator program aimed toward the air superiority fighter application, the F-15. Two contractors would be selected, and each would get about $50 million to build and test two demonstrator engines, one of which would be tested at the Air Force’s Arnold Engineering Development Laboratory (AEDC) in Tullahoma. This demonstrator program reflected the “fly before you buy” philosophy that had been used in other Department of Defense programs. Allison declined to bid, leaving General Electric and Pratt & Whitney to compete with each other.
In the meantime, the F100 team in Florida, under the direction of Gordon Titcomb, was working around the clock. The FRDC team designed what they thought the customer requested and got the first demonstrator engine to test in Florida on July 30, 1969 [3]. The second engine was delivered to the Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tullahoma (AEDC) in November 1969 for the final testing of the engine.
Source: The Engines of Pratt & Whitney by Jack ConnorsThe Air Force selected Pratt & Whitney to develop the F100 engine in early 1970. One of the reasons the military selected the company was its knowledge of inlet–engine compatibility technology and experience— lessons learned from the F-111/TF30 program
Source: ENGINE WARS: COMPETITION FOR U.S. FIGHTER ENGINE PRODUCTION
- Apr 68
F-15 engine RFPs to GE, P&W and Allison- Aug 68
GE and P&W selected to each built two technology demonstrators (one USAF and one USN) under 18 months contracts- Jul 69
50 hour experimental engine demonstrations (XF100)- Jan 70
P&W engine selected for F-15- Mar 70
Developmental contract award- Feb72
YF100 60-hr Preliminary Flight Readiness Test (PFRT)- Mar 72
F100 installation engine- Oct 73
F100 Qualification Test
by any chance do know anything about GE's FX engine proposal? I assume it wasn't related to the later F101/F110. The only thing I'm aware of is that the Air Force Evaluated PW's proposal as all around superior.Source: ENGINE WARS: COMPETITION FOR U.S. FIGHTER ENGINE PRODUCTION
- Apr 68
F-15 engine RFPs to GE, P&W and Allison- Aug 68
GE and P&W selected to each built two technology demonstrators (one USAF and one USN) under 18 months contracts- Jul 69
50 hour experimental engine demonstrations (XF100)- Jan 70
P&W engine selected for F-15- Mar 70
Developmental contract award- Feb72
YF100 60-hr Preliminary Flight Readiness Test (PFRT)- Mar 72
F100 installation engine- Oct 73
F100 Qualification Test
Thomas R. Dabney & Michael J. Hirschberg
It was also designated XF100. It was descended from the GE1/10 engine developed for the US / FRG VSTOL fighter.
The primary reason P & W got the contract was they were thought to be superior on engine installation and inlet compatibility after the horrible experience of the F-111 and the TF30. GE took this onboard and assigned dedicated engineers to work with the 3 AMSA contenders on engine/airframe installation during the F101 competition, and this helped them win that one.
P&W F100 then had bad issues with engine stalls, while GE F101, J101/F404 and F110 were all trouble free.
AWST 3 March 1969![]()
General Electric displayed its GE1/10 augmented turbofan demonstrator engine in Washington, D.C. last week. This engine is the basis for the powerplants the company is proposing for the Navy’s F-14B and the Air Force's F-15 aircraft. The engine is approximately 143 in. long and 38 in. in diameter. It is designed to operate at turbine inlet temperatures above 2,000F.
Interesting that the GE1/10 demonstrator appears to have two stages of variable vanes in the fan module, both inlet guide vanes and between the 1st and 2nd stage of the fan. This may have been for data gathering, determining what the optimum angle of the 1st to 2nd stage vanes, or whether variable vanes were even needed in a multistage fan of this pressure ratio. F100, F101, F110, F404, F119, and F135 only have variable inlet guide vanes, and the RB199 and EJ100 dispense with inlet guide vanes entirely.AWST 3 March 1969View attachment 684421
General Electric displayed its GE1/10 augmented turbofan demonstrator engine in Washington, D.C. last week. This engine is the basis for the powerplants the company is proposing for the Navy’s F-14B and the Air Force's F-15 aircraft. The engine is approximately 143 in. long and 38 in. in diameter. It is designed to operate at turbine inlet temperatures above 2,000F.
You are right, the F100 did not bypass the oil around the air/oil coolers. In addition to the additional failure modes this type of valve system could have introduced, you also have the problem of stagnant oil trapped inside the cooler. This trapped oil could get cooked and coked in place under the high temperature supersonic fan duct air flow conditions, while blocking the airflow as in the original design reduced the heat transfer while constantly moving oil thru the coolers.Very interesting! One thing that always bugged me is that US jets did not seem to have airframe-external air/oil heat-exchangers (and as you write, later engines indeed do not!) while European ones did. Even the Typhoon and Rafale still have what I think are air/oil heat-exchangers on the bottom of the engine bays.
Also interesting that they did not bypass the fan duct heat-exchangers on the oil side at high Mach, which intuitively seems like the obvious thing to do. But then that requires some kind of actuated valve (with associated failure modes) while the production solution does not (correct me if I'm wrong), so clever idea.
Did supercruise in any way make oil thermal management more challenging in the F119? With the F100-PW-220 & -229 the AB fuel cooling loop was already gone, but then supersonic flight in a F-15 or F-16 is a comparatively transient affair. If the -229 oil cooling system partially relied on never reaching thermal steady state in the top right corner, the F119 would've likely required a re-think?
Actually, as a result of the stalls due to the afterburner, a task force was established at Pratt & Whitney. As a result they came up with a detection system to detect the hot afterburner gases flowing up the duct into the fan system, and that with some other engine parameters were developed into a stall detection for the electronic engine control. The electronic engine control would then automatically retard the power lever to military power while simultaneously scheduling the exhaust nozzle to open someone to relieve the back pressure on the fan. This resulted in essentially eliminating the engine from going into stall stagnation, and was done before the proximate splitter was incorporated.The original development F100 engine had titanium fan and compressor disks in all 13 stages of compression (3 fan, 10 high compressor). They learned the hard way that under the high compression ratio design of the engine of 25:1, the high pressures and temperatures at the back end of the high compressor set the conditions for self sustaining titanium fire, or as we in the propulsion community like to call it - a rapid oxidation event. While the compressor exit conditions did not initiate a titanium fire, any hot spark or excessive rub from a broken blade or other unusual condition could start the fire, and the high partial pressure of oxygen in the back of the compressor would propagate to the entire high compressor. For those who have never witnessed a Ti fire, once it starts it is like magnesium. During at least one test in an altitude test cell, the Ti fire initiated and all that was left following the event was the motor mounts.
Subsequently, the high compressor was redesigned with Nickel disks, blades, stators, and cases in the rear 7 stages of the high compressor, with the weight of the engine increasing from around 2900 lbs to 3050 lbs. This philosophy of nickel aft stages has carried forward in the F100-229 and F119/F135 high compressors.
I believe the F101 was a direct development from the GE1/10 demonstrator. I didn’t realize how much smaller the demonstrator engine was. Interesting that the high compressor was 14 stages, while the production F101/F110/CFM56 compressor was only 9 stages.GE1/10 details from Aircraft Engines of the World 1970 by Paul H Wilkinson.
Sorry to revive an old post, but do you have a source for this information? I'm attempting to write a report on this engine and would love to reference it if possible.F100 Control System
Part 3 - Back Up Control
For single engine safety in the F-16, the F100-PW-200 was equipped with a Back Up Control (BUC) to enable the pilot to continue to operate the engine if there was a failure of the Unified Fuel Control (UFC). The only inputs to the BUC were the mechanical throttle input, fan duct pressure for altitude bias, and a separate push / pull cable for rear compressor variable vane position feedback. The BUC did not know engine speed, inlet temperature, or turbine temperature.
When the pilot decided that BUC operation was needed, he was directed to first place the throttle at mid-range if the engine was running, or in cutoff if the engine had flamed out. BUC was then selected via a cockpit switch, which depowered a transfer solenoid in the BUC, allowing fuel pressure to move a valve that transferred core fuel flow from the UFC to the BUC. That same fuel pressure was ported to the Variable Geometry Transfer Valve (VGTV) which switched control of the RCVV and Start Bleed from the UPC to the BUC, and closed off the 13th stage bleed air supply to the Convergent Engine Nozzle Control (CENC). Throttle input position (PLA) directly modulated core fuel flow and RCVV position.
Instead of an automatic start sequence in the UFC initiated by moving the throttle from cutoff to the 15 degree Idle position, a new Idle detent was electrically activated in the cockpit throttle at 41 degrees PLA. When the pilot moved the throttle from cutoff to 15 degrees, the BUC output light off fuel flow only. Once the pilot received an indication of engine light-off with increasing RPM and FTIT, he was then supposed to slowly advance the throttle over a 30-40 second period from 15 degrees PLA to the BUC Idle stop of 41 degrees, mimicking the N2 and FTIT rise seen during a normal engine start. When the throttle reached the Idle position, the high compressor start bleed closed. The pilot was then restricted to advancing or retarding the throttle between the 41 degree Idle and 86 degree Mil setting with no less than 5 seconds between Idle and Mil power settings, directly controlling core fuel flow and RCVV vane position. The F100 exhaust nozzle is a balance beam construction, with exhaust pressure on the balance segments and the area of the convergent segment forward of the pivot air loading the nozzle in the closed position. With the bleed air muscle pressure shut off to the CENC, the nozzle would close to minimum Aj as exhaust pressure increased with the slow throttle advance.
The BUC was a very simple control that afforded get home capability, but it had several drawbacks:
- It was highly dependent on pilot throttle technique during a high work load event - the engine was not responding properly to pilot input. If the throttle was moved too fast during start or from Idle to Mil, the engine would stall and overtemp with no protections.
- Thrust was limited at Mil power, and might not be enough to climb if performing a heavyweight takeoff. The permissible flight envelope was very limited for proper BUC operation.
- Advancing the throttle into AB was prohibited. If AB was selected, the UFC would still turn on AB fuel and ignition and sequence up to Zone 5 if requested. With the exhaust nozzle fully closed, this would result in immediate stall and turbine overtemp with no protections.
- It was discovered that if the pilot started advancing the throttle too soon toward Idle after light-off FTIT indication, the engine could still accelerate while being about 10% N2 below the normal start trace. Once throttle reached BUC Idle and the start bleed closed, the engine immediately stalled and stagnated, requiring the pilot to shut the engine down again to reattempt the start. The Dash-1 and maintenance manuals were changed to direct the operator to wait until N2 rpm stabilized after light off before starting the advance toward the Idle detent.
Sir, may I ask you one question about F100-PW-220 sub-model? I heard that the technology of F100-PW-229 was introduced into F100-PW-220 to form a new model called F100-PW-220P (F100-PW-220+/220E+), is it true? If yes, When was F100-PW-220P introduced into the F-15/F-16 fleet?Much of this can be found in the F-15 / F-16 / F100 maintenance Tech Orders, and within P&W proprietary training materials. I wrote these posts from my personal experiences with the F100 engines as a field service engineer for P&W for 30+ years
So F100-PW-232 would be a sorta PW analogue to the F110-GE-132 of the F-16 Block 60s with similar thrust ratings?The -220P was never produced or introduced into the F-15 or F-16 fleet.
P&W originally developed an increased airflow fan and LPT for the F100 with a design airflow of 240 lbs/sec (pps), company designation PW1128, utilizing the -220 core. This was further developed into the -229 under the USAF Improved Performance Engine (IPE) with a redesigned high compressor and turbine core module with higher airflow. To reach the target thrust of 29K, the fan speed was increased, pushing the airflow to 248 pps, which fully used the F-16 original normal shock inlet capacity of 250 pps. The downside of overflowing the 240 pps fan to 248 pps was a reduction in fan efficiency, driving up turbine temperatures.
The USAF approved the large mouth inlet for the F-16 capable of 275 pps airflow to feed the F110-GE-110 (260 pps) and the other IPE engine F110-GE-129 (265 pps). P&W saw an opportunity and designed / tested a new high efficiency fan of 275 pps airflow capacity. This new fan on the -229 created the F100-232, which would have been rated at 32K thrust at -229 turbine temperatures, or 29K thrust with much reduced temperatures for longer life.
P&W proposed a program where new 275 pps Fans and LPTs would be produced and installed on current -229 engines for make -232 engines. The removed -229 fans and LPTs would be installed on -220/220E engine, creating the -220P, which would have operated the fans at the original 240 pps airflow, with a thrust rating in the 26-27k range, essentially recreating the original PW1128.
The USAF never funded the F100-PW-232 development and didn’t accept the -229 fan to -220P plan, so the -220P never existed except on paper.
So in effect the -232 would only offer an alternative supply of 32k thrust engines without otherwise improving performance beyond what existed. And I guess this is precisely why it didn't happen as the US may have felt content with GE?Yes, the F100-232 would have had similar ratings and applications as the F110-132, which is currently only in the Block 60 F-16.
The -232 did have some additional development challenges. The new Fan was longer than the -229 fan due to the wide chord fan blade technology borrowed from the YF119 / F119 which made the engine longer at the front end. To keep the engine interface with the aircraft common with older F100s, the augmentor was to be shortened, the front of the gearbox extended, engine mounts shifted forward, and bleed air plumbing moved forward to line up with the existing aircraft facilities.
They were contemporaries, the USAF stopped funding them in the 90s. When the UAE came around it just seems it was the luck of the draw they picked the F110-GE-132 and that was funded.So in effect the -232 would only offer an alternative supply of 32k thrust engines without otherwise improving performance beyond what existed. And I guess this is precisely why it didn't happen as the US may have felt content with GE?
Without knowing more about the program, i always suspected the F118 made the difference for the UAE selection.And UAE provided the funding for the -132. The USAF didn’t pay for the development of either the -132 or -232, beyond some initial R&D that lead to the design of the advanced fan concepts for both. The -132 had the advantage of the B-2 program funding the blisk fan development for the F118, which was then available for the -132.
What a shame about the F100-PW-232, I thought the F100-PW-232 would provide more dry thrust than the F110-GE-132 due to the lower bypass ratio. Also, does the F100-PW-232 have a Vmax mode like the F100-PW-220 to provide extra thrust(I know F100-PW-220 has Vmax mode, but but F100-PW-229 canceled this mode) ?The -232 did have some additional development challenges. The new Fan was longer than the -229 fan due to the wide chord fan blade technology borrowed from the YF119 / F119 which made the engine longer at the front end. To keep the engine interface with the aircraft common with older F100s, the augmentor was to be shortened, the front of the gearbox extended, engine mounts shifted forward, and bleed air plumbing moved forward to line up with the existing aircraft facilities.