Littoral Combat Ship - Freedom/Independence

[Airbus A340]

AIUI the speed was to allow the LCS to exit the missile dropbasket by the time the missile arrived. I have read (on for a like these) that the LCS was a response to Cebrowski's Streetfighter concept. Streetfighter was gaining momentum and the USN did LCS to redirect the Street fighter lobby to build something actually useful. CODAG is inherently tough on gearing because the smooth torque of the GT has to be combined with the pulsing torque of the diesel. This, and the advanced hulls, made LCS an issue. Add on things like deleting corrosion control systems and other mismanagement and you can see the problem. The mission package idea never made any real sense. Why not build a minesweeper version that doubles as a patrol craft? Why not build a littoral ASW vessel that doubles as a patrol craft? Why not build a vessel for imperial policing that enforces quarantines is a big war? What made them think that a single vessel could switch between ASW, MCM and patrol?

Here's what LCS could have been. A smaller vessel with reasonable speed and a large flight deck. A mission bay with boat handling facilities, UAV, USV, UUV, etc. Space to embark special forces and/or law enforcement personnel. MK110 for credibility. RAM for some modicum of self defense. Cheap radar fit like the LCS actually has. Diesel engines for long range or GT for quieter and less maintenance. What about the MCM version? Do you put the sonar in the hull or in the mission bay? That's a question for a group of naval officers trained as engineers who confer with industry professionals and maybe seek help from engineering and physics personnel in the think thank and university sectors. Like they used to do before Rumsfeld decided he knew everything. Same thing with the ASW version sonar. Torpedo tubes yes or no? Level of acoustic silencing? Again, ask the systems engineers to offer options wrt to cost and capability.

I would go farther. No names. Just numbers. No real damage control, no ability to take battle damage above being raked or taking an RPG or ATGM. Easy for the crew to exit the vessel. If it gets sunk, it's a number not a name.

Instead we got a big waste of time and money. They should name the last one the Rumsfeld, then decommission it after they break the champagne on the bow.

 

[Scott Kenny]

As a note of caution though, all the numbers above are based on assuming that each ship could burn their tanks down to very low levels with no adverse affects, whereas operationally in peace time their could potentially be some limits placed on how much fuel a ship may be allowed to burn before needing to refuel for stability and seakeeping reasons.

Or you let seawater into the fuel tanks and just slurp fuel off the top of the water.

 

[Maskoki]

Hi,

As I undertand it, one of the biggest misconceptions about the LCS designs are their top speed. While it is often noted that this ship allow them to quickly respond to emerging threats, it really needs to be noted that this really only appears to apply to relatively nearby threats. Specifically, the GlobalSecurity website notes that for the LCS-1 had a cruise speed range of 2138 nm @ 14kts, and a high speed range of 855 nm @ 43.6kts.

For comparison, the DDG 51 class is listed as having a cruise speed range of 4400 nm @ 20kts.

For reference, the Sea-Distances.org website indicates that a trip from Jacksonville Florida to Rota Spain (which is listed as being 3710nm) @ 14kts would take 11 days and 1 hr, not including time for at least one mid-voyage refueling that would be required by the monohull LCS, since is listed range at 14kts is 2138nm (as noted above,per GlobalSecurity). If the ship were instead to try and sail at the 43.6kts listed by GlobalSecurity it notionally would take 3 days and 13hrs (not accounting for any refueling time), but since the GlobalSecurity Site suggests a range of only 855nm at that speed, then the ship would appear to require at least 4 refueling stops enroute, which would add significantly to the total voyage time, and would assume that there are at least 4 Underway Replensihment Groups stationed enroute at ideal locations to support this transit.

Conversely, with the notional 4400nm range @20 kts for the DDG 51, this ship could theoretically make the trip without refuling in 7 days and 18hrs.

As a note of caution though, all the numbers above are based on assuming that each ship could burn their tanks down to very low levels with no adverse affects, whereas operationally in peace time their could potentially be some limits placed on how much fuel a ship may be allowed to burn before needing to refuel for stability and seakeeping reasons.

As such, the numbers above would seem to suggst to me that if you want an LCS (or at least if you want a monohull LCS) to quickly react for very short distances (say in or around a Carrier Battle Group or some other form of Surface Ship Group) it could make use of its high top speed to quickly resond to an emerging threat. Or similarly, if you want that ship to quickly "dart in to conduct a quick mission and then quickly pull back" for something perhaps up to 300nm away or so, it may also be able to make use of its high top speed. But if you are looking to quickly deploy one or more of these ships from its home port to restation it over seas, not only will it not likely be able to make much use of its high top end speed, but due to its lower than normal cruise speed (in comparison to ships likethe DDG etc) it will likely take a fair bit longer time to get these assets on station in the event of an emerging situation.

I didn't see similar range information for the Trimaran LCS on the GlobalSecurity site, but if I can find similar information for it,it would be relatively easy to do similar calcs for it.

Regards

Your fuel/range figures and reasoning are spot on and further indict the LCS-1 class. The design failed the minimum range target (3,500 nm @ sub-20 kts) by 1,400 nm, or 2/5ths of the target range. Not a small miss.

Range really limits how the USN can employ the ship once it completes transoceanic transit. LCS-1, operating alone, as an economy-of-force ‘contributor,’ basically can’t do missions more than ~750 nm from a base, in part due to its poor range, and in part due to the limited replenishment ships the Navy can deploy. This means that the Persian Gulf, the Med, & the Baltic are about the only realistic far-hemisphere theaters in which we can use LCS-1s, and sprinting, for which the ship was optimized, is ill-advised (even after the combining gear was fixed) - might not make it back to port if you do it.

Indo-Pacific distances are simply too great for the LCS-1.

LCS-2’s range is better, so the Navy is able to gain use from that class in WestPac, but LCS-2 wallows at low speeds and suffers more hull cracking.

However, due to the lack of VLS, neither class can defend themselves adequately if they manage to get there…making the Persian Gulf, SCS, & first island chain treacherous waters for both classes regardless of their operational range, especially with the proliferation of AShCMs & AShBMs.

 

[DWG]

I think the issue with range is a bit misleading - LCS really only makes sense as a forward deployed asset, in which case you're going to be operating in short seas where you can take advantage of the speed without the range limitations becoming crippling.

OTOH the idea of trans-oceanic deployments now has me picturing an LCS with a buddy-refuelling rig.

 

[Firefinder]

One thing to Remember bout the speed was partly to scoot the fuck out of the way of incoming missiles that will also be dealing with soft kill measures and close in weapons.

Be able to go from 30 to 40 may not seem like much but it is enough to open just enough space to screw with most missiles targetting systems on terminal approach. Only the really High end weapons be able to adjust for that even now and those are slatted for the BIG THREATS like the CVNs. Toss in its decent ADA system?

It is good enough to protect itself from threats from attacks of opportunity which is 95 percent of attacks on ships. Ad Hoc strikes on precede vulnerable targets.

We talking bout less then 5 missiles of the air cruise type. The RAM 57mm and EWAR gear of the LCS can handle that.

Anymore and you are looking at a Focus Strike on the main task force which is going need all the missiles punch through that.

Which is far better than any other minesweeper or Patrol type out there thats not heavier than them. The LCS pushes what you need to successively attack it way up compare to what it was replacing. And can at least add to the EWAR game and protect itself somewhat. If you want more...

Well the FFGs show what you need. A Complete Combat system of the AEGIS type with all the Trappings and add ons with the cost. Anything less then that and you get the LSC and anything less then THAT?

Be an expandable drone or a barge.

Remember the BIG COST of the Ship be the Combat systems and the LSC has what likely the Minimum to NOT IMMEDIATELY DIE in war. Anything better and you will be looking at similar cost of the FFG at least.

Also for the Aluminum Cracking?

Congrats they join a decent chunk of the fleet with that issue, they at least waited a decade to start unlike the Ticos which did at launch.

 

[Airbus A340]

Firefinder makes an extremely important point. Plot cost on the x-axis and capability on the y-axis. The graph is not linear. To simplify the graph it has a straight high slope region, then infection point 1. Then a straight lower slope region until inflection point 2 is reached. Straight higher slope region until inflection 3 then lower slope until 4. Higher slope until 5. The 3 high slope regions are corvettes, frigates and destroyers/cruisers. Anyone can quibble with the terms but it's about AAW. Self defense, then local area defense, then Aegis level. You want to be around the odd inflection points. LCS was there, at least when it comes to AAW.

 

[apparition13]

It's a pretty lousy bang for buck ratio, because for some of the figures I've seen you could have had an Absalon and an Iver Huitfeldt for price of one LCS. The former is more capable for the low end stuff, and the latter much more capable for the high end stuff.

 

[Airbus A340]

It's a pretty lousy bang for buck ratio, because for some of the figures I've seen you could have had an Absalon and an Iver Huitfeldt for price of one LCS. The former is more capable for the low end stuff, and the latter much more capable for the high end stuff.

Part of that is the premium for building the ship in the USA. The other part is the speed. The speed issue is the crux of the matter with LCS because so many of the problem stem from that. The need for exotic hull shapes and materials (compared with other warships) and the need for so much power. If they could have accepted lower speed then LCS might have worked.

 

[H_K]

I think the issue with range is a bit misleading - LCS really only makes sense as a forward deployed asset, in which case you're going to be operating in short seas where you can take advantage of the speed without the range limitations becoming crippling.

True in the Persian Gulf, Med or Baltics but not so much in the Indopac, where even as a forward deployed asset range would be an issue:

1,500nm roundtrip from Singapore to the southern Spratly Islands
2,800nm roundtrip from Guam to the Luzon strait or Taiwan's east coast

So basically LCS would have to turn around as soon as it got somewhere useful, especially if spending anytime cruising at tactical speed (20 knots) or sprinting at 30+ knots.

 

[Desertfox]

Basically, LCS should have two different ship types. A slow multi-mission ship (Slow Independance?), and a fast patrol boat (New Pegasus).

 

[DWG]

True in the Persian Gulf, Med or Baltics but not so much in the Indopac, where even as a forward deployed asset range would be an issue:

How much priority was the USN giving to combat in the Spratlys in 2003? We're really complaining that it wasn't built to fight the war after the one it was designed for (ie the Gulf).

 

[H_K]

How much priority was the USN giving to combat in the Spratlys in 2003? We're really complaining that it wasn't built to fight the war after the one it was designed for (ie the Gulf).

Well that's the issue really... the USN designed a ship that was excessively tailored to one small theater, rather than designing a globally capable combattant that could be operated by all its commands - in particular by its largest fleet (7th Fleet).

I still don't understand how an admiral like Cebrowski could have been so myopic or afforded so much leeway to push such a misguided solution.

 

[Firefinder]

Well that's the issue really... the USN designed a ship that was excessively tailored to one small theater, rather than designing a globally capable combattant that could be operated by all its commands - in particular by its largest fleet (7th Fleet).

I still don't understand how an admiral like Cebrowski could have been so myopic or afforded so much leeway to push such a misguided solution.

Mainly cause what they are primary replacing had even less range.

The Avenger class Minesweepers had less then 2000 miles of range and needed to be ship on a Blue Marlin type vessel to their operations zone.

And the Pegasus Class hydrofoils which the LCS spiritually replaced had barely 1000 miles of range themselves.

Even the much lawd Cyclone class maxes out at around 2,100 miles.

Compare to those designs even the Freedom class has legs in both fuel and provisions.

 

[DWG]

I still don't understand how an admiral like Cebrowski could have been so myopic or afforded so much leeway to push such a misguided solution.

One word, Rumsfeld!

 

[Jimmo952]

One word, Rumsfeld!

Cebrowski did not push LCS. Cebrowski championed the idea of large amounts of heavily armed missile boats.

Nowadays, we'd call that a swarm and would try to achieve that effect with UAVs and USVs.

In Cebrowski's time, there were those that had an inkling that Cebrowski was onto something, but it was just too radical and limited.

Pushed by Rumsfield to look at the idea, the Navy braintrust played with the idea until they jointly came up with LCS, which had very little to do with Cebrowski's concept.

Cebrowski is probably rolling in his grave.

 

[Desertfox]

Rumsfeld as Cheney before him did so much damage to the US military and foreign standing...

The US should have just license built the Danish Absalon and Swedish Skjold designs. Could have had 100 working ships in service for the same price.

 

[Maskoki]

Right - slower non-waterjet corvette-sized vessel for ASW (slow work - examining large volumes of ocean water) and off board MCM work (even slower work), and faster (but not so fast that you sacrifice other capabilities) for anti-shipping & VBSS.

 

[TomS]

Right - slower non-waterjet corvette-sized vessel for ASW (slow work - examining large volumes of ocean water) and off board MCM work (even slower work), and faster (but not so fast that you sacrifice other capabilities) for anti-shipping & VBSS.

VBSS? That's what helicopters and RHIBs are for.

 

[DWG]

Cebrowski did not push LCS. Cebrowski championed the idea of large amounts of heavily armed missile boats.

Nowadays, we'd call that a swarm and would try to achieve that effect with UAVs and USVs.

In Cebrowski's time, there were those that had an inkling that Cebrowski was onto something, but it was just too radical and limited.

LCS was arguably an attempt to turn Streetfighter into something usable while also addressing other requirements such as the need for to replace the mine countermeasures force. The combination didn't do either requirement any favours, a 50kt missile boat is one thing, a 50kt multi-role light frigate is another. A 25-30kt multi-role vessel might have had a much better chance of making things work. My personal opinion is that Streetfighter as envisioned by Cebrowski would have been even less use than LCS, being a one trick pony and effectively a next generation Pegasus class PHM.

The IRGC fell down the same small littoral combatant rabbithole, but went the low-tech FIAC swarm route. I'm not convinced either Streetfighter or LCS are much more useful against them than a shore-based helicopter with a ASUW capability - cf Wildcat with its potential load of 20 Martlets.

 

[Maskoki]

VBSS? That's what helicopters and RHIBs are for.

100% agreement with you.

Mid-Indian Ocean or South China Sea, where do those get fuel, sailors, & bullets?

CVSGs & ARGs can’t be everywhere… either can DDGs, though we’re wearing them out by trying.

If we had FFGs, that would probably be your answer. But we don’t - we have LCS instead (for now).

My response was in double-agreement with and expanding on Desert Fox’s two posts. He recognized that if we were going to build sub-Frigates, we needed two types, slower and less-slow.

[I can’t bring myself to type the word “f a s t” after what the LCS has done e to the Navy.]

 

[PFJN]

Hi,
As I understand it the "concept" for the LCS program was kind of an amalgamtion of many different ideas including;

• modularity to allow a common hull to be outfitted with different packages sothat they could conduct different missions, and potentially (hopefully) quickly swap out between missions rather than trying to design a larger hull capableof performing multiple missions
• low manning, including a core crew to run the ship, with the ability to carry additional personnel when needed for maintenance, or to operate some of the mission packages, etc
• high-speed for reasons that are not really fully clear to me (I've heard suggestions of various reasons)
• small size, especially with a shallow draft for coastal/littoral operations.

As envisioned it is my understanding that they would in theory be able to replace ships like Mine Counter Measures Vessels, Patrol Boats, Frigates, and other such vessels in many roles.

It is alos my understanding that LCS 1 was ordered in 2004, laid down in 2005, launched in 2006, and commissioned in 2008. While, the Danish ship Abaslon was ordered in 2001, laid down in 2003, launched in 2004, and commissioned in 2004, and declared fully operational in 2007.

As such, while Absalon represnts an intersting alternative to the overall LCS design program she wasn't really a known quantity yet when the LCS concept and designs were being developed. Additionally, at 6600t full load, she might be considered a bit large for some proposed missions (like coastal ASW and anti Mine Warfare, etc), while at a 24kt top speed she might not be fast enough for more traditional frigate type roles in the USN.

Additionally, while the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates, with a top speed of 28kts would appear to be much more suited for many traditional USN frigate type roles, and at a 6,545t full load displacement, in many ways appear somewhat similar to the FFG61 class frigates eventually ordered by the USN, since they were not laid down until 2008 and commissioned in 2012 they appear to have come about too late to have been viewed as an alternative to the LCS's during their design, as well.

 

[Cordy]

FWIW the all diesel long range 9,000+nm Iver Huitfeldt class F362 Peter Willemoes was clocked at 31 kts during North Sea trials though do not know in what condition, commonly ship maximum speed defined at 90% MCR at the vessel's full load displacement, so think your 28 kts is correct.

 

[Firefinder]

After the Fun of having the 28 knot Perry try to work with the CSGs I doubt that the Navy will want another 28 knot frigate.

Especially after the Mid1990s when the Perry's were really showing how fun it was.

Especially since the Navy cant afford to split it up via multiple class like they could in the Cold War from cost and crew needs.

So a 32 knot service speed is all but required. Cause the Frigates are now needed on CVN guard duty as such need to be able to keep up with them. So both the Absalon and Huiteldt class are out unless you can easily mod the to regularly do that speed.

Heck the Speed modern frieghter ships do will push up the speed as well. You want the escorts to be bout 5 to 10 knots faster then the frieghters so the escorts can split off and form back up as needed. That still rings true with Copters and tge average modern Container haulers which carry 70 percent of the goods books it at 25 knots.

 

[that_person]

high-speed for reasons that are not really fully clear to me (I've heard suggestions of various reasons)

More so than anything, it was response time. They wanted a ship that could quickly find and neutralize littoral-specific targets. You can’t chase down a pirate skiff or boghammer with a top speed of 28 knots.

Another part of it was probably survivability.
The initial LCS CONOPS had them operating on the far peripheries of the CSG. If something bigger came along, they had to run.

There was even consideration to increasing the speed requirement to 50 or 60 knots.

As envisioned it is my understanding that they would in theory be able to replace ships like Mine Counter Measures Vessels, Patrol Boats, Frigates, and other such vessels in many roles.

During the late 80s and early 90s, the Navy largely gave up on the idea of a low-end ship to fulfill conventional mission sets. See the 1988 Surface Combatant Force Requirement Study for more info.

As such, while Absalon represnts an intersting alternative to the overall LCS design program she wasn't really a known quantity yet when the LCS concept and designs were being developed. Additionally, at 6600t full load, she might be considered a bit large for some proposed missions (like coastal ASW and anti Mine Warfare, etc), while at a 24kt top speed she might not be fast enough for more traditional frigate type roles in the USN.

Other thing is the Navy originally wanted 55 LCS hulls, minimum. Absalon is a bit expensive for that.

But, the initial LCS concept is fundamentally different from how they’re currently being used. The LCS as a dedicated littoral combatant is dead, that idea died during the first Obama Administration. They’re now being used as low-end, specialized mission ships to take pressure off the Burke fleet and fill the gaps left by the retiring support vessels.

Because of that, I’d argue the current LCS designs are a bit small for their new niche. A clean-sheer design would deprioritize speed in favor of endurance and a larger, more permanent self-defense armament.

That’s more akin to a traditional frigate than a dedicated littoral combatant. I think a Absalon or Mogami-type LCS successor would be appropriate in 2024 context, but fundamentally fails in 2003.

Additionally, while the Iver Huitfeldt class frigates, with a top speed of 28kts would appear to be much more suited for many traditional USN frigate type roles, and at a 6,545t full load displacement, in many ways appear somewhat similar to the FFG61 class frigates eventually ordered by the USN, since they were not laid down until 2008 and commissioned in 2012 they appear to have come about too late to have been viewed as an alternative to the LCS's during their design, as well.

The original LCS concept is largely detached from those of a traditional frigate. A dedicated littoral combatant fills mission sets an FFG just can’t.

FFGs are low-end combatants, but they fill traditional mission sets. They’re largely designed around area AAW, fleet ASW, etc. The only meaningful distinction between them and a DDG is they’re inexpensive enough you can send on anti-piracy patrols (granted that’s still overkill).

Now look at the original LCS CONOPS, which had them getting into close-quarter knife fights with boghammers, deploying an array of drones to hunt diesel-electric submarines, and hunting mines. Yes they were intended to operate with a CSG, but it fundamentally fills rolls a traditional FFG can’t. The LCS is a product of the littoral threat environment, and is largely useless outside of it.

There’s a reason the LCSs are smaller, faster, and don’t have Aegis.
Trying to compare them to traditional frigates shows incomplete understanding of the topic.

 

[Desertfox]

What I'm hearing is that LCS should have been based on the Skjold-class corvettes.

 

[johnpjones1775]

What I'm hearing is that LCS should have been based on the Skjold-class corvettes.

Except those missile boats don’t have any of the necessary capabilities the LCS needed except speed, an inferior gun for the job, significantly worse SAMs…
Visbys would be closer.

 

[TomS]

What I'm hearing is that LCS should have been based on the Skjold-class corvettes.

An enlarged Skjold was offered for the preliminary Focussed Mission High-Speed Ship effort. It suffered from way too many moving parts -- separate lift and propulsion engines (and generators), air cushion skirts, etc. SES designs also tens to be fairly weight sensitive, which isn't great if you're trying to design around variable payloads.

JJMA on LSC Team - Magazines

John J. McMullen Associates (JJMA) is a member of the Raytheon LCS team recently selected by the US Navy to develop the preliminary design of a Li

magazines.marinelink.com

 

[Airbus A340]

Skjold is supposed to be stealthy but I have a question. When the cloud of spray envelops the Skjold due to its propulsion system, what happens to the RCS? Missile boats are pretty much useless against a competent opponent and the USN simply does not need them.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Skjold is supposed to be stealthy but I have a question. When the cloud of spray envelops the Skjold due to its propulsion system, what happens to the RCS? Missile boats are pretty much useless against a competent opponent and the USN simply does not need them.

How exactly do you figure missile boats are pretty much useless?
The basic tactic for striking ships and battle groups has been saturation for decades now. If the goal is to shoot a lot of missiles at a target you either need a few ships with a butt load of missiles, or you need a lot of ships with a few missiles each.

How exactly does a ‘competent navy’ deal with a dozen or more targets launching 8 missiles each?
A USN CSG would heavily struggle with that, especially in an area like the Baltic where there’s a lot of small islands and spits, fjords, etc for missile boats to hide behind, pop out launch, and run back into cover.
Plenty of places like that in the SCS and pacific as a whole as well.

 

[Airbus A340]

Missile boats are hopeless against air attack. Their sensors are less effective due to lower mast height and greater ship motion in the sea. How well did PT boats do in the Pacific when the Japanese lacked good radar?

 

[Firefinder]

The best counter for a Swam attack is via air with multi launch weapons.

And the US has more of those then I feel like listing.

A Fleet of boghammers seem like a threat til they are spotted... oh 100 miles out by airborne ground search radar and deleted by a metric fuckton of cheap weapons from like 4 f18s before they get in range.

And no hiding will not help, not when modern UNCLASS ground search radar gives better pictures then some cameras, and the ISR cameras are insane res. To say nothing bout sonar picking them out.

Basically the French Jeune Ecole doctrine for torpedo boats and that fall flat on its face over a century ago without air power and radar.

 

[johnpjones1775]

Missile boats are hopeless against air attack. Their sensors are less effective due to lower mast height and greater ship motion in the sea. How well did PT boats do in the Pacific when the Japanese lacked good radar?

They did pretty good, but they also didn’t have guided weapons either.

The air power has to find them first, and assumes there’s air power actively supporting the targeted ship(s)

In the end we don’t know how effective missile boats actually would be against a modern large ship, but we do know that missile boats sank several large(comparatively) ships in the in the 60s and 70s iirc

 

[TomS]

They did pretty good, but they also didn’t have guided weapons either.

PTs were in fact terrible at their imagined mission of attacking enemy capitol ships. At most, they get an assist on one cruiser and successes against a couple of DDs. They were OK for going after coastal convoys, mostly with guns, in New Guinea and the Solomons. But once the Japanese wised up to them, airplanes (mostly scout floatplanes) were fairly effective counters.

 

[johnpjones1775]

PTs were in fact terrible at their imagined mission of attacking enemy capitol ships. At most, they get an assist on one cruiser and successes against a couple of DDs. They were OK for going after coastal convoys, mostly with guns, in New Guinea and the Solomons. But once the Japanese wised up to them, airplanes (mostly scout floatplanes) were fairly effective counters.

The first torpedo boats did great.
Later eras were no longer just intended for attacking larger ships in general, which they did pretty good at.

 

[PFJN]

After the Fun of having the 28 knot Perry try to work with the CSGs I doubt that the Navy will want another 28 knot frigate.

...

Hi,
Unfortunately aren'tt he new Constellation class FFG62s only about 28kts (some sites I'veseen have suggested even lower)/

 

[johnpjones1775]

Hi,
Unfortunately aren'tt he new Constellation class FFG62s only about 28kts (some sites I'veseen have suggested even lower)/

I haven’t seen that.
Wiki says in excess of 26, and for FREMMs the french version says in excess of 27, and Italy in excess of 30.

So it’s pretty likely they’ll be doing around 30.

 

[Airbus A340]

They did pretty good, but they also didn’t have guided weapons either.

The air power has to find them first, and assumes there’s air power actively supporting the targeted ship(s)

In the end we don’t know how effective missile boats actually would be against a modern large ship, but we do know that missile boats sank several large(comparatively) ships in the in the 60s and 70s iirc

FACs did best in WW1 because the sensors (eyeballs) were equal on both sides. The eyeballs in the larger ships could be higher up but so were the detectable masts and superstructures of those ships. The eyeball data processing systems on the FACs might be better or worse off than those on the ships depending upon how long each opponent had been out of port and how high the seas were. Once radar became the primary sensor, it was game over for FACs. The FACs have smaller apertures, less processing power, and shorter masts. The smaller size means that antenna placement for active sensors, ESM, and ECM becomes a problem. Vessel motion and its effects on weapons, sensors, and crew is worse. Unless the FAC has been out of port for a short time the maintenance on the large ship is better.

FACs are given high speed for a number of reasons. It is not to run in at high speed. It helps in the getaway but it's mainly so they can be where they need to be when they need to be there. It's also so they can move into position during a window when enemy sensors are not able to look. This is key because sensors are making it harder and harder to do this every year. FACs rely upon stealth and sensor nets are just taking that away.

BTW, the target ships have guided weapons too. So do the choppers, UAVs, USVs and everything else the ships deploy. The FACs are essentially helpless vs PGMs because their defenses are crippled by the small size for the reasons given above. Not to mention battle damage resistance.

 

[johnpjones1775]

FACs did best in WW1 because the sensors (eyeballs) were equal on both sides. The eyeballs in the larger ships could be higher up but so were the detectable masts and superstructures of those ships. The eyeball data processing systems on the FACs might be better or worse off than those on the ships depending upon how long each opponent had been out of port and how high the seas were. Once radar became the primary sensor, it was game over for FACs. The FACs have smaller apertures, less processing power, and shorter masts. The smaller size means that antenna placement for active sensors, ESM, and ECM becomes a problem. Vessel motion and its effects on weapons, sensors, and crew is worse. Unless the FAC has been out of port for a short time the maintenance on the large ship is better.

FACs are given high speed for a number of reasons. It is not to run in at high speed. It helps in the getaway but it's mainly so they can be where they need to be when they need to be there. It's also so they can move into position during a window when enemy sensors are not able to look. This is key because sensors are making it harder and harder to do this every year. FACs rely upon stealth and sensor nets are just taking that away.

BTW, the target ships have guided weapons too. So do the choppers, UAVs, USVs and everything else the ships deploy. The FACs are essentially helpless vs PGMs because their defenses are crippled by the small size for the reasons given above. Not to mention battle damage resistance.

Targets may have guided weapons, but many of them have minimum engagement ranges, and a clever commander can get nice and close, launch, and have their missiles within the minimum engagement range of the longest ranged missiles. Again though, a dozen missile boats each launching 8 missiles is 96 threats to deal with. If they’re as slow as .7 Mach, launched from 30 miles away (slightly beyond the longest real world combat missile launch from a surface vessel) a ship would have less than 3.3 minutes to detect, classify, and engage 96 missiles before taking hits.

From what I know and can find most if not all of the SM missile family wouldn’t even be able to engage that close, meaning you’re relying on ESSM, 5” gun, and which ever CIWS the ship has installed, and maybe someone randomly shooting mk38 in the air in their general direction, along with chaff.

While chaff has a 100% success rate in combat I don’t believe it would decoy anywhere near 96 missiles.

As for sensors, missile boat has the advantage imho, you don’t need a super powerful sensor to detect a formation of ships moving at the same speed in the same direction, meanwhile those larger ships need to be able to pick out the threats from regular maritime traffic. The missile boats will most likely identify the larger ships before the larger ships even know they’re there.

 

[Airbus A340]

Targets may have guided weapons, but many of them have minimum engagement ranges, and a clever commander can get nice and close, launch, and have their missiles within the minimum engagement range of the longest ranged missiles. Again though, a dozen missile boats each launching 8 missiles is 96 threats to deal with. If they’re as slow as .7 Mach, launched from 30 miles away (slightly beyond the longest real world combat missile launch from a surface vessel) a ship would have less than 3.3 minutes to detect, classify, and engage 96 missiles before taking hits.

From what I know and can find most if not all of the SM missile family wouldn’t even be able to engage that close, meaning you’re relying on ESSM, 5” gun, and which ever CIWS the ship has installed, and maybe someone randomly shooting mk38 in the air in their general direction, along with chaff.

While chaff has a 100% success rate in combat I don’t believe it would decoy anywhere near 96 missiles.

As for sensors, missile boat has the advantage imho, you don’t need a super powerful sensor to detect a formation of ships moving at the same speed in the same direction, meanwhile those larger ships need to be able to pick out the threats from regular maritime traffic. The missile boats will most likely identify the larger ships before the larger ships even know they’re there.

The system you advocate for gets all the benefit of any doubt, the system it is prospectively engaging gets none. You want FACs to be grouped into a system to increase their firepower. Doing that takes away their flexibility. Flexibility is one of the benefits of smaller cheaper systems like FACs. Grouping FACS into a less flexible but higher firepower system suggests just getting a larger more expensive less flexible system in the first place. Of course, grouping small cheap stuff flexibly is what swarming is about so there is that. I've been on fora like these for 20+ years and know better than to try and argue with the "What the Navy really needs is (insert my pet system here)" types. This post is for others to learn from.

 

[johnpjones1775]

The system you advocate for gets all the benefit of any doubt, the system it is prospectively engaging gets none. You want FACs to be grouped into a system to increase their firepower. Doing that takes away their flexibility. Flexibility is one of the benefits of smaller cheaper systems like FACs. Grouping FACS into a less flexible but higher firepower system suggests just getting a larger more expensive less flexible system in the first place. Of course, grouping small cheap stuff flexibly is what swarming is about so there is that. I've been on fora like these for 20+ years and know better than to try and argue with the "What the Navy really needs is (insert my pet system here)" types. This post is for others to learn from.

Navies don’t just launch offensive missiles without having the target clearly identified for multiple reasons, including but not limited to, preserving their combat capabilities and not wasting missiles on non-threats, preventing international condemnation and potential more adversaries joining the fight.

The missile boats could be spread over a fairly wide area of 20-30 miles, and sailing to imitate the patterns of fishing vessels, so they wouldn’t be moving in formation at the same speed or heading like the enemy group likely would.

Depending on the location of hostilities AWACS deep inland or ashore radar could also be feeding the boats data, or even other larger warships that the targets are particularly focused on.

There are so many very practical ways for the USN, RFN, or PLAN to utilize missile boats in both offensive and defensive roles.

Glad you’ve learned not to argue with people like yourself.