LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.
Not much because they don't have the cash. Brilliant Pebbles would work even better against FOBS than a regular ICBM and it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

Torpedoes would have too negotiate a sonar defence system and a cruise missile is basically a small aircraft, so they'd have been sent back to the 1950s.
Its not about whether BP or something else can defend against them or not (for the record I do like BP and thinks its the best missile defense system currently achievable), the issue is that Russia is concerned enough already with out current missile defense system to go ahead and spend hard cash on ways to defeat it.

Russia considers its nuclear deterrent as vital for the survivability of the nation and any attempt to undermine it as a threat to their sovereignty. Remember they probably have a requirement for a minimum number of warheads that must hit in a retaliatory strike to achieve suitable levels of deterrence. Anything that drops them below that level is a significant threat, this includes US first strike capability (even if we would never actually use it) and missile defense. Throw in BP and now they feel they are very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

Remember we where well on our way to getting rid of MIRVed land-based ICBMs under START II, untill the US left the ABM Treaty. Had the US stayed in ABM, we could have seen New START with even lower limits (1000 warheads?) and less capable ICBMs. Now we are looking at the possibility of no replacement for New START, no INF, and a very possible new nuclear arms race. I believe that in our effort to increase our missile defense capabilities we have pushed foreign powers to increase their nuclear forces capabilities even further, paradoxically decreasing stability and making a nuclear strike more likely. The only way BP works is if it's a joint US-Russia project that provides both nations with the same amount of capability.
START II and INF were dead in the water as soon as China came on the scene.

Russia would have too spent a lot of money which it doesn't have to respond to such a system. It went bankrupt trying to maintain a nuclear force that large in the first place.
There was no reason to go below START I IMHO. At that point the US should have decoupled its arsenal from peer to peer number comparisons and built a force specific to our security needs and those our allies
 
There was no reason to go below START I IMHO. At that point the US should have decoupled its arsenal from peer to peer number comparisons and built a force specific to our security needs and those our allies
Indeed, I think START II was only appropriate to a microcosm of time in the '90s. Right now START I or even SALT II is the maximum that can be committed to.
 
Trump administration wants to retain option for road-mobile GBSD variant

By Jason Sherman
July 18, 2019 at 1:36 PM
The Trump administration wants to retain the option to develop a road-mobile variant of the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, objecting to legislation that would extend through 2030 the current statutory ban on truck-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles -- which are more difficult for an adversary to target than silo-based weapons. The White House Office of Management and Budget, in a July 9 statement of administration policy , formally objected to a provision in the fiscal year 2020 defense policy bill...


https://insidedefense.com/daily-new...-wants-retain-option-road-mobile-gbsd-variant
 
It depends how you define, "effective". The idea is to convince the other guy it's best not to launch (particularly in the certifiably insane strategy of "escalate to deescalate"). If your system is robust enough to shoot down a dozen RVs launched by a madman, and effective enough to impart an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the minds of rational actors, that's all you need. The whole, "it won't be able to shoot down a World War III launch" notion is a straw man.
Very true. I'm not being derogatory about GBI for one second but I would not bet $100 on it stopping 24 single RV missiles at the current deployment quantity, let alone 24 MIRV missiles, before we even get to China or Russian-sized threats.

If you increased GBI deployment to 500 missiles, combined it with BP plus 2,000 SM-3 IIBs and 2,000 THAAD-ER/X, that would completely wipe out the 24 missile Kim-type threat and make

You wouldn't need anything near that to deal with 24 single-warhead missiles.
Well no, but I like to prepare fro the worst.;)

100 GBIs in Alaska, 100 in Maine, 100 in Texas, and maybe 1200 THAAD-ER around the country would do it.
Trump administration wants to retain option for road-mobile GBSD variant

By Jason Sherman
July 18, 2019 at 1:36 PM
The Trump administration wants to retain the option to develop a road-mobile variant of the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, objecting to legislation that would extend through 2030 the current statutory ban on truck-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles -- which are more difficult for an adversary to target than silo-based weapons. The White House Office of Management and Budget, in a July 9 statement of administration policy , formally objected to a provision in the fiscal year 2020 defense policy bill...


https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/trump-administration-wants-retain-option-road-mobile-gbsd-variant


Smart move. Everybody else is doing them.
 
NK ad Iran are continuing to develop them because BP was never fielded and nearly all SDI spending was pretty much axed after 1991.

NK has a "theoretical" ability to hit the US with an ICBM, Iran has no chance. You are assuming SDI and BP would have 'detered' them from trying to build ICBM's but keep in mind they have NOT actually done so since their "ICBMs" are more space launchers and not real weapons.

Right now they could deliver them by ICBM. They could try smuggle one in by ship but that is a long journey that intelligence services would have a good chance of picking up on.

IRBMs actually and those were developed to hit the 'neighbours'. And no they are unlikely to try and smuggle a 'missile' onto a ship, again it's not an actual viable method because they LOSE if they try it and the US is NOT the targets they want to 'take down' if they are going down.

NK didn't develop ICBMs to target its neighbours.

IRBMs it did and it's "ICBM" is a very complex and slow to launch multi-stage missile that would have to first be UNOTICED while preping to launch which can take up to a week and THEN pass through multiple layers of defense systems to reach the US. And as a above that's NOT the target nor would they consider 'wasting' a weapon on such a target if they were going down. (I'll grant they MIGHT do so to try and draw an un-restrained US response just to heap more damage to the area but it's not likely as they can try and hit closer and more vulnerable targets without going up against such defense systems)

On the last note, if you prevent proliferation with a stronger missile defence then the chances of nukes finding their way into terrorist hands reduces. Russia and China may move to counter and the US may counter that but the threat of Russia and China having more nukes bothers me less the thought of NK having any at all.

"Proliferation" by nation states leading to nuclear weapons in 'terrorist' hands is a myth. The simple fact is that any nation that CAN build nuclear weapons is well aware that "terrorists" are just as likely to target those that 'gave' them the weapons as someone else. Further it is quite easy to tell from the detonation not only WHO made the weapon but where the materials are from, (down to specific mines where the uranium came from no less) so peopel who HAVE nuclear weapons are very, very careful with who has access to them. And I don't understand how you can assume that missile defense is what prevents proliferation. Proliferation was prevented by both international agreement and enforcement which degraded once the Cold War was over. The knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons has always been difficult to contain and the best that can be done is to try and limit the proliferation. But for the majority of possible delivery systems available to those nation now seeking such weapons the ICBM is the very LAST one on the list. So BP and SDI would be seen by nations such as Russia and China as being aimed at them not some rogue nation state or terrorits organization and they'd be right.

You likely SHOULD be bothered about NK having nukes, Iran too, because they would be VERY unlikely to use them against the US itself but raining destruction on their neighbors should, oh say, the US come knocking one day and rendering large swaths of the Korean Penisula or the Middle East, (and if "you" are going to go why NOT blow up a dozen gun-type bombs as surface bursts in your own nation to put as much radioactive debris into the environment as possible, truck or fly some to nearby oil fields as well the more the merrier) contaminated.

Even if we manage to cut off ANY means of delivering a nuclear weapon outside their country they'd still use them if they thought they had no choice which is really the reason they want them in the first place anyway. SDI and BP in fact NO anti-ICBM system is going to change that thinking, and in that thinking btw I think Iran is a lot less wonky than NK is.

Randy
 
Trump administration wants to retain option for road-mobile GBSD variant

By Jason Sherman
July 18, 2019 at 1:36 PM
The Trump administration wants to retain the option to develop a road-mobile variant of the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, objecting to legislation that would extend through 2030 the current statutory ban on truck-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles -- which are more difficult for an adversary to target than silo-based weapons. The White House Office of Management and Budget, in a July 9 statement of administration policy , formally objected to a provision in the fiscal year 2020 defense policy bill...

https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/trump-administration-wants-retain-option-road-mobile-gbsd-variant

Can't access the article from where I'm at BUT the 'more-difficult-to-target' isn't as true as it sounds. We went through this pretty thoroughly during the Midgetman development.

In fact that'd be a logical system to re-start and deploy, which is likely why it won't be done of course. IIRC my 'pendulum' swing atm the Air Force is back to not wanting 'mobile' ICBMs and wants whatever new system we get to fit into and utilize the MMIII missile silo's, transports and support systems. One of the main problems with the SICBM was it didn't. OMB is probably noting that keeping this 'option' open means a VASTLY increased cost for whatever MMIII replacement we do end up getting because of the parellel development of a fixed and mobile system and the overall cost of making something that big 'road mobile' in an real sense. Given the politics of the situation that means Congress will authorize buying far fewer than requested to 'cut costs' (and that's a VERY bi-partisan position btw) which will lead to a much reduced leg of the triad.

Randy
 
I think the issue described in the article is, the House wants to retain the ban on the development of mobile ICBMs. The Administration is arguing against a ban, but is not saying it intends to develop them. It just wants to preserve the ability to do so in the future.
 
The Russian Topol-M and Yars ICBMs are both road-mobile and silo-based and roughly in the same size category as the MIII. There's no reason you can't do both, if anything should be fairly easy to modify any road-mobile to be silo launched. So it would be better to design for road-mobile first (even if never deployed on a road launcher) than to design for silo-launch and then try to make it road-mobile.

Making something mobile is not about making it more difficult to target but to increase the warhead cost to neutralize it. Take a MPS scheme. Say you have 200 missiles with 10 shelters each, if each shelter requires a nuclear warhead, now an enemy requires 2,000 warheads at a minimum to target all your missiles vs our current silo system where only 400 warheads are required. Note also that that is with half of the current missile force. You can increase the capability and survivability of the force while also reducing the total numbers (which everyone will love) and you discourage the enemy from attacking your missiles as its no longer efficient for them to do so.

And I am definitely much more worried about the Russian nuclear arsenal which numbers in the thousands and has the accuracy and tonnage to cause major issues, than the handful of unreliable NK ICBMs with tiny inaccurate warheads or the currently non-existant Iranian ICBMs with non-existant nukes. We were well on the path to reducing nuclear warhead numbers but we are close to restarting a nuclear arms race where the enemy already has a head start and the political will to see it thru.
 
I think the issue described in the article is, the House wants to retain the ban on the development of mobile ICBMs. The Administration is arguing against a ban, but is not saying it intends to develop them. It just wants to preserve the ability to do so in the future.


How did a ban ever get in place to start with? What a stupid idea.
 
I think the issue described in the article is, the House wants to retain the ban on the development of mobile ICBMs. The Administration is arguing against a ban, but is not saying it intends to develop them. It just wants to preserve the ability to do so in the future.


How did a ban ever get in place to start with? What a stupid idea.
Like the ban on even R&D of new nuclear warhead types
 
NK ad Iran are continuing to develop them because BP was never fielded and nearly all SDI spending was pretty much axed after 1991.

NK has a "theoretical" ability to hit the US with an ICBM, Iran has no chance. You are assuming SDI and BP would have 'detered' them from trying to build ICBM's but keep in mind they have NOT actually done so since their "ICBMs" are more space launchers and not real weapons.

Right now they could deliver them by ICBM. They could try smuggle one in by ship but that is a long journey that intelligence services would have a good chance of picking up on.

IRBMs actually and those were developed to hit the 'neighbours'. And no they are unlikely to try and smuggle a 'missile' onto a ship, again it's not an actual viable method because they LOSE if they try it and the US is NOT the targets they want to 'take down' if they are going down.

NK didn't develop ICBMs to target its neighbours.

IRBMs it did and it's "ICBM" is a very complex and slow to launch multi-stage missile that would have to first be UNOTICED while preping to launch which can take up to a week and THEN pass through multiple layers of defense systems to reach the US. And as a above that's NOT the target nor would they consider 'wasting' a weapon on such a target if they were going down. (I'll grant they MIGHT do so to try and draw an un-restrained US response just to heap more damage to the area but it's not likely as they can try and hit closer and more vulnerable targets without going up against such defense systems)

On the last note, if you prevent proliferation with a stronger missile defence then the chances of nukes finding their way into terrorist hands reduces. Russia and China may move to counter and the US may counter that but the threat of Russia and China having more nukes bothers me less the thought of NK having any at all.

"Proliferation" by nation states leading to nuclear weapons in 'terrorist' hands is a myth. The simple fact is that any nation that CAN build nuclear weapons is well aware that "terrorists" are just as likely to target those that 'gave' them the weapons as someone else. Further it is quite easy to tell from the detonation not only WHO made the weapon but where the materials are from, (down to specific mines where the uranium came from no less) so peopel who HAVE nuclear weapons are very, very careful with who has access to them. And I don't understand how you can assume that missile defense is what prevents proliferation. Proliferation was prevented by both international agreement and enforcement which degraded once the Cold War was over. The knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons has always been difficult to contain and the best that can be done is to try and limit the proliferation. But for the majority of possible delivery systems available to those nation now seeking such weapons the ICBM is the very LAST one on the list. So BP and SDI would be seen by nations such as Russia and China as being aimed at them not some rogue nation state or terrorits organization and they'd be right.

You likely SHOULD be bothered about NK having nukes, Iran too, because they would be VERY unlikely to use them against the US itself but raining destruction on their neighbors should, oh say, the US come knocking one day and rendering large swaths of the Korean Penisula or the Middle East, (and if "you" are going to go why NOT blow up a dozen gun-type bombs as surface bursts in your own nation to put as much radioactive debris into the environment as possible, truck or fly some to nearby oil fields as well the more the merrier) contaminated.

Even if we manage to cut off ANY means of delivering a nuclear weapon outside their country they'd still use them if they thought they had no choice which is really the reason they want them in the first place anyway. SDI and BP in fact NO anti-ICBM system is going to change that thinking, and in that thinking btw I think Iran is a lot less wonky than NK is.

Randy
NK has definitely tested an ICBM according to publicly available intelligence. It is unlikely t,hat they can field a large number but even a small number can pose a threat given current missile defence capabilities. Given that they could only ever afford a small number, it is very unlikely that they would have funded such a pursuit if BP was in operation.

We're not talking about IRBMs though and even they push out to well beyond South Korea and Japan, who would class as it's neighbours.

It seems to have a TEL.

Frankly I'm not bothered about NK setting off nukes on themselves, but I find the idea of them reaching Europe and North America uncomfortable. So if they have to resort to local detonations, the system has worked. An added bonus would be completely stuffing the ASBM capabilities of nations who might have designs on nearby islands and large swathes of sea as their personal EEZ.
 
The Russian Topol-M and Yars ICBMs are both road-mobile and silo-based and roughly in the same size category as the MIII. There's no reason you can't do both, if anything should be fairly easy to modify any road-mobile to be silo launched. So it would be better to design for road-mobile first (even if never deployed on a road launcher) than to design for silo-launch and then try to make it road-mobile.

The main reason we haven't done both is cost and somewhat deployment method :) As you note though the 'better' route is mobile to silo but that's not the way the program or option seem to be set up which is why there's more cost to the process. See the Minuteman was initially supposed to be a 'mobile' missile based on rail garrisons using the national railway system. Couple the inaccuracy of the rail system and the vulnerability only silo basing won out.

Making something mobile is not about making it more difficult to target but to increase the warhead cost to neutralize it. Take a MPS scheme. Say you have 200 missiles with 10 shelters each, if each shelter requires a nuclear warhead, now an enemy requires 2,000 warheads at a minimum to target all your missiles vs our current silo system where only 400 warheads are required. Note also that that is with half of the current missile force. You can increase the capability and survivability of the force while also reducing the total numbers (which everyone will love) and you discourage the enemy from attacking your missiles as its no longer efficient for them to do so.

That's not how it works and not the concept being discussed. There are only parking shelters and the missiles and launchers are sent mobile ONLY when an attack is felt to be or confirmed to be imminent. This has always been the Achilles heel of US mobile systems because it costs a LOT to move these things around unless you limit the area they can go which defeats the purpose of having them mobile. Similarly when the shelter plan was considered politics and other concerns limited the total area the shelters could occupy which essentially reduced the number of warheads needed take them out to less than 10 which again made the concept useless. (Needing less missiles, less warheads was exactly the logic which the politics ran with assuming you then needed less shelters, fewer personnel, and less room to separate the shelters)

The idea behind the SICBM and hardened launcher was they were harder to track and target but even before they project was canceled over the Cold War ending the number of proposed missiles and launchers was being cut steadily because “less’ were needed to do the job since they were harder to find/hit and (key point) they were capable of surviving a “near-miss” due to having a hardened launch vehicle. But the cost of dispersal operations meant that they would not be dispersed until very late which pretty much meant they wouldn’t get very far out of the target zone if at all.

And I am definitely much more worried about the Russian nuclear arsenal which numbers in the thousands and has the accuracy and tonnage to cause major issues, than the handful of unreliable NK ICBMs with tiny inaccurate warheads or the currently non-existent Iranian ICBMs with non-existent nukes. We were well on the path to reducing nuclear warhead numbers but we are close to restarting a nuclear arms race where the enemy already has a head start and the political will to see it thru.

Russia, (no offense to anyone :) ) very much wants to show they are America’s equal or better again so they make a lot of plans and power-points for “new” weapons but as far as I can tell they aren’t really that much ahead per-se nor are they willing and able to put most of what they’ve been testing into production or deployment. It’s helped that for a couple of decades now the US has been seen worldwide as the less trustworthy and more aggressive nation. On the other hand in the US we have to build up ‘threats’ that are NOT Russia and China because they are so much or our markets, (we’re theirs too but who pays attention to that when there’s rhetoric to be slung) so we tend to build up lesser “enemies” into threatening bugaboos.

In some cases, such as NK, that works because hey anything that lets them tell their populations and anyone else who’ll listen that the US is ‘afraid’ of them is a bonus. (Always remembering that you need to be careful of the lesson of Saddam Hussain and what happened to him) But in the US there’s a large number of citizens who can note that the ‘threat’ we’re talking about and the threat we are actually countering are two different things.

Considering a good number of them are politicians and advisors who can and do spout the rhetoric and then deny the funding for the weapons and research, (and it’s VERY much a cross-the-board spectrum of people on both sides of the isles here folks) to ‘save taxpayer money’ and keep Russia and China friendly while assuring everyone that what we have it fine it’s no wonder everyone, (including Russia, China, NK and Iran as well as most of us poor citizens) are confused.

In the end the end of the Cold War was supposed to make the world a safe place but it’s never BEEN a safe place and most people forgot that in the rush of relief that the “real” danger had finally gone away. And while no one (I think) really wants to restart the arms race in fact the one time “Super Powers” are realizing that everyone else is catching up with them and they may not have a real choice.

Randy
 
Pretty much everybody, except the US, who are developing new ICBMs are making them mobile.
 
NK has definitely tested an ICBM according to publicly available intelligence. It is unlikely t,hat they can field a large number but even a small number can pose a threat given current missile defence capabilities. Given that they could only ever afford a small number, it is very unlikely that they would have funded such a pursuit if BP was in operation.

The key to those "ICBMs" is they have a very limited payload capability in reaching Europe and the US. Small enough that it's unlikely they could actually deliver a nuclear weapon. BP was/is a hugely expensive system that would requre a complex and intensive infrastructure to support which is a main reason the US rejected the concept. Since they COULD afford even a 'small number' its not likely that BP would have detered them anymore than out current ABM capability would.

We're not talking about IRBMs though and even they push out to well beyond South Korea and Japan, who would class as it's neighbours.

The entire reason we've pushed the ABM systems downward is so that we can provide some protection to our allies who happen to be the neighbours in question. By the logic we're using to 'deter' NK and Iran we need to extensivly upgrade and deploy MORE ABM systems to those states NOT the US who is in almost no danger what-so-ever.

It seems to have a TEL.

TE, the article is mis-informed and the article they were replying to is actually more accurate. They don't have mobile launchers only mobile tractors and erectors and those have to travel with propellant vehicles and launch crew. They have to use well surveyed and mapped launch points as well which further limits their oveall mobility. The only TEL's they have are for short range and medium-range weapons.

Frankly I'm not bothered about NK setting off nukes on themselves, but I find the idea of them reaching Europe and North America uncomfortable.

The latter case is why we have an ABM system at all but keep in mind it was always about trying to find a way to deter Russian and Chinese ICBMs. It's the entire reason we backed out of the orignal ABM treaty in the first place. In the former you actually SHOULD mind as it is not like the US and Europe won't be greatly effected which is the point after all.

So if they have to resort to local detonations, the system has worked. An added bonus would be completely stuffing the ASBM capabilities of nations who might have designs on nearby islands and large swathes of sea as their personal EEZ.

Actually it hasn't but that's the difference between something that works and one that only looks like it works. In the first case you're not effected because the scenerio is detered and prevented tin the second you're just not effected YET but you will be and it will be pretty bad. See between China, South Korea and Japan being screwed, (which will greatly effect the US not to mention killing a lot of US personnel and families) most of Asia is going to be effected as will Russia and Europe. Similary the Middle East should Iran decide to go down fighting.

But again the way to prevent that does NOT help ease the minds of anyone in China or Russia because the same ABM systems that could 'save' those nations can also be seen as a threat to their ability to project power. And it is.

Randy
 
But again the way to prevent that does NOT help ease the minds of anyone in China or Russia because the same ABM systems that could 'save' those nations can also be seen as a threat to their ability to project power. And it is.

Randy

And they're both working on ABM systems of their own so. . .
 
Pretty much everybody, except the US, who are developing new ICBMs are making them mobile.

Actually they are looking at it but the question remains if they will actually do so. (Keep in mind as pointed out earlier the most effective way is to design mobile but deploy fixed in case you change your mind. The US has pretty much determined they didn't want to do so from the start) Russia and China don't have the open space and area they used to have and like the US are finding that actually deploying large numbers of mobile launchers isn't as easy as it used to be.

Randy
 
But again the way to prevent that does NOT help ease the minds of anyone in China or Russia because the same ABM systems that could 'save' those nations can also be seen as a threat to their ability to project power. And it is.

Randy

And they're both working on ABM systems of their own so. . .

Why yes they are and why would that be? Wasn't there a treaty that limited that that they ALL agreed to at one point but someone, some nation, unilatteraly withdrew from it and thereby negated it? All so they could put a few (less than 50) Ground Base Intereptors into place whereas that number and their coverage COULD have been worked into the treaty instead of withdrawing? And both theater and local ABM systems were open under the treaty so there's that too.

This was the exact spiral and situation the treaty was supposed to prevent in the fist place.

Randy
 
Pretty much everybody, except the US, who are developing new ICBMs are making them mobile.

Actually they are looking at it but the question remains if they will actually do so.

Randy

They're doing a whole lot more than "looking" at them.

Mobile ICBMs.jpg

(IIRC Russia is also looking at restarting production of the rail-mobile SS-24.)
 
Why yes they are and why would that be? Wasn't there a treaty that limited that that they ALL agreed to at one point but someone, some nation, unilatteraly withdrew from it and thereby negated it?

Russia had already been cheating on it, and China and India weren't included.
 
Why yes they are and why would that be? Wasn't there a treaty that limited that that they ALL agreed to at one point but someone, some nation, unilatteraly withdrew from it and thereby negated it?

Russia had already been cheating on it, and China and India weren't included.

China agreed to the treaty in the mid-80s, India was considering only a local, (Pakistian) system and hadn't even started researching an actual system. And how was Russia 'cheating'? The US was techincally 'cheating' both during SDI and prior to pulling out of the treaty but other than some clarifiction questions and intentions inquiries they were OK with the US research.

Randy
 
Why yes they are and why would that be? Wasn't there a treaty that limited that that they ALL agreed to at one point but someone, some nation, unilatteraly withdrew from it and thereby negated it?

Russia had already been cheating on it, and China and India weren't included.

China agreed to the treaty in the mid-80s, India was considering only a local, (Pakistian) system and hadn't even started researching an actual system. And how was Russia 'cheating'? The US was techincally 'cheating' both during SDI and prior to pulling out of the treaty but other than some clarifiction questions and intentions inquiries they were OK with the US research.

Randy


SOC (a member here) mentioned missile-specific info. Don't happen to have it at my fingertips.
 
Russia, (no offense to anyone :) ) very much wants to show they are America’s equal or better again so they make a lot of plans and power-points for “new” weapons but as far as I can tell they aren’t really that much ahead per-se nor are they willing and able to put most of what they’ve been testing into production or deployment. It’s helped that for a couple of decades now the US has been seen worldwide as the less trustworthy and more aggressive nation. On the other hand in the US we have to build up ‘threats’ that are NOT Russia and China because they are so much or our markets, (we’re theirs too but who pays attention to that when there’s rhetoric to be slung) so we tend to build up lesser “enemies” into threatening bugaboos.

In some cases, such as NK, that works because hey anything that lets them tell their populations and anyone else who’ll listen that the US is ‘afraid’ of them is a bonus. (Always remembering that you need to be careful of the lesson of Saddam Hussain and what happened to him) But in the US there’s a large number of citizens who can note that the ‘threat’ we’re talking about and the threat we are actually countering are two different things.

Considering a good number of them are politicians and advisors who can and do spout the rhetoric and then deny the funding for the weapons and research, (and it’s VERY much a cross-the-board spectrum of people on both sides of the isles here folks) to ‘save taxpayer money’ and keep Russia and China friendly while assuring everyone that what we have it fine it’s no wonder everyone, (including Russia, China, NK and Iran as well as most of us poor citizens) are confused.




Russia has introduced and deployed multiple generations of ICBMs since the 90's. I am not aware of a Russian ICBM program which entered the test phase and did not reach deployment. It's possible that happened but I don't recall such a thing.

Threat sources are countries with nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them and the political disposition to regard the US as their enemy. I am not aware of US defense policy or threat assessments being shaped by economic arguments especially in regards to Russia and China. A bugaboo connotes a falsehood. Scare quotes such as "enemies" also connotes falsehood. You are implying North Korea and Iran are not threats or enemies but simply victims of cynical US politicians.

I assume you mean that missile defense is promoted to counter smaller threat countries but are actually intended for Russia and China. Missile defense under SDI specifically identified Russia as the primary objective and has always included lesser threats as being automatically covered as a natural consequence. After SDI was terminated by Congress, missile defense was downgraded to cover potential rogue state threats as well as accidental launch scenarios. It never disavowed the ideal ability to counter major threats if technology and budget permitted.

As for doubletalk on keeping Russia and China friendly while misleading US voters, the only thing that comes to mind is Obama's post election flexibility comment to Medvedev. You will need to cite specific instances to clarify this. I too am confused but not by the politicians.
 
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They're doing a whole lot more than "looking" at them.

(IIRC Russia is also looking at restarting production of the rail-mobile SS-24.)

Oddly enough the RS-24 was developed to defeat an ABM system around 2007 wonder why they'd want to do that at that time? About 109 deployed, about a third of them in silos. As for the SS-24 information I've seen says they are looking at putting modifed RS-24s on rails but it's not clear if they will since rail is highly vulnerable. Which is why they retired the SS-24 in the first place.

The same reasoning drove the development of the latest DF-31 and new DF-41, (which is replacing not augmenting the DF31) about a third are silo deployed as well.

NK's missile I addressed above

The Indian Agni-V, (still testing) is directed at countering the Chinese mobile threat. Remains to be seen if they actually deploy it.

But let's be clear "I" personally would rather the US developed a possibly mobile missile system. Those examples while only one among many you'd think might push the effort but again that's not the way the US has developed our systems and tactics. Given the parameters of the program the goal is to develop something to go into the MMIII silos and THEN, (maybe) develop a mobile version. As I can't access the article I'm at a disadvantage but I'm pointing out that the US has not been very supported to mobile ICBMs so the 'ban' would make some economic sense, (especailly the way the Administration is suggesting the program would go) since it would prevent an expensive and complex 'secondary' program running in parallel to the main at the whim of this or a future administration. But it's been pretty obvious that any mobile system would BE a secondary at best option which is, (and has been noted) pretty backwards.

Does the ban only apply to this program or does it preclude ANY mobile ICBM development? (As mentioned there's supposed to be a ban on new nuclear weapons development as well)

Randy
 
Desert Storm showed the difficulty in locating mobile ballistic missiles even with aircraft directly overflying the deployment area. A persistent orbital radar system might get around this but it would be a significant extension over existing capability.

I have not followed the GBSD program closely but I thought at one time it was looking at a compatible missile for Navy use. In any event, a ground mobile ICBM should be as accurate as Trident. That was probably true for the SICBM even in the 80's.

A mobile ICBM (not multi-shelter) would seem to offer the best survivability even if constrained to roam within the existing range limits of current US ICBM deployment areas. This would reduce political opposition from the usual critics although they will still do everything possible to obstruct it.

If GBSD is constrained to deploy into existing Minuteman silos, it would be interesting to revive point defense systems to protect them. Even under the ABM treaty, the US was allowed to maintain the Safeguard system deployed near Minot but of course this was opposed by the same critics. A railgun might be usable in this application.
 
Most of the SICBM basing schemes were more properly described as relocatable where a portion of the launchers
were detached from their tractors, hunkered down (the only way they were hard) and then re-positioned at intervals
or at need.

The hardness levels increased the blind bombardment cost but was only achievable when the launchers were emplaced.

The claim that rail is highly vulnerable needs some justification since it's practically the only way to keep a land-based
missile continuously mobile.
 
Most of the SICBM basing schemes were more properly described as relocatable where a portion of the launchers
were detached from their tractors, hunkered down (the only way they were hard) and then re-positioned at intervals
or at need.

The hardness levels increased the blind bombardment cost but was only achievable when the launchers were emplaced.

 
You don't need continuous mobility, you don't even need the launchers to be undetected. All you need is to have the cost of taking them out be more than the enemy is willing to pay. That's why I would go with a "shell game" MPS system. Back in the Cold War era when the Soviet Union had 10,000 warheads it probably was not a viable system but in today's era where they are limited to 1550 it becomes quite doable.

ABM point defense of missile silos is actually a stabilizing force unlike GBI or BP.
 
ABM point defense of missile silos is actually a stabilizing force unlike GBI or BP.

How do you figure? Sure, it increases the uncertainly of being able to take out a force but so does GBI.
 
Deterrence only works when value targets (on a retaliatory strike) are placed at risk. GBI can target any inbound ICBM reducing the risk on those value targets. However, a point defense system covering only ICBM silos preserves their retaliatory capability while allowing the enemy to hold the value targets at risk. Increasing the GBI force or adding BP places the enemy in a use it or lose situation. Just as not having a point-defense system places the US ICBM force in a launch-on-warning posture for the same reason.

Systems that can survive a first-strike and successfully retaliate are stable (ie SLBMs, road-mobile ICBMs, protected silos). Systems that can not are not (ie unprotected silos especially if MIRVed, ICBMs that can not penetrate missile defenses).
 
NK has definitely tested an ICBM according to publicly available intelligence. It is unlikely t,hat they can field a large number but even a small number can pose a threat given current missile defence capabilities. Given that they could only ever afford a small number, it is very unlikely that they would have funded such a pursuit if BP was in operation.

The key to those "ICBMs" is they have a very limited payload capability in reaching Europe and the US. Small enough that it's unlikely they could actually deliver a nuclear weapon. BP was/is a hugely expensive system that would requre a complex and intensive infrastructure to support which is a main reason the US rejected the concept. Since they COULD afford even a 'small number' its not likely that BP would have detered them anymore than out current ABM capability would.

We're not talking about IRBMs though and even they push out to well beyond South Korea and Japan, who would class as it's neighbours.

The entire reason we've pushed the ABM systems downward is so that we can provide some protection to our allies who happen to be the neighbours in question. By the logic we're using to 'deter' NK and Iran we need to extensivly upgrade and deploy MORE ABM systems to those states NOT the US who is in almost no danger what-so-ever.

It seems to have a TEL.

TE, the article is mis-informed and the article they were replying to is actually more accurate. They don't have mobile launchers only mobile tractors and erectors and those have to travel with propellant vehicles and launch crew. They have to use well surveyed and mapped launch points as well which further limits their oveall mobility. The only TEL's they have are for short range and medium-range weapons.

Frankly I'm not bothered about NK setting off nukes on themselves, but I find the idea of them reaching Europe and North America uncomfortable.

The latter case is why we have an ABM system at all but keep in mind it was always about trying to find a way to deter Russian and Chinese ICBMs. It's the entire reason we backed out of the orignal ABM treaty in the first place. In the former you actually SHOULD mind as it is not like the US and Europe won't be greatly effected which is the point after all.

So if they have to resort to local detonations, the system has worked. An added bonus would be completely stuffing the ASBM capabilities of nations who might have designs on nearby islands and large swathes of sea as their personal EEZ.

Actually it hasn't but that's the difference between something that works and one that only looks like it works. In the first case you're not effected because the scenerio is detered and prevented tin the second you're just not effected YET but you will be and it will be pretty bad. See between China, South Korea and Japan being screwed, (which will greatly effect the US not to mention killing a lot of US personnel and families) most of Asia is going to be effected as will Russia and Europe. Similary the Middle East should Iran decide to go down fighting.

But again the way to prevent that does NOT help ease the minds of anyone in China or Russia because the same ABM systems that could 'save' those nations can also be seen as a threat to their ability to project power. And it is.

Randy
You are aware that nuclear warheads need not be very large, apart from the fact we'd don't know the payload capability. But 270kg is enough for 1.2MT.

You either work in intelligence or you're making a lot of massive assumptions there.

A few dozen ground-based interceptors might not necessarily work though. Kim obviously sees it the same way. The better the missile defence, the greater the deterrent.

That would be unfortunate but better than nukes going off locally. It would also be an act of suicide for that nation.

China could have done more to stop NK developing WMDs in the first place and the alternative to missile defence would be INF-breaking proliferation via South Korea and Japan to counter North Korea, which China and Russia would be even less happy with, but it would let them know how unhappy we are about NK.
 
Deterrence only works when value targets (on a retaliatory strike) are placed at risk. GBI can target any inbound ICBM reducing the risk on those value targets. However, a point defense system covering only ICBM silos preserves their retaliatory capability while allowing the enemy to hold the value targets at risk. Increasing the GBI force or adding BP places the enemy in a use it or lose situation. Just as not having a point-defense system places the US ICBM force in a launch-on-warning posture for the same reason.

Systems that can survive a first-strike and successfully retaliate are stable (ie SLBMs, road-mobile ICBMs, protected silos). Systems that can not are not (ie unprotected silos especially if MIRVed, ICBMs that can not penetrate missile defenses).
Point defence has a short time to take out up to 10+ warheads per missile, plus decoys if exo-atmospheric. BP hits the missiles before the warheads get deployed, when the target is still relatively slow and large.
 
Its not about efficiency, BP is clearly the more effective missile defense system, but in doing so it is also more unstable as it reduces the confidence the enemy has in being able to successfully conduct a retaliatory strike. Unless and until it is 100% effective it places the enemy in a use it or lose position and against an enemy who sees their nuclear force as vital for their sovereignty it increases their possibility of going nuclear (ie escalate to deescalate). BP also allows one to more freely conduct a pre-emptive strike since one is then more confident of surviving the retaliatory strike.

Just listen to Putin's 1 March 2018 speech, he specifically calls out the US for leaving the ABM treaty, and points to that as the reason for all their new developments. It doesn't matter if missile defense is aimed at Russia or not, what matters is how they see it and to them it is a direct threat to their national security.
 
Its not about efficiency, BP is clearly the more effective missile defense system, but in doing so it is also more unstable as it reduces the confidence the enemy has in being able to successfully conduct a retaliatory strike. Unless and until it is 100% effective it places the enemy in a use it or lose position and against an enemy who sees their nuclear force as vital for their sovereignty it increases their possibility of going nuclear (ie escalate to deescalate). BP also allows one to more freely conduct a pre-emptive strike since one is then more confident of surviving the retaliatory strike.

Just listen to Putin's 1 March 2018 speech, he specifically calls out the US for leaving the ABM treaty, and points to that as the reason for all their new developments. It doesn't matter if missile defense is aimed at Russia or not, what matters is how they see it and to them it is a direct threat to their national security.

Again the point here is not that you necessarily agree with the Russian perspective on this but that you recognize it is their perspective and use this to help frame your understanding of their likely actions and reactions to your actions.
This type of reasoning is critical to understand what does and does not deter potential opponents and what does and does not destabilize such deterrence.
It’s better basis for decisions than the US-only-perspective vacuum-sealed-from-reality game-theory reasoning being displayed by some contributors.
 
Its not about efficiency, BP is clearly the more effective missile defense system, but in doing so it is also more unstable as it reduces the confidence the enemy has in being able to successfully conduct a retaliatory strike. Unless and until it is 100% effective it places the enemy in a use it or lose position and against an enemy who sees their nuclear force as vital for their sovereignty it increases their possibility of going nuclear (ie escalate to deescalate). BP also allows one to more freely conduct a pre-emptive strike since one is then more confident of surviving the retaliatory strike.

Just listen to Putin's 1 March 2018 speech, he specifically calls out the US for leaving the ABM treaty, and points to that as the reason for all their new developments. It doesn't matter if missile defense is aimed at Russia or not, what matters is how they see it and to them it is a direct threat to their national security.
Only if they have knowledge of the deployment, even right now there are satellites being launched that are completely classified and not even listed as being fro the NRO. And really, are they going to launch WW3 just because they don't like a missile defence strategy? Nobody particularly likes Russia's INF-breaching cruise missiles but WW3 was never on the cards as a response. And as regards sovereignty, a missile defence shield doesn't affect that in any way. How on Earth does it imply a forthcoming invasion? Hell, Iraq and Afghanistan were difficult enough, the idea of invading Russia is ridiculous.

Russia has more ICBM-capable ABMs than the US right now. Shorter range but still more nonetheless. And ABM development is inevitable given NK and Iran, not to mention China's ASBMs, Putin should blame them. The only viable alternative to improved missile defence given NK's developments is invading it, which is hardly less destabilising. Improved missile defence is simply the best and most peaceful response to a very bad development.
 
Again the point here is not that you necessarily agree with the Russian perspective on this but that you recognize it is their perspective and use this to help frame your understanding of their likely actions and reactions to your actions.
This type of reasoning is critical to understand what does and does not deter potential opponents and what does and does not destabilize such deterrence.
It’s better basis for decisions than the US-only-perspective vacuum-sealed-from-reality game-theory reasoning being displayed by some contributors.


If appeasing Russian sentiments become factors in setting US missile defense policy, they will be ready to offer more sentiments to cover additional topics. And naturally they will all concern the existential survival of their country.

The sovereign response to Russian sentiments is to analyze what they can do and whether that materially changes anything. In regards to this, some people regard Russian sentiments over Russian rationality. What's that phrase again? The soft bigotry of low expectations.
 
Again the point here is not that you necessarily agree with the Russian perspective on this but that you recognize it is their perspective and use this to help frame your understanding of their likely actions and reactions to your actions.
This type of reasoning is critical to understand what does and does not deter potential opponents and what does and does not destabilize such deterrence.
It’s better basis for decisions than the US-only-perspective vacuum-sealed-from-reality game-theory reasoning being displayed by some contributors.


If appeasing Russian sentiments become factors in setting US missile defense policy, they will be ready to offer more sentiments to cover additional topics. And naturally they will all concern the existential survival of their country.

The sovereign response to Russian sentiments is to analyze what they can do and whether that materially changes anything. In regards to this, some people regard Russian sentiments over Russian rationality. What's that phrase again? The soft bigotry of low expectations.

No it's about making decisions (or in the context of this web site proposing decisions) that at least try to take into account what other parties will actually do rather than what you would like them to do, or ignoring that part of the calculation entirely to push your own pet agendas.
Even another rational player may have a different rationale then you, and if you don't even try to understand it how do you expect to think through their likely actions & re-actions?

I am no fan of the Putin regime and there are of course aspects of hypocrisy, inconsistency and strains of ultra-nationalistic exceptionalism to their nuclear/ missile/ deterrence policy (or almost all their policies for that matter). Other contributors here have been substantially more muted re: Putin for readily apparent US domestic political reasons that none of us need to go into.
And honestly one doubts Putin's Russia can actually afford to build and field half of what their propaganda promises and is so keen to project as resurgent Russian power ("Make Russia great again"?).
Unfortunately even on this website (and on this topic) you can see the US equivalent mindset feeding on its Russian equivalent (and I'm sure it's vice versa on Russian equivalents of this website).
 
No it's about making decisions (or in the context of this web site proposing decisions) that at least try to take into account what other parties will actually do rather than what you would like them to do, or ignoring that part of the calculation entirely to push your own pet agendas.
Even another rational player may have a different rationale then you, and if you don't even try to understand it how do you expect to think through their likely actions & re-actions?

I am no fan of the Putin regime and there are of course aspects of hypocrisy, inconsistency and strains of ultra-nationalistic exceptionalism to their nuclear/ missile/ deterrence policy (or almost all their policies for that matter). Other contributors here have been substantially more muted re: Putin for readily apparent US domestic political reasons that none of us need to go into.
And honestly one doubts Putin's Russia can actually afford to build and field half of what their propaganda promises and is so keen to project as resurgent Russian power ("Make Russia great again"?).
Unfortunately even on this website (and on this topic) you can see the US equivalent mindset feeding on its Russian equivalent (and I'm sure it's vice versa on Russian equivalents of this website).


You see a lot of pet agendas from other people. Of course you don't see yours.

You are no fan of Putin but you wind up advancing his arguments a lot more than "other contributors more muted" in their critiques of him. I suppose that should include me since I am the designated Putin Puppet here. And yet here we are with you lecturing about the need to take his feelings into account.

What is this equivalent US mindset that so bothers you? Updating 50 year old strategic weapons? Developing purely defensive weapons to protect the lives of citizens? Or something more mundane like prioritizing the interests of the US in trade.

Finally, what are these domestic US political reasons you wish to shun? The moon landing hoax of politics that is the Russia/Trump fraud? Shouldn't that include me as an active conspirator? Why hold back?
 
For the record;
- I support the US renewing their nuclear triad in an efficient non- escalating way.
- I am a bit more skeptical of but still fundamentally support some form of limited missile defense purely aimed at the likes of North Korea & Iran. However I also understand that such systems may only have a limited impact in such regimes decision making and rationale, especially in “worst-case” scenarios.

So efforts to make me some kind of diametrically opposing view is utterly misguided and speaks far more to some contributors desire to gang up on a representative of the their hated “other side” (and lack of interest in nuances in a nuanced World).

Look through my previous comments - I have been more of a consistent and principled critic of Putin’s regimes than many of the people who would make common cause with your views in this instance. Many of those other contributors are happy to parrot other Putin-favored talking points like cutting-and-running on NATO, not keeping Japan & South Korea under the US nuclear umbrella etc.
Looks up their comments under other topics and you will see; far right concepts seeping into main stream right wing discussion while the likes of Putin watches and smiles in satisfaction.

What I am trying to do (but executing to mixed results) is to suggest something that goes all the way back to Sun Tzu and the Art of War - (actually) know you enemy and come to (actually) understand (but not necessarily agree with) their perspective.
And not to fall back on your prejudices and assumptions, instead be skeptical of them.
Otherwise your decision making may be ruinously bad.

When I speak of agenda I don’t necessarily (only) speak of those that are intended to be malign or to favor a non-US power.
For example a number of contributors here could probably be considered ballistic missile enthusiasts with great nostalgia for the continual developments and evolution during Cold War; in that context that may colour their perception of issues and of “solutions”.
As example I am a big fan of the Avro Vulcan and the NA Valkyrie (hopefully spelled right) but I am not blind to their intended purposes, limitations, relevance (and lack there of) etc.
 
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