LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[bobbymike]

The Case for the US ICBM Force - Matthew Kroenig

https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/12/14/air-force-ballistic-missile-becomes-a-test-case-for-trump-industrial-strategy/#5f2ac4f67757

In September the White House released a long-awaited interagency study documenting the decline of the U.S. defense industrial base. It found that the number of companies capable of building essential combat systems had withered to only one or two in many cases, and that even when multiple domestic sources were still available, they often faced “single points of failure” in their supply chains.

The study identified government contracting behavior as a key factor contributing to industrial decay. In recent months, I have written pieces describing how the Army often exhibits little concern for industrial-base impacts in its spending decisions. Today’s piece is about the Air Force, and how it can either help or harm the defense industrial base depending on how it buys the nation’s next intercontinental ballistic missile.

 

[bobbymike]

https://defensemaven.io/warriormaven/future-weapons/air-force-digital-weapons-technique-fast-tracks-new-icbms-to-war-u-5UFLSW0k2Bq77iNk63-A/

The Air Force is building a new generation of nuclear armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) using cutting edge "digital engineering" methods intended to fast-track development of the new weapons system and fire off initial prototypes as soon as next year.

Digital engineering, using advanced computer programming, design work and engineering software enables Air Force developers to analyze a wide range of realistic weapons designs without having to build them all. Naturally, this streamlines weapons development and potentially circumvents some lengthy or more cumbersome elements of the traditional acquisition process - to bring powerful new high tech weapons to the force on a faster timeframe.

“With digital engineering we can look at 10 to 20 designs,” William Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, told an audience recently at an Air Force Association Symposium.

 

[bobbymike]

From Inside Defense

USAF accelerates GBSD schedule, reduces estimated EMD cost

The milestone B decision and engineering and manufacturing development phase for the Air Force's new land-based nuclear deterrent are each scheduled to begin about three months earlier than expected.
-----------------------------------------------
Hope they build a larger missile for future upload or new type of RV, BGV/MaRV??, payload flexibility.

 

[sferrin]

They should make some more "Minotaur Vs" and put warheads on them.

 

[bobbymike]

They should make some more "Minotaur Vs" and put warheads on them.

ATK contemplated an all solid Antares !!

 

[bobbymike]

New Air Force nuclear-armed ICBMs to deploy by 2029

The Pentagon will have new, upgraded nuclear-armed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles operational by 2029, launching a new era in nuclear weapons technology -- to include improved targeting, guidance technology and overall resilience against enemy attacks and attempted intercepts.

www.foxnews.com

 

[bobbymike]

Opinion: No Time For Delay To Nuclear ICBM Replacement | Aviation Week Network

To modernize U.S. nuclear forces, we must ensure rapid development of the ground-based strategic deterrent Minuteman III replacement.

m.aviationweek.com

 

[Forest Green]

I was wondering when we were going to get around to replacing the LGM-30G Minuteman-III missiles. Hopefully, the United States Air Force intends to also upgrade the computers in the silos and retires the 8-inch (200 mm) floppy disk.

I was disappointed that the MGM-134A Midgetman was cancelled in 1992. It seems to me that we should have had mobility to some of our land-based nuclear deterrent due to the vulnerability of missile silos to attack. I wonder if the United States could have constructed something similar to the Club-K Container Missile System inside ISO shipping containers.

Perhaps the timing is right for modernization of our land-based nuclear deterrent with increased tensions with the People's Republic of China and Cold War 2.0 with the Russian Federation.

The end of the ABM treaty and the advent of Hit-to-kill interceptors radically changes the vulnerability equation of silos; we can defend
the silos with as many interceptors as we wish and a nuclear weapons release authorization is not required to begin launching interceptors.

Most mobility schemes end up looking an awful lot like Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) because of the security, reliability and "public interface" issues of continuously mobile schemes.

The ISO shipping container scheme, like other concealment schemes, quickly runs afoul of treaty (e.g. New START) verification requirements.

I personally liked the idea of co-locating a LoADS interceptor and it's radar with each MX missile. At a stroke it doubled the number of RVs the other side would have to expend to be sure of a kill. And they've been looking at Terminal defense against ICBMs with KKVs for some time now. HEDI was the first (that I know of).

Atmospheric Interceptor Technology (AIT)

www.globalsecurity.org

I think Brilliant Pebbles was and still is the best method of defence. Put 4,067 small satellites armed with KKVs in a LEO using reusable launchers and you can hit enemy missiles as soon as they leave the atmosphere before they even get chance to deploy their payload. That way you make the number of MIRVs per missile and HGVs irrelevant. Such a system would also get at least 4-shots at stopping BGRVs and would be a complete cock-block to any FOBS.

Then replace LGM-30s with an LGM-118 type missile using AMaRVs and add MGM-134s, also with AMaRV. Then you might me reasonably well placed to counter what Russia and China are likely to throw into the mix by 2030.

 

[bobbymike]

ICBM replacement is necessary and affordable

As great power competition with Russia and China returns in new and concerning forms, this relatively small investment in protecting our nation’s most vital interest – namely, its survival – seems …

thehill.com

 

[Desertfox]

While Brilliant Pebbles would be great (if a tad expensive) you run the problem of causing major instabilities while the system is being deployed as you place Russia and China in a "use it or lose it" scenario as their deterrent becomes less and less useful. Great if you can pull it off but so so dangerous.

I would prefer a road-mobile with MPS scheme. Say you have 200 missiles with 10 shelters each, if each shelter requires a nuclear warhead, now an enemy requires 2,000 warheads at a minimum to target all your missiles vs our current system where only 400 warheads are required.

 

[fredymac]

While Brilliant Pebbles would be great (if a tad expensive) you run the problem of causing major instabilities while the system is being deployed as you place Russia and China in a "use it or lose it" scenario as their deterrent becomes less and less useful. Great if you can pull it off but so so dangerous.

For rational state actors, the question is not "use it or lose it" but "follow suit or commit suicide". For other state actors, there is also the issue of whether they woke up in a foul mood. Not having your future existence subject to veto on someone else's mental state is one of the enduring motivations for a defense oriented strategy.

In the specific case of Russia and China, they already have expended significant money developing ABM technology so the question is one of priority. A credible defensive technology allows a smaller nuclear deterrence to help offset cost. However, no matter how well you think your defensive systems work, you would still have have strong reservations against ever putting it to a life or death test. This establishes an inclination favoring restraint.

 

[Forest Green]

While Brilliant Pebbles would be great (if a tad expensive) you run the problem of causing major instabilities while the system is being deployed as you place Russia and China in a "use it or lose it" scenario as their deterrent becomes less and less useful. Great if you can pull it off but so so dangerous.

I would prefer a road-mobile with MPS scheme. Say you have 200 missiles with 10 shelters each, if each shelter requires a nuclear warhead, now an enemy requires 2,000 warheads at a minimum to target all your missiles vs our current system where only 400 warheads are required.

With reusable launchers it would be vastly cheaper today than when first envisaged, although there was a proposed McDonnell Douglas DC-X reusable launcher. I guess you would have to run it as a black project and then say 'surprise ' when finished.

In the specific case of Russia and China, they already have expended significant money developing ABM technology so the question is one of priority. A credible defensive technology allows a smaller nuclear deterrence to help offset cost. However, no matter how well you think your defensive systems work, you would still have have strong reservations against ever putting it to a life or death test. This establishes an inclination favoring restraint.

Oh certainly, you wouldn't want to test any defensive system against a Russian-sized arsenal but such a system would likely deter the likes of Iran and North Korea from even bothering to field a paltry number of ICBMs. They can't afford enough to be a credible threat, so they would just have to give up.

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force releases request for proposals for new ICBM system

The request is for the weapon system’s Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase and includes five production lot options to produce and deploy the weapon system.

www.af.mil

 

[kaiserd]

While Brilliant Pebbles would be great (if a tad expensive) you run the problem of causing major instabilities while the system is being deployed as you place Russia and China in a "use it or lose it" scenario as their deterrent becomes less and less useful. Great if you can pull it off but so so dangerous.

I would prefer a road-mobile with MPS scheme. Say you have 200 missiles with 10 shelters each, if each shelter requires a nuclear warhead, now an enemy requires 2,000 warheads at a minimum to target all your missiles vs our current system where only 400 warheads are required.

With reusable launchers it would be vastly cheaper today than when first envisaged, although there was a proposed McDonnell Douglas DC-X reusable launcher. I guess you would have to run it as a black project and then say 'surprise ' when finished.

In the specific case of Russia and China, they already have expended significant money developing ABM technology so the question is one of priority. A credible defensive technology allows a smaller nuclear deterrence to help offset cost. However, no matter how well you think your defensive systems work, you would still have have strong reservations against ever putting it to a life or death test. This establishes an inclination favoring restraint.

Oh certainly, you wouldn't want to test any defensive system against a Russian-sized arsenal but such a system would likely deter the likes of Iran and North Korea from even bothering to field a paltry number of ICBMs. They can't afford enough to be a credible threat, so they would just have to give up.

That comment shows a degree of naivety and lack of understanding of an Iran or North Korea’s thinking, or of the real world effectiveness of any defense against nuclear weapons and the resulting required decision making of a “rational” US decision maker.
Reagan era fantasies of total flawless “missile shields” are not a good guide to the reality that could ever be delivered, even against limited opponents.

 

[Forest Green]

That comment shows a degree of naivety and lack of understanding of an Iran or North Korea’s thinking, or of the real world effectiveness of any defense against nuclear weapons and the resulting required decision making of a “rational” US decision maker.
Reagan era fantasies of total flawless “missile shields” are not a good guide to the reality that could ever be delivered, even against limited opponents.

Completely false. If GBI can hit a warhead target with a closing speed of ~14km/s after travelling several thousand miles, an orbiting KKV hitting a huge and much slower launch vehicle pre-payload-deployment, whilst it still has a huge rocket plume coming out the back would be a piece of cake in relative terms. The former is hitting the knob on the barn door from 2000 yards, the latter is hitting the barn from 100 yards. There would be 4,067 of the KKV-equipped micro-sats orbiting the planet, with each one only a few hundred km from 8 others surrounding it. The missile would have to get through that net and deploy and then the warhead would have to get back past the same net before re-entry. In between that, you have GBI (ERINT) and maybe SM-3 IIB (LEAP) doing their thing and after it you have an updated version of THAAD (HEDI) taking out anything that actually got that far. It scared the USSR enough for them to bankruppt themselves trying to put a 100 ton MW-class CO2 laser into space.

Okay this is actually from a music video, but if you imagine the GBMDI and point defense are actually the Brilliant Pebbles net and GBMDII is GBI and SM-3 IIB.

North Korea is not a rich country and neither is Iran. How many ICBMs or IRBMs could they afford to field? One or two dozen max, which would be useless against brilliant pebbles.

 

[Desertfox]

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.

 

[sferrin]

That comment shows a degree of naivety and lack of understanding of an Iran or North Korea’s thinking, or of the real world effectiveness of any defense against nuclear weapons and the resulting required decision making of a “rational” US decision maker.
Reagan era fantasies of total flawless “missile shields” are not a good guide to the reality that could ever be delivered, even against limited opponents.

The notion that such a defense would need a 100% kill rate to be effective is laughable.

 

[fredymac]

That comment shows a degree of naivety and lack of understanding of an Iran or North Korea’s thinking, or of the real world effectiveness of any defense against nuclear weapons and the resulting required decision making of a “rational” US decision maker.
Reagan era fantasies of total flawless “missile shields” are not a good guide to the reality that could ever be delivered, even against limited opponents.

As nobody can read minds, what Iran or North Korea is thinking can only be inferred from their behavior and character. Both are dictatorships with nuclear ambitions and who cause grief for their neighbors. A baseline estimate follows from there.

Real world effectiveness can be demonstrated by repeated testing. Successes and even failures leading to design corrections can then anchor models for estimating system performance. The physics of strategic missile interception are proven. The focus of MDA has already moved on to improving the sensor network to eliminate gaps and enhance target discrimination.

1950's SciFi concepts like a nuclear powered underwater robot armed with a Cobalt radioactive Tsunami bomb and taking days to reach its target is something of an unintended affirmation of the overall missile defense program. The opposite of what someone would do if they thought the program was a useless waste of money.

 

[Forest Green]

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.

Not much because they don't have the cash. Brilliant Pebbles would work even better against FOBS than a regular ICBM and it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

Torpedoes would have too negotiate a sonar defence system and a cruise missile is basically a small aircraft, so they'd have been sent back to the 1950s.

 

[Forest Green]

A missile defense against a large scale attack by a peer power is likely to be an exceptionally expensive fools errand (ultimately would not give sufficient protection to be worth while and may risk destabilization without a up side).

And trying to kid yourself that a specific irrational actor’s decision making would necessarily be impacted by such a defense system (or that their would have been other delivery systems not impacted by such missile defenses systems) is also quite likely a fools errand.

And you otherwise fail to engage with my other questions - allies, US based etc?

I hope other contributors can grasp that simple answers to complex problems are almost always wrong.

You're making a lot of assumptions. I think I said that some of a large nuclear arsenal would probably get through from the start but are they ever likely to launch a pre-emptive strike given that they can't possibly calculate how many warheads and missiles each target would need anymore. If BP (Brilliant Pebbles) doesn't hit the missile on the way up, SM-3 IIB might get it just after, or GBI might get the warhead or bus after that, or SM-3 IIB again might get the warhead after that. If not BP gets it before re-entry, or THAAD-ER/X gets it in the terminal phase. It a 6 phase system, if each part is 75% effective, then the chance of anything getting through is 0.24%.

Dictators are often more cold and calculating than you may imagine. The term 'irrational' is probably misplaced.

 

[marauder2048]

I'm not sure that strategic miscalculation on the part of rogue actors would necessarily imply irrationality.

The advantage of non-nuclear strategic defenses is that their employment is far more certain
i.e. doesn't require a presidential nuclear weapons release authorization or congressional approval
and structured.

A retaliatory response is more amorphous, complicated (the presence of other well armed nuclear powers in the region)
and from the viewpoint of the attacker not necessarily guaranteed to destroy the regime.

For peer threats, a really effective system would force a shift to more expensive and/or more stabilizing
platforms e.g. bombers.

it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

There are purely endo-atmospheric direct injection trajectories for HGVs. But the cost of doing
so appears to be greater than ballistic + pull-up.

 

[sferrin]

There are purely endo-atmospheric direct injection trajectories for HGVs. But the cost of doing
so appears to be greater than ballistic + pull-up.

The original BGRV never got higher than 120,000 feet as I recall. (Just going by memory though.)

 

[Forest Green]

There are purely endo-atmospheric direct injection trajectories for HGVs. But the cost of doing
so appears to be greater than ballistic + pull-up.

True but that will limit range considerably and potentially be vulnerable to endo-atmospheric intercept systems during the boost phase.

 

[Forest Green]

The original BGRV never got higher than 120,000 feet as I recall. (Just going by memory though.)

The terminology is quite strange then because surely the 'RV' part is false since it never re-enters.

 

[fredymac]

On the one hand: missile defense is useless and only fools think otherwise.

And simultaneous with that: missile defense is provocative.

 

[sferrin]

On the one hand: missile defense is useless and only fools think otherwise.

And simultaneous with that: missile defense is provocative.

You're asking for logic now? What kind of monster are you?

 

[Forest Green]

I think a system of ground-based interceptors only will fit the description of being provocative and ineffective (or effective but not in a big way). Once you firmly commit to space-based interceptors like BP, then it becomes effective and provocative. But nuclear proliferation is also provocative and so the latter is a response to that, particularly the NK case, which likely (IMHO) had some outside help.

 

[sferrin]

I think a system of ground-based interceptors only will fit the description of being provocative and ineffective (or effective but not in a big way). Once you firmly commit to space-based interceptors like BP, then it becomes effective and provocative. But nuclear proliferation is also provocative and so the latter is a response to that, particularly the NK case, which likely (IMHO) had some outside help.

It depends how you define, "effective". The idea is to convince the other guy it's best not to launch (particularly in the certifiably insane strategy of "escalate to deescalate"). If your system is robust enough to shoot down a dozen RVs launched by a madman, and effective enough to impart an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the minds of rational actors, that's all you need. The whole, "it won't be able to shoot down a World War III launch" notion is a straw man.

 

[Forest Green]

It depends how you define, "effective". The idea is to convince the other guy it's best not to launch (particularly in the certifiably insane strategy of "escalate to deescalate"). If your system is robust enough to shoot down a dozen RVs launched by a madman, and effective enough to impart an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the minds of rational actors, that's all you need. The whole, "it won't be able to shoot down a World War III launch" notion is a straw man.

Very true. I'm not being derogatory about GBI for one second but I would not bet $100 on it stopping 24 single RV missiles at the current deployment quantity, let alone 24 MIRV missiles, before we even get to China or Russian-sized threats.

If you increased GBI deployment to 500 missiles, combined it with BP plus 2,000 SM-3 IIBs and 2,000 THAAD-ER/X, that would completely wipe out the 24 missile Kim-type threat and make everyone else not want to escalate. It's a lot of money but hey, the US flushed $5.9tr into Iraq and Afghanistan, that would have more than covered such a deployment with enough left over for some Zenith Stars, the other 563 F-22s, 29 Zumwalts and the 19 CG-Xs.

 

[RanulfC]

Oh certainly, you wouldn't want to test any defensive system against a Russian-sized arsenal but such a system would likely deter the likes of Iran and North Korea from even bothering to field a paltry number of ICBMs. They can't afford enough to be a credible threat, so they would just have to give up.

You're aware I hope that in fact that "logic" has been shown not to work? Both cited examples are still developing nuclear weapons in any case and its rather illogical to assume they even plan on using them in a manner that an anti-missile system would even be able to address. Assuming that these supposed 'rogue' nations would even consider trying to deliver a weapon to the US, (or just about anyone else) they would have to be delivered by a method OTHER than ICBM to have any chance at all of reaching the target.

For the most part these nations have no plan to even suggest they would threaten the United States, their targets are much closer and harder to defend but if they can 'scare' someone in the US a bit then that's all to the good. (Unless they scare them TOO much and suddenly have the US looking to come knocking, in which case they use the nukes to deny the US 'victory' on the ground)

The problem is even if Russia and China agree with the 'logic' the problem is that an anti-ICBM system still has some effect against their deterence stance. And in Russia's case systems are being deployed along their border that they see as a threat.

In the end the actual logic of:
"On the one hand: missile defense is useless and only fools think otherwise.
Along with the fact that in small quanties and against certain threats missile defense DOES work and is effective
No matter what it will still remain provicative

There's a reason we had an ABM treaty with the USSR/Russia in the first place.

Is true but at the same time being prepared even for the most unlikely event is prudent. I've pointed out elsewhere "The First Cup of Coffee War" (https://books.google.com/books?id=i...epage&q="The First Cup of Coffee War"&f=false) because it IS a thing that could happen and is the sort of defense that everyone should have in place because "non-national" players are a thing and have both the capability and will to do what a nation would not. No amount of anti-ICBM systems would ever deter such a player nor would the threat of 'destruction' by retaliation.

Randy

 

[Jemiba]

Thread cleaned up from the quarrel between two members.
Please, back to constructive-minded posts. It would be a pity, if this thread
would have to be closed, because of such things ...

 

[sferrin]

It depends how you define, "effective". The idea is to convince the other guy it's best not to launch (particularly in the certifiably insane strategy of "escalate to deescalate"). If your system is robust enough to shoot down a dozen RVs launched by a madman, and effective enough to impart an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the minds of rational actors, that's all you need. The whole, "it won't be able to shoot down a World War III launch" notion is a straw man.

Very true. I'm not being derogatory about GBI for one second but I would not bet $100 on it stopping 24 single RV missiles at the current deployment quantity, let alone 24 MIRV missiles, before we even get to China or Russian-sized threats.

If you increased GBI deployment to 500 missiles, combined it with BP plus 2,000 SM-3 IIBs and 2,000 THAAD-ER/X, that would completely wipe out the 24 missile Kim-type threat and make

You wouldn't need anything near that to deal with 24 single-warhead missiles.

 

[Desertfox]

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.

Not much because they don't have the cash. Brilliant Pebbles would work even better against FOBS than a regular ICBM and it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

Torpedoes would have too negotiate a sonar defence system and a cruise missile is basically a small aircraft, so they'd have been sent back to the 1950s.

Its not about whether BP or something else can defend against them or not (for the record I do like BP and thinks its the best missile defense system currently achievable), the issue is that Russia is concerned enough already with out current missile defense system to go ahead and spend hard cash on ways to defeat it.

Russia considers its nuclear deterrent as vital for the survivability of the nation and any attempt to undermine it as a threat to their sovereignty. Remember they probably have a requirement for a minimum number of warheads that must hit in a retaliatory strike to achieve suitable levels of deterrence. Anything that drops them below that level is a significant threat, this includes US first strike capability (even if we would never actually use it) and missile defense. Throw in BP and now they feel they are very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

Remember we where well on our way to getting rid of MIRVed land-based ICBMs under START II, untill the US left the ABM Treaty. Had the US stayed in ABM, we could have seen New START with even lower limits (1000 warheads?) and less capable ICBMs. Now we are looking at the possibility of no replacement for New START, no INF, and a very possible new nuclear arms race. I believe that in our effort to increase our missile defense capabilities we have pushed foreign powers to increase their nuclear forces capabilities even further, paradoxically decreasing stability and making a nuclear strike more likely. The only way BP works is if it's a joint US-Russia project that provides both nations with the same amount of capability.

 

[kaiserd]

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.

Not much because they don't have the cash. Brilliant Pebbles would work even better against FOBS than a regular ICBM and it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

Torpedoes would have too negotiate a sonar defence system and a cruise missile is basically a small aircraft, so they'd have been sent back to the 1950s.

Its not about whether BP or something else can defend against them or not (for the record I do like BP and thinks its the best missile defense system currently achievable), the issue is that Russia is concerned enough already with out current missile defense system to go ahead and spend hard cash on ways to defeat it.

Russia considers its nuclear deterrent as vital for the survivability of the nation and any attempt to undermine it as a threat to their sovereignty. Remember they probably have a requirement for a minimum number of warheads that must hit in a retaliatory strike to achieve suitable levels of deterrence. Anything that drops them below that level is a significant threat, this includes US first strike capability (even if we would never actually use it) and missile defense. Throw in BP and now they feel they are very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

Remember we where well on our way to getting rid of MIRVed land-based ICBMs under START II, untill the US left the ABM Treaty. Had the US stayed in ABM, we could have seen New START with even lower limits (1000 warheads?) and less capable ICBMs. Now we are looking at the possibility of no replacement for New START, no INF, and a very possible new nuclear arms race. I believe that in our effort to increase our missile defense capabilities we have pushed foreign powers to increase their nuclear forces capabilities even further, paradoxically decreasing stability and making a nuclear strike more likely. The only way BP works is if it's a joint US-Russia project that provides both nations with the same amount of capability.

I’d agree with much of that as I don’t object to any and all US missile defense.
The issues with Russia speaks to some of the muddy thinking on the US side and apparently unintended consequences tied up with pursuing different forms of missile defense without any realistic attempt to understand rivals perspectives and likely reactions, including those you are specifically trying to deter.

 

[fredymac]

For decades, technology has favored the offense. Today, sensors, software, and miniaturization have made defense viable. A policy of assured survival can be considered in supplement and eventual replacement of reciprocal hostage taking with nuclear missiles.

MIRVed interceptors, sea based defense, and expanded sensor networks will negate all but the largest threat scenarios. Nuclear war still requires mass delivery. Sneaking bombs across borders only works at a level for terrorism and guarantees unrestricted retribution. Iran and North Korea know this which is why they are striving to develop intercontinental range missiles.

Russian priorities and perceptions must be recognized but should not command accommodation. Russia can pursue its own policies to the limits of its finances (or beyond them if they ignore the last time). It would be great if they decided to pursue the same path but then it would also be great if they got along with Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltics, etc.

 

[marauder2048]

Russia considers its nuclear deterrent as vital for the survivability of the nation and any attempt to undermine it as a threat to their sovereignty. Remember they probably have a requirement for a minimum number of warheads that must hit in a retaliatory strike to achieve suitable levels of deterrence. Anything that drops them below that level is a significant threat, this includes US first strike capability (even if we would never actually use it) and missile defense. Throw in BP and now they feel they are very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

In theory, by 2020 the Russians will have closed the publicly well documented since the 80's gaps in their early warning against SLBM attacks.
And that was in the face of continued improvements to C4/D5, the collapse of Russian ASW and the heavy biasing of the US strategic forces towards SSBNs.

The claim that they feel or felt vulnerable to preemption or a first-strike just isn't borne out by where they've put their money or their priorities.

 

[Forest Green]

You forget that even a Brilliant Pebbles constellation small enough to defeat only Iran or North Korea is still big enough to put a serious dent in a Russian mass strike. The Russians are already paranoid (talking about FOBS, HGVs, nuclear torpedoes, nuclear cruise missiles) about our current missile defense which is no where near as good as Brilliant Pebbles, just think what they will do if we go ahead with such a system.

Not much because they don't have the cash. Brilliant Pebbles would work even better against FOBS than a regular ICBM and it doesn't matter if an ICBM is carrying a HGV because it never gets chance to deploy its payload.

Torpedoes would have too negotiate a sonar defence system and a cruise missile is basically a small aircraft, so they'd have been sent back to the 1950s.

Its not about whether BP or something else can defend against them or not (for the record I do like BP and thinks its the best missile defense system currently achievable), the issue is that Russia is concerned enough already with out current missile defense system to go ahead and spend hard cash on ways to defeat it.

Russia considers its nuclear deterrent as vital for the survivability of the nation and any attempt to undermine it as a threat to their sovereignty. Remember they probably have a requirement for a minimum number of warheads that must hit in a retaliatory strike to achieve suitable levels of deterrence. Anything that drops them below that level is a significant threat, this includes US first strike capability (even if we would never actually use it) and missile defense. Throw in BP and now they feel they are very vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike.

Remember we where well on our way to getting rid of MIRVed land-based ICBMs under START II, untill the US left the ABM Treaty. Had the US stayed in ABM, we could have seen New START with even lower limits (1000 warheads?) and less capable ICBMs. Now we are looking at the possibility of no replacement for New START, no INF, and a very possible new nuclear arms race. I believe that in our effort to increase our missile defense capabilities we have pushed foreign powers to increase their nuclear forces capabilities even further, paradoxically decreasing stability and making a nuclear strike more likely. The only way BP works is if it's a joint US-Russia project that provides both nations with the same amount of capability.

START II and INF were dead in the water as soon as China came on the scene.

Russia would have too spent a lot of money which it doesn't have to respond to such a system. It went bankrupt trying to maintain a nuclear force that large in the first place.

 

[Forest Green]

It depends how you define, "effective". The idea is to convince the other guy it's best not to launch (particularly in the certifiably insane strategy of "escalate to deescalate"). If your system is robust enough to shoot down a dozen RVs launched by a madman, and effective enough to impart an unacceptable level of uncertainty into the minds of rational actors, that's all you need. The whole, "it won't be able to shoot down a World War III launch" notion is a straw man.

Very true. I'm not being derogatory about GBI for one second but I would not bet $100 on it stopping 24 single RV missiles at the current deployment quantity, let alone 24 MIRV missiles, before we even get to China or Russian-sized threats.

If you increased GBI deployment to 500 missiles, combined it with BP plus 2,000 SM-3 IIBs and 2,000 THAAD-ER/X, that would completely wipe out the 24 missile Kim-type threat and make

You wouldn't need anything near that to deal with 24 single-warhead missiles.

Well no, but I like to prepare fro the worst.

 

[Forest Green]

Oh certainly, you wouldn't want to test any defensive system against a Russian-sized arsenal but such a system would likely deter the likes of Iran and North Korea from even bothering to field a paltry number of ICBMs. They can't afford enough to be a credible threat, so they would just have to give up.

You're aware I hope that in fact that "logic" has been shown not to work? Both cited examples are still developing nuclear weapons in any case and its rather illogical to assume they even plan on using them in a manner that an anti-missile system would even be able to address. Assuming that these supposed 'rogue' nations would even consider trying to deliver a weapon to the US, (or just about anyone else) they would have to be delivered by a method OTHER than ICBM to have any chance at all of reaching the target.

For the most part these nations have no plan to even suggest they would threaten the United States, their targets are much closer and harder to defend but if they can 'scare' someone in the US a bit then that's all to the good. (Unless they scare them TOO much and suddenly have the US looking to come knocking, in which case they use the nukes to deny the US 'victory' on the ground)

The problem is even if Russia and China agree with the 'logic' the problem is that an anti-ICBM system still has some effect against their deterence stance. And in Russia's case systems are being deployed along their border that they see as a threat.

In the end the actual logic of:
"On the one hand: missile defense is useless and only fools think otherwise.
Along with the fact that in small quanties and against certain threats missile defense DOES work and is effective
No matter what it will still remain provicative

There's a reason we had an ABM treaty with the USSR/Russia in the first place.

Is true but at the same time being prepared even for the most unlikely event is prudent. I've pointed out elsewhere "The First Cup of Coffee War" (https://books.google.com/books?id=iW10CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT91&lpg=PT91&dq="The+First+Cup+of+Coffee+War"&source=bl&ots=HhuQQ72n1X&sig=ACfU3U1fVPmT2zaIu1WY-Bq6jyJS0SyhYQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiUiLrF-77jAhVbWs0KHfNwANkQ6AEwDXoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q="The First Cup of Coffee War"&f=false) because it IS a thing that could happen and is the sort of defense that everyone should have in place because "non-national" players are a thing and have both the capability and will to do what a nation would not. No amount of anti-ICBM systems would ever deter such a player nor would the threat of 'destruction' by retaliation.

Randy

NK ad Iran are continuing to develop them because BP was never fielded and nearly all SDI spending was pretty much axed after 1991.

Right now they could deliver them by ICBM. They could try smuggle one in by ship but that is a long journey that intelligence services would have a good chance of picking up on.

NK didn't develop ICBMs to target its neighbours.

On the last note, if you prevent proliferation with a stronger missile defence then the chances of nukes finding their way into terrorist hands reduces. Russia and China may move to counter and the US may counter that but the threat of Russia and China having more nukes bothers me less the thought of NK having any at all.