LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

sferrin said:
Nice wall of text. ICBMs REQUIRE an enemy to attack your homeland, guaranteeing a response, and raising the threshold for an attack as high as possible. It's not about, "warhead sink" at all. I'd prefer they were mobile but we know how certain parties would get their panties in a bunch if we had those in the US. (Never mind that every other country on the planet, who has ICBMs, has them mobile.) And the notion that SSBNs will be impossible to detect, ever, is laughable.
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You are contradicting yourself, ICBM silos require a nuclear attack, road-mobiles can be taken out by a couple of guys with ARs.
 
Forest Green said:
There's 12 boats and 150 crew. A single person sets something to make a delayed noise, moves on to somewhere else and repeats. It's not impossible to have one twat on nearly every boat.
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It's very, very difficult to get even ONE twat like that into the SSBN crews (and remember, two crews so some 3600+ dudes in SSBNs).

FFS, the FBI talked to my third grade teacher.


Forest Green said:
Bottom line you need ICBMs and SSBNs... and some bombers for telling people you're annoyed.
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Exactly.

  • SSBNs hold MAD assured. You will not find all the boomers, between 2/3 and 3/4 of which are at sea 24/7/365. 8 or 9 boats, any one of which carries twice the total explosive firepower employed in WW2.
  • ICBMs are a use-or-lose asset, the enemy knows exactly where they are. So you need to launch before the incoming attack lands.
  • Bombers are how you signal your alert levels to the rest of the world. Everyone can see them flying around. Suddenly getting bombers airborne and keeping them aloft for 24+ hours at a stretch? Sends a bit of a message. Bombers also allow you to have more control over threat signaling, since you can even send the bombers in from their alert orbits towards the enemy and recall them up to or beyond the point where they penetrate the enemy ADIZ.
 
bobbymike said:
Not submarines but a twat boatload

cdrsalamander.substack.com

There is Dysfunction, and then there's USS Manchester (LCS 14) Gold Crews in 2023

yes..."stinky" is appropriate
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Yeah, that's a severe dysfunction in the surface navy. The chief's mess concept in general is a massive clusterfuck of privilege and snobbery, and sometimes you get whole cases of (remainder of profanity, 1.23TB, deleted)

"I'm a Chief, I'm special, I deserve to have access to things my juniors don't." *spits*
 
A Tentative Fleet Plan said:
There are financial resource constraints, and conventional capabilities will be far more important for an US-China war over Taiwan (or indeed any proxy war between US forces and a Chinese-backed opponent, given the propensity for such conflicts in a Cold War), and given the need to conduct survivable conventional strike on the cheap with easily stockpiled munitions like JDAMs and Quickstrike Mines, I think the US needs much more than 100-200 B-21s, and needs large numbers NGADs to support them in the face of opposing 5th generation fighters.

Better to devote financial resources to that, than a system that solely seems to exist due to inter-service parochialism. I will outright state that I do not think GBSD will work as a warhead sink, it is unlikely that the Russians will target empty silos when they can hit more valuable cities, and the Chinese strategic nuclear forces have always had a counter-value role from the beginning, so aren't going to be targeting the silos in the first place. SSBNs seem to be relatively invulnerable, even with recent advances in blue-green lasers, especially given the amount of sea room they have to operate in. The position of ICBM silos and mobile ICBM garrisons and deployment areas will be known at all times, and the number of ancillary units (including command vehicles, support vehicles, mobile kitchens for the crew and security vehicles, see Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy) required for mobile ICBMs, combined with associated electronic signatures mean they are far more vulnerable to being tracked than SSBNs, whose autonomy and active transmissions are minimal, not to mention the current US acoustic advantage over Chinese SSNs and limited quantity of high-quality Russian submarines. In terms of delivery systems SLBMs are as accurate and responsive as ICBMs, and in the US context, higher throw-weight, so there is no justification for ICBMs along those lines.
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I agree, I also have to say it's pretty funny how people consder this so unexcptable consdering this is exactly what brition and France dose. In times of fiscal constraints specialization is needed, not giving the airforce rockets because they haven't gotten over the fact that the navy was allowed to have aircraft 70+ years ago.
 
Cjc said:
I agree, I also have to say it's pretty funny how people consder this so unexcptable consdering this is exactly what brition and France dose. In times of fiscal constraints specialization is needed, not giving the airforce rockets because they haven't gotten over the fact that the navy was allowed to have aircraft 70+ years ago.
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Again, this comes down to the different legs of the Triad doing different things.
  • Silo ICBMs are the use-or-lose weapon, there's not quire 30 minutes from "warning of appearance of launch" to the time that the silos need to launch or risk being destroyed. Silos raise the stakes of attacking the mainland US to guaranteed nuclear retaliation.
  • Nuclear bombers are the visible threat level indicator. It's safe to assume that there's someone outside every US bomber base that will post online "Hey, all the bombers just took off all of a sudden, WTF?" When you scramble nuclear bombers, you are sending a very clear message that someone is about to be stomped.
  • SSBNs are the MAD guarantee that even if you do somehow manage to destroy the US ICBMs and bomber bases in a first strike, you will still be destroyed.
Yes, the UK gave up on silo ICBMs and bombers, because they didn't have enough real estate to protect the silos and airfields. Country too small physically.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Again, this comes down to the different legs of the Triad doing different things.
  • Silo ICBMs are the use-or-lose weapon, there's not quire 30 minutes from "warning of appearance of launch" to the time that the silos need to launch or risk being destroyed. Silos raise the stakes of attacking the mainland US to guaranteed nuclear retaliation.
  • Nuclear bombers are the visible threat level indicator. It's safe to assume that there's someone outside every US bomber base that will post online "Hey, all the bombers just took off all of a sudden, WTF?" When you scramble nuclear bombers, you are sending a very clear message that someone is about to be stomped.
  • SSBNs are the MAD guarantee that even if you do somehow manage to destroy the US ICBMs and bomber bases in a first strike, you will still be destroyed.
Yes, the UK gave up on silo ICBMs and bombers, because they didn't have enough real estate to protect the silos and airfields. Country too small physically.
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Bombers atlest have a useful conventional role (like he said and as russia is showing) but I can't see any president not launch nukes if they are hitting citys insted of launchers. Wich makes the land based argument pretty sperius.
 
Cjc said:
Bombers atlest have a useful conventional role (like he said and as russia is showing) but I can't see any president not launch nukes if they are hitting citys insted of launchers. Wich makes the land based argument pretty sperius.
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That's getting into counter-force versus counter-value arguments that I'm not sure really belong here. (and they're nightmarishly and psychotically complex)

Bombers generally cannot scramble fast enough to get out from under an ICBM strike unless already fully loaded. ICBMs are ~30min from launch to impact. So unless they're already airborne, you can write off your bombers in the event of a missile strike at your military. That's why the US ran Operation Chrome Dome into the late 1960s, to keep some bombers airborne and away from the primary ICBM targets. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome

Land based ICBMs also demand that the attacker assign warheads to those silos, instead of shipyards or air bases or cities. An attacker may take out some missiles that would otherwise strike him, if the ICBMs are slow to launch.

Because I'd much rather see Wyoming and Montana nuked than DC, Seattle, Norfolk, etc.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Bombers generally cannot scramble fast enough to get out from under an ICBM strike unless already fully loaded.
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During and after the cancellation of Operation Chrome Dome SAC had a number of B-52s fully fuelled and loaded with nukes on the apron ready to launch (IIRC their engines were equipped with black-powder starter cartridges to enable simulaneous start of all eight engines) and they could IIRC be up and away within 15 minutes.

Scott Kenny said:
Because I'd much rather see Wyoming and Montana nuked than DC, Seattle, Norfolk, etc.
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I doubt that the inhabitants of Wyoming and Montana would appreciate or share the sentiment;):D.
 
NMaude said:
During and after the cancellation of Operation Chrome Dome SAC had a number of B-52s fully fuelled and loaded with nukes on the apron ready to launch (IIRC their engines were equipped with black-powder starter cartridges to enable simulaneous start of all eight engines) and they could IIRC be up and away within 15 minutes.
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Right, which gives the alert crews ~10 minutes to get from wherever they were to the aircraft. Airbases are big places.


NMaude said:
I doubt that the inhabitants of Wyoming and Montana would appreciate or share the sentiment;):D.
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Fortunately, there aren't many people at all in the missile fields. I'm talking population densities under 1 per 10 square miles out there. Most of the immediate fatalities would be cows, not people.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Again, this comes down to the different legs of the Triad doing different things.
  • Silo ICBMs are the use-or-lose weapon, there's not quire 30 minutes from "warning of appearance of launch" to the time that the silos need to launch or risk being destroyed. Silos raise the stakes of attacking the mainland US to guaranteed nuclear retaliation.
  • Nuclear bombers are the visible threat level indicator. It's safe to assume that there's someone outside every US bomber base that will post online "Hey, all the bombers just took off all of a sudden, WTF?" When you scramble nuclear bombers, you are sending a very clear message that someone is about to be stomped.
  • SSBNs are the MAD guarantee that even if you do somehow manage to destroy the US ICBMs and bomber bases in a first strike, you will still be destroyed.
Yes, the UK gave up on silo ICBMs and bombers, because they didn't have enough real estate to protect the silos and airfields. Country too small physically.
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As a rhetorical questions - then what's the purpose of SLCM-N and the fighter capable gravity bombs then?

Because we don't have a triad - we have a triad for deterrence, SLCM-N in case one of the modernization programs fails miserably, and a gravity bomb for our allies - but that doesn't paint quite as nice as a picture?
 
zevets said:
As a rhetorical questions - then what's the purpose of SLCM-N and the fighter capable gravity bombs then?

Because we don't have a triad - we have a triad for deterrence, SLCM-N in case one of the modernization programs fails miserably, and a gravity bomb for our allies - but that doesn't paint quite as nice as a picture?
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Any nuclear cruise missile ends up as a strategic weapon. I suspect they're intended for enemy naval yards or other things close ish to the coastline. Their long range is more to allow for time-on-target attacks from a limited number of launchers. You launch at a target maybe 1000nmi away and route each missile such that they all arrive at the same time give or take. For the first launched missiles, that means flying farther, so that the last launched missiles flying direct arrive at the same time.

Fighters being able to carry nukes is something of a holdover from the days of Massive Retaliation, plus the Strike Breaker programs of the 1970s and 1980s. How do you stop an attack from an entire armored division or more? Nuking it is one option. Not ideal, mind you, unless that armored division is still on enemy soil that is downwind from you.

Also, the only nuclear bombs remaining in the US Arsenal are B61s, which are employable on almost all aircraft in the USAF and USN. And they're still a strategic weapon that requires the personal order of the President of the United States, confirmed by the Secretary of Defense.
 
I know all these facts - but we are rearming at the same time we are going broke. Old reasons and habits shouldn't drive requirements..

Why go to all the expense of certifying those aircraft for nuclear bombs, if the Ukranians have shown a solution to the whole Russian tank problem at a much more affordable price, with a lot less fallout? In practice, the reason B61-12 got renewed with 1) bipartisan support is that we share them with our allies, and 2) our nuclear-industrial base needs a practice run before the hard parts start.

On SLCM-N: the Biden administration got elected and started trying to cancel SLCM-N, but since then has started developing SLCM-N. I personally find this very concerning. Notably, the reasoning for it is the need for a "low yield weapon": https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12084 I personally doubt low-yield concepts actually "increase deterrence", which is why I think it's a hedge against failures against our full-triad modernization.
 
zevets said:
I know all these facts - but we are rearming at the same time we are going broke. Old reasons and habits shouldn't drive requirements..

Why go to all the expense of certifying those aircraft for nuclear bombs, if the Ukranians have shown a solution to the whole Russian tank problem at a much more affordable price, with a lot less fallout? In practice, the reason B61-12 got renewed with 1) bipartisan support is that we share them with our allies, and 2) our nuclear-industrial base needs a practice run before the hard parts start.
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You're misunderstanding.

The planes were all certified for B61s in the 1980s or 1990s. The requirements for F35s to be nuclear certified was part of the original JSF requirements in the 1990s.

USN probably still has the nuclear storage spaces in the carriers, but hasn't carried since the mid-1990s. I'm not sure if USMC ever did load nukes on their planes after the 1950s. Hence why only the F-35A is nuclear capable, and the -B and -C are not at present.​


zevets said:
On SLCM-N: the Biden administration got elected and started trying to cancel SLCM-N, but since then has started developing SLCM-N. I personally find this very concerning. Notably, the reasoning for it is the need for a "low yield weapon": https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12084 I personally doubt low-yield concepts actually "increase deterrence", which is why I think it's a hedge against failures against our full-triad modernization.
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IIRC the low yield is supposed to be the last warning before a massive exchange. "Escalate to de-escalate"

Not that I believe it works.

B61-12 is accurate enough that you can use a lower yield to deal with targets that would have needed a much higher yield because we couldn't put the boom on the front porch before.
 
Scott Kenny said:
You're misunderstanding.
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I promise you I'm not. I just don't take old requirements and justifications as gospel.

There is still recert work required iirc and I think we're misallocating a pile of funds on the wrong weapons systems, and with sentinel blowing out the budget, we can't afford any missteps.

That includes developing five nuclear weapon systems, when four would do just fine.
 
zevets said:
I promise you I'm not. I just don't take old requirements and justifications as gospel.

There is still recert work required iirc and I think we're misallocating a pile of funds on the wrong weapons systems, and with sentinel blowing out the budget, we can't afford any missteps.

That includes developing five nuclear weapon systems, when four would do just fine.
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For what it's worth, I think SLCM-N is a bad call as well. The paperwork overhead for people who work with nuclear weapons (missile techs and torpedomen in this case) or nuclear command and control systems (radiomen) is absurd.

But the USN does need a replacement for the Tomahawk. Something stealthier. (If the JASSM airframe fits into a 21" circle, that but with a longer airframe for a big fuel tank)
 
Scott Kenny said:
That's getting into counter-force versus counter-value arguments that I'm not sure really belong here. (and they're nightmarishly and psychotically complex)

Bombers generally cannot scramble fast enough to get out from under an ICBM strike unless already fully loaded. ICBMs are ~30min from launch to impact. So unless they're already airborne, you can write off your bombers in the event of a missile strike at your military. That's why the US ran Operation Chrome Dome into the late 1960s, to keep some bombers airborne and away from the primary ICBM targets. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chrome_Dome

Land based ICBMs also demand that the attacker assign warheads to those silos, instead of shipyards or air bases or cities. An attacker may take out some missiles that would otherwise strike him, if the ICBMs are slow to launch.

Because I'd much rather see Wyoming and Montana nuked than DC, Seattle, Norfolk, etc.
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As the mx program showed there is basically no way to armore silos to the point that they will make a dent in any attackers missile attack (and if they don't have enough missiles then there not going to waste them on empty silos anyway) at least not without makeing the silos more expensive then the missiles themselves.

And like I said bombers are at best a signaling device (and even then there are better ways) but are much more useful as a conventional Deterrent.

Personally counter force and counter value is a false dichotomy, even if a state wanted to use a counter strike only no sate being attacked as any reason not to escalate, so any strike is going become counter value immediately. And consdering how as I said land based missiles don't any anything that sea based dose then I don't see why we sould waste billions on the mostly useless part of the arsenal.

Honestly the only land based basing proposal I think would actually work was putting a missile on LCACs and haveing them move off base on warning. That could provide a signaling mechanism, could actually soak a useful number of nukes and would be more survivable then silos. And even with all that I don't think it would be worth the money sense you are still gust recreating what subs already give you.
 
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I wonder if the USAF will simply stop trying to modernise the Minutemen silos and support infrastructure for the LGM-35A Sentinel and instead just build new missile-silos with the associated support infrastructure?
 
NMaude said:
I wonder if the USAF will simply stop trying to modernise the Minutemen silos and support infrastructure for the LGM-35A Sentinel and instead just build new missile-silos with the associated support infrastructure?
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I think that's what they are doing now, hence the price hike, but it avoids a lot of risk and unknowns. Dealing with old stuff always adds problems.
 
NMaude said:
I wonder if the USAF will simply stop trying to modernise the Minutemen silos and support infrastructure for the LGM-35A Sentinel and instead just build new missile-silos with the associated support infrastructure?
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As I understand, that's what they're doing. New silos and new wiring between silos. But because that wasn't part of the original contract, big ugly problems adding it.
 
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Scott Kenny said:
Right, which gives the alert crews ~10 minutes to get from wherever they were to the aircraft. Airbases are big places.
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Indeed, they are. However, the alert facility, is right next to the alert ramp, which is just off the end of the runway, which is why the standard is 15 minutes from the klaxon to the last set of wheels up, I could say more about how that breaks down but won't other than it doesn't take too long to don a flight suit, cinch the boots, wrap the laces, grab your helmet bag and run to the jet 200 yards away. It only sucks a little bit more if it goes off and you're in the shower and have to fly the mission in a wet flight suit.

I've used the cartridges on the BUFF for tests (love the smell of cordite) and flew with the guys who stood alert.
 
mkellytx said:
Indeed, they are. However, the alert facility, is right next to the alert ramp, which is just off the end of the runway, which is why the standard is 15 minutes from the klaxon to the last set of wheels up, I could say more about how that breaks down but won't other than it doesn't take too long to don a flight suit, cinch the boots, wrap the laces, grab your helmet bag and run to the jet 200 yards away. It only sucks a little bit more if it goes off and you're in the shower and have to fly the mission in a wet flight suit.

I've used the cartridges on the BUFF for tests (love the smell of cordite) and flew with the guys who stood alert.
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I've certainly done my share of "put on the coveralls from a dead sleep" before...
 
mkellytx said:
Yeah, but least in the alert facility and missile silo there's no rack overhead to bump your cranium. ;)
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Roll to the side, feet down do NOT straighten up until both feet are on the ground. Step away from the racks as soon as both feet are on the ground.

Fortunately, I didn't have the "sit upright" startle reaction.
 
Scott Kenny said:
Roll to the side, feet down do NOT straighten up until both feet are on the ground. Step away from the racks as soon as both feet are on the ground.

Fortunately, I didn't have the "sit upright" startle reaction.
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Muscle memory, lol. My dad always threatened to disown me if I didn't take an officer route, preferably AF, acceptable Navy, never Army and you're not crazy enough to go Marines. He was very happy to pin my butter bars on at an AFB.

In Iraq I was in a regular "college dorm room" bunk bed, but there were only 2 CGO's; me a newly pinned on O-3 and the other guy an O-2 in a room with 6 bunks (12 beds) and air conditioning. We went to the base dump, found some discarded HMMWV armor, put it on the top bunk and then stored our body armor over our heads on top of the Kevlar armor plate. If something went boom, plenty of room to sit up, and the week after we left a dud rocket hit the unit next to ours, we would have a little protection.

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Yeah, that was my rack in Kirkuk.

Operational BUFF's had them, you could bump the cranium, test birds used that space for orange boxes. The ejection seats were comfortable enough to "rest your eyes", you just may bang the back of your cranium on the headrest if you were supposed to be doing something at the moment and got called on the intercom.
 

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