LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[Desertfox]

Could a radar distinguish between a Tomahawk and SLCM-N? AGM-86 and JASSM-ER, or LRSO and JASSM-XR for that matter?

That is certainly an issue with SLCM-N, especially off of subs. The air-launched missiles are less of an issue since it is unlikely that they would be used for a decapitation strike and bombers are typically used for signalling, which means you want the other side to know that nukes are on board.

 

[Grey Havoc]

In any case, I do not think either side would destroy production or launch facilities of satellites.

Even in a limited strategic nuclear exchange I suspect that they would be priority targets.

 

[Josh_TN]

Even in a limited strategic nuclear exchange I suspect that they would be priority targets.

If we’re talking nukes, absolutely. I was thinking a conventional war might at least start out with both sides avoiding economic/infrastructure strikes to avoid an escalation that causes permanent long term economic damage for everyone. But perhaps I’m being too optimistic.

 

[Scott Kenny]

If we’re talking nukes, absolutely. I was thinking a conventional war might at least start out with both sides avoiding economic/infrastructure strikes to avoid an escalation that causes permanent long term economic damage for everyone. But perhaps I’m being too optimistic.

Depends on what infrastructure you're talking about.

For example, the US targeted power substations in Iraq, as have Russia and Ukraine. Not the generators, those are hard to replace and tend to cause a lot of collateral damage. Substations on the other hand are hard to replace because there's just usually not enough unused transformers in storage and they're kinda long lead time items for the big ones. But after the fighting stops, it's relatively easy to replace all the transformers.

It was one of the interesting points about the US occupation of Iraq. If a substation went down the Iraqis quickly learned that the US was very serious about getting it back up as soon as they could, it wasn't some "punishment" thing like the Baathists would do. "Stuff's broken, we'll have it back up as soon as we can" and meaning it went a long way towards keeping the locals not-violently-unhappy (not sure I'd really call many of the Iraqis happy with the US).

 

[Kat Tsun]

Could a radar distinguish between a Tomahawk and SLCM-N? AGM-86 and JASSM-ER, or LRSO and JASSM-XR for that matter?

No. You'd wait until initial battle damage reports to decide if you want to nuke the other guys and by how much. Everyone does this.

Like maybe a sub-launched CPS vs a Trident D5 on a depressed trajectory, or even a D5 LE on a depressed trajectory with PGRVs at some future point.

The only purpose of such a thing would be to attack nuclear weapons while keeping nukes in reserve to threaten population attacks.

The entire point of Prompt Global Strike and its spawn (CPS etc.) was to destroy North Korean/Iraqi/whoever's ballistic missile TELs quickly because it was an outgrowth of WARBREAKER. We know how to find the TELs (air/spaceborne GMTI), we have the means to store their locations (WARBREAKER), and now we need to kill them (PGS).

It's all very point, click, delete. I'm sure it would be handy to have for beating "A2/AD" or something maybe.

Somewhere in the Combined Arms School library at Fort Leavenworth there's a VHS tape that talks about this.

Even in a limited strategic nuclear exchange I suspect that they would be priority targets.

It would be easier to launch killer cubesats to poke holes in a constellation, than set a precedent that denies access to space, I'd think.

That is certainly an issue with SLCM-N, especially off of subs. The air-launched missiles are less of an issue since it is unlikely that they would be used for a decapitation strike and bombers are typically used for signalling, which means you want the other side to know that nukes are on board.

It's a war between two nuclear armed superpowers. Nukes are on the board from the first minute. It may even open with nukes, against Okinawa and Yokosuka, to neutralize the U.S. forward deployed CSG and Marine aviation units. No one really knows.

The only thing that is reasonable to assume is that leadership classes in either U.S. or PRC would rather take a small L than commit suicide.

Escalating a limited tactical nuclear war to a strategic exchange is silly and in this era of high connectedness and telecommunications, the bilateral back and forth through neutral intermediates (the European Union? France? Germany?) should be pretty good compared to 1985 or whatever, when the Soviets would be slamming every Swiss bank with a few kilotons to liberate captive gold from its slavery. Decapitation strikes are useful against undeveloped despotisms, and their tinpot dictators, but not against nuclear armed nations.

Russia doesn't seem terribly interested in hitting NATO shipments in Poland directly, at least until they transit into the combat theater (Ukraine), so it's hard to imagine why either the U.S. or PRC would want to attack each other's mainlands over Taiwan or sandbar bases. The two belligerents are even fighting a proxy war in Africa, so non-nuclear third nations are also fair game, and the United States has no real designs on striking Russian leadership or whatever.

Anyway, nukes will be on the board instantly if only because the sole playbook on "how to crack open a U.S. carrier battlegroup at sea" involves using at least a dozen or two nuclear missiles. Milan Vego has a book on the subject specifically.

 

[bobbymike]

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=VTQ8yZSyrC0

 

[Forest Green]

I'm very surprised when I hear that they're on privately owned land. Who owns that land? Doesn't sound too good for security.

 

[NMaude]

I'm very surprised when I hear that they're on privately owned land. Who owns that land? Doesn't sound too good for security.

I would've thought that the DOD would've bought all of the relevant parcels of land back in the 1970s.

 

[Byeman]

I would've thought that the DOD would've bought all of the relevant parcels of land back in the 1970s.

The sites that contain the missile silos are gov't owned. They are individual parcels of land and not contiguous. A silo is separated from another by over 4 miles. Here are two in North Dakota. There is farm land around them.

 

[TinWing]

The sites that contain the missile silos are gov't owned. They are individual parcels of land and not contiguous. A silo is separated from another by over 4 miles. Here are two in North Dakota. There is farm land around them.

I would dare say that having immense tracts of overgrown government owned land with no human habitation would be a lot riskier than having active farm land and a highly suspicious rural population around the missile silos. In other words, Chinese nationals have been caught stealing GMO seeds from test fields by the farmers themselves, so any malevolent party sneaking up on a missile silo faces being observed by a hostile civilian population as well as active USAF security and increased electronic surveillance. Sentinel silos will be safe enough on the ground.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I would dare say that having immense tracts of overgrown government owned land with no human habitation would be a lot riskier than having active farm land and a highly suspicious rural population around the missile silos. In other words, Chinese nationals have been caught stealing GMO seeds from test fields by the farmers themselves, so any malevolent party sneaking up on a missile silo faces being observed by a hostile civilian population as well as active USAF security and increased electronic surveillance. Sentinel silos will be safe enough on the ground.

Exactly.

 

[TinWing]

No. You'd wait until initial battle damage reports to decide if you want to nuke the other guys and by how much. Everyone does this.



The only purpose of such a thing would be to attack nuclear weapons while keeping nukes in reserve to threaten population attacks.

The entire point of Prompt Global Strike and its spawn (CPS etc.) was to destroy North Korean/Iraqi/whoever's ballistic missile TELs quickly because it was an outgrowth of WARBREAKER. We know how to find the TELs (air/spaceborne GMTI), we have the means to store their locations (WARBREAKER), and now we need to kill them (PGS).

It's all very point, click, delete. I'm sure it would be handy to have for beating "A2/AD" or something maybe.

Somewhere in the Combined Arms School library at Fort Leavenworth there's a VHS tape that talks about this.



It would be easier to launch killer cubesats to poke holes in a constellation, than set a precedent that denies access to space, I'd think.



It's a war between two nuclear armed superpowers. Nukes are on the board from the first minute. It may even open with nukes, against Okinawa and Yokosuka, to neutralize the U.S. forward deployed CSG and Marine aviation units. No one really knows.

The only thing that is reasonable to assume is that leadership classes in either U.S. or PRC would rather take a small L than commit suicide.

Escalating a limited tactical nuclear war to a strategic exchange is silly and in this era of high connectedness and telecommunications, the bilateral back and forth through neutral intermediates (the European Union? France? Germany?) should be pretty good compared to 1985 or whatever, when the Soviets would be slamming every Swiss bank with a few kilotons to liberate captive gold from its slavery. Decapitation strikes are useful against undeveloped despotisms, and their tinpot dictators, but not against nuclear armed nations.

Russia doesn't seem terribly interested in hitting NATO shipments in Poland directly, at least until they transit into the combat theater (Ukraine), so it's hard to imagine why either the U.S. or PRC would want to attack each other's mainlands over Taiwan or sandbar bases. The two belligerents are even fighting a proxy war in Africa, so non-nuclear third nations are also fair game, and the United States has no real designs on striking Russian leadership or whatever.

Anyway, nukes will be on the board instantly if only because the sole playbook on "how to crack open a U.S. carrier battlegroup at sea" involves using at least a dozen or two nuclear missiles. Milan Vego has a book on the subject specifically.

Let’s be realistic. America leadership in the immediate future is certain to be very elderly. Xi Jinping at 71 seems to be fit and rational, but as leader for life will how will he be at the age of 81, 86, 91 or even 101? It’s wrong to presume that any nuclear power won’t go full on strategic rather than losing. Or that any nuclear power doesn’t have a “doctrine of preemption.” Modern communications might actual hasten a nuclear exchange, as personal insults seem to be prevalent in the relations between great powers. Another reason why a limited nuclear exchange will go full on strategic is the high dud rate from aging tactical nukes and perhaps even their modern replacements which have been designed after a long generational hiatus and are physically untested, as well as the high probability of interception. If the tactical nukes don’t accomplish the ends of an attacking nuclear power, or the dud rate is embarrassing, the same preempting power might go full strategic even if they aren’t facing retaliation. This is not a commentary on one particular country or political system but a universal observation on the state of political leadership in 2024. Military leaders in every major power are younger, more fit and far less prone to dementia and sociopathy than political leaders, elected or otherwise. Anyone who makes it through the promotion cycle to be a senior general or admiral is better vetted than any head of state. Clemenceau, said that, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” Clemenceau wasn’t a belligerent and malignant narcissist with advanced dementia and the sole commander of a world ending nuclear arsenal.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Let’s be realistic. America leadership in the immediate future is certain to be very elderly. Xi Jinping at 71 seems to be fit and rational, but as leader for life will how will he be at the age of 81, 86, 91 or even 101? It’s wrong to presume that any nuclear power won’t go full on strategic rather than losing. Or that any nuclear power doesn’t have a “doctrine of preemption.” Modern communications might actual hasten a nuclear exchange, as personal insults seem to be prevalent in the relations between great powers. Another reason why a limited nuclear exchange will go full on strategic is the high dud rate from aging tactical nukes and perhaps even their modern replacements which have been designed after a long generational hiatus and are physically untested, as well as the high probability of interception. If the tactical nukes don’t accomplish the ends of an attacking nuclear power, or the dud rate is embarrassing, the same preempting power might go full strategic even if they aren’t facing retaliation. This is not a commentary on one particular country or political system but a universal observation on the state of political leadership in 2024. Military leaders in every major power are younger, more fit and far less prone to dementia and sociopathy than political leaders, elected or otherwise. Anyone who makes it through the promotion cycle to be a senior general or admiral is better vetted than any head of state. Clemenceau, said that, “War is too important to be left to the generals.” Clemenceau wasn’t a belligerent and malignant narcissist with advanced dementia and the sole commander of a world ending nuclear arsenal.

This is all fair, though you'd think a belligerent narcissist would be less likely to sacrifice themselves if it meant they might die, to be fair.

My point is simpler though: Tactical-operational and operational level weapon employment against solely military targets isn't going to trigger mass retaliation, and both belligerents might be willing to look past radiation in Shanghai or San Diego if it means the sole impact area is a military base.

This is different from the 1980's, except the very last few years or months of that decade, because the USSR had a pretty light hair trigger. It knew it wouldn't be able to necessarily "win" without attacking America directly, because America still controlled the financial and industrial wealth of the world, which is no longer the case today. This is why the USSR threatened to bring any tactical use of weapons to a strategic exchange, which shifted in the 1980's to the USSR thinking it might be able to constrain a tactical-operational use of weapons to the European theater solely, provided it avoided nuking any of the other P5's metropoles.

Similar thinking has captured DOD right now.

SLCM-N would fit in with GLCM and maybe some obscure Soviet nuclear cruise missiles as an airbase/radar/command post deleter. I don't think it's supposed to be used to vaporize apartment blocks or flatten CPC headquarters buildings, but perhaps I am wrong, and the U.S. is actually planning on moving its strategic deterrent to SSNs to augment the SSBN force.

It can do both, obviously, but the provisioning of fast attacks with nuclear weapons seems to be for operational concerns rather than strategic.

 

[Scott Kenny]

[...] the provisioning of fast attacks with nuclear weapons seems to be for operational concerns rather than strategic.

Very much this.

If you want to use the SLCM-Ns, you need subs where they can cover whatever targets you assign them. Which means the subs can't be elsewhere doing other missions.

There's also a really ugly administrative overhead with nukes called the Personnel Reliability Program. And that's an _epic_ pain in the ass. "Would you ever deny your parents marijuana because it's illegal, even if they're dying of cancer?" was a legit question for PRP, and a reason we had to file administrative separation paperwork for one of the missile techs on my first boat (Don't know why that question hadn't been asked long before he got to the boat). I told my dad the story and informed him that if such a scenario came up, he was to shut up and eat the brownies.

In the Cold War, it was less of an issue because fast attacks also carried SUBROCs, so they had to do the PRP work anyways. Having a handful of TLAM-Ns onboard was not any extra work for them.

Today, though, getting everyone PRP certified and the enhanced clearances would be a monumental fustercluck.

 

[Forest Green]

The sites that contain the missile silos are gov't owned. They are individual parcels of land and not contiguous. A silo is separated from another by over 4 miles. Here are two in North Dakota. There is farm land around them.

Out of interest, on a side note, where are the GBIs kept at Vandenburg, is it the old MM silos?

 

[Byeman]

Out of interest, on a side note, where are the GBIs kept at Vandenburg, is it the old MM silos?

Too many GBIsnfor that.

 

[bobbymike]

Out of interest, on a side note, where are the GBIs kept at Vandenburg, is it the old MM silos?

I think I recall seeing pictures of new silo construction but don’t quote me.

 

[Forest Green]

Too many GBIsnfor that.

How many are there now? Because there's 54 silos up in Fort Geely Alaska at 63°57'5.62"N 145°43'10.30"W.

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4703104-congressional-group-on-nuclear-arms-sets-july-hearing-for-embattled-missile-program/

 

[Desertfox]

Out of interest, on a side note, where are the GBIs kept at Vandenburg, is it the old MM silos?

Their own silos, the MM silos are still being used for testing.

 

[Desertfox]

Very much this.

If you want to use the SLCM-Ns, you need subs where they can cover whatever targets you assign them. Which means the subs can't be elsewhere doing other missions.

There's also a really ugly administrative overhead with nukes called the Personnel Reliability Program. And that's an _epic_ pain in the ass. "Would you ever deny your parents marijuana because it's illegal, even if they're dying of cancer?" was a legit question for PRP, and a reason we had to file administrative separation paperwork for one of the missile techs on my first boat (Don't know why that question hadn't been asked long before he got to the boat). I told my dad the story and informed him that if such a scenario came up, he was to shut up and eat the brownies.

In the Cold War, it was less of an issue because fast attacks also carried SUBROCs, so they had to do the PRP work anyways. Having a handful of TLAM-Ns onboard was not any extra work for them.

Today, though, getting everyone PRP certified and the enhanced clearances would be a monumental fustercluck.

Thats why I keep pushing the nuke CPS on Zumwalt idea. Its only 3 ships that would need PRP and its 3 ships that aren't really needed anywhere else, so you can assign them to the specific area as needed. And if you want them on a sub, well you can stick multiple CPS on a Trident tube and get rid of the W76-2 in the process, which is truly a waste of a Trident and destabilizing to boot.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Thats why I keep pushing the nuke CPS on Zumwalt idea. Its only 3 ships that would need PRP and its 3 ships that aren't really needed anywhere else, so you can assign them to the specific area as needed. And if you want them on a sub, well you can stick multiple CPS on a Trident tube and get rid of the W76-2 in the process, which is truly a waste of a Trident and destabilizing to boot.

Zumwalt with nukes would just have SLCM-N in the VLS? CPS would never get a nuke for very obvious reasons: it's in the name!

If there were going to be a reincarnation of SWERVE and its nuclear payload it would be carried by a 774 or something.

 

[flateric]

Thats why I keep pushing the nuke CPS on Zumwalt idea.

This is GBSD topic. Not DD(X). Not CPS.
You are free to create new one for your ideas but please don't spam this one. The same thing about GLCM/SLCM stuff.

 

[bobbymike]

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4703104-congressional-group-on-nuclear-arms-sets-july-hearing-for-embattled-missile-program/

Same names every time.

 

[sferrin]

Same names every time.

All with a "D" next to them.

 

[Desertfox]

For the record every single current nuke program with the exception of SLCM-N started under the Obama (D) administration.

 

[Forest Green]

Their own silos, the MM silos are still being used for testing.

Do you have a Google Earth grid reference?

 

[Forest Green]

US security demands continued nuclear triad investment

Opinion: The advanced age of America's nuclear triad is eroding its deterrent value.

www.defensenews.com

 

[bobbymike]

House Appropriators Want to Cut Back on Sentinel in 2025, Study Mobile Basing

House appropriators want to cut $324 million from the Air Force Sentinel program due to delays and are asking for a mobility study.

www.airandspaceforces.com

 

[Forest Green]

House Appropriators Want to Cut Back on Sentinel in 2025, Study Mobile Basing

House appropriators want to cut $324 million from the Air Force Sentinel program due to delays and are asking for a mobility study.

www.airandspaceforces.com

rehabilitation of more than 150 silos

There's already 450 silos, 400 used + 50 spare, so that would mean 600 silos. Which sounds pretty positive - 600x4 warheads maybe. With 12x16x8 SLBM warheads that should make 3,936 ICBM+SLBM warheads, which is around what I thought was needed (4,000).

 

[Shoes31]

House Appropriators Want to Cut Back on Sentinel in 2025, Study Mobile Basing

House appropriators want to cut $324 million from the Air Force Sentinel program due to delays and are asking for a mobility study.

www.airandspaceforces.com

Given the sad state of our mobile infrastructure of roads, bridges, and railroad tracks a mobile basing approach would not be a good idea IMO. The one exception I'd say would be a TEL that can be carried internally on a C-5 - you can have those TEL flown around to various airbases and other sites and play the shell game that way.

 

[Forest Green]

I'm sure this mobile-basing idea has been ran through more than once already and it always ends up with fixed silos.

 

[Dilandu]

I'm sure this mobile-basing idea has been ran through more than once already and it always ends up with fixed silos.

Well, Russia have mobile ICBM... China have mobile ICBM... North Korea have mobile ICBM... Out of all nuclear powers possessing ICBM, more than a half were able to make them mobile without much troubles (and India seems to took the road-mobile ICBM route also).

 

[Forest Green]

Well, Russia have mobile ICBM... China have mobile ICBM... North Korea have mobile ICBM... Out of all nuclear powers possessing ICBM, more than a half were able to make them mobile without much troubles (and India seems to took the road-mobile ICBM route also).

Yeah, but in those places you can shoot any unauthorised persons approaching the launcher without hesitation, receive a medal and the national news will praise the action, lest the same thing happen to them.

 

[Dilandu]

Yeah, but in those places you can shoot any unauthorised persons approaching the launcher without hesitation, receive a medal and the national news will praise the action, lest the same thing happen to them.

I kinda doubt that US armed guard would heistate to shoot any unauthorised person approaching the ICBM silo. America have quite a lot of unused land, that could be safely federalized for ICBM dispersion.

 

[bobbymike]

There's already 450 silos, 400 used + 50 spare, so that would mean 600 silos. Which sounds pretty positive - 600x4 warheads maybe. With 12x16x8 SLBM warheads that should make 3,936 ICBM+SLBM warheads, which is around what I thought was needed (4,000).

I don’t read that as additional silos but refurbishment of existing operational MMIII silos

 

[sferrin]

Given the sad state of our mobile infrastructure of roads, bridges, and railroad tracks a mobile basing approach would not be a good idea IMO. The one exception I'd say would be a TEL that can be carried internally on a C-5 - you can have those TEL flown around to various airbases and other sites and play the shell game that way.

Off road (or even dirt road) you can have them all over the west desert.

 

[Forest Green]

I kinda doubt that US armed guard would heistate to shoot any unauthorised person approaching the ICBM silo. America have quite a lot of unused land, that could be safely federalized for ICBM dispersion.

If they can fence off all the relevant land from the general public that's fine, but in the other countries you mentioned these things are free to roam in the wilderness.

I don’t read that as additional silos but refurbishment of existing operational MMIII silos

I guess you could read it either way. 150 total would be ridiculously low.

 

[Desertfox]

The US does have mobile ICBMs, they are called Trident II. Remember that the survivable second-strike component of the US triad is the SLBMs, while for Russia and China its the road-mobiles, different countries, different needs.

 

[Josh_TN]

Given the sad state of our mobile infrastructure of roads, bridges, and railroad tracks a mobile basing approach would not be a good idea IMO. The one exception I'd say would be a TEL that can be carried internally on a C-5 - you can have those TEL flown around to various airbases and other sites and play the shell game that way.

I feel the sun has set on land mobile basing. The PRC has some -400 remote sensing satellites, with two hundred of those launched just in 2022 and 2023. Any hope of hiding massive 5-6 axle TELs and their support and security infrastructure will be gone soon. The Russians already escort their TELs with dazzler lasers for this reason. In the U.S. one would also have to contend with commercial UAVs operated by foreign agents. There is no longer much advantage to land based mobile missiles.