LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

MX was a counter to the R-36s not the RT-23s. The R-36 and Sarmat are also destabilizing, as is any big silo-based MIRVed (>3) ICBM. The RT-23s, not so much since they were designed to be mobile and therefore survivable to a first-strike.

And GBSD isn't going anywhere, the only system in jeopardy is SLCM-N, which is not even part of the triad.
 
And GBSD isn't going anywhere, the only system in jeopardy is SLCM-N, which is not even part of the triad.
Well, it's nuclear so is effectively only used in the strategic levels.

I'm not totally sold on them because they take weapons space away from conventional cruise missiles and torpedoes. Weapons space is a very precious commodity on a submarine.

You'd need to generally not carry any on a fast attack and then reload a sub with nukes to have enough of a strike per sub.
 
Agreed, SLCM-N is not a good idea. There are better ways to get the tactical effect. Personally, I would go with a nuke CPS and turn the Zumwalts into nuke boats, now you have the Navy equivalent of a B-52 in that they can be used as a way to message, and it only impacts 3 one-off ships.
 
Would it make sense now to move the ICMB's under the command of the Space Force?

Not in the slightest. Strategic bombardment is the job of the U.S. Air Force at its most basic. ICBMs are the modern day B-24.

The Space Force is taking the orbital warfare, strategic communications, and orbital reconnaissance mission away from the USAF. This is not bad, but rather an improvement for the AF leadership, because it means the USAF can focus on its core mission of fighting the air battle instead of needing to act as a ersatz proxy for a bunch of ad-hoc strat commo troops.

The Navy will probably retain some command of space if only because the Navy needs to be the most "complete" military branch.

And also have funding for the nuclear triad under a different budget then the normal service budget?

Maybe. A separate nuclear force would probably be quite useful for emphasizing the USAF's role as deliverer of air-dropped munitions.

Agreed, SLCM-N is not a good idea. There are better ways to get the tactical effect.

A gravity bomb isn't better than a stealth cruise missile. The U.S. Army also lacks nuclear artillery. What "better ways", then?

SLCM-N is going to be an operational-tactical weapon (OTRK) for destruction of hardened command posts, naval units, and airbases. It will free up a bunch of INDOPACOM's JSFs for running DCA against the hundreds of FC-31s and J-20s, and the thousands of J-10s, J-7s, and Flankers, they will be facing.

Personally, I would go with a nuke CPS and turn the Zumwalts into nuke boats

As cool as it would be to watch SWERVE come back from the dead it won't happen.
 
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If it comes to deciding whether to drop SLCM-N or ICBMs, then drop the SLCM-Ns. It would be destabilising for the US NOT to have ICBMs given that all other rival nuclear powers do.

The Air Force can't tell the Navy to stop making a cruise missile to burn money on their decade-long rocket program lol. If they can't fund GBSD, or manage the program properly, then that's their problem. Congress will just tell the Air Force to SLEP the Minutemen for the 5425th time if GBSD dies.

Trying to smuggle in "complete launch complex replacement" in your ostensible "budget missile refurb" program is a bad idea.
 
The Air Force can't tell the Navy to stop making a cruise missile to burn money on their decade-long rocket program lol. If they can't fund GBSD, or manage the program properly, then that's their problem. Congress will just tell the Air Force to SLEP the Minutemen for the 5425th time if GBSD dies.

Trying to smuggle in "complete launch complex replacement" in your ostensible "budget missile refurb" program is a bad idea.
Except that it's showing to be cheaper to completely replace the launch complexes than refurbish them, and the GAO agrees on that point!
 
Except that it's showing to be cheaper to completely replace the launch complexes than refurbish them, and the GAO agrees on that point!

I think the original idea was that it wouldn't require any refurbishment but that may have been based on assumptions of booster size.

I also don't know why people in this thread seem to think GBSD is at risk of being "canceled" though.

What will happen is DAF just keeps delaying the flight tests until the budget picks up the slack, when Congress decides to pass an actual appropriations bill instead of CRs, because they're shoveling the missile proper money into digging up giant copper cables in Montana. That continues at least for a couple years. The decade long program drags for an extra 3 or 5 years and LGM-35 enters service in the year ending in its numerical designation.

That's like the absolute worst case scenario.

The Congress can help avoid this future by giving DOD and DOE more money, but it hasn't passed an appropriations bill yet, so it won't.

Also SLCM-N isn't at risk of anything right now because the Navy is procuring it and both STRATCOM boss and the House want it too.
 
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I think the original idea was that it wouldn't require any refurbishment but that may have been based on assumptions of booster size.
I think it was based on rather optimistic assessments of the conditions of the MM3 silos, Launch Control, and those copper cables in Montana(etc).

Turns out, the copper cables were a hacked and spliced rats nest that needed to be replaced in their entirety. Too many splices and you start losing data packets. Picture a 50yo used car that's had 10 owners, and each one has messed with the stereo. How many splices?!? Better off buying a whole new replacement wiring harness and starting fresh!


Also SLCM-N isn't at risk of anything right now because the Navy is procuring it and both STRATCOM boss and the House want it too.
Functionally, operationally, SLCM-N is a mess. If you're generally floating around with a couple of nukes in the VLS, that's a number of conventional cruise missiles that you cannot carry. Or that you're carrying cruise missiles in the Torpedo Room in place of a few torpedoes, and Virginia class only have 26 stows for torpedoes (and 12 VLS tubes). Plus you are imposing all the crew certification stuff of nuclear weapons, which is a paper work nightmare (trust the Missile Submarine admin guy on this one, that paperwork SUCKS).

I honestly do not see any scenario where a single submarine would only launch a couple of SLCM-Ns as the attack. I'd expect more like a dozen missiles per sub as a single attack on anything that was worth expending a nuke on, just because of all the defenses that such a target would have. Yes, I'm expecting needing to fire 10-12 missiles to get one on target.
 
I think it was based on rather optimistic assessments of the conditions of the MM3 silos, Launch Control, and those copper cables in Montana(etc).

Turns out, the copper cables were a hacked and spliced rats nest that needed to be replaced in their entirety. Too many splices and you start losing data packets. Picture a 50yo used car that's had 10 owners, and each one has messed with the stereo. How many splices?!? Better off buying a whole new replacement wiring harness and starting fresh!

Yeah that's fair then. I am a fan of fiber optics too so I don't really have any complaints. I just forgot the Air Force hates infrastructure.

Functionally, operationally, SLCM-N is a mess.

Well, it seems to be a very good system for the Pacific by increasing the capacity of the Navy to contribute to the tactical nuke fight. The carriers don't have gravity bombs anymore and the only tactical shaped weapon in inventory is the W76-2s, so what's the alternative?

The Air Force will be too busying keeping the PLAAF at an arm's length to attack everything with B61-12 all the time.

W76-2 is too dumb of a weapon to waste on tactical targets unless you need to rebuff a tank division or something I guess.

You can potentially put B61-12 on a carrier...maybe? I'm not even sure if the Fords have nuclear ammunition storage spaces anymore given they were designed, much less built, long after the surface ships lost their nukes.

SLCM-N gives INDOPACOM an option to hit tactical-operational targets that doesn't involve one of maybe 100-200 in-theater F-35A, a partial ballistic missile launch from the Pacific Ocean, or rebuilding the interior magazine spaces of the CVNs.

If you're generally floating around with a couple of nukes in the VLS, that's a number of conventional cruise missiles that you cannot carry. Or that you're carrying cruise missiles in the Torpedo Room in place of a few torpedoes, and Virginia class only have 26 stows for torpedoes (and 12 VLS tubes).

Block V seems to address this by a comfy margin tbf.

Plus you are imposing all the crew certification stuff of nuclear weapons, which is a paper work nightmare (trust the Missile Submarine admin guy on this one, that paperwork SUCKS).

There was a time when this was the norm though. Every surface escort had to file paperwork for nuclear Terrier/Talos and ASROC-N.

I think if SLCM-N is restricted to the Block Vs then it won't be the worst thing ever. They have a lot of VLS cells and there's only 10.

I honestly do not see any scenario where a single submarine would only launch a couple of SLCM-Ns as the attack. I'd expect more like a dozen missiles per sub as a single attack on anything that was worth expending a nuke on, just because of all the defenses that such a target would have. Yes, I'm expecting needing to fire 10-12 missiles to get one on target.

I think that's the intention, but throw in 80-90 conventional missiles to "soak" the air defense, as a dozen alone seems small tbh.

Beats the "couple hundred" a JASSM or TLAM-C would require. Both DAF and DON increasingly seem to think that tactical nukes are going to be an integral part of beating the PLA's bigger numbers though. I think DA is still trying to figure out if they're even going to participate outside of the Coastal Artillery.

If you "only" need to shoot 50 conventionals and 10 nuke missiles, and you get a couple nuke leakers to obliterate an airbase runway with 80-90 HAS, you're coming out on top in the magazine fight too. One of the things learned from Desert Storm was that the magazine stockpile of PGMs was still too small relative to traditional dumb weapons to fight for more than a few days.

Gaza suggests it's still too small, and that's a single besieged city, not an opposing superpower with multiple Megagaza supercities.

The government can/should though if GBSD is short.

The House is the reason SLCM-N exists at all. If SLCM-N dies then GBSD is also on the chopping block.
 
The SLCM usage described essentially is strategic. I do not see how that occurs without a larger strategic exchange. There are some island bases that can be attacked as military only, non sovereign Chinese territory (Woody,Subi, Firecross,etc) but I’m unconvinced even that kind of exchange would stay tactical. By the time Block V is operational, so is B-21, which seems like a much more efficient way of delivering nukes rather than raining conventional munitions and penaides to help a dozen nukes through.
 
The House is the reason SLCM-N exists at all. If SLCM-N dies then GBSD is also on the chopping block.
I don't see why that should be the case. What can SLCM-N do that AGM-86/LRSO can't, except possibly requiring a huge amount of time to move a submarine in range of the target. A nuclear tipped JASSM-ER for use by SHs and and F-35s would make more sense, if the Navy does need a nuclear-tipped cruise missile at all.
 
I don't see why that should be the case. What can SLCM-N do that AGM-86/LRSO can't, except possibly requiring a huge amount of time to move a submarine in range of the target. A nuclear tipped JASSM-ER for use by SHs and and F-35s would make more sense, if the Navy does need a nuclear-tipped cruise missile at all.

Hypothetically at least one nuclear armed submarine is in position at the start of the conflict such that it has a shorter reaction time than a bomber. That seems like a thin justification to me but I presume that is the primary advantage. I think building a few more bombers and being able support an armed airborne alert during tension or conflict is probably a better use of funds. A pair of bombers is going to carry more than anything short of Blk Vs as dedicated nuclear platforms.
 
Hypothetically at least one nuclear armed submarine is in position at the start of the conflict such that it has a shorter reaction time than a bomber. That seems like a thin justification to me but I presume that is the primary advantage. I think building a few more bombers and being able support an armed airborne alert during tension or conflict is probably a better use of funds. A pair of bombers is going to carry more than anything short of Blk Vs as dedicated nuclear platforms.
It could be in the area, but hypothetically it could also have been picked up by ASW aircraft.
 
I do not see how that occurs without a larger strategic exchange. There are some island bases that can be attacked as military only, non sovereign Chinese territory (Woody,Subi, Firecross,etc) but I’m unconvinced even that kind of exchange would stay tactical.

This is the present conundrum all of DOD is finding itself in, tbf.

It seems to be slowly convincing itself that nuclear attacks on the Chinese mainland will be able to stay at sub-strategic thresholds, as long as they are small and limited to military formations and associated infrastructures within reasonable distances of the SCS and Taiwan, which doesn't seem incorrect. The anticipated use of low yield nuclear weapons is probably just recognition that PGM stockpiles aren't going to grow much over the next 3 to 4 years.

This just seems to be a repeat of 1980's naval thinking, though, so we've been here before.

I could see W76-2 or SLCM-N getting pulled from service if the 2027, 2030, and 2030+ apocalypse predictions pass without any events, but not before the PGM stockpiles of things like LRASM and JASSM-ER get bulked out by a few thousand weapons, at least.
 
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This is the present conundrum all of DOD is finding itself in, tbf.

It seems to be slowly convincing itself that nuclear attacks on the Chinese mainland will be able to stay at sub-strategic thresholds, as long as they are small and limited to military formations and associated infrastructures within reasonable distances of the SCS and Taiwan, which doesn't seem incorrect. The anticipated use of low yield nuclear weapons is probably just recognition that PGM stockpiles aren't going to grow much over the next 3 to 4 years.

This just seems to be a repeat of 1980's naval thinking, though, so we've been here before.

I could see W76-2 or SLCM-N getting pulled from service if the 2027, 2030, and 2030+ apocalypse predictions pass without any events, but not before the PGM stockpiles of things like LRASM and JASSM-ER get bulked out by a few thousand weapons, at least.

SLCM is not going to exist this decade, and functionally neither will Blk V. I also do not get the impression DoD is seriously contemplating tactical first use, only a response to Russia/PRC first use (but I am not in such circles). I think any tactical exchange by the two countries ends swiftly in either both backing down or both escalating to strategic use. Regardless, I do not see a use case for SLCM-N personally.

As for PGM inventories, I think that problem can be solved by end of decade with new munitions lines and expansion of production. AGM-158 is supposed to expand from 550 to 850.
 
SLCM is not going to exist this decade, and functionally neither will Blk V. I also do not get the impression DoD is seriously contemplating tactical first use, only a response to Russia/PRC first use (but I am not in such circles).

If the option is between "losing Taiwan" and "using nukes", when the PGM inventories fall below threshold, it will depend on who is in the White House I think. That assumes the war happens "on schedule" in 2027. If nothing happens then, or probably before the mid-2030's, then nothing happens and SLCM-N might just be a funny idea.

I think any tactical exchange by the two countries ends swiftly in either both backing down or both escalating to strategic use.

The third option is that it remains localized to INDOPACOM, with tit-for-tat nuclear strikes, because both sides rely on naval power to fight. Navies can't survive strategic exchanges because they have to return to ports, the war is merely over Taiwan and not the actual existence of either side's leadership, and there isn't a huge incentive to attack each other's populations due to the threat of ICBMs.

As for PGM inventories, I think that problem can be solved by end of decade with new munitions lines and expansion of production. AGM-158 is supposed to expand from 550 to 850.

Ukraine seems to suggest any major war will require quintuple digits of cruise missiles of all types on hand, tbf.

Russia has fired 7,500 cruise missiles of all types and 3,700 Shaheds as of last December, the latter of which it is using identically to and as supplements for cruise missiles, so that's at least 10,000 missiles expended in a relatively small regional war broadly similar to Korea. Neither side is any closer to victory than they were, and Russia is producing well north of a thousand cruise missiles a year, too.

At the very least it might finally clear out Tomahawk inventory and floor space in favor of LRASM/JASSM based airframes.
 
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Ukraine seems to suggest any major war might require quintuple digits of cruise missiles of all types on hand, tbf.

Russia has fired 7,500 cruise missiles of all types and 3,700 Shaheds as of last December, the latter of which it is using identically to and as supplements for cruise missiles, so that's at least 10,000 missiles expended in a relatively small regional war broadly similar to Korea. Those 300 extra missiles might buy you two additional theater-wide attacks at most.

The U.S. will also most likely begin SiAW and HACM production by 2027, and I expect these to be large multi year buys. There is also interest by both the USAF and ISN to purchase another thousand or so munitions a year in a similar time frame, though it remains questionable if anyone can meet the need. The introduction of the B-21 will also make the much larger inventory of glide bombs far more viable. Perhaps the U.S. will not have a completely satisfactory number of weapons by 2030 but it should at least be in a dramatically better position than now.
 
Ukraine seems to suggest any major war will require quintuple digits of cruise missiles of all types on hand, tbf.

Russia has fired 7,500 cruise missiles of all types and 3,700 Shaheds as of last December, the latter of which it is using identically to and as supplements for cruise missiles, so that's at least 10,000 missiles expended in a relatively small regional war broadly similar to Korea. Neither side is any closer to victory than they were, and Russia is producing well north of a thousand cruise missiles a year, too.
Agreed here. Any shooting war will require 10k+ units in inventory plus 1k or more new production annually.


At the very least it might finally clear out Tomahawk inventory and floor space in favor of LRASM/JASSM based airframes.
What JASSMs are able to be launched out of a Torpedo tube or VLS rig?
 
Agreed here. Any shooting war will require 10k+ units in inventory plus 1k or more new production annually.

What JASSMs are able to be launched out of a Torpedo tube or VLS rig?

USAF goal is 10k AGM-158, and it should just about be there by 2030. If something like ERAM or MACE actually does get purchased (Speedracer? Powered JDAM? Whatever SOCOMs little cruise missile is?) that would be great too…

Realistically the limiting factor for submarines is how quickly they can be reloaded. The limiting factor of surface vessels is likely how long they can survive. I suspect the Tomahawk inventory is adequate.
 
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Realistically the limiting factor for submarines is how quickly they can be reloaded.
It's a days work to refill the torpedo room of a fast attack, at a port with a crane truck. You could do it at Guam, I'm positive they have the crane trucks and an armory. You can do it at Pearl, I know they have the stuff (done it there).

You do not want to try it at sea. The weapons loading setup is a major breach of watertight integrity.


The limiting factor of surface vessels is likely how long they can survive. I suspect the Tomahawk inventory is adequate.
I suspect the real question is if the ESSMs can intercept an AShBM. The DDGs will probably do fine, the question is whether the carrier and everything else without Aegis can deal with those missiles.
 
I doubt a carrier would ever be without DDG escort around such threats.
Depends on whether the USN has grokked just how close the defending ship has to be to the carrier.

IIRC, carriers usually operate with their closest escort like 15nmi away, practically over the horizon. But that's too far away to deal with hypersonics, you need to be within ~5-7nmi of the target to be able to engage the hypersonic.
 
Depends on whether the USN has grokked just how close the defending ship has to be to the carrier.

IIRC, carriers usually operate with their closest escort like 15nmi away, practically over the horizon. But that's too far away to deal with hypersonics, you need to be within ~5-7nmi of the target to be able to engage the hypersonic.
Fairly sure SM-6 and SM-3 can manage just a tad more than 5-7nm. :cool:
 
It's a days work to refill the torpedo room of a fast attack, at a port with a crane truck. You could do it at Guam, I'm positive they have the crane trucks and an armory. You can do it at Pearl, I know they have the stuff (done it there).

You do not want to try it at sea. The weapons loading setup is a major breach of watertight integrity.

That is my point: submarines are not going to be reloading often enough for the tomahawk inventory to really matter. Realistically, only Hawaii is outside PRC ballistic missile range, even that assumes they are unwilling to use conventional ICBMs for an attack on a US state.

I suspect the real question is if the ESSMs can intercept an AShBM. The DDGs will probably do fine, the question is whether the carrier and everything else without Aegis can deal with those missiles.

I would presume at least one ABM equipped Aegis ship within 3000 yards of the carrier, as I thought was regular practice. The question to my mind is 1). do USN defensive systems have the capability to absorb the number of ballistic missiles the PLA-RF can fire into various range bands and 2). does the USN have the magazine capacity to absorb repeat strikes? The first one is quite unclear; the second one seems to be likely no. If the USN surface fleet can remain on station for extended periods, even at a distance (let us say 1000 miles off shore), then I would be pleasantly surprised.

All of this of course presumes that the PRC has sufficient ISR assets to provide targeting information for such strikes. However, given the extensive number of remote sensing satellites they have orbited now (something like 300-400, with 200 in just the last couple years), it seems likely that barring some ingenious orbital coup by the USSF or very effective deception scheme by the USN, the PRC will have fairly consistent global target tracking.

Short version - if the USN actually gets the chance to run out of its supply of ~2000 tomahawks, I think it is already doing extremely well.
 
Depends on whether the USN has grokked just how close the defending ship has to be to the carrier.

IIRC, carriers usually operate with their closest escort like 15nmi away, practically over the horizon. But that's too far away to deal with hypersonics, you need to be within ~5-7nmi of the target to be able to engage the hypersonic.

Presumably at least one of the defenders would be located down the threat axis between the carrier and the opposition coast, even if it was not adjacent to the carrier.
 
Depends on whether the USN has grokked just how close the defending ship has to be to the carrier.

IIRC, carriers usually operate with their closest escort like 15nmi away, practically over the horizon. But that's too far away to deal with hypersonics, you need to be within ~5-7nmi of the target to be able to engage the hypersonic.

2 to 5 nmi off the fantail to protect against ABMs and torpedoes. Return of the plane guard destroyer.

Fairly sure SM-6 and SM-3 can manage just a tad more than 5-7nm.

This would be a big ask.

THAAD is something like 20 km of ground range against ICBM reentry vehicles, which is to say if I draw a circle on the map around my battery, an RV landing 30 or 40 km away probably won't be able to be intercepted. KEI could probably go out to 40 km against a ICBM-type target. IRBMs may be slightly easier to intercept. Soviet expectations for A-135 complex was 30-40 IRBM (Pershing II) or 3-6 ICBM (Minuteman) reentry vehicles.

I'm not sure SM-3 has any real capability against hypergliders, because the SM-3 interceptor is the SDI railgun's ammunition, and SM-6 has no ABM interceptor capability at all because it's literally a SM-2ER with a AMRAAM seeker. There's been talk of giving SM-3 the THAAD interceptor so it can attack endo-atmospheric targets but "right now" (2020) the talk is (was?) a new-type interceptor for the SM-3 HAWK.
 
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This would be a big ask.

THAAD is something like 20 km of ground range against ICBM reentry vehicles, which is to say if I draw a circle on the map around my battery, an RV landing 30 or 40 km away probably won't be able to be intercepted. KEI could probably go out to 40 km against a ICBM-type target. IRBMs may be slightly easier to intercept. Soviet expectations for A-135 complex was 30-40 IRBM (Pershing II) or 3-6 ICBM (Minuteman) reentry vehicles.

I'm not sure SM-3 has any real capability against hypergliders, because the SM-3 interceptor is the SDI railgun's ammunition, and SM-6 has no ABM interceptor capability at all because it's literally a SM-2ER with a AMRAAM seeker. There's been talk of giving SM-3 the THAAD interceptor so it can attack endo-atmospheric targets but "right now" (2020) the talk is (was?) a new-type interceptor for the SM-3 HAWK.
Dude, go do some research and get back to me. First SM-6 BM intercept was almsot 10 years ago, most recent one was like 2 months ago.

As for SM-3, we're weren't talking about HGVs, just standard AShBMs. Depending on where the BM is launched from relative to the ship, it might not get very far at all.
 
2 to 5 nmi off the fantail to protect against ABMs and torpedoes. Return of the plane guard destroyer.



This would be a big ask.

THAAD is something like 20 km of ground range against ICBM reentry vehicles, which is to say if I draw a circle on the map around my battery, an RV landing 30 or 40 km away probably won't be able to be intercepted. KEI could probably go out to 40 km against a ICBM-type target. IRBMs may be slightly easier to intercept. Soviet expectations for A-135 complex was 30-40 IRBM (Pershing II) or 3-6 ICBM (Minuteman) reentry vehicles.

To be fair, unguided ballistic missiles are going to be coming in hotter than a MaRV, which presumably has to catch some air and do at least a mild pull up maneuver of some kind to be able to actually track a moving target. Also the primary limitation would probably not be how close the defending unit is to the target but whether the defending unit is between the target and the incoming fire, with slightly higher altitudes being probably a marginal problem given ample warning and sufficient interceptor altitude.

I'm not sure SM-3 has any real capability against hypergliders, because the SM-3 interceptor is the SDI railgun's ammunition, and SM-6 has no ABM interceptor capability at all because it's literally a SM-2ER with a AMRAAM seeker. There's been talk of giving SM-3 the THAAD interceptor so it can attack endo-atmospheric targets but "right now" (2020) the talk is (was?) a new-type interceptor for the SM-3 HAWK.

SM-3 is exoatmospheric only, so it is not effective against anything truly gliding (although "space" is a somewhat nebular definition in this case). It is not clear to me whether some hypersonics actually boost into space proper (100km) or remain within the edge of the atmosphere throughout their entire flight. In the former case, SM-3 might engage before re-entry within close enough range. Most likely however SM-3 is limited to MARV type targets that are ballistic outside of atmosphere and would adjust their trajectory after re-entry (I'm thinking DF-21D and its DF-26 equivalent, for instance).

SM-6 has in fact intercepted medium range ballistic missile targets, though I would think its control surfaces would struggle at the higher altitudes some hypersonics might cruise at. It is not clear if there is an envelope gap between the two types or not, but I would guess there is. But SM-6 should at least be effective against a glider or maneuvering re-entry vehicle when its in its terminal dive (and possible other SAMs as well), so long as the firing ship is the target or is very near the target. A hypersonic glider is by definition losing speed across its entire flight path after burn out, and diving through the thicker air will only accelerate that process. So speed of the glider will vary inversely with range to the target and also to some extent with altitude, and that will affect which SAM envelopes it falls within. It is not a binary solution set; some engagement geometries might favor the offense or defense more but still be achievable intercepts with lower success rates.

There is definitely a lot to be gained by engaging a glider at extreme range either before it attempts any maneuvers or else to force it to maneuver early in its flight path - the latter option still increases the engagement envelope of terminal defensive weapons by slowing the target down.
 
To be fair, unguided ballistic missiles are going to be coming in hotter than a MaRV, which presumably has to catch some air and do at least a mild pull up maneuver of some kind to be able to actually track a moving target. Also the primary limitation would probably not be how close the defending unit is to the target but whether the defending unit is between the target and the incoming fire, with slightly higher altitudes being probably a marginal problem given ample warning and sufficient interceptor altitude.

It's hard to imagine that the CSG, with its limited number of escorts, could counter a multi-threat axis attack by hypergliders, supersonic missiles, and MaRVs, but a ersatz FCTF should be able to survive. RIP forward deployed CSG I guess unless the PRC is incompetent.

There is definitely a lot to be gained by engaging a glider at extreme range either before it attempts any maneuvers or else to force it to maneuver early in its flight path - the latter option still increases the engagement envelope of terminal defensive weapons by slowing the target down.

This is what SM-3 HAWK was supposed to do tbf. It would have been a new interceptor because E2I yucky or something idk.
 
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It's hard to imagine that the CSG, with its limited number of escorts, could counter a multi-threat axis attack by hypergliders, supersonic missiles, and MaRVs, but a ersatz FCTF should be able to survive. RIP forward deployed CSG I guess unless the PRC is incompetent.

Realistically, most of the ballistic or hypersonic weapons are going to be coming from the same threat axis unless the formation is very close to the first island chain. There are not a lot of geometries for an H-6 attack that do not pass over Taiwanese, Japanese, or Philippine airspace and given its range limitations, such a strike is going to have limited freedom of movement once in the second chain. If they are relying on a fighter escort, that freedom movement gets rather close to a straight line. Ship based ballistic missiles might be placed further afield, but the further from friendly fighter cover they are, the less likely they are to survive. Realistically the threat axis is roughly centered on Taiwan and the threat arc is probably only some 30-60 degrees or so depending on the position and distance of target task force.

This is what SM-3 HAWK was supposed to do tbf but I think HDWS died a while ago. It would have been a new interceptor.

The budget option would be mating E2I-derived THAAD interceptor to SM-3 I guess.

GPI unfortunately will probably take a decade to produce anything deployable.
 
Well if they want an SM-3 variant that can do end-atmospheric intercepts just replace the SM-3 Block IIA's Raytheon built EKV with the THAAD's KKV.
 
Well if they want an SM-3 variant that can do end-atmospheric intercepts just replace the SM-3 Block IIA's Raytheon built EKV with the THAAD's KKV.
THAAD is a LM product, this was a Raytheon concept. They've been working on kill vehicles for quite awhile, they will manage.
 
THAAD is a LM product, this was a Raytheon concept. They've been working on kill vehicles for quite awhile, they will manage.

In that case Raytheon no doubt has developed its' own version equivalent to the THAAD KKV.
 

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