LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[bobbymike]

House panel quashes immediate funding for mobile ballistic missile option
April 28, 2016

An amendment
included in the House Armed Services Committee's version of the fiscal year
2017 defense policy bill prohibits funds for a mobile variant of the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent System.

Offered by Rep.
Rick Larsen (D-WA), the language blocks funds in FY-17 and FY-18 to retain or
develop a mobile option for GBSD, the Minuteman III's replacement.

The amendment comes
after Air Force and industry officials revealed plans to explore a mobile
option for the intercontinental ballistic missile replacement. As part of its
technology maturation and risk reduction draft request for proposals, the Air
Force asked industry to explore a mobile basing option for the GBSD, Inside
the Air Force previously reported. The design features and total cost to
support the modular GBSD will be evaluated during the TMRR phase, Air Force
spokesman Maj. Rob Leese told ITAF March 4.

In an April 11
interview with ITAF, service officials emphasized that the mobile basing
option might not appear on GBSD until the 2050 time frame. The draft RFP asks
industry to look at an open architecture system for GBSD, so that the initial
design gives the Air Force the ability to adjust to any new requirements in the
future, including a mobile basing variant, Eric Single, chief of Air Force
Global Strike Division acquisition, told ITAF. Industry will deliver a
preliminary design during GBSD's technology maturation and risk-reduction
phase, which is not tied directly to the mobile option, but to any capability
upgrades the service must make over the weapon's life cycle, he said.

Separately, Larsen
offered another amendment regarding GBSD which asks for "the incremental cost
associated with missile designs which include the flexibility to develop mobile
variants, as well as the strategic doctrine which will inform an eventual decision
on whether to included mobility requirements in a future procurement."

The amendment would
expand language submitted in the House Armed Services strategic forces
subcommittee's mark of the bill, which demands a more detailed acquisition
strategy, contract structure and cost estimate for GBSD. While the mark asked
for more information on the missile system's recapitalization, including
opportunities for commonality between GBSD and the Navy's Trident II D5
sub-launched ballistic missile, the subcommittee omitted language on the mobile
missile option. -- Leigh Giangreco

 

[Grey Havoc]

With 'friends' like these...

:

 

[sferrin]

With 'friends' like these...

:

No kidding. I find it absolutely stupefying that we have lawyers making decisions on technical or strategic matters. Larsen (a Democrat) with silos in his state. . .. Nah, no conflict of interest there.

 

[bobbymike]

Senate lawmaker seeks clarity from Air Force on GBSD time line

May 06, 2016

Sen. Steve Daines (R-MT) has requested a meeting with Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James to discuss the milestone A review for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent System, congressional sources told Inside the Air Force this week.

Daines previously questioned why the Air Force had not reached its milestone A decision for the Minuteman III's replacement during an April 20 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing with Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall.

Kendall assured Daines that GBSD's timeline remains on track, but that his office was waiting on an independent cost estimate, a legal prerequisite to declaring milestone A.

"So I have to satisfy that legal requirement in order to have the milestone A, as a dot-on-the-wall of something you did," he said. "That does not slow down releasing the RFP industry, which is the substance of what we're doing. So I'm going to hit milestone A as soon as I can."

The RFP release will come within weeks, but signing milestone A is dependent upon the cost analysis office giving the Pentagon a better cost estimate, Kendall said. Milestone A could come in June, but Kendall cautioned he did not have control over that aspect of the time line.

The milestone A shift is a fairly new change, Eric Single, chief of Air Force Global Strike Division acquisition, told ITAF in an April 11 interview. Although the Air Force would like to complete milestone A before releasing the RFP, the key documents for the RFP are the acquisition strategy, test plan and systems engineering plan, he said. Those three documents are complete and are in final work, so the Air Force was comfortable receiving proposals while the service continues to track additional requirements such as the independent cost estimate, he said.

"Milestone A is a statutory certification before you start [technology maturation risk and reduction]," he said. "So it really needs to be done just prior to contract award."

The Air Force is able to release the RFP without an independent cost estimate because the service already has a program cost estimate, he said. However, the cost estimate doesn't impact the RFP since the service will have a negotiated settlement with industry, Single added.

"What is important for the RFP is the scope of the work that we want done in TMRR, so we have to very much detail and describe that," he said. "The proposal itself details the exact work in TMRR and then industry will come back with a proposal on how they would accomplish that work, what they think the cost would be to do that and then we do the negotiation."

Meanwhile, GBSD's potential mobile option could face political headwinds as the Senate draws up its defense policy bill. An amendment included in the House Armed Services Committee's version of the fiscal year 2017 defense policy bill prohibits funds for a mobile variant of the GBSD, ITAF previously reported. Offered by Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA), the language blocks funds in FY-17 and FY-18 to retain or develop a mobile option for GBSD.

The Air Force first tossed up the idea of a mobile ground missile fleet during the Cold War. But in 1961, the Pentagon quashed plans for a rail-operated system, instead opting for more underground sites.

"I sponsored this amendment to press the Air Force to focus on modernizing the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad, instead of developing unnecessary capabilities," Larsen said in a May 4 email to ITAF. "By prohibiting mobility, [the House Armed Services Committee] is saving taxpayers billions by rejecting a scheme that was unwanted and unworkable even when our country was facing grave nuclear threats during the height of the Cold War."

 

[bobbymike]

The Case for the Ground Deterrent

—Brian Everstine

5/9/2016

A healthy nuclear deterrent without a large, healthy intercontinental ballistic missile force just isn’t possible. The Air Force currently has 450 missiles on three bases, spread out across five states, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, deputy commander of US Strategic Command. Without those, a potential adversary could launch an attack focused on the small number of bomber bases and submarine bases, and effectively take out the US nuclear option. During a 2013 visit to China, Chinese officials said North Korea had 10 missiles, a number that potentially could destroy the intellectual capability at national laboratories, along with the production, delivery, and weapons storage of nuclear bombs. “I think having a very affordable deterrent capability, like today’s ground-based deterrent … makes great sense to our country,” Wilson said. “It means an adversary has to go all in with a large number of weapons.” (See also: Moving Forward on GBSD and Needed Nuclear Investment)

 

[bobbymike]

42 years ago in Aviation Week the perfect, IMHO, MMIII replacement is described

 

[TomS]

A healthy nuclear deterrent without a large, healthy intercontinental ballistic missile force just isn’t possible. The Air Force currently has 450 missiles on three bases, spread out across five states, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, deputy commander of US Strategic Command. Without those, a potential adversary could launch an attack focused on the small number of bomber bases and submarine bases, and effectively take out the US nuclear option.

This seems to ignore the fact that a substantial fraction of the US SSBN force is at sea at any given time. Killing their bases still leaves a hundred or more submarine-based warheads available.

 

[sferrin]

A healthy nuclear deterrent without a large, healthy intercontinental ballistic missile force just isn’t possible. The Air Force currently has 450 missiles on three bases, spread out across five states, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, deputy commander of US Strategic Command. Without those, a potential adversary could launch an attack focused on the small number of bomber bases and submarine bases, and effectively take out the US nuclear option.

This seems to ignore the fact that a substantial fraction of the US SSBN force is at sea at any given time. Killing their bases still leaves a hundred or more submarine-based warheads available.

At best 7 SSBNs are out at any given time. That's seven targets that could be taken out in minutes.

 

[TomS]

A healthy nuclear deterrent without a large, healthy intercontinental ballistic missile force just isn’t possible. The Air Force currently has 450 missiles on three bases, spread out across five states, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, deputy commander of US Strategic Command. Without those, a potential adversary could launch an attack focused on the small number of bomber bases and submarine bases, and effectively take out the US nuclear option.

This seems to ignore the fact that a substantial fraction of the US SSBN force is at sea at any given time. Killing their bases still leaves a hundred or more submarine-based warheads available.

At best 7 SSBNs are out at any given time. That's seven targets that could be taken out in minutes.

With what magical ASW capability? No one yet has demonstrated anything that can reliably find and kill US SSBNs in open ocean.

 

[sferrin]

With what magical ASW capability? No one yet has demonstrated anything that can reliably find and kill US SSBNs in open ocean.

Which doesn't preclude one appearing tomorrow. Nor does it mean that just because one can't read about it on Gawker that something doesn't exist. And there's always just tailing them 24/7. Scoffing at the idea of a counter is usually considered unwise. I'd prefer making the other guy risk 400 ICBMs launched at my own country than allowing them to take out my entire nuclear force with a handful of torpedoes.

 

[TomS]

With what magical ASW capability? No one yet has demonstrated anything that can reliably find and kill US SSBNs in open ocean.

Which doesn't preclude one appearing tomorrow. Nor does it mean that just because one can't read about it on Gawker that something doesn't exist. And there's always just tailing them 24/7. Scoffing at the idea of a counter is usually considered unwise. I'd prefer making the other guy risk 400 ICBMs launched at my own country than allowing them to take out my entire nuclear force with a handful of torpedoes.

Re: Tailing 24/7. It's not a trivial task -- total track time against US SSBNs is still measured in hours, including the entire Cold War.

People have been worrying about the magical "make the oceans transparent" technology since the 1980s at least -- it's still magical. It's not going to change overnight.

 

[bobbymike]

With what magical ASW capability? No one yet has demonstrated anything that can reliably find and kill US SSBNs in open ocean.

Which doesn't preclude one appearing tomorrow. Nor does it mean that just because one can't read about it on Gawker that something doesn't exist. And there's always just tailing them 24/7. Scoffing at the idea of a counter is usually considered unwise. I'd prefer making the other guy risk 400 ICBMs launched at my own country than allowing them to take out my entire nuclear force with a handful of torpedoes.

There is no benefit to getting rid of the ground based leg of the Triad. You don't enhance security, your allies are worried about your commtiment to extended deterrence, you don't really save money in any real sense given the cost of ICBMs to the defense budget/federal budget and in fact leave yourself potentially more vulnerable with two legs that can be destroyed by conventional means.

 

[sferrin]

With what magical ASW capability? No one yet has demonstrated anything that can reliably find and kill US SSBNs in open ocean.

Which doesn't preclude one appearing tomorrow. Nor does it mean that just because one can't read about it on Gawker that something doesn't exist. And there's always just tailing them 24/7. Scoffing at the idea of a counter is usually considered unwise. I'd prefer making the other guy risk 400 ICBMs launched at my own country than allowing them to take out my entire nuclear force with a handful of torpedoes.

There is no benefit to getting rid of the ground based leg of the Triad. You don't enhance security, your allies are worried about your commtiment to extended deterrence, you don't really save money in any real sense given the cost of ICBMs to the defense budget/federal budget and in fact leave yourself potentially more vulnerable with two legs that can be destroyed by conventional means.

Dumping the triad is all downside. Sure, you might save a few bucks but it'll cost you far more than you'll save in the end.

 

[Triton]

Does GBSD also have money allocated for new computer systems and software? Or are they going to try to keep the legacy equipment going with the new missiles? Do the legacy silos need any structural or mechanical updates since they are now over 50 years old?

 

[bobbymike]

Does GBSD also have money allocated for new computer systems and software? Or are they going to try to keep the legacy equipment going with the new missiles? Do the legacy silos need any structural or mechanical updates since they are now over 50 years old?

My understanding is yes if you look at an earlier post that contains the FBO RfP it details the totality of the program.

 

[bobbymike]

Speaking of SSBN threats

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/lethal-undersea-drones-the-ultimate-military-game-changer-16109

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.newsmaker.com.au/news/57191/intercontinental-ballistic-missile-market-growth-forecast-at-58-cagr-to-2020#.Vz5EHq10zMq

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2016/usaf-peds/0605230f_4_pb_2016.pdf

 

[bobbymike]

https://defensesystems.com/articles/2014/07/09/air-force-icbm-technologies.aspx

Found this article just searching ICBM/GBSD terms but don't see it posted at SPF. Anyway, found this interesting:

The announcement is looking to develop an open architecture thrust vector system for a three-stage, medium-class, ICBM launch vehicle that can be used across all three stages.

Now do they mean 'medium' in the arms control sense up to 100 tons (Peacekeeper) or in the booster size class which would be MMIII sized as they call the Peacekeeper solid rocket a "Large Class Size" booster? I'm guessing the latter.

Also, for questions up the thread about what encompasses the program

Additional studies focus on developing propulsion and thermal protection systems, adapting multiple independent reentry vehicle capabilities into the Minuteman III, increasing penetration capabilities, improving battery designs, designing advanced ordnance initiation systems and safeties, examining the possible use of a Trajectory Correcting Vehicle or a Trajectory Shaping Vehicles, and improving missile stage separations.

Although I have read elsewhere it includes the C2 and modernized MMIII silos.

 

[bobbymike]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/how-much-does-new-icbm-cost?NL=AW-19&Issue=AW-19_20160901_AW-19_829&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_3&utm_rid=CPEN1000000230026&utm_campaign=6906&utm_medium=email&elq2=bc5a0778c2af492d8fbadeeca5f03a74

$62 billion over 30 years is literally peanuts considering total federal government spending over next 30 years will potentially exceed $200 TRILLION. Modernizing ICBMs equal to 0.031% of this figure. Why the "it's unaffordable" argument is so disingenuous.

 

[bobbymike]

GBSD Enters Technology Maturation, Risk Reduction Phase

9/6/2016

​The Air Force’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, which will eventually replace the service’s aging intercontinental ballistic missiles, received milestone A approval on Aug. 23, moving the program into the next phase of acquisition, according to a release. GBSD will now enter the technology maturation and risk reduction phase, where the Air Force anticipates awarding up to two contracts by the end of Fiscal 2017. The Air Force wants to keep the new system in service through 2075 and is expected to deploy it beginning in the late 2020s. The Minuteman III missile dates to the 1970s and was designed with a 10-year service life. Hill AFB, Utah, is managing the acquisitions process for the new ICBM. (See previously: Ground Based Question Mark from the July issue of Air Force Magazine.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2612/Article/933679/af-reaches-first-milestone-in-acquisition-of-new-icbm.aspx

 

[Orionblamblam]

The Air Force wants to keep the new system in service through 2075 and is expected to deploy it beginning in the late 2020s.

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

 

[sferrin]

The Air Force wants to keep the new system in service through 2075 and is expected to deploy it beginning in the late 2020s.

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

At least in the US anyway. Hell, I can't help but wonder if (computers aside) GBSD will even be as advanced as Peacekeeper or Midgetman.

 

[RyanC]

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

Even more *sadder*

USAF assumes that Missile Defense will not make any major advances in *fifty* years.

As I see it, GBSD will have a very limited service life (2025-2029 out to 2035) before it's just obsoleted wholesale by either decently high powered lasers or a nation-state deciding to build out a GBI style system to the maximum possible capability.

 

[sferrin]

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

Even more *sadder*

USAF assumes that Missile Defense will not make any major advances in *fifty* years.

As I see it, GBSD will have a very limited service life (2025-2029 out to 2035) before it's just obsoleted wholesale by either decently high powered lasers or a nation-state deciding to build out a GBI style system to the maximum possible capability.

Good luck with that. That's a lot of money. Furthermore, the US is far ahead of either Russia or China in the strategic ABM department, and neither of those two nations share your view as they are both pursuing new ICBMs and SLBMs.

 

[bobbymike]

The Air Force wants to keep the new system in service through 2075 and is expected to deploy it beginning in the late 2020s.

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

At least in the US anyway. Hell, I can't help but wonder if (computers aside) GBSD will even be as advanced as Peacekeeper or Midgetman.

And this from a 1987 issue of Air Force Monthly

Smaller Boosters, Bigger Loads

Rocket engines are also in for a big shot of change as a result of re­search rallied by Forecast II. Such research is generating a new class of fuels—"high-energy-density pro­pellants"—that are expected to dou­ble the thrust of existing solid and liquid propellants in space boosters. Their energy density—thrust per unit of mass—may be ten times or more that of current propellants. This will make them amenable to containment in boosters of dwarfish dimensions and of puny poundage in comparison with the boosters that now loom like skyscrapers on planetary launchpads. The implications for the US space program are profound. It has always been plagued by the extraordinarily high cost of boosting payloads into orbit. Smaller boosters capable of carrying larger and more numerous payloads at the same total system weight will translate into far greater cost-effectiveness, capability, and versatility for the US space pro­gram, which is currently short on all such attributes. Forecast II sees the advanced fuels as powering the heavy-lift launch vehicles of the future. USAF has a crying need for such lifters. The Space Shuttle fleet has a limited and uncertain future, and the Stra­tegic Defense Initiative program, the Space Station program, and oth­ers to involve outsize payloads will make strong demands on US spacelaunch capabilities in the 1990s and beyond. The first of the heavy lifters—the Advanced Launch System (ALS)­is being developed and will be op­erational well before Forecast II's futuristic propellants come on the scene—but maybe not all that long before.


The Air Force plans to demon­strate the technologies of such fuels by 1990. Experiments on them be­gan this year, and researchers be­lieve that the technologies will be under control in relatively short order. Such work stands as yet another example of going nature one better in Forecast II research. It involves exciting the outer-shell electrons of such inherently stable chemical ele­ments as argon and krypton to make them unstable. Once this state is reached, the agitated electrons are "bound" in ionic or covalent com­pounds that expend enormous, pent-up energy upon combustion. Air Force Astronautics Labora­tory (formerly Rocket Propulsion Laboratory) and AFOSR have awarded twelve contracts to univer­sities to master the chemistry and the "excited-state physics" in­volved in producing the powerful propellants. Forecast II officials are confident that such mastery is well within reach. Supercomputer calculations have told them so.

 

[sferrin]

Anything ever come of that?

 

[GeorgeA]

"Excited-state physics" is the key phrase. Hard to make that happen and if you could, hard to store the result for any useful length of time.

Also (off-topic but on-topic), shouldn't this topic be in Aerospace instead of The Bar?

 

[Orionblamblam]

Anything ever come of that?

Seemingly no. A generation ago there was excitement over high energy density propellants such as N20 (that's N-Twenty, not N-Two-Oh, a Buckeyball of nitrogen) and metastable helium and metallic hydrogen, but it's been years and more years since I've heard anything but theory. More than a decade ago there were reports of an exciting new development in explosives, some new molecule that would provide a few percent better bang than HMX or RDX; and for that few percent the cost was insanely high.

Something people often don't realize is that nature has limits. Chemical rockets are about as good as chemistry will allow... and have been since the 1960's. To get *meaningful* improvements in performance, you'll need to go to wholly different technologies (scramjets, nuclear rockets, etc.) or rely on some pretty hand-wavy theories.

 

[sferrin]

Anything ever come of that?

Seemingly no. A generation ago there was excitement over high energy density propellants such as N20 (that's N-Twenty, not N-Two-Oh, a Buckeyball of nitrogen) and metastable helium and metallic hydrogen, but it's been years and more years since I've heard anything but theory. More than a decade ago there were reports of an exciting new development in explosives, some new molecule that would provide a few percent better bang than HMX or RDX; and for that few percent the cost was insanely high.

Something people often don't realize is that nature has limits. Chemical rockets are about as good as chemistry will allow... and have been since the 1960's. To get *meaningful* improvements in performance, you'll need to go to wholly different technologies (scramjets, nuclear rockets, etc.) or rely on some pretty hand-wavy theories.

'bout what I figured. It's why the RL10 is still so popular.

 

[Orionblamblam]

'bout what I figured. It's why the RL10 is still so popular.

Yup. Engines like the RL-10 and SSME produce very nearly every last little bit of performance. There is only just so much energy to be had in hydrogen and oxygen chemical reactions, and once you have effectively captured and utilized half of that energy you start running up against diminishing returns. You can play tricks... turn the SSME into an aerospike and you'll produce better results for a ground-to-space booster. Ad a *really* big expansion nozzle and you'll improve performance in a vacuum (this ha been done to great success with the RL-10). But the best course for improvement available would be in maintaining the performance while reducing complexity and cost while improving reliability. Jack up chamber pressure and you might get a slight improvement in performance, but you'll reduce the size of the engine.

If you want *really* better performance, you need to use something very different. And apart from nukes, there's nothing else that has been demonstrated to work. And I have doubts about the likelihood of nuclear-powered ICBMs.

 

[marauder2048]

So, what's sadder:
1) That the USAF assumes that there won't be any meaningful improvements in propulsion or structures in *fifty* years
2) That they're probably right

Even more *sadder*

USAF assumes that Missile Defense will not make any major advances in *fifty* years.

As I see it, GBSD will have a very limited service life (2025-2029 out to 2035) before it's just obsoleted wholesale by either decently high powered lasers or a nation-state deciding to build out a GBI style system to the maximum possible capability.

It's not like the US hasn't been investing in MaRVs (all of the CPGS risk reduction flights) and next-gen penetration aids. I'd actually be more concerned with defeating EMRG-based terminal defenses.

 

[bobbymike]

Mark my words they are laying the ground work for cancellation.

http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-09-06/new-nuclear-armed-missile-seen-costing-u-s-85-billion-up-36

Kendall wrote that inflation assumptions and the defense industry’s capability to produce the missiles are major sources of cost uncertainty. Still, he said the $85 billion placeholder is “the most reasonable estimate of program cost at this point.”

Did you ever think you would read, although many of us suspected, a statement like this?

The last ICBM development occurred in the 1980s, she said.

The state of the Triad and nuclear enterprise is to the point, IMHO, many, many politicians Republican and Democrat could be charged with Treasonous neglect of our national security.

 

[sferrin]

I'll bet if we cancel it it will magically be easier ten years down the road. How pathetic is it that even North Korea has more ambition?

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force Challenges Pentagon Cost Estimate of Next-Generation Nuclear Missiles

More work needs to be done before the Defense Department can accurately estimate the cost of modernizing the nation’s arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James said Sept. 7.

The Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office recently projected that the ground-based strategic deterrent program, known as GBSD, would cost at least $85 billion in the coming decades, according to Bloomberg News. That number is $23 billion higher than the latest estimate put forth by the Air Force.

The large discrepancy was partly the result of differing methodology and assumptions about various facets of the program, James told reporters during a media roundtable at the Pentagon.

“The CAPE used one program and extrapolated forward. We used a variety of components of programs and extrapolated forward to build up our estimates,” she said. “We had certain assumptions about efficiencies in manufacturing, CAPE had different assumptions about efficiencies in manufacturing. And there was probably 15 other different assumptions as well.”

The latest estimates may not be reliable because they are based on antiquated data, she said.

“The difference in the cost estimates basically, fundamentally comes down to: We have not collectively done a cost estimate of this type for probably more than 40 years,” she said. “The data that everybody is using to try to build up these cost estimates is somewhat dated simply because we haven’t done it in so long.”

James expects the projections to change as more information is gathered.

“As we go forward, as we get the proposals back from industry, this will inform what I believe will be refinements in that cost estimate over time as we learn more,” she said. “The point is, if you haven’t done it in 40 years you need to refine it as you go along.”

Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman are all vying to build the next-generation of ICBMs. James voiced optimism about the program, despite concerns about the price tag.

“It’s an important program,” she said. “We’re going to work through this. There’s just no question in my mind.”

The project has already reached an important milestone, with the request for proposals from industry having been released in July, she noted.

“We’re moving ahead and we will work through these different cost estimates. And then whatever the cost estimate will be, we will put it into our five-year defense plan” at the end of this year, she said.

 

[marauder2048]

SECNAV Mabus' call to abolish OSD (and by extension CAPE) is sounding better and better.

...

The various inflation indices used in DOD is a recurring theme here (at least with me).
It can lead to wildly different estimates especially for a program as big and as long running as GBSD.

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

 

[sferrin]

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

Because those paying attention have been talking about the train wreck since the Clinton administration.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

Because those paying attention have been talking about the train wreck since the Clinton administration.

Deborah Lee James told reporters at the Air Force Association conference that the delta between the cost estimates for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program is “not that high” and indicated she was not surprised by the difference in numbers, given how long it has been between the last ICBM program and its replacement.

“We haven’t done this in 40 years. There were different approaches used to build up the costs,” James said.

:'(

This was not too long ago called the Land Based Strategic Deterrent to be deployed in 2018.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/james-new-icbm-cost-question-will-not-impact-next-budget

Why do the words 'train wreck' come to mind?

CAPE just revised its B-21 APUC down by ~ 7% which translates into a multi billion dollar swing in total program cost. Is that a train wreck?