LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[marauder2048]

It's interesting to look at how assumptions and technologies may have changed since the last serious mobile-missile go-around.

Midgetman was predicated on a hail of warheads over its entire deployment zone, hence its complexity despite the fact that the missile itself was quite small. The Russians put a full-size ICBM on a wheeled launcher that's supposed to use normal roads, but in practice I doubt it.

A 30 klb weapon on a smaller, constantly dispersed vehicle would be different. However, you would have to worry about tracking, given the number of insecure or poorly secured video surveillance networks that exist.

It's been analyzed to death but an advantage of rail mobility is that it gets around the "it looks unlike anything else on planet earth" tracking liability inherent to wheeled mobile launchers.

 

[LowObservable]

But a 30,000 lb missile wouldn't need much more than the 80,000 lb gross weight of a standard semi. Every Petro and Flying J in the nation could be a nuclear site...

 

[TomS]

Not sure how that's a good thing.

 

[LowObservable]

It probably isn't, but we're into considering possibilities here.

 

[sferrin]

Not sure how that's a good thing.

How is it a bad thing? Am I going to be more dead if they hit a gas station 5 miles away than if they hit an air base 5 miles away? Not trying to be a smart ass here, I'm honestly curious how making the enemy's targeting problem several orders of magnitude more difficult is a bad thing. That said, I can think of several OTHER reasons why a nuclear weapon traversing the interstate highways would be a bad thing, mostly because of our own people. (Sad as that is.) Every (pardon my French) attention whore in the country would be trying to stop them for their 15 seconds of fame. Imagine SJWs blocking off nuclear weapons vehicles instead of shutting down a freeway or crapping on cop cars. Short of a "kill zone" around the convoys (which would elicit a whole 'nother level of chicken-little hysteria) this kind of problem would be unavoidable. On top of that you can be sure there would be a group of bored stupid people who would make it their hobby to spot and track the vehicles and post current locations real-time on the internet. (Effectively doing the enemy's job for them.)

Trains would be perfect as would offroad TELs like Midgetman (or that ABM-armed Peacekeeper carrying hovercraft). Have them trolling around in areas already off-limits to the public like the Nevada Test Site, White Sand Missile Range, etc. Hydrofoils might not be bad either. The could anchor or patrol on diesel most of the time and then scatter fairly quickly. If I could pick my perfect deployment method though I'd have something like a Peackeeper in a superhard silo with each silo having it's own radar and maybe half a dozen HiBEX/LoADS-type missiles in silos. Like Ratheon's Quick Kill on steroids. (Or a railgun with guided munitions when they're sufficiently developed.)

 

[LowObservable]

Rather than worrying about the SJWs and bored stupid people, I'd focus on the level of security provided by speed-camera networks.

 

[sferrin]

Rather than worrying about the SJWs and bored stupid people, I'd focus on the level of security provided by speed-camera networks.

That too. (Though it's probably less of an issue in the US than other places.) According to Wiki:

"As of 2009, speed cameras existed in 48 communities in the United States, including in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Washington, and Washington, D.C.[79]"

It's undoubtedly grown but I doubt it would be that difficult to map out everywhere there AREN'T those camera and just go there. I'm sure if Uncle Sugar said, "if you'll let us deploy our road-mobile ICBMs in your state we'll make traffic cams illegal there" there would be states that signed up. Something like that would be relatively easy to control. Hundreds of millions of people with cell phone cameras much less so.

 

[marauder2048]

But a 30,000 lb missile wouldn't need much more than the 80,000 lb gross weight of a standard semi. Every Petro and Flying J in the nation could be a nuclear site...

It's a fine idea that's been proposed many times but the security and command vehicles would be way too conspicuous and the public interface issues are probably insurmountable.

We already transport literally tons of nuclear waste and solid rocket boosters via rail on a regular basis with very few issues.

Going for a 60,000 - 80,000 lb MMIII sized missile (and IFOG based inertial guidance) mitigates many of the problems they ran into trying to rail enable a 200,000 lb MX.

And to sferrin's point, you could carry along an overlay or underlay ABM system. IOW, the scalability, cost and silo-compabilitity arguments are compelling and it gets you very close
to the survivability of the continually dispersed public road mobile system with fewer headaches.

 

[sferrin]

And to sferrin's point, you could carry along an overlay or underlay ABM system. IOW, the scalability, cost and silo-compabilitity arguments are compelling and it gets you very close
to the survivability of the continually dispersed public road mobile system with fewer headaches.

I've often wondered about the possibility of rail-mobile ABMs/strategic SAMs/and their radars. One could fit a hell of a radar on a train car.

 

[marauder2048]

And to sferrin's point, you could carry along an overlay or underlay ABM system. IOW, the scalability, cost and silo-compabilitity arguments are compelling and it gets you very close
to the survivability of the continually dispersed public road mobile system with fewer headaches.

I've often wondered about the possibility of rail-mobile ABMs/strategic SAMs/and their radars. One could fit a hell of a radar on a train car.

"Enough is Enough! I have had it with these motherf**king Sprints on this motherf**king train!"

 

[Grey Havoc]

And to sferrin's point, you could carry along an overlay or underlay ABM system. IOW, the scalability, cost and silo-compabilitity arguments are compelling and it gets you very close
to the survivability of the continually dispersed public road mobile system with fewer headaches.

I've often wondered about the possibility of rail-mobile ABMs/strategic SAMs/and their radars. One could fit a hell of a radar on a train car.

"Enough is Enough! I have had it with these motherf**king Sprints on this motherf**king train!"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PuG_vORgYY

 

[Pioneer]

I'm sorry to be cynical, but how many of these railway/tunnel ICBM systems has the Pentagon wasted million/billions $$$$ on, to no avail?
Why cant they brush the dust off the Mobile Minuteman program for rail-based ICBMs for which the USAF released details in1959. Or more relevant why not the MX basing studies (Peacekeeper Rail Garrison1980's) and implement this comprehensive study?
I think its ironic, that whilst the U.S. publicised such basing systems since the 1960's (Minuteman), the former Soviet Union, and now Russia and PRC are actually doing what the U.S. has been flogging like a dead and bloated elephant in the sun for decades. More action and less talk. Seriously fix your economy, practice what ya preach, stop being a victim and integrator of corporatocracy, which is bleeding your nation from the inside. And stop playing 'I wanna be the only super power' rhetoric, because the PRC is catching up and is going to leave you behind!!

It's hard to believe that the U.S. 'actually organised the 4062nd Strategic Missile Wing (Mobile) on 1 December 1960 for 3 planned LGM-30 Minuteman missile train squadrons, each with 10 trains carrying 3 missiles per train. But sadly with the Kennedy/McNamara cutbacks, the DoD announced "that it has abandoned the plan for a mobile Minuteman ICBM.'

Sorry about my rant ???

Regards
Pioneer

 

[sferrin]

I'm sorry to be cynical, but how many of these railway/tunnel ICBM systems has the Pentagon wasted million/billions $$$$ on, to no avail?

I still think a combination of mobile Midgetman and Peackeepers in defended superhard silos is the way to go. The Midgetman for the ability to ride out an attack and the Peacekeepers for throw weight and deterrent value. (And they'd also have a decent chance of surviving. At the very least they will demand an enemy throw a LOT of warheads at them to guarantee a kill.)

 

[Grey Havoc]

I still think a combination of mobile Midgetman and Peackeepers in defended superhard silos is the way to go. The Midgetman for the ability to ride out an attack and the Peacekeepers for throw weight and deterrent value. (And they'd also have a decent chance of surviving. At the very least they will demand an enemy throw a LOT of warheads at them to guarantee a kill.)

That would be a very cost effective expedient in the near term; unfortunately shortages of logic and sanity are rife at the present time.

 

[DrRansom]

I am confused about the desire for both mobile ICBMs and superhardened silos. If one considers the nuclear Triad, the role of survivable second-strike capability seems to fall to the Submarine arm, while the role of flexible first strike and conventional weapon proof capability falls to the ICBM arm. Buying a mobile ICBM and a very advanced SSBN fleet simultaneously seems redundant; a luxury not available to these financially constrained times.

Making the ICBM silos nearly conventional proof, via permanent air defenses and point defenses, helps the ICBM fulfill it's role in nuclear deterrence. That would be a better investment then buying an expensive and politically difficult mobile missile system.

 

[sferrin]

I am confused about the desire for both mobile ICBMs and superhardened silos. If one considers the nuclear Triad, the role of survivable second-strike capability seems to fall to the Submarine arm,

Consider we will only have 12 (at best) SSBNs with a fraction of that on patrol at any given time, compared to the 41 we had at one time. Sure, the new subs are more deadly but it's still easier to kill 12 than 41. The mobile ICBMs protects you against a breakthrough in ASW. (Or the other guy just putting tails on our SSBNs and following them around.)

 

[DrRansom]

If there is a threatened breakthrough in ASW, then a crash mobile program can be pursued. But before then, it seems to me that a heightened investment in silo survivability is better than dealing with the political implications of mobile basing.

Put in other terms, mobile basing is unlikely unless there is a crisis in the SSBN force. In that case, any research / discussion into mobile basing constitutes a waste of effort which could be better focused on hardening existing silos.

 

[sferrin]

If there is a threatened breakthrough in ASW, then a crash mobile program can be pursued.

"Crash" isn't what it used to be. If we find out China/Russia has had a major breakthrough, and has deployed it, -today- it would probably be a decade before we had a mobile ICBM even in production let alone deployed in numbers.

 

[marauder2048]

If there is a threatened breakthrough in ASW, then a crash mobile program can be pursued. But before then, it seems to me that a heightened investment in silo survivability is better than dealing with the political implications of mobile basing.

Put in other terms, mobile basing is unlikely unless there is a crisis in the SSBN force. In that case, any research / discussion into mobile basing constitutes a waste of effort which could be better focused on hardening existing silos.

The MILCON costs of reinforcing existing silos would come very close to that of a small rail mobile force.

The bigger issue is the large uncertainty as to survivability since you would really need to test the new materials and design against an actual nuclear detonation to have high confidence.

Rail lets you start gradually and relatively cheaply (just captive carry initially) while you buld up your operational expertise. You can subsequently scale out or up as circumstances dictate.

 

[sferrin]

The bigger issue is the large uncertainty as to survivability since you would really need to test the new materials and design against an actual nuclear detonation to have high confidence.

Don't know that that would be necessary as there is a lot of materials nuclear test effects data out there for reference.

 

[marauder2048]

The bigger issue is the large uncertainty as to survivability since you would really need to test the new materials and design against an actual nuclear detonation to have high confidence.

Don't know that that would be necessary as there is a lot of materials nuclear test effects data out there for reference.

I was surprised to find out that only about 10% of the nuclear tests the US conducted were weapons effects tests. So I'm skeptical that they could, with high confidence, extrapolate from that data to some of the newer materials* that have been developed in the intervening 25 years especially in the presence of nuclear earth penetrators.

* Subscale SIFCON-based superhardened silo testing may have been conducted

 

[sferrin]

The US was still doing underground nuclear testing while the Peacekeeper and Midgetman were being developed. Between that and the large scale above ground testing they were doing with conventional explosions.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_Scale

It's a virtual certainty they got enough data to be reasonably confident of future designs. (Assuming anybody is still around from that era with relevant experience, and all the data was analyzed and cataloged sufficiently of course.)

 

[DrRansom]

The issue of nuclear tests is beside the point. The purpose of the land based ICBM force is to require an adversary to resort to nuclear attacks to destroy the US nuclear deterrent. In that case, what matters is if the silo is hardened against bombs and hypersonic conventional weapons. The silo should be hardened against many nuclear weapons, to require a sufficiently advanced attack, but it 'only' needs to be hardened against conventional weapons.

Hence: air defenses and point defenses to defeat conventional aircraft and smart weapons.

 

[marauder2048]

The issue of nuclear tests is beside the point. The purpose of the land based ICBM force is to require an adversary to resort to nuclear attacks to destroy the US nuclear deterrent. In that case, what matters is if the silo is hardened against bombs and hypersonic conventional weapons. The silo should be hardened against many nuclear weapons, to require a sufficiently advanced attack, but it 'only' needs to be hardened against conventional weapons.

Hence: air defenses and point defenses to defeat conventional aircraft and smart weapons.

If there's no need to operate in a nuclear weapons effects environment then the entire GBSD would look very different.

In any event, there would still be the need for extensive and very expensive testing and MILCON to harden the silos against conventional hypersonic KEPs and conventional EPWs.

 

[sferrin]

The issue of nuclear tests is beside the point. The purpose of the land based ICBM force is to require an adversary to resort to nuclear attacks to destroy the US nuclear deterrent. In that case, what matters is if the silo is hardened against bombs and hypersonic conventional weapons. The silo should be hardened against many nuclear weapons, to require a sufficiently advanced attack, but it 'only' needs to be hardened against conventional weapons.

Hence: air defenses and point defenses to defeat conventional aircraft and smart weapons.

If there's no need to operate in a nuclear weapons effects environment then the entire GBSD would look very different.

In any event, there would still be the need for extensive and very expensive testing and MILCON to harden the silos against conventional hypersonic KEPs and conventional EPWs.

The idea of a superhard silo isn't to survive a direct hit. Just ain't gonna happen. What it aims to do though is make it so you almost HAVE to get a direct hit to kill it. There was even one design that, if it was at the edge of the crater and got buried, it would shove off the overburden and still be able to launch from the silo.

 

[marauder2048]

The issue of nuclear tests is beside the point. The purpose of the land based ICBM force is to require an adversary to resort to nuclear attacks to destroy the US nuclear deterrent. In that case, what matters is if the silo is hardened against bombs and hypersonic conventional weapons. The silo should be hardened against many nuclear weapons, to require a sufficiently advanced attack, but it 'only' needs to be hardened against conventional weapons.

Hence: air defenses and point defenses to defeat conventional aircraft and smart weapons.

If there's no need to operate in a nuclear weapons effects environment then the entire GBSD would look very different.

In any event, there would still be the need for extensive and very expensive testing and MILCON to harden the silos against conventional hypersonic KEPs and conventional EPWs.

The idea of a superhard silo isn't to survive a direct hit. Just ain't gonna happen. What it aims to do though is make it so you almost HAVE to get a direct hit to kill it. There was even one design that, if it was at the edge of the crater and got buried, it would shove off the overburden and still be able to launch from the silo.

I didn't mean to suggest or imply that the superhard silo was intended to survive a direct hit.

For nuclear weapons effects environment I was thinking more of salvage fuzed warheads that had survived but had been deflected and the low-altitude detonations of the early nuclear tipped ABM systems.
And then the more general problem of flyout in a post nuclear attack environment.

 

[sferrin]

and the low-altitude detonations of the early nuclear tipped ABM systems.
And then the more general problem of flyout in a post nuclear attack environment.

There aren't anymore nuclear-tipped ABMs in the US (though I do seem to recall there was speculation about bringing them - nuclear warheads- back). HEDI and ERIS could almost have been thought of as hit-to-kill Sprints and Spartans respectively. Thing about nuclear armed ABMs (aside from setting off EMP warheads over your own country) is that they're heavy. Spartan had (roughly) SM-3 Block IIA range/altitude capability but was so much larger because of that 5 Mt warhead.

 

[marauder2048]

and the low-altitude detonations of the early nuclear tipped ABM systems.
And then the more general problem of flyout in a post nuclear attack environment.

There aren't anymore nuclear-tipped ABMs in the US (though I do seem to recall there was speculation about bringing them - nuclear warheads- back). HEDI and ERIS could almost have been thought of as hit-to-kill Sprints and Spartans respectively. Thing about nuclear armed ABMs (aside from setting off EMP warheads over your own country) is that they're heavy. Spartan had (roughly) SM-3 Block IIA range/altitude capability but was so much larger because of that 5 Mt warhead.

Getting a timely nuclear weapons release authorization for the interceptors is also tricky; my remarks above were about historical factors that shaped MM.

I vaguely recall reading some interview with the head of the DSB who mentioned something about resurrecting nuclear tipped ABM. Any links?

It's interesting that the Navy kept its nuclear tipped interceptors until the late 80's. And I gather from your comment that Gazelle and Gorgon are still operational but strike me as being in a weird place treaty wise.

 

[bobbymike]

SHOT

Air Force, Navy team examining commonality for future strategic missiles
January 22, 2016

A team comprised of Air Force and Navy officials is analyzing how the two services could use common subsystems and components in their future strategic missiles, according to a recent report.

The assessment team is led by the Air Force's program executive office for strategic missile systems and the director of Navy strategic systems programs, according to a report delivered to Congress in December by Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall's office. The group also includes representatives from U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Global Strike Command, the Air Force Office of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, and the Navy's Undersea Warfare division.

The Air Force is replacing its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile through the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, which aims to field a new missile in the 2030 timeframe, according to the report. It adds that the Navy will replace its Trident II D5 sub-launched ballistic missile about 10 years later.

"We expect the ongoing assessment will result in a number of promising commonality candidate components and technologies," the report states. "The use of these may offer significant cost, technical, and schedule risk reduction opportunities to GBSD and future Navy ballistic missile programs."

The Air Force was scheduled to conduct technical discussions with industry on its GBSD project Jan. 11-13 at Hill Air Force Base, UT, Inside the Air Force reported in December. The service is planning to seek permission by March to formally launch the technology maturation and risk reduction phase of the projected $62.3 billion GBSD program.

The joint assessment team is analyzing what components from the Navy's currently fielded D5 Life-Extension (D5LE) missile could be procured off-the-shelf for the Air Force's GBSD, as well as D5LE components that might require minor modification for use in the ground-based program, according to the report. In addition, the assessment is reviewing what GBSD-developed components could be used in the Navy's follow-on program.

The group has already ruled out using the DL5E itself, or a variant of the missile, as the Air Force's next ICBM. The team found that the "additional costs and risks of a common missile system outweigh potential benefits and possible development cost reductions," the report states.

"To meet Air Force requirements, modifications would be needed for payload, performance, survivability, storage and transport, infrastructure, command and control, and production," it continues. "This would raise significant technical issues and would substantially increase overall program costs -- far outweighing any potential savings from enhanced commonality."

The subsystems and components the team is studying for potential commonality across the Air Force's and Navy's missile systems include avionics; post-boost systems; power and distribution parts; ordnance; controls; flight-test ranges and systems; booster components; reentry systems; missile-system structures; and other ground and shipboard control systems, the report shows.

The document does not give any figures for how much money could be saved by pursuing commonality, but it notes that the Air Force estimates it has avoided nearly $600 million in its ICBM fuze modernization effort by leveraging common components in the Navy's fuze development program.

The risks of pursuing commonality, the report states, includes scenarios in which common components fail, which in this case would impact two legs of the nuclear triad. It could also lead to a "loss of supplier diversity, innovation and design flexibility" across the strategic industrial base, the document continues, as well as "technical and manufacturing obsolescence."

"Joint programs that extend continuous production of common components over a long period of time risk creating future dependencies on obsolete parts and manufacturing processes," the report states. "The key challenge is sustaining critical design, engineering, and production capabilities over time."

Kendall's report notes that the assessment team is studying those risks, in addition to the opportunities for pursuing commonality.

 

[bobbymike]

CHASER

DOD: Domestic solid rocket motor industrial base fragile, 'atrophying'

The Pentagon is concerned about the domestic solid rocket motor industrial base as budgets continue to be strained, the workforce ages and competitive opportunities are limited, according to a recent report sent to lawmakers by Defense Department acquisition chief Frank Kendall.

 

[sferrin]

CHASER

DOD: Domestic solid rocket motor industrial base fragile, 'atrophying'

The Pentagon is concerned about the domestic solid rocket motor industrial base as budgets continue to be strained, the workforce ages and competitive opportunities are limited, according to a recent report sent to lawmakers by Defense Department acquisition chief Frank Kendall.

It's depressing how many former ATK rocket people work where I do. We call it "ATK North".

 

[Pioneer]

The Pentagon is concerned about the domestic solid rocket motor industrial base

And so it should be!

as budgets continue to be strained

? I'm sorry but it's the Pentagon which has created such self-made, self perceived budget strain on itself, with decades of wasted and unfocussed weapons programs! Now that a 'real' conventional threat has risen, the Pentagon, so self-infatuated by its own power, has specifically contributed to the neglect of its Strategic Deterrent force.
I think it ironic that during the Cold War, the United States (eligibly) did everything in its power to both curtail the Soviet's economy, and denying transfer of the most rudimentary technology - especially that could be used in military application! And yet the United States has done the complete opposite with the PRC! It can not and should not be forgotten or overlooked, the United States more than any other country and politic created and supported the coming of the PRC as a rising superpower in terms of technology and economics!
The United States is going to continue to suffer

'industrial base fragility'

,

'budget strain'

, and

'workforce ageing and limited competitive opportunities'

so long as its 'Corporatocracy'-based business/political collusion keep handing over its industrial and intellectual base to China for expeditious corporate profits - as opposed to the fundamental foundations of a nation, let alone one that calls itself a superpower.
My biggest concern is that the United States (with China's strategic and purposeful strategy) is doing to itself, specifically what it strategized and executed against the former Soviet Union - economic demise and collapse. I'm really concerned that the United States miraculous realisation that it has fundamentally and ignorantly neglected its nuclear force, whilst its potential principle adversaries China and Russia have not! A decade and a half of enacting its ideological War on Terrorism has not just taken the eye off the resurgence of China and Russia as recognised and serious foes. It's exhausted both the United States economy and military.

Sorry about frustrating rant! :-[

Regards
Pioneer

 

[marauder2048]

It can not and should not be forgotten or overlooked, the United States more than any other country and politic created and supported the coming of the PRC as a rising superpower in terms of technology and economics!

Because the Japanese, Russians, South Koreans, Taiwanese and Europeans had no technology or economic exchanges with the PRC whatsoever.

 

[bobbymike]

Trident D5 / GBSD Commonality Document

 

[marauder2048]

Trident D5 / GBSD Commonality Document

For the Post Boost System, I'm curious if they could scale-up TDACS.

 

[bobbymike]

Replacing Minuteman III


—Jennifer Hlad

3/3/2016

​The Minuteman III will have a difficult time surviving in the active anti-access, area denial environment of the future, which makes it critical that the US have the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent fully operational by 2030, Gen. Robin Rand, the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, on Tuesday. “We must continue efforts to modernize the Minuteman III weapons systems, where appropriate, until we bring the ground based strategic deterrent online. This is an absolute critical national interest that will provide strategic deterrence, and if needed, global strike, for years to come,” Rand said. “The Minuteman III with each year becomes more and more obsolete, and I am concerned that if we don’t replace it … we will not be able to provide the capabilities that are needed.” Upgrades to the Minuteman III in lieu of replacement would likely be very costly and also wouldn’t give the Air Force the capabilities it needs, Rand said. (See Also: Budget Reaffirms Commitment to Nuclear Enterprise)

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force and industry project final GBSD request for proposals for April

March 04, 2016

With a modernization bow wave on the horizon in the 2020s, the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system is still forging ahead and is expected to reach a milestone A decision by April, according to Air Force and industry officials.

Gen. Robin Rand, head of Air Force Global Strike Command and Ted Kerzie, director of Boeing Strategic Systems, confirmed this week that the program should release its final requests for proposals this April. The Air Force will release its second draft RFP on March 4 and will host a March 8 industry day at Hill Air Force Base, UT. The service is also expected to launch the technology maturation and risk-reduction phase of the program this month.

"So they're moving quickly and moving smartly," Kerzie said in March 2 interview with Inside the Air Force.

The Air Force plans to recapitalize its legacy Intercontinental Ballistic Missile fleet with the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system. It will replace the infrastructure of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, including its entire flight system, weapons system and command-and-control infrastructure. The Air Force is looking to renovate the existing launch control centers and reach initial operational capability by 2027. The service could award a contract for the recapitalization effort as soon as summer of 2017, Kerzie said.

The Air Force, Navy and industry partners have also teamed up to find potential commonalities in the services' future strategic missiles, Inside the Navy previously reported. The services could leverage common avionics, ordnances and missile-system structures for the Air Force's GBSD and the Navy's Trident II D5 sub-launched ballistic missile, which could be fielded in the 2040s.

Although Boeing is not contracted to do work on the GBSD, the company has participated in a conceptual design architecture guidance with General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin. During the work, Boeing assessed the potential risks of new guidance system integration, analyzed technology and manufacturing readiness for critical and enabling technologies, proposed risk mitigation strategies, and recommended a test and evaluation strategy, Boeing spokeswoman Queena Jones said in a March 2 email to ITAF.

Following the yearlong study, Boeing will execute a final report this summer, Kerzie said.

"[Pentagon acquisition chief Frank] Kendall directed the Air Force and the Navy to continue to exhaust all avenues to make sure we can find every area [where] there can be commonality," Rand said during a House Armed Services hearing March 2. "We're committed to doing that, and I know of no roadblocks interfering in the progress we're making."

Boeing also completed two successful operational flight tests of the legacy Minuteman III ICBM on Feb. 20 and Feb. 25 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Boeing delivers a telemetry instrumentation wafer, called the Mod 7, which is placed in a stack on the missile. The telemetry wafer captures data during each flight test, Kerzie said.

"We help the Air Force monitor the missile from a guidance standpoint, make sure everything's operational," he said. "Then the Air Force launches it and then we do a post-mortem analysis to make sure that it performed as predicted."

 

[Grey Havoc]

Post-boost propulsion system for ICBMs under study (UPI via Spacedaily)

 

[bobbymike]

USAF and industry exploring mobile ballistic missile option for ICBM replacement

April 07, 2016


The Air Force is examining a mobile option for the recapitalization of its intercontinental ballistic missile fleet, according to service and industry officials.

As part of its technology maturation and risk reduction draft request for proposals, the Air Force has asked industry to explore a mobile basing option for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent System, Ted Kerzie, the director of Boeing Strategic Systems, said in an April 6 interview with Inside the Air Force. The design features and total cost to support the modular GBSD will be evaluated during the TMRR phase, Air Force spokesman Maj. Rob Leese told ITAF March 4.

Boeing expects another draft RFP this Friday and the final RFP by May, Kerzie said. The details of the draft RFP have been released only to prospective bidders.

"Silo basing is the baseline, but [the Air Force wants] to hedge and be able to look at future mobile basing for the missile," Kerzie said. "There is a study that they would like to perform that talks about mobile launches as an option."

Boeing already addressed the mobile option during a recent conceptual design architecture guidance effort, which the company participated in with General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin. During the work, Boeing assessed the potential risks of new guidance system integration, analyzed technology and manufacturing readiness for critical and enabling technologies, proposed risk-mitigation strategies and recommended a test and evaluation strategy, ITAF previously reported.

"We basically looked at impacts to the architecture [and] what we would have to do with the design to make it compatible with a mobile launcher," Kerzie said. "It's doable, the Russians do it right. There's different tactics or strategies you could use to make a mobile option work."

The Air Force plans to recapitalize its legacy intercontinental ballistic missile fleet with the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system. It will replace the infrastructure of the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, including its entire flight system, weapons system and command-and-control infrastructure. The Air Force is looking to renovate the existing launch control centers and reach initial operational capability by 2027. The service could award a contract for the recapitalization effort as soon as summer of 2017.

A mobile ground missile fleet is not a new concept for the Air Force or Boeing, which built the original Minuteman system. In 1961, the Pentagon quashed plans for a railroad operated system, instead opting for more underground sites, the Chicago Tribune then reported. Still, the theory that moving missiles could increase the system's survivability has remained the same since.

Today, Boeing could provide lighter technology, propulsion, propellant and casing materials than it could have 50 years ago, making the mobile option easier, Kerzie said. Whether the new missiles would be transported by rail or road would be determined in the TMRR, he said.

A mobile missile fleet would not only require a lighter design, but a different guidance set than the legacy fleet. With a silo-based system, the missile launches from a fixed location, while a mobile launch begins from an unknown location, Kerzie said. Industry could look to the Navy's Trident submarine launched ballistic missile guidance set, which tracks missiles using star positioning, he said.

The Air Force has hinted in recent years at a mobile option, which the service has often characterized as a modular design. During an Air Force Association event in 2014, Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command discussed a more flexible missile system for the future.

"So if we need to replace the system, we should probably build into it the flexibility to do some other things in the future that the current Minuteman can't," he said.

That year, the Air Force completed an analysis of alternatives examining extending the ICBM system through 2075, an improved system recapitalizing existing infrastructure and a hybrid system that would institute mobile forces in the 2050s. The AOA recommended the improved system, which would cost $159 billion over the system's life cycle, compared to the hybrid system that would cost $242 billion.

Industry may not develop an entirely mobile missile, but rather a plug-and-play system that could be turned into a mobile missile if needed, Kerzie said. The TMRR would help determine whether components, pieces, parts or large subsystems could be used for a mobile missile, he said.

The Air Force, Navy and industry partners are also focusing on common missile components between the future GBSD and Navy's Trident II D5 sub-launched ballistic missile. The services could leverage common avionics, ordnance and missile-system structures for the two systems.

Lockheed's vice president and manager of strategic and missile defense systems also confirmed the discussion over the last eight months has moved toward leveraging common subsystems, rather than a common missile option between the Air Force and Navy.

"The requirements are so different and some of the constraints are so different, really no one at this point is talking about a common missile," Mathew Joyce said during a March 15 Lockheed media day. "We've migrated to a point called intelligent commonality and so that means a range of commonality, it could be a subsystem, it could be components, it could be a technology."

While the Air Force could not address the GBSD's survivability in an anti-access, area denial environment, Leese said the future solution will address threats that could emerge in an A2/AD environment, in addition to the aging and attrition concerns associated with the ICBM fleet. However, a mobile option would not make the missile system more survivable in an A2/AD environment, since it would not affect the re-entry system coming into the target area, Kerzie said. -- Leigh Giangreco
________________________________________________________________________________
From what this reads like the GBSD will be MMIV or smaller but with only 400, likely, ICBMs under New START they need to be a modernized Peacekeeper sized system IMHO as the very uncertain future may see the need to re-MIRV. Even with one warhead if they are worries about future A2AD environments then the excess payload can be decoys and penaids.

 

[bobbymike]

Moving Forward on GBSD

—Will Skowronski

4/21/2016

A request for proposal for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program’s first phase is “a couple weeks away,” Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall told lawmakers Wednesday. Kendall told the Senate Appropriations Committee’s defense panel on Wednesday the GBSD program, which is meant to replace the Air Force's Minuteman III weapons system, is on track. Risk reduction and preliminary design will be the first substantive work on the project, he said, and the Pentagon will work to cut costs in anticipation of having to fund the nuclear triad upgrade. "It’s going to be an expensive system by any metric,” he said, referring to the GBSD program. (See also: Funding the Nuclear Bow Wave.)