LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[sferrin]

100” diameter!! A guy can dream

And that's still actually small compared to things like Titan II, SS-18 and it's replacement.

 

[Desertfox]

Why the fetish for giant boosters? Smaller means more efficient, more missiles, cheaper, more basing options, less chance to get canceled. Give me an ICBM that can fit in a standard 40' shipping container.

 

[bobbymike]

Why the fetish for giant boosters? Smaller means more efficient, more missiles, cheaper, more basing options, less chance to get canceled. Give me an ICBM that can fit in a standard 40' shipping container.

Like Sarmat and the DF-41 those tiny missiles

 

[Desertfox]

Yes Sarmat... the most vulnerable and destabilizing missile in the Russian arsenal. We should definitely copy that one. A handful of Tridents and poof a third of the Russian warheads are gone.

 

[bobbymike]

Yes Sarmat... the most vulnerable and destabilizing missile in the Russian arsenal. We should definitely copy that one. A handful of Tridents and poof a third of the Russian warheads are gone.

In a preemptive first strike? Interesting

 

[bobbymike]

Northrop could get $85 billion award to make next-gen ICBMs sooner than expected

As long as access to secure facilities continues, the Air Force could award a contract for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program early.

www.defensenews.com

 

[bobbymike]

Aerojet Rocketdyne gearing up for GBSD??

Aerojet Rocketdyne

Aerojet Rocketdyne

www.rocket.com

Can buildup to 39’ first stage & 100” diameter. Peacekeeper was 28’ & 92” respectively.

Not saying GBSD will be anywhere near this size but it’d be nice

 

[bobbymike]

Extending MMIII could save $17.6 billion out to 2046? This is laughable. In the next 26 years total federal spending could exceed $140 trillion!! So that’s 0.0126% are you kidding me?

If you made $140,000/annum and thought cutting $17.60/year from personal spending would save your finances

Congress Should Hit Pause On The New Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

The Air Force is moving to fast-track a key award in an attempt to lock the program in as soon as possible. But ballooning costs, doubts over the continuing relevance of ICBMs and the upcoming election all cry out for a pause.

www.forbes.com

 

[bobbymike]

Northrop CEO says GBSD deal may be finalized up to two months early
Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden said the contract to develop the Air Force's Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, expected to be awarded during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020, may be signed one or two months early
————
Please be Peacekeeper sized

 

[bobbymike]

DOD seeks authority for GBSD prime contractor to perform launch center MILCON work
The Defense Department is asking lawmakers to grant the Air Force secretary the authority to pay for military construction projects needed to modify Minuteman III launch centers for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent using the new system's fiscal year 2021 research and procurement funds.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Yet another example of pennywise and pound foolish I fear.

 

[bobbymike]

Aerojet MCAT test for future strategic strike systems - Missile Components Asvanced Technologies

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=3198716943495402&id=535226966511093

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force sets up combined GBSD developmental, operational testing team
The Air Force is standing up a joint developmental and operational test force that integrates military, civilian and contractor personnel to support the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent and serve as a model for future programs

 

[bobbymike]

Northrop Grumman completes major design review for GBSD program

Northrop Grumman has successfully completed its fourth and final major design review with the U. S. Air Force under the technology maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) phase of the Ground Based Stra

www.defenceconnect.com.au

 

[bobbymike]

Keep modernization of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program on track

Today, nuclear deterrence is more important than ever, which is why we must prioritize efforts to modernize the triad.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Grey Havoc]

Next-gen ICBM program survives defunding attempt in House panel

The House Armed Services Committee has shot down a plan that would've slashed funding for the Air Force’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent program.

www.defensenews.com

 

[bobbymike]

From Inside Defense pay site


GBSD requires 20 new launch facilities, missiles equipped with legacy warheads by FY-29
The Minuteman III replacement team must transition 20 launch facilities -- each loaded with an in-silo missile and deployed with a legacy reentry vehicle and warhead -- to achieve initial operational capability on the new intercontinental ballistic missile system in fiscal year 2029

 

[bobbymike]

AAIA student paper: A Modernization of the United States' Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System

https://www.aiaa.org/docs/default-source/uploadedfiles/education-and-careers/university-students/design-competitions/1st-place-missile-system.pdf?sfvrsn=a2e83820_0

 

[jsport]

Air Force and Navy air-launch ICBM

U.S. nuclear triad exist to ensure a decisive retaliatory strike.

www.foxnews.com

 

[bobbymike]

Democrats And Republicans Agree: Phase Out Land-Based Nuclear Missiles

Although Democrats and Republicans increasingly seem worlds apart, when it comes to nuclear weapons issues, they’re actually much closer than one might think when it comes to the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, which is outdated, strategically destabilizing and very expensive.

www.forbes.com

Author

Matt Korda
Aerospace & Defense
I write about the nexus between nuclear weapons, climate change, and injustice

 

[Dilandu]

Well, the main argument for land-based ICBM is that they are cheap. Much cheaper & faster to build than SLBM's. If you suddenly need to increase your nuclear arsenal, building new missile sub with 24 missiles would took at least five years; the same amount of land-based missiles could be deployed in less than a year and for a fraction of cost.

For example: in 1980s, "Ohio"-class missile sub cost roughly 2 billions of dollars, and counting 24 "Trident" missiles (roughly 30 millions each) - 2,72 billions.

For that money, 38 MX missiles (roughly 70 millions each) could be deployed.

P.S. But what is clearly NOT wise, is to concentrate on silo-based missiles instead of mobile launchers.

 

[marauder2048]

P.S. But what is clearly NOT wise, is to concentrate on silo-based missiles instead of mobile launchers.

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

 

[sferrin]

P.S. But what is clearly NOT wise, is to concentrate on silo-based missiles instead of mobile launchers.

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

They can't be THAT expensive if every other country on the planet with ICBMs uses them. (Even lowly North Korea.)

 

[marauder2048]

P.S. But what is clearly NOT wise, is to concentrate on silo-based missiles instead of mobile launchers.

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

They can't be THAT expensive if every other country on the planet with ICBMs uses them. (Even lowly North Korea.)

They definitely don't have our manning costs.

If you are a new nuclear power, the cost of building silos (assuming you have the appropriate geology and expertise),
will be weighed against the cost of putting the missile on a TEL.

 

[Dilandu]

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

Not that much.

 

[marauder2048]

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

Not that much.

They totally kill it; it's cheaper to do mobility on subs or bombers. They wouldn't require any development costs.

 

[In_A_Dream]

Perhaps look up the definition of nuclear proliferation?

You're right, thank you lol.

 

[sferrin]

P.S. But what is clearly NOT wise, is to concentrate on silo-based missiles instead of mobile launchers.

Mobile launchers pretty much kill the cheap argument.

They can't be THAT expensive if every other country on the planet with ICBMs uses them. (Even lowly North Korea.)

They definitely don't have our manning costs.

If you are a new nuclear power, the cost of building silos (assuming you have the appropriate geology and expertise),
will be weighed against the cost of putting the missile on a TEL.

Good point. In any case, the whole, "land based ICBMs are useless" is a red herring. Even in silos they're far more of a deterrent than bombers or SLBMs.

 

[Dilandu]

Even in silos they're far more of a deterrent than bombers or SLBMs.

Exactly how?

 

[marauder2048]

Even in silos they're far more of a deterrent than bombers or SLBMs.

Exactly how?

They require a nuclear attack to destroy.

 

[bobbymike]

Even in silos they're far more of a deterrent than bombers or SLBMs.

Exactly how?

They require a nuclear attack to destroy.

On the homeland

 

[sferrin]

Even in silos they're far more of a deterrent than bombers or SLBMs.

Exactly how?

They require a nuclear attack to destroy.

On the homeland

This is the key that some just cant' wrap their head around. If Russia or China sank an Ohio (and it's 200+ warheads, or whatever they've been downloaded to) and then claimed, "whoops, accident", would we nuke them? Probably not. If they nuked the equivalent amount of warheads on ICBMs (couple hundred nukes going off on the homeland) then yeah, no way they're talking their way out of that. It raises the bar for a war starting. In other words it's a deterrent. The only thing keeping SSBNs "safe" is they're currently hard to detect. I wouldn't bank on it staying that way forever.

 

[Desertfox]

You can always sink one or two of their subs in retaliation, its not like they are hard to find. But thats beside the point. Yes single-warhead ICBMs in silos are stabilizing deterrents, MIRVed ICBMs in silos (like Sarmat or Peacekeeper) however are destabilizing.

 

[marauder2048]

You can always sink one or two of their subs in retaliation, its not like they are hard to find. But thats beside the point. Yes single-warhead ICBMs in silos are stabilizing deterrents, MIRVed ICBMs in silos (like Sarmat or Peacekeeper) however are destabilizing.

Except big missiles like MX are highly resistant to pindown effects; the declassified
1979 ICBM and Strategic Force Modernization Options study indicated that MX could not be pinned down by an SLBM attack.

So the typical threats to a LOW/LUA posture are eliminated.

 

[bobbymike]

Air Force announces GBSD locations at three existing missile bases

The Air Force plans to begin military construction activities as early as 2023 at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, as it moves forward in the process of replacing the aging Minuteman III ICBMs with the

www.minot.af.mil

 

[RanulfC]

You can always sink one or two of their subs in retaliation, its not like they are hard to find. But thats beside the point. Yes single-warhead ICBMs in silos are stabilizing deterrents, MIRVed ICBMs in silos (like Sarmat or Peacekeeper) however are destabilizing.

Except big missiles like MX are highly resistant to pindown effects; the declassified
1979 ICBM and Strategic Force Modernization Options study indicated that MX could not be pinned down by an SLBM attack.

So the typical threats to a LOW/LUA posture are eliminated.

In theory? I'd suspect a slightly different outcome in reality since the MX as deployed as the "Peacekeeper" was based in repurposed Minuteman silo's and as such were likely MORE, not less vulnerable as compared to the various proposed MX basing systems which were supposed to be new designs with a high survive-ability.

Randy

 

[marauder2048]

You can always sink one or two of their subs in retaliation, its not like they are hard to find. But thats beside the point. Yes single-warhead ICBMs in silos are stabilizing deterrents, MIRVed ICBMs in silos (like Sarmat or Peacekeeper) however are destabilizing.

Except big missiles like MX are highly resistant to pindown effects; the declassified
1979 ICBM and Strategic Force Modernization Options study indicated that MX could not be pinned down by an SLBM attack.

So the typical threats to a LOW/LUA posture are eliminated.

In theory? I'd suspect a slightly different outcome in reality since the MX as deployed as the "Peacekeeper" was based in repurposed Minuteman silo's and as such were likely MORE, not less vulnerable as compared to the various proposed MX basing systems which were supposed to be new designs with a high survive-ability.

Randy

Given that pindown resistance is a property of the missile and not the silo your suspicions are baseless.

 

[RanulfC]

You can always sink one or two of their subs in retaliation, its not like they are hard to find. But thats beside the point. Yes single-warhead ICBMs in silos are stabilizing deterrents, MIRVed ICBMs in silos (like Sarmat or Peacekeeper) however are destabilizing.

Except big missiles like MX are highly resistant to pindown effects; the declassified
1979 ICBM and Strategic Force Modernization Options study indicated that MX could not be pinned down by an SLBM attack.

So the typical threats to a LOW/LUA posture are eliminated.

In theory? I'd suspect a slightly different outcome in reality since the MX as deployed as the "Peacekeeper" was based in repurposed Minuteman silo's and as such were likely MORE, not less vulnerable as compared to the various proposed MX basing systems which were supposed to be new designs with a high survive-ability.

Randy

Given that pindown resistance is a property of the missile and not the silo your suspicions are baseless.

Been quite awhile since I read such that used "pindown' to mean something other than "threaten to destroy or have the capability to destroy before use" which is not just the missile but its supporting and operational systems. MX, as a "missile" included both it's silo and basing in the analysis's I read as the missile itself is useless without those systems and they were highly positive with the assumption of proposed basing and operations. Not so much as they were actually deployed.

Randy

 

[uk 75]

The TRIAD of ICBMs, Bombers and subs seems to cover most of the bases.
It ought to be possible after 50 years to come up with a smaller ICBM than Minuteman using more survivable dispersed silos.

 

[Dilandu]

Given that pindown resistance is a property of the missile and not the silo your suspicions are baseless.

Actually, it's both of them working in complex.