LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program



And? It wouldn't be wise to bank on it.
The young horticulturalist asked his master why he needed martial arts lessons.

Because it’s better to be a warrior in a garden than a gardener in a war ;)

Or if you want peace prepare for war
 
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I appreciate your opinions are genuinely held and I don’t think we are going to agree on significant aspects m.
If you are remotely interested in convincing anyone who doesn’t already 100 percent agree with you you’ll need a much better arguments than that.

And as relates to previous discussions around the GDSD the actual decisions will have to be made in the realm of what is actually possible in the real world rather than using fantasy spending plans and grossly exaggerated estimates of opponent numbers.
We've wasted more money on less worthy causes and the majority of money spent on projects like this actually go back into the economy (via job generation and spending), or come back as taxes.
 
That assumption is probably based on the officially held number of warheads and, if so, it's using a non-fact to conclude another non-fact. But the fact this guy is a professor at a Beijing University and a nuclear strategist should have one questioning his motives.

And statements like this, "The newly developed DF-41 ICBM may be MIRV-equipped as well." He's using 'may' as a prefix for a known fact.
 
To change the subject, what about silos inside concentric rings? I.e. you have your silo and then have 2 or 3 separate outer rings, each with a similar wall thickness, maybe 5m apart.
 
To change the subject, what about silos inside concentric rings? I.e. you have your silo and then have 2 or 3 separate outer rings, each with a similar wall thickness, maybe 5m apart.

They'd just drop it in the middle of the, "bullseye". Note the accuracy of Pershing II 30+ years ago:

It seems we’ve either willingly, intentionally or shortsightedly retarded our strategic weapons capabilities since McNamara and then doubled down since GHWB41
 
They'd just drop it in the middle of the, "bullseye". Note the accuracy of Pershing II 30+ years ago:

True but very few RVs have terminal guidance. 150m CEP seems to be the figure for many Russian missiles, although that is guess work to some extent.
 
Congratulations, this is the next thread locked, because some members aren't able to discuss a theme in a
sensible way, to accept the fact, that there may be different opinions and to prevent a discussion from sliding
into a vociferous clamour.

Sad, but obviously unavoidable ...
 
Congratulations, this is the next thread locked, because some members aren't able to discuss a theme in a
sensible way, to accept the fact, that there may be different opinions and to prevent a discussion from sliding
into a vociferous clamour.

Sad, but obviously unavoidable ...
I'm going to reopen the topic, but bear in mind my patience for endless politically tinged arguments is limited and posting bans are a possibility.
 
So basically when Northrop Grumman bought Orbital ATK it was game set and match.
 
I'm surprised Lockheed Martin and Aerojet Rocketdyne didn't put in a bid.
AJR was involved in the program and may still be in the mix for some work, but their large-diameter SRM work wasn't nearly as robust as what NG can now claim now and has deteriorated further now that their Sacramento facility is gone. There's been some talk of forcing/helping AJR back into this line of work by taking a shared-buy approach reminiscent of how the Navy used the SSN program to keep 2 sub builders healthy. But it would cost more and take a serious commitment to enduring the inevitable teething problems that would come with rebuilding AJR's large solids capability. And AJR is not nearly set up to be a Prime on this sort of program.

Lockheed, or anyone else that isn't NG, would face the same issue as Boeing: they'd be forced into bidding as a prime with NG as a major subcontractor, and would have to make a case for being better at integrating NG's stages than NG while also bidding competitively against NG. The Boeing withdrawal was almost inevitable as soon as the NG-Orbital ATK deal was approved. The only question is: how does USAF and the rest of the Pentagon react, and how does NG fair as the only option in town.
 
Just dust off the MGM-134.
I really think that ~400 mobile launchers, constantly moving around in a country this size, represents a far more survivable deterrent than 450 silos the targeting solutions to which are unchanging and well known. Presenting an enemy with a "SCUD hunt" a third the size of North America means they can never assure the destruction of the deterrent. It would make the survivability of the GBSD comparable to that of the SSBNs. The Midgetman worked, it's developed and 30 years on it still seems to meet requirements. Of course the erector launcher prototype was scrapped, but it might be better to use a new one anyway. It will fit into a 53 foot trailer and at 30,000 pounds, it's tare weight makes it usable on U.S. highways.

30 years on, spinning up production is, of course, going to involve some changes and detail updates, but most of the design work is surely still useable.

Amusingly, if they used rope memory or whatever computer tech they were using back then it might make the software more resistant to hacking since there might not be enough code for malware to work with.
 
While I'll agree mobile launchers are more survivable they are also more expensive and have logistical and security issues. A tractor-trailer in the highway can easily disappear but people will hate nuclear weapons randomly driving around the highways. That's why we went with Midgetman's off-road concept in the first place.
 
Amusingly, if they used rope memory or whatever computer tech they were using back then it might make the software more resistant to hacking since there might not be enough code for malware to work with.

With regards as to the rope memory, I don't think it's quite that old. ;)
 
But it's not as if previous production ICBMs didn't have different suppliers for different solid stages.
 
But it's not as if previous production ICBMs didn't have different suppliers for different solid stages.
All three of the Trident II (and I think Minuteman as well) stages came from different manufacturers. The problem lies in that they eventually all fell under ATK, then ATK merged with the other big solid rocket supplier in Orbital. ATK Orbital was all set to supply the boosters to both the Boeing and NG entries, then NG went and bought out ATK Orbital. Smart move by NG but it basically ended competition.
 
Aerojet did solid stages on MX and Midgetman. You could have argued against all of the previous mixed stage approaches on
cost grounds as well but even back in the 80's there were industrial base concerns about large SRMs.
 
All three of the Trident II (and I think Minuteman as well) stages came from different manufacturers. The problem lies in that they eventually all fell under ATK, then ATK merged with the other big solid rocket supplier in Orbital. ATK Orbital was all set to supply the boosters to both the Boeing and NG entries, then NG went and bought out ATK Orbital. Smart move by NG but it basically ended competition.
I think some large mergers should probably be blocked on competition grounds and perhaps this was one of them.
 
AJR was involved in the program and may still be in the mix for some work
Final stage (warhead bus) of the missile probably. I think liquid propulsion is where their strength is.
Liquid and small solids. I wouldn't be shocked to see the bus/upper stage use a diverted-thrust solid for maneuvering.
 
Just dust off the MGM-134.
I really think that ~400 mobile launchers, constantly moving around in a country this size, represents a far more survivable deterrent than 450 silos the targeting solutions to which are unchanging and well known. Presenting an enemy with a "SCUD hunt" a third the size of North America means they can never assure the destruction of the deterrent. It would make the survivability of the GBSD comparable to that of the SSBNs. The Midgetman worked, it's developed and 30 years on it still seems to meet requirements. Of course the erector launcher prototype was scrapped, but it might be better to use a new one anyway. It will fit into a 53 foot trailer and at 30,000 pounds, it's tare weight makes it usable on U.S. highways.

30 years on, spinning up production is, of course, going to involve some changes and detail updates, but most of the design work is surely still useable.

Amusingly, if they used rope memory or whatever computer tech they were using back then it might make the software more resistant to hacking since there might not be enough code for malware to work with.

I don't recall its range being that great for China.
 
AJR was involved in the program and may still be in the mix for some work
Final stage (warhead bus) of the missile probably. I think liquid propulsion is where their strength is.
Liquid and small solids. I wouldn't be shocked to see the bus/upper stage use a diverted-thrust solid for maneuvering.

That's a fairly pronounced weight penalty.
Depends on the implementation, the MX bus had a large axial engine+smaller maneuvering thrusters and wasn't a featherweight. If the next missile used something along the lines of Trident II's through-deck configuration and that stage had thrust vectoring, the performance might be worth the weight.
 
Might be interesting to see what's possible on the weight reduction side, Isp side for throttleable solids; this paper is circa 2000.
And IM compliance since I can't see the Air Force going for a through-deck configuration and PBV that's Navy class 1.1 levels of boom.




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Does anyone foresee the new IBM as being able to take a "southern" route over the south pole to reach intended targets?
Will it carry more than 1 warhead as the minuteman now carries?
Stealth features like hiding the plume on launch?
Just a fan/patriot with questions.
 
Does anyone foresee the new IBM as being able to take a "southern" route over the south pole to reach intended targets?
Will it carry more than 1 warhead as the minuteman now carries?
Stealth features like hiding the plume on launch?
Just a fan/patriot with questions.
The LBSD (Land Based Strategic Deterrent) back in 2004 was contemplating a 26k range to accomplish South Pole shots to get to places without overflying Russia. Much to my chagrin it will be a “new” Minuteman carrying one W87 with decoys IMHO
 

5 SSBNS, 40 bombers, no first use
 
The US has no need to do a FOBS (over-the-South Pole) attack. Russia is doing so to avoid the US missile defense specifically GBI and the BMEWs line. Russia does not have an equivalent missile defense system, its current ABM is point defense and doesn't care what direction the ICBMs are coming from and Russia has radars looking south (concerned with China and to a lesser extend Pakistan and Israel). Going over the South pole just increases complexity and decrease the payload size.

There's also no need for "stealth" propellants for a retaliatory system. What are you trying to hide? Besides the amount of energy release required for an ICBM is near impossible to hide. That is a huge amount of thermal energy and in order to have "smokeless" propellants (that are not truly stealth) you have to drop the metal component of the propellant and by extension a significant drop in performance.

I think it will have the capability like MM3 of being upload with 3 warheads but most likely will only be deployed with one. Which also means the post-boost vehicle can be made smaller and lighter.
 
A southern launch doesn't imply warheads in orbit like FOBS and the point is typically to avoid overflight of other nuclear powers.

Russia is doing so to avoid the US missile defense specifically GBI and the BMEWs lin

Or the fact that the US doesn't have much in the way of southern facing early warning capability.
And most of what's there is near or on the coast.
 
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FOBS is the most efficient way of getting warheads over the South pole.

China does not have the capability to target MM3 so there would be no need to use the MM3 force in a nuclear strike on China. You can instead use a Pacific based SSBN which wouldn't need to overfly Russia. Note that a South pole strike on China could potentially overfly India or Pakistan, both of whom are nuclear armed.
 
FOBS is the most efficient way of getting warheads over the South pole.

And the least accurate and practically banned by treaty.

China does not have the capability to target MM3 so there would be no need to use the MM3 force in a nuclear strike on China.

A complete non-sequitur.

You can instead use a Pacific based SSBN which wouldn't need to overfly Russia.

Fewer tubes on fewer subs. And given the well known and persistent limitations of Russian early warning against
Pacific SLBM attacks rather ill-advised.


Note that a South pole strike on China could potentially overfly India or Pakistan, both of whom are nuclear armed.

They don't have quick retaliatory responses that could threaten CONUS and no ability to detect it anyway.
 
FOBS was banned under SALT II but is not currently banned by New START, note Russia's constant talk about a "South pole" capability on their new Sarmat. FOBS is also not considered to fall under the Outer Space Treaty. Any "South pole" attack will suffer accuracy issues which can be solved via the use of GPS, this is not a FOBS-specific problem.

So Russia would be concerned about SLBMs but not by a FOBS attack on China? Do note that such an attack could very well be aimed at Russia, all the warheads have to do is keep going a bit more before deorbiting.

MM3 is more likely to be used if it is under threat. Since China can not threaten MM3 there would be less need to use it against China. You say there are fewer tubes on the subs but the subs carry more than twice as much warheads as the MM3 force, and China would not require the level of nuclear strike that Russia would.
 

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