Unrelated, I found a couple of improved Deustchland-class pre-dreadnought plans from RM 3 some months ago but never post here, these are the part of 1906 naval programs presumably. There are no data on hull dimensions (except Projekt IX haven't read it yet), only design requirements at 16000 tons and top speed of 19 knots. Total of 10 projects (Projekt I - X), they only have above/top view of the hull plans sadly. Here's the all-big gun projects, the rest are mixed caliber with 28cm, 24cm, 21cm, 19cm and 17cm types.
"Projekt I" - 6x28cm/L40 (3x2), 8x17cm and 24x8.8cm in casemate.
"Projekt II" - 6x28cm/L40 (2x2, 2x1), 4x21cm (4x1) and 24x8.8cm in deck mounts and casemate.
"Projekt III" - 10x28cm/L40 (2x2, 2x1 in turrets and 4x1 in casemate) and 24x8.8cm in deck mounts and casemate.
"Projekt VI" - 12x28cm/L40 (4x2 in turrets, 4x1 in casemate) and 24x8.8cm in deck mounts and casemate.
One notable mixed caliber pre-dreadnought type was "Projekt IX" have 2x2 28cm but armed to the teeth with 16x21cm in twin turrets!one can be describe as "German Lord Nelson".
Before I forget. This is a picture of H-40 Armor, which came in two variants. The right armor scheme provides more overall armor, especially deck armor, and appears to be caused by an acknowledgement of the role of aircraft.
I did go with H-41s armor for this one. Since there is no armor provided for H-40A and H-40B (as they are known, but H-40B was drawn up in 1941), it's impossible at this time to say with any certainty what the armor values would be. Presumably they would be equal to H-39 since these designs are based heavily upon it. However, H-39s overall protective scheme was considered inadequate even after they were laid down. So much so that a complete redesign was seriously considered before the ships were scrapped. The desires of improvement over H-39 mixed with the results of Bismarck led to the H-41. If H-40A/B were ever to be built (as a redesign of H-39), it might have been to these sorts of protection specifications.
H-40A and H-40B are non-serious design studies likely meant to appease Hitler, who desired larger naval guns than 40.6cm. H-40A and H-40B presumably are to carry these 40.6cm+ guns, since no caliber is given in their plans. 45cm perhaps? Hard to say. One can certainly tell that no serious amount of effort was expended for the designs, so it is safe to say that the armor values are highly likely to be equal to that of H-39.
To make a simplification of these two paragraphs, H-40A/B are just gunswapped H-39 with minor changes.
When translating RM 6/32 Development of Battleship "H" and "J" (Thread page 22 for those who curious), there are 4 pages above it, seems describe the main gun choices for battleship "H" and "J". Unfortunately they're all hand writing! so i can't read it but you can see some texts of the main guns for the class, 35cm, 38cm, 40.6cm, the rebored 42cm and according to page 115 these documents dated in 13.01.1937.
On Page 114 you'll see "5-38cm" text, possibly the 5x2 arrangement (but i do consider 2x3/3x2 layout are possible too).
"H" were also originally to be third sister ships of Bismarck-class (F and G), a modified design based on preliminary Bismarck and armed with 8x35cm guns at 35000 tons.
Does anyone have a drawing of the protection scheme for H-39 (cross-sections and/or side and top views)?
And also what armor improvements were planned for H-41?
Does anyone have a drawing of the protection scheme for H-39 (cross-sections and/or side and top views)?
And also what armor improvements were planned for H-41?
This may qualify as a cross section, but it doesn't seem to show the main belt. IIRC, the main belt was 145mm upper belt over 300mm main belt.
I don't have good access to my scanner right now, but Dulin & Garzke have a cross section of H-41 on pg 321 which shows the armor improvements. 150 mm deck armor. . "Battleships: Axis & Neutral Battleships in World War II"
Today's topic is the Deutschland rebuilds. / and me throwing a bunch of diesel engine development at the screen because I can't help but explain every little facet and detail.
This series of rebuild concepts and proposals that was to encompass only Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee at first, but grew to include Deutschland.
The genesis of the oft-unknown Deutschland rebuilds starts with the lessons learned at sea with the class over the 1930's, and in particular that of the Spanish Civil War where the Kriegsmarine came to truly understand the issues of their Panzerschiffe steaming outside the relatively calm North and Baltic seas from which they had been operating from a majority of their service lives.
Koop describes in his book Warships of the Kriegsmarine:Pocket Battleships of the Deutschland Class the types of issues faced, and the beginnings of creative solutions to solve them, in this paragraph:
The issues described are somewhat similar to the very same as those faced by some Kaiserliche Marine in the First World War: wet bows, sterns awash at high speed, the like. The large cruisers of the Derfflinger-class suffered these two issues listed in particular, which is not surprising given that a lot of basis was taken from Imperial-era design when the Reichsmarine first truly began to rebuild in the mid-20's.
The solution at first was a relatively simple one: reduce the secondary battery to just four (rather than eight) 15cm or alter it to an intermediate DP caliber (12.8cm) and remove the aircraft, thereby reducing topweight. However, as it will be said in later excerpts, the Panzerschiffe are too valuable to just reduce their combat capability for manners such as improved seakeeping (not seaworthiness). The solution would then be to "lighten up" the unnecessarily massive Star Wars-esque battle-masts on Scheer and Spee by cutting them down and making them tubular.
The "raising of the lateral bulges to the upper deck level" idea is reminiscent of Karlsruhe's 1938 rebuild which served to enhance her structural strength, seakeeping, and armor (in particular against sub-6" caliber projectiles). Here you can see Karlsruhe before and after conversion:
The primary difference between Karlsruhe and the Deutschlands was that instead of fitting a new exterior, the larger cruisers were to extend their side bulges upwards. Here is a photo to illustrate what I mean: View attachment 692314
Again, the quote was: "raising of the lateral bulges to the upper deck level". A translation into simpler terms being: Moving the side bulges to the uppermost deck that stretches all the way fore and aft. That would be the deck (highlighted in red) from the above photo where the bulge has been raised to. Here is another illustration for clarity, deck colored red to match the above illustration. View attachment 692313
The usefulness of such a decision as this is hard to quantify as there are no steel thickness values shown for the bulges. This means that there is an addition of weight above the waterline for only a potentially very small increase in protection. But I suppose any addition in protection is a good one, no? Even 10-15mm would be a great improvement on top of 80mm. Raising the bulges should also add to hull volume, increasing buoyancy and seakeeping characteristics (as so far as my imperfect understanding concludes).
Radar to be installed was, as of the early planning stages in approximately 1938, likely the FuMG 39 (gO) but later (approximately 1939+) to have fitted a full FuMO 22 or FuMO 27. According to Koop/Schmolke, the FuMO 22 is a gunnery radar of 81.5cm wavelength, 500 kHz frequency, 8 kW output, 368 MHz frequency for a 14-18km range with +/- 3 degrees of bearing accuracy. According to Die Deutschen Funkmessverfahren bis 1945 (a much more believable source) the range for the FuMO 22 as installed aboard Scharnhorst/Gneisenau, Admiral Hipper/Blucher, and Admiral Scheer/Deutschland was 25km to battleships with a bearing accuracy of +/- 5 degrees. The statistics from Koop/Schmolke are identical to those of the FuMO 21.
In addition to the new radar, stabilization for the searchlights was to be provided for which would be beneficial in night actions, especially against small fast craft such as motor torpedo boats or destroyers who might otherwise be lost as the ship heaves and rolls in turns at high speed and/or in high seas.
Splinter shields for AA is an underrated improvement that, if anything, provides solace to anti-aircraft gunners that the shield will provide some measure of protection against strafing fire, splinters, etc, allowing them to further focus on their duties instead of fearing for their lives in their wide-open mount and serves to increase overall survivability as well as effectiveness. Germany was behind the curve on such developments - at least for light AA, not really making any attempts to amend this until the latter half of the war.
Perhaps the most important of all these improvements is the strengthening of the motor foundations. Heavy vibration, excessive noise, constant maintenance, shorter operating times and more plagued these early engines, being in 1933 a relatively new and untested technology, especially at this scale. Thankfully there was a fix for biggest problems (vibration and noise) which was to increase the strength and rigidity of the motor's foundations. This served to increase the integrity of the engines (without making them individually heavier, thereby reducing their power to weight ratio). This would prove to be a critical aspect of maintaining the health of diesel motors in the postwar era.
Now that we have gone through an introduction to the problems of the Deutschland's machinery, let's take a deeper dive on how exactly they've become so relatively "common knowledge" to the point of even being picked up in modern "Pop History":
In short, these days the issues of the Deutschland's propulsion plant (such as those described in the paragraph before last) are rather well-known, but what most do not know is that a lot of these problems have been exaggerated wildly on purpose, and as such has forever tainted the legacy of a revolutionary ship and her unique engine system with the effects of such still being felt in today's "Pop History". The Deutschland-class had been a pioneer design which had beyond proved the usefulness and practicality of such systems overall in spite of the initial teething problems, thus leading us to the modern age of gas turbines and diesel engines. But to fully understand the circumstances surrounding the rise of the diesel engines aboard large warships it is necessary that we go on a long tangent to explore the history of German naval diesel development and its interaction with its direct rival: steam.
Let us again refer to Koop:
Among some naval circles in the modern age (read: nerds in Discord servers who talk about warships all day) the effect of steam lobbyists/steam plant manufacturers in Germany (Wagner, Blohm & Voss, Brown Boveri and Co, DeSchiMag, and more) during this period in the development of large marine diesels has become well-known and understood, but for the wider world of your average naval hobbyist or enjoyer, such information might not have - or more deceptively misleading info has taken root. The purpose of this tangent is to set the record straight on that.
Reading from the above excerpts, the MAN Works Circular from 1935 states that their diesels 'give great satisfaction now as before', this quote referring to earlier MAN diesel engines. Although everyone already knows about the diesel engines present aboard the Panzerschiffe (M9Z 42/58), if one pays a bit of extra attention they will realize that earlier ships in the Reichsmarine also carried MAN diesels. For instance, the Konigsberg-class cruisers carried a pair of 10-cylinder low-power diesels and the Leipzig/Nurnberg carried four 7-cylinder diesels. While these engines themselves had issues and proved troublesome for a time, the type of criticism befalling them is significantly less than the 9-cylinder engines aboard the Deutschlands. Why?
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, diesel and steam propulsion lived in a sort of symbiotic relationship. Diesel did not interfere with the installation of a typical steam plant, but worked to improve the range of the ships. Thusly they lived happily together to increase the overall capability of the cruisers they were installed in.
Then the Bremse appeared.
The very existence of Artillerieschulschiff Bremse (commissioned 1932) represented an actual threat to the steam monopoly being that she was roughly a sort-of 'testbed' or 'proof-of-concept' for the sort of "engine-only" system that that would be upscaled and installed aboard the Deutschlands. Bremse may have carried slightly smaller 8-cylinder "M8Z 30/44" engines compared to the large 9-cylinder "M9Z 42/58" aboard Deutschland, but the ship really was a proof of concept, and an exciting one at that, proving that ships even as small as destroyers (Bremse was 103.62m/1870t max) could be powered exclusively by diesel technology. With this in mind, it should be no surprise that Bremse is where the diesel ridicule truly started as she herself faced many problems with the relatively new technology (especially in so small a package). Regardless, diesels were showing promise and if allowed to further develop could end up producing greater and greater horsepower for their weight to the point they could compete with steam and still offer much greater ranges for the ships they would be installed on. As such the teething issues that inevitably cropped up were, naturally, exploited by lobbyists in favor of steam plant manufacturers to push Kriegsmarine favor back in the direction of their products as the primary method of propulsion which served to protect their control of future contracts. Even worse, MAN is essentially stuck steadfast between a rock and a hard place: the Reichsmarine has dictated that the Diesels must produce the most PS(HP)/kg possible (necessitating making them as light as possible and therefore much more susceptible to noise and vibration) while their rival is looking for any excuse to make them look bad. While you can tell that MAN were fully aware of this given the sarcastic remarks about Deutschland, they had little choice in the matter if they wanted to remain relevant to the Kriegsmarine.
On top of everything MAN has to deal with is the undeniable fact that the steam lobby is sort of...accurate with their criticisms.
Let's break that down.
Let's get this out of the way first: the problems faced by the shipboard diesels MAN created were practically unavoidable. Beyond the fact that MAN is being shafted from both ends, large marine diesel engines of the size and power as those in the Deutschlands are an entirely new territory and as such must be placed in ships to conduct tests before they can create effective solutions. One might think that Bremse, being the 'testbed', might be the ship to do this, but there are some problems:
The engines are of two different types and power outputs.
Panzerschiff A (Deutschland)'s diesels were ordered earlier.
One is a 1,800t destroyer-sized and constructed vessel, the other is a 14,000t heavy cruiser.
There is literally less than a year between the commissioning of Bremse and Deutschland, so any general diesel-specific issues could hardly be ironed out fully in such a short space of time. (Issues related to Bremse's diesels were not fixed until 1939).
The issues regarding the diesels are related to their design and the design of their mountings, meaning that the issues aren't superficial and solved quickly (recall that they were not "ironed out" until 1941.)
In short: MAN is again screwed.
Additionally, I am not so biased or proud as to deny the truth. It is true that the engines were built too light. It is true that the engines vibrated horribly. It is true that the noise is literally unbearable. It is true that constant maintenance must be conducted. It is true that a stock of spare parts must be kept for said maintenance. It is true that diesels, at this period in time, use significantly more space and weight than steam for the same power output.
Deutschland sailors working in the engine rooms stated that without hearing protection the noise was so incredibly loud that their ears bled, and vibrations shook their bodies. Admiral Graf Spee, after having exceeded her scheduled engine maintenance by literally twice the work hours following the 1939 Battle of River Plate, was found to only be capable of a maximum safe speed of 17 knots because some of her engines were showing severe cases of overuse (Misshapen pistons, cylinder cracks, cracks in the foundations, the like). In service, Admiral Scheer typically rotated out her engines by keeping some on for cruising while conducting maintenance on the others. While trails showed that almost all could make 28 knots, maximum service speed was typically just 25 knots, and this means that they have no hope of outrunning the new French Deutschland-killers: the Dunkerque and Strasbourg (as I like the call them: the damn-near greatest overreaction in naval design history, brought to the world by Fr*nch copium and a rampant inferiority complex) or, worse, faster and faster battleship designs emerging in the mid-to-late 1930's (28 and 30-knotters).
It was these types of issues that led the Kriegsmarine to eventually select steam propulsion for Panzerschiffe D and E* (which would later be upscaled to became Scharnhorst and Gneisenau), in particular the lacking speed, of which steam promised miracles in its operation with very high efficiency and ranges capable of matching that of diesels, low maintenance requirements, less space and weight, and high power outputs.
(*Panzerschiff A = Deutschland, B = Scheer, C = Graf Spee, D = later Scharnhorst, E = later Gneisenau).
Yeah, I'm sure we all know how that turned out. It wouldn't be until 1938 that the Kriegsmarine, now forced to re-focus on long-range raiding operations as they could not ever directly face the Royal Navy, began to see reason once more...but as Koop said: "they missed the bus". 4 years of development is a long time to miss out on.
As discussed earlier, most of the issues cropping up from the diesels installed aboard Bremse and the Deutschlands was actually capable of being fixed with some alterations. The truth is that most of these issues (highlighted by the steam lobbyists) featured a strong case of malicious misdirection. While it is true that the problems faced were very much real, they did not decide to disclaim that these were teething issues or that some were endemic to the type of diesels MAN was forced to produce by requirement. Nobody reading this with a diesel truck or car - typically - suffers from having their eyeballs shake from the vibration, or their ears bleed from the noise? Or have to conduct constant maintenance to ensure that the engine works at all and won't have the pistons become misshapen and the cylinders crack? Do you hear these sorts of issues from most modern marine diesel engines? Or from modern MAN diesels? (Yes, MAN does still make marine diesel engines to this day, and they're quite good even if they have no 24-cylinder options to compare to sadly).
Alas there was little MAN could do but publish in their papers. MAN's chief engineer could not wait all day to be seen by the various naval groups to explain what needed to be done as he had work to do himself which essentially left the MAN diesels comparatively less defended and thus far more susceptible to the sort of misdirection posed by steam lobbyists. But that misdirection is not the truth. Even later on in their lifespan the M9Z 42/58 engines aboard the Deutschlands gave good service. Well enough that the Soviets used the engine type post-war, having gotten examples from Lutzow (ex-Deutschland) when they raised her. In Soviet service the engine was named "9CHN42/58" and featured a supercharger, continuing in service until the 1980s aboard some auxiliary vessels. There is even a Soviet diesel destroyer project that potentially uses the engine, having parameters matching the M9Z on top of the fact that the Soviets did not develop high-speed diesels of their own until after the war meaning they would source from their neighbors. It would have used 12 of these engines for three shafts (Project D-35).
Later MAN engines (those designed from 1938 and onward) would take the lessons learned from the Panzerschiffe into account for the M9Z 65/95, M11Z 42/58, V12Z 42/58, and V12Z 32/44 - or at least as best as they could given that they still needed to be capable of producing the most horsepower for the weight to compete with and (eventually) match or supersede steam. With each new model this became more and more of a reality. For instance the V12Z 32/44 - first trialed in 1944 - initially had a 100% rated output power of 10,000 hp on 67 tons (all auxiliaries included sans oil cooler). When the engine was fitted with a "exhaust gas supercharger" (turbocharger) later in testing, and this turbocharger was improved, the engine was capable of maxing out at just over 15,000 hp (approximately 11,600-12,000 hp nominal continuous). That meant it now was possible to get 80,000 continuous maximum continuous horsepower with eight engines geared to two shafts with a minor space and weight penalty - on a DESTROYER, and this is with the stock engine which did not feature the turbocharger. The V12Z 32/44 proved its worth in 1944/45, but unfortunately testing did not continue due to lack of fuel. The Allies were keenly interested in these engines post-war with the U.S. and British each taking one of the four produced. One such engine still exists to this day in Germany. The U.S.S.R. did not get one of these engines. The V12Z 32/44 form factor is still produced by MAN to this day under slightly different nomenclature and with up to 20-cylinders in V-form.
German diesels displayed an astonishing rate of improvement given the circumstances. In 1933 the M9Z was 100t per engine with an absolute maximum of 7,100 hp (abt. 6,000 continuous). In 1944, the V12Z 32/44 was producing (without supercharger) 12,500 hp maximum and 10,000 hp continuous - a massive improvement from just 10 years ago, with a 4 year gap in development thrown in there, with a part of the development cycle occurring during a war they were losing in the second half. Even despite the miracle child 32/44, the V12Z 42/58 held its own in 1940, weighing 136.5t and producing 15,600 hp maximum and easily capable of 10,000 hp continuous (conducting a 200-hr test run at this horsepower).
Among all the engines produced during and after 1938, the only one that may have had a serious problem(s) would be the lightweight V12Z 32/44. Designed primarily for destroyers, it was noted there may be potential vibration issues onboard Z51, the diesel destroyer testbed ship under construction since 1943, if they were to be fitted. Desperate to install the machinery and complete the ship to conduct trials, it was planned to place all four produced engines inside the ship, geared to the center shaft, and omit the wing shafts so that the effects of vibration could be tested as soon as possible. Perhaps fortunately for the safety of the engines this was not carried out due to testing still being conducted. Despite this, resilient mounts to remedy such problems were created after the war ended which drastically reduced vibration and dampened the noise at the cost of some additional weight. Postwar diesels created by Germany were also heavier.
With the explanations of German marine diesel development history done, let's continue with the rebuilds:
Having gotten a taste for a rebuild, it should come as no surprise by now that the project would escalate rapidly. It is almost by nature that the Konstruktionamt would do so, and yet again it brings forth interesting concepts for the rebuild. Surprisingly enough this passage states that the planned increased beam and length would have prejudiced seakeeping qualities, but I do not see how that would be the case unless the beam extension was only a portion of the total side height (increasing weight above the waterline) or if the hull was made much finer in an attempt to reduce drag and increase speed. What of Karlsruhe, though? She, too, features a beam extension in (possibly) much the same way, but there does not appear to be any notes of a deteriorated seakeeping ability. If anything it should be the opposite. Unfortunately it remains a mystery for now.
This passage is rather ironic given that two of the three Panzershiffe this refers to survived well into the war, but it does underline one of the biggest issues with the Deutschland class: speed.
Diesel engines of sufficient power to weight ratio did not exist in the early 1930's to propel these cruisers at sufficient speed to be considered acceptable by 1939 standards. Initially their speeds were adequate given the initial mission profile and potential competition they would face. All that was required was that they outgun anything faster (treaty cruisers) and manage to outrun or out-cruise anything larger (battleships). For a short time this was possible as the only nations with ships capable of catching the Panzerschiffe at the time not being foreseen as enemies (the British [Renown/Hood] and the Japanese [Kongo]). In fact, it was only the Polish and Russians that the Germans first considered, France a little later, and finally the British in 1938. Even the US did not have capital ships capable of catching the Pazerschiffe until the North Carolina class and the speeds provided for them only reached parity with the Deutschlands (though, to be fair, the turbines aboard NC would likely outlast the diesels in a sustained chase).
Things would change with the arrival of faster and faster capital ships. It was not long before 28 knots became something of a standard and even this was raised higher in some designs (30-knotters). To put it all simply: a speed increase would be necessary to delay obsolescence and increase the effectiveness and lifespan of the Panzerschiffe with respect to their intended roles.
In reality, the 1940 rebuilds for Deutschland (now Lutzow) and Admiral Scheer only went a small way to increasing the effectiveness of the ships compared to the big dreams planned out in 1937-1939. Though it certainly helped with finally stomping out the big issues around vibration and noise, it did not go so far as to fix the other major issue regarding speed (which would have required a lengthening of the hull or a re-engine). Unfortunately that is just the nature of the beast, and the war had done an excellent job of throwing almost every single naval building plan into disarray.
I can't think of a really good way to segue into this next part so we're just gonna go ahead with it.
Recently something spectacular has been found in relation to that very desire (an increase in speed). In the recent past a good acquaintance of mine went to the US National Archives to picture German machinery plans, NavTechEU documents, and other similar items and he has returned some exciting information, much more than I had expected. One of those is in relation to the Panzerschiffe rebuilds.
Finding these plans reveals that the full scope of the rebuilds is a lot less known that we currently realize. I would say that this falls to the fact a lot was lost or destroyed, but also because there is a lot of information that simply has not been digitized yet. Aside from the BA/MA, the US National Archives is a critical offender for their lack of digitization as those documents and plans represent a vast wealth of untapped Kriegsmarine knowledge; contained within the dozens of boxes are large stacks of papers and plans - a massive missing piece of information for the history of the Kriegsmarine.
Today I am proud to share one of those smaller pieces with the internet, and perhaps the world, for the first time.
1938 was the primary year that a lot of the rebuild planning was conducted, that much is clear, so it should be no surprise that beginning in August of that year three sketches were created to study the possibility of replacing the dated and fault-prone plant of M9Z 42/58 diesels with models that were under study for possible construction.
The year 1938 represents a big shift for the Kriegsmarine as they make a return to diesel systems and re-shift the focus of their navy to that of being fully engaged in a trade war against the Russians, Polish, French, and most particularly the British. Against such long odds simply being good enough or equal to can no longer cut it, and thus gave the motivation for these engine replacement concepts, as no matter how refurbished the M9Z engines were, they could not provide the necessary speed required.
On 19 August 1938, "Entwurf I" of the "Umbau-Panzerschiffe" project was created: View attachment 692899 View attachment 692904
This first sketch is certainly incomplete and is fraught with issues, but is understandable given the tightness of the space provided. For both images depicted the length of the propulsion spaces is split in the middle to demonstrate two possible arrangements, the first (or "aft") being on the left, and the second (or "forward") being on the right. "Panzersch Deutschland" at the top appears to be the first draft, the earliest attempt which is abandoned quite early for Scheer and Spee which have slightly wider machinery spaces.
"Panzersch Adm Scheer u Adm Graf Spee" show a further two ideas and represents a more completed version of the Deutschland plan above it. The first/left/"aft" arrangement shows V10Z 42/58 main engines with attached auxiliary engines - the same arrangement as with the prior M9Z 42/58's aboard Scheer and Spee which featured one auxiliary engine per two main engines. The second/right/"fore" group shows V8Z 42/58 main engines with a single auxiliary engine for auxiliary machinery. The difference here is that there is an 8-cylinder (V4Z) 42/58 engine possibly being used to provide scavenging air and an M7Z 42/58 representing the auxiliaries. Scavenging engines were implemented to provide fresh air to the main engines so they could operate at maximum power without having their power reduced by needing to provide for their own fresh air. (Think of it like the belt on your car engine sucking some power to provide for electronics). A split gearbox featuring only two motors per gearbox (as in the M9Z 42/58 system) is used and sees the oil mills re-arranged.
Both the "aft" arrangement is impossible because the gearbox room needs to be made longer to accommodate the gearbox (it states approximately 11m is required), but cannot be done because there is no more space lengthwise. Additionally, the main engines do not fit (it is noted as 'zu eng!' - "too tight!"). For the "fore" arrangement it appears that the issue regarding the gearbox has been solved, but it has the air blower hanging very slightly outside of the citadel as it cannot be moved anywhere else as there is no room.
On 6 September 1938, another attempt was made. This is "Entwurf II": View attachment 692905
The second attempt shows much-reduced ambition as compared to the first: "Greatest power that can be accommodated with V-engines in the old space available for engine room". At the top we can see eight V7Z 42/58 engines each of approximately 9,100 PSe, four per Vulcan gear box, for a total of 67,000 PSe - or about a 10,000 PSe increase over the maximum output of the M9Z 42/58 engine system. It also appears to show two separate arrangements fore and aft with a third below.
The "aft" arrangement shows Spee's auxiliary engines of 420 kW, one per pair of main engines with the possibility of a single 900 kW 9-cylinder engine in their stead. The "fore" arrangement shows a much more conventional method of two Deutschland-style auxiliaries of 270 kW, one per engine.
The final arrangement provided below shows a slightly more powerful system of 72,500 PSe. This is done by removing space from the gearbox room and allocating it to the second motor room so that V8Z 42/58 engines can be provided for. These engines are given a synchronous coupler so that the V7Z and V8Z engines can operate on the same gearbox. Auxiliaries would be as the above depiction (Spee auxiliaries or 900 kW 9-cyl).
Overall this would be the power required to push these ships to the proper speeds of 30 knots that was desired, but it isn't over yet.
The final design was made on 9 September 1938. This is "Entwurf III": View attachment 692906
This is where all limitations are dropped and whatever space is needed is provided. The length of the machinery spaces depicted for the V11Z 42/58 engines is 76 meters, a 15.5 meter increase over the original 60.5 meter length. The width has been increased to 12.4 meters at the base (from 11 meters) and 16 meters at the top (from 14.8 meters) and the usable space height has increased to 6.8 meters (from 6.3 meters). In all, the space of the citadel has increased 15.5 meters x 1.4 / 1.2 meters x 0.5 meters - a not-so-insignificant increase in citadel volume. I wonder if this reflects the hull length and beam increases planned for the Deutschlands? Another mystery.
Either way the results are as one might expect. With each engine producing about 14,300 PSe and gearing losses taken into account, the new system was to produce about 106,000 PSe - double the output of the old system. Length and beam extensions were almost certainly in-mind for this, as it would be the only way to fit such a system, but even with the added weight speeds of 32-33 knots would have been possible. No doubt this was the goal so as to match the Admiral Hipper-class cruisers and better keep up with the Scharnhorst and up-and-coming Bismarck class battleships.
It is obvious from looking at the designs presented that the plans for re-engines were not taken too seriously, acting more as initial studies for the very possibility. But why?
Because, unfortunately, there was not a lot of choice.
The funds required to rapidly develop diesel engines (of which had been provided for MAN from 1928-1934) had only just been once again greenlit earlier in 1938. While some advancements such as the V-form engine had been made in the 1934-38 period, their R&D cycles were far from complete. The engines that had been developed during that period (such as the M11Z, M12Z 42/58) were simple extensions of the M9Z 42/58 and as a result were longer. The citadel length had been intended for engines 9 cylinders long and there was certainly no room left to replace them 1:1, leaving V-engines as the only reasonable option.
It would not be until 1940 that the V12Z 42/58 engine conducted its trail runs. This means that in 1938 it would be acknowledged that V-form engines would not be a reality until years later, but at the same time the political situation was rapidly devolving in late 1938 and into 1939, thus putting the threat of war much closer. In addition to this, the required
I suppose the big thing I wanted to do here was a prospective poke at what one of the Deutschlands (I was thinking Admiral Scheer) might look like "unleashed", being given the full treatment of the various prospective rebuild ideas (including the special plans I made reference to in one of my earlier posts which detail a 1938 re-engine series of proposals), but at this moment I just don't have the time. I'll have to edit it just like I had to edit the Gneisenau Rebuild one - and that doesn't just apply for this section, there's stuff I know I'm missing from the diesel history section above (including some fact checking) and it almost certainly reads like crap so it will need to be restructured as well.
I won't leave you empty-handed and blueballed of course, so here's what I have in mind:
Umbau-Panzerschiff "Adm. Scheer" (Rebuild 1940 to 1942, stats will reflect ship in 1945)
Increased length and beam (750t)
Modified battle-mast to tubular-type.
Re-engine to two quad sets of V12Z 42/58 engines with improved motor foundations.
Raising bulges to weather deck level.
Various improved models of sensors
Giving shields to AA
Unifying secondary battery to 12.8cm SK C/34 in Drhl. C/38 twin turrets.
Other small items of interest noted in the rebuild plans.
Thank you for your time and I hope that you will come by and check the edited version at a later date. It'll be better, I promise. Maybe.
i know this is an old post but do you by chance have some sources that i can look at or is the vast majority of this information stuck inside of arcives
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