The vulnerability of combat helicopters has translated into a high number of losses on the Russian side. In February, a report published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the Russian Aerospace Forces had lost 40% of their pre-war Ka-52 Hokum-B attack helicopter fleet.
While some of the Russian helicopter losses have been pretty absurd, I'm not sure projected Apache losses over Fulda were all that much lower...
 
Those of us who were guarding the Fulda Gap did not expect to make it to day 3.

Neither side in the ongoing conflict in Europe have transitioned to fighting attack helicopters at night. Most of the western militaries have transitioned to conducting offensive attack helicopter operations at night. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of the MANPAD systems which are almost all Mark 1 eyeball directed, line of sight systems. It is not a panacea solution, but the risk is significantly less.

Interestingly as you can see here: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/mil-mi-28-versions.3398/post-695792
Russian Army Aviation is using tactics very common in the West. Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) with precision long range weapons. Ironically this is somewhat of a return to the original concept for attack helicopters in NATO for the general defense during the Cold War. Operating behind the ground frontage, sniping critical targets such as command and control and mobile air defense systems. This is also consistent with how the Israelis have used their Apache's with Spike NLOS. Even in the Information Age with a fully transparent battlefield, being able to maneuver precision fires at ~230 kmh behind your forward lines to hit targets tens of kilometers on the other side is a powerful capability. Other than very specialized missions done by one or two rotorcraft, with meticulous planning and support, crossing into enemy territory, even in the dead of night, will be an expensive endeavor.

The next real argument for Army Aviation around the world is; do you need a very specialized attack helicopter to do this or can you outfit an appropriate lift helicopter for the mission(s)? UH-60, NH-90, LYNX, Mi-8/17/171 all have the capacity to be outfitted for long-range attack. Since the mission is conducted from a relative sanctuary you don't need the suppression weapons (guns).
 
Those of us who were guarding the Fulda Gap did not expect to make it to day 3.
Oof, that's actually worse than I thought it was going to be.

When we meet up and start swapping tall tales, first adult beverage is on me!


The next real argument for Army Aviation around the world is; do you need a very specialized attack helicopter to do this or can you outfit an appropriate lift helicopter for the mission(s)? UH-60, NH-90, LYNX, Mi-8/17/171 all have the capacity to be outfitted for long-range attack. Since the mission is conducted from a relative sanctuary you don't need the suppression weapons (guns).
I would not want to give up the guns. There will almost certainly be times when you need to support the troops and the enemy is within 50m so no other weapons are advised due to danger close ranges.

Those times where it may happen are likely to not be in near-peer conflict, but I would still innately arm the helos for COIN and permissive skies. And then make it so that you can swap out most of the gun ammo load for more fuel or whatever and load long range stuff in case of near-peer conflicts.
 
Oof, that's actually worse than I thought it was going to be.

When we meet up and start swapping tall tales, first adult beverage is on me!



I would not want to give up the guns. There will almost certainly be times when you need to support the troops and the enemy is within 50m so no other weapons are advised due to danger close ranges.

Those times where it may happen are likely to not be in near-peer conflict, but I would still innately arm the helos for COIN and permissive skies. And then make it so that you can swap out most of the gun ammo load for more fuel or whatever and load long range stuff in case of near-peer conflicts.
I agree. You can buy the beverages. :cool:
 
I'd disagree on peer conflict.
Peer conflict (especially not as localized as second part of Ukraine) can be larger, and peers, strong as they are, aren't strong everywhere - especially in Pacific.
It's one thing if you're doing cas, but armed escort by default should be able to react to pop up threats.

Also, while guns aren't much use in positional warfare (and their [effective] range should be increased though caliber and guidance), during the first part of the conflict they were quite vital.

Positional warfare represents failure of both sides to conclude conflict decisively. It's unwise to assume failure without making it happen (as in 1914), Poles and French shown it too well in early WW2.
 
Also, while guns aren't much use in positional warfare (and their [effective] range should be increased though caliber and guidance), during the first part of the conflict they were quite vital.
Eh, if you need more range just use guided 70mm rockets.

Guns need accuracy over range and I don't think any helicopter can handle recoil over 30x113mm in a flex mount. 30x173mm or maybe 35x228mm in a fixed mount, and either one will push a hovering aircraft around.
 
Eh, if you need more range just use guided 70mm rockets.

Guns need accuracy over range and I don't think any helicopter can handle recoil over 30x113mm in a flex mount. 30x173mm or maybe 35x228mm in a fixed mount, and either one will push a hovering aircraft around.
If you can do both with one mount, why not? Larger ammo capacity in a smaller volume as a bonus.
Lofted moderate-speed ifv 50mm (which is large enough to be guided) IMHO will do the trick with manageable recoil.
 
If you can do both with one mount, why not? Larger ammo capacity in a smaller volume as a bonus.
Lofted moderate-speed ifv 50mm (which is large enough to be guided) IMHO will do the trick with manageable recoil.
Current US Army IFV 50mm is 50x228mm, the 35mm NATO blown out to 50mm bore. And that's above what I believe is helicopter recoil tolerance in a turret for sure, and likely above fixed-mount recoil tolerance.

Though if there is a gun bigger than 30x113mm mounted on a helicopter, I'm sure someone on this forum will tell me.
 
Though if there is a gun bigger than 30x113mm mounted on a helicopter, I'm sure someone on this forum will tell me.
This thread is about helicopter with 30x165 2a42, and it wasn't the largest. ;-)

I personally doubt there is any specific helicopter restriction any different from fixed-wing aircraft of a similar size.

Which means, guns of any sane caliber can be mounted in principle, it's more of a matter of common sense.
 
To keep from getting the thread too far off the rails, I personally agree with the continued need for dedicated armored helicopters with a wide ordinance capability.
 
A Ka-52 seems to have gone down in Kursk, reasons unclear.

View: https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1820867428881953043


Video of shootdown
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C0l_kuQpL8M


Allegedly two were downed this week:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yp57P4eUJx4&t=25s
 
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Those of us who were guarding the Fulda Gap did not expect to make it to day 3.

Neither side in the ongoing conflict in Europe have transitioned to fighting attack helicopters at night. Most of the western militaries have transitioned to conducting offensive attack helicopter operations at night. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of the MANPAD systems which are almost all Mark 1 eyeball directed, line of sight systems. It is not a panacea solution, but the risk is significantly less.

Interestingly as you can see here: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/mil-mi-28-versions.3398/post-695792
Russian Army Aviation is using tactics very common in the West. Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) with precision long range weapons. Ironically this is somewhat of a return to the original concept for attack helicopters in NATO for the general defense during the Cold War. Operating behind the ground frontage, sniping critical targets such as command and control and mobile air defense systems. This is also consistent with how the Israelis have used their Apache's with Spike NLOS. Even in the Information Age with a fully transparent battlefield, being able to maneuver precision fires at ~230 kmh behind your forward lines to hit targets tens of kilometers on the other side is a powerful capability. Other than very specialized missions done by one or two rotorcraft, with meticulous planning and support, crossing into enemy territory, even in the dead of night, will be an expensive endeavor.

The next real argument for Army Aviation around the world is; do you need a very specialized attack helicopter to do this or can you outfit an appropriate lift helicopter for the mission(s)? UH-60, NH-90, LYNX, Mi-8/17/171 all have the capacity to be outfitted for long-range attack. Since the mission is conducted from a relative sanctuary you don't need the suppression weapons (guns).

Abandoning the gun and armour saves a lot of weight, which means savings in cost or increased time on-station. Combining it with a transport compartment allows partial self-deployment and multi-role use. Seems like the future. The remaining question I have though - does it make sense to put a big radar on one of these things to allow it to do stand-off surveillance and self-designate targets?
 
Abandoning the gun and armour saves a lot of weight, which means savings in cost or increased time on-station. Combining it with a transport compartment allows partial self-deployment and multi-role use. Seems like the future. The remaining question I have though - does it make sense to put a big radar on one of these things to allow it to do stand-off surveillance and self-designate targets?
I believe that Russia currently has the ability to conduct electronic warfare from a HIP. The U.S. Army used to have this capability with an "E"H-60 through the early 1990s. These days I suspect that this mission is being conducted using UAV.
 
The next real argument for Army Aviation around the world is; do you need a very specialized attack helicopter to do this or can you outfit an appropriate lift helicopter for the mission(s)? UH-60, NH-90, LYNX, Mi-8/17/171 all have the capacity to be outfitted for long-range attack. Since the mission is conducted from a relative sanctuary you don't need the suppression weapons (guns).
I actually disagree here, if only for the ability to support troops in contact with the enemy. I'd want an aircraft with a gun on it for that specific purpose. And the gun is specifically because of the reduced danger close range compared to rockets. Yes, I'm aware that that situation should be very rare, like 1 in 100 combat missions or less. I still want the dedicated attack helo/tiltrotor, not a Black Hawk or Valor with rockets hanging off the sides.

Also, IIRC there is at least one treaty that limits the number of attack helicopters in Europe, which I think is still in force. If your Transport helicopters have targeting systems in them, they all count as attack helicopters under this treaty. Yes, treaties can be withdrawn from or allowed to lapse. No chance of renegotiating this treaty with Russia as long as Putin or other "restore the Russian Empire" types are in charge.
 
I would counter argue that the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiments (SOAR) MH-60 series, and the Columbian UH-60L "Arpía" are both demonstrations of converted lift platforms with considerable combat experience demonstrating the feasibility of close in support to ground troops. Mi-8/17/171 certainly can be outfitted with a large array of ground support weapons. Most of the other lift helicopters in this category have at least demonstrated the ability to be armed this ways. With the development of laser and INS guided 2.75, and similar sized non-US rockets, the potential dispersion of of these weapon types is reduced.
While one could argue that the platforms above have been used in less than major combat, I think we have to consider the realities of modern combat environment. Close support in large scale combat, does not really allow for diving fire from ~1000 ft /1600m with the incredible amount of weapons available near the line of engagement to deal with relatively slow and low flying machines. Gun runs usually have to be made along the line of engagement without very serious risk to the people you are intending to support. It is the same for unguided rockets in most cases. Rotorcraft, as CAS, in less intense combat environments would be my weapon of choice for troops in contact. I just do not think the methods used for COIN are currently as viable in massed mechanized combat amongst competent combatants.
The UH-60 can be outfitted to carry AGM-114 Hellfire. It can not only carry 16 on the ESSS wings, it could also carry an entire reload inside the aircraft. This would have made for a very heavy UH-60, but teamed with a laser equipped UAS or manned platform it could carry quite a punch several kilometers behind the line of contact. This would also would have reduced the rearm/refuel signature as it carries its own reload. If loaded with precision rockets in 19 shot rockets pods it could carry 76 precision rockets with ~ 38 reloads on board. I suspect other utility helicopters could be similarly outfitted.
Attack helicopters are designed to work close in extremis conditions and many of them have come home with scars to prove it. They are expected to be shot at and are designed for that function. However current events have demonstrated that even with all of the redundancy and armor, flying in direct support of ground forces is an expensive proposition. One that cannot be sustained even with modern production technologies. Current ongoing combat in Europe and the middle east sees for the most part attack helicopters using standoff techniques to attack precise targets at range. Something any cold war era attack helicopter pilot would understand completely. I would contend that most of your lift aircraft, designed for the assault mission, are also designed to be shot at as they might have to land troops on top of the enemy. UH-60 is designed to continue to operate after taking a number of hits from heavy machine gun, but not anti-aircraft caliber. I will assume most of the other helicopters with this mission are also designed with a comensortate level of ballistic protection.
Finally I would make a fiscal argument. Attack helicopters are very specialized platforms. They do one thing only. Have you ever seen an attack helicopter sling load ammo to the forward troops? This could change though as we are seeing helicopters being used as anti-UAS platform. Those attack helicopters with radar will be even better at intercepting slow flying bombs. The armed lift helicopter allows flexibility to the commander for a number of missions. Attack helicopter pilots collect their pay playing cards when there is no one to shoot.
Finally you are correct in that there was a Conventional Force Europe treaty that limited the number of attack helicopters in Europe. It is sadly defunct. As far as I know there are no other treaties or agreements that have been promulgated to supercede it.
 
I would counter argue that the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiments (SOAR) MH-60 series, and the Columbian UH-60L "Arpía" are both demonstrations of converted lift platforms with considerable combat experience demonstrating the feasibility of close in support to ground troops. Mi-8/17/171 certainly can be outfitted with a large array of ground support weapons. Most of the other lift helicopters in this category have at least demonstrated the ability to be armed this ways. With the development of laser and INS guided 2.75, and similar sized non-US rockets, the potential dispersion of of these weapon types is reduced.
As I understand it, the dispersion of the rockets is not considered in their danger-close range. Rather, it's defined by the explosive equivalent load they carry.



I just do not think the methods used for COIN are currently as viable in massed mechanized combat amongst competent combatants.
Agreed here, it's going to take new methods.


I would contend that most of your lift aircraft, designed for the assault mission, are also designed to be shot at as they might have to land troops on top of the enemy. UH-60 is designed to continue to operate after taking a number of hits from heavy machine gun, but not anti-aircraft caliber. I will assume most of the other helicopters with this mission are also designed with a comensortate level of ballistic protection.
I think we may start needing to design transport helos/tiltrotors to take hits from 23mm and maybe even 30mm.



Finally I would make a fiscal argument. Attack helicopters are very specialized platforms. They do one thing only. Have you ever seen an attack helicopter sling load ammo to the forward troops? This could change though as we are seeing helicopters being used as anti-UAS platform. Those attack helicopters with radar will be even better at intercepting slow flying bombs. The armed lift helicopter allows flexibility to the commander for a number of missions. Attack helicopter pilots collect their pay playing cards when there is no one to shoot.
I've seen civvie Cobras doing sling loads. IIRC those have most of the military electronics ripped out so they can sling load more, but I bet an Apache could still lift 6000lbs if you left the wings empty. Still carrying the full load of 30mm, though.



Finally you are correct in that there was a Conventional Force Europe treaty that limited the number of attack helicopters in Europe. It is sadly defunct. As far as I know there are no other treaties or agreements that have been promulgated to supercede it.
Okay, so that argument is defunct. Good.
 
Does anyone know what the current numbers of Ka-52 Hokum Bs are in Russia's inventory? I understand that they've suffered heavy casualties since February 24, 2022.
 
Does anyone know what the current numbers of Ka-52 Hokum Bs are in Russia's inventory? I understand that they've suffered heavy casualties since February 24, 2022.
They reportedly had 133 at the start of the war. As of today, according to Oryx, they have had 61 destroyed or damaged. Therefore you would probably looking at ~70
 
Even if one takes Oryx figures as gospel, which one really shouldn't do, there are some variables to consider.
Some of the damaged aircraft will be repaired.
Additional aircraft have been put in service since the start of war. So far, approximately 140 Ka-52 and 20+ Ka-52M have been delivered.

War spotting website https://ukr.warspotting.net/search/?belligerent=2&weapon=12&model=172 is a little bit more conservative and possibly more trustworthy than oryx but again, same issues remain and it shouldn't be treated as authority on the matter.

It's thus possible that there are upward of 110 airframes in service, though I'd say no one outside Russian MoD really knows.
 
A real telling variable is the number of sorties that are being generated per day/month. We will of course not get that, but it would let.us have an idea of whether the loss rate is bad or realistic for the combat environment.
Also it appears that the Russian attack helicopter community, having met the Darwinian crucible, have learned more appropriate tactics.
Regardless of the source, one should always remain skeptical of reports. Some try to be realistic with reports, but remember the old maxim of war, that truth is the first victim.
 
Yeah getting tired of certain Russian weapons systems (that I admittedly have a bias for) getting mocked and ridiculed when a lot of this conflict is misunderstood even by very good people. These attack helicopters are facing the best manpads ever made and in substantial numbers including the scary starstreak missile. On top of portable and crewed point defense it is facing very good medium range air defenses as well. Helicopters are just facing extremely dangerous odds in every conflict they fly in and so far what I have read the ka-52 is to be a respected foe. Especially the new ka-52m with upgraded x and ku band radars, upgraded data links and drone operating capabilities as well as an upgraded defense suite.
 
There is no point clinging on how many Ka-52 or whatever Russians already lost in the war.. as the factory making them are still standing and all the institutions supporting those factories are active and still doing their job to get required resources.
 
Interesting... pretty decent platform for the job. Unlike many other helos the Ka-52 has the required combination of performance (speed/climb/altitude thanks to the coaxial layout), weapons (Igla AAM) and sensors (nose radar) to do air-to-air combat effectively.
 
It is very likely that the use of helicopters for very low altitude anti-drone defense will increase with all militaries. Israel and Ukraine are actively doing so now as well.
 
Even if one takes Oryx figures as gospel, which one really shouldn't do, there are some variables to consider.
Some of the damaged aircraft will be repaired.
Additional aircraft have been put in service since the start of war. So far, approximately 140 Ka-52 and 20+ Ka-52M have been delivered.

War spotting website https://ukr.warspotting.net/search/?belligerent=2&weapon=12&model=172 is a little bit more conservative and possibly more trustworthy than oryx but again, same issues remain and it shouldn't be treated as authority on the matter.

It's thus possible that there are upward of 110 airframes in service, though I'd say no one outside Russian MoD really knows.
Orxy hasn't done anything to convince me that it's not a reliable sorse. consdering the limits this sort reporting has, especially with aircraft, it's more likely to be under counting then over counting.
 
Even if one takes Oryx figures as gospel, which one really shouldn't do,...

Most sources seem to regard the compilations on oryxspioenkop.com as being both more in depth and comprehensive than anything provided by officialdom (of any stripe).
According to Oryx, a military analysis website that has painstakingly tracked visual confirmation of destroyed equipment, Russia has lost significantly more heavy equipment than Ukraine ...
-- https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2022/08/the-case-for-cautious-optimism-in-ukraine.html
("This commentary originally appeared on Foreign Policy on August 9, 2022.")

So, are you saying that figures published on oryxspioenkop.com need to be taken within the context of the qualifiers in their introductions? Or are you claiming to have insights or examples to share of egregious errors in volume by Oryx?

It would be nice to know for sure. If the former, too true (and Oryx contributors would likely concur). If the latter, let's see those examples. AFAIK, Oryx is largely a volunteer effort and a highly taxing one at that. If that overall effort is being disparaged for potential errors or incompleteness already covered by Oryx section intros, that would seem to be in poor form.
 
Oryx is a bad accounting source for ground equipment - be it because of attribution bias or simply due to being overwhelmed by the scale of conflict.

For air losses (where there are far fewer cases and attribution is almost always unquestionable) they're as perfect as osint can be .
 

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