Israel strikes on Iran

Archibald -

Howdy !

Thanx for the info link !


With regards,
357Mag
 
No excuse :( ...
How would you feel about a country that visually identified an aircraft as a passenger plane and still shot it down with a fighter plane anyway around the same time?
 
TSRJoe and Forrest Green -

Howdy !

Gentlemen…I only now have taken note of red circled arrows at the top of the comments box. While I had not noticed these in the past, it appears they are intended to draw repeat attention to comments/links you have posted on the “ Israel Strikes Iran “ post.
More specifically, these were included for my edification. If I missed that distinction,
I apologize that did not pick up on that !

Please be assured, my previous comments were not intended imply that the U.S. Navy did not make a grave mistake in the shoot down of the Iranian airliner. Moreover, U.S.
“ compensation “ paid to Iran because of the incident, did not “ gloss things over “.

I will opine that a contributing factor to the USS Stark attack was Iran’s belligerence and attacks on oil tankers during the “ Tanker War “; IRAQ making the attack on the Stark notwithstanding. The USS Stark was present to provide protective escort to tankers in-opposition to Iran’s irresponsible actions against them. The 37 U.S. sailors died as a result of the attack in the Stark.

Today, amid other mischief; Iran is hurtling towards the 46th anniversary of ” Hostage Crisis “. Every day they more closely approach their “ day of reckoning “ ( IMHO ).


With regards,
357Mag
 
As regards any postulated U.S. use of a notional “ conventional” armed ICBM or SLBM on Iranian nuclear facilities…

Those who the U.S. would not want to potentially alarm, would need to be prior-informed of any impending launch(es), and the intended terminus of the trajectory.
This is not an unknown practice.

This is not as sensational idea as it may sound. Even for attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles, Iranian airspace defenses would first be neutralized, which is something
the Israelis recently demonstrated. If Iran were to some how cobble together any form of ABM defense, the U.S. and/or Israelis would also take these out prior to attacking the nuclear sites.

Given that Iran’s deep underground nuclear facilities cannot reasonably be further hardened on short notice, Iran would be left to watch the attacks unfold.
Right, there's ways to set something up for a deliberate attack on Iran or North Korea. (What you described is the standard process for doing test launches, BTW.)

The problem is that this only works for deliberate attacks on what might as well be a non-resisting target.

You can't make a general policy of loading some ICBMs or SLBMs in the field with conventional warheads and the rest with nukes, and then use the conventional warheads on one of the Nuclear powers that can strike the US.
 
The Stratolaunch Roc would need air support—but I could see a one-off bomb dropped on Fordow.
 
Right, there's ways to set something up for a deliberate attack on Iran or North Korea. (What you described is the standard process for doing test launches, BTW.)

The problem is that this only works for deliberate attacks on what might as well be a non-resisting target.

You can't make a general policy of loading some ICBMs or SLBMs in the field with conventional warheads and the rest with nukes, and then use the conventional warheads on one of the Nuclear powers that can strike the US.

Scott -

Howdy ! Always nice to hear from you.

As regards your final paragraph, above…

IF, and I say IF the U.S. did put conventional warheads on a special-use clutch of ICBMs
( example ); I should imagine their use would be laid out in some specific guidance; and not some “ general policy “.

And of course as is widely thought, Iran is not ( yet ) a “ nuclear power “.
Preventing that from happening would certainly be one postulated mission for a notional U.S. convention warhead ICBM. However, in today’s reality, breaching Iran’s deeply buried sites is
the MOP’s raison d’etre; N’est-ce pas ?
 
And such use would pretty much amount to a declaration of war by the US. something I'd hope even they (or its proxies) would not be stupid enough to do against another sovereign state no matter how much 'under threat' the hawks on the hill felt

On that note il get back to researching 'secret projects'
 
And such use would pretty much amount to a declaration of war by the US. something I'd hope even they (or its proxies) would not be stupid enough to do against another sovereign state no matter how much 'under threat' the hawks on the hill felt

On that note il get back to researching 'secret projects'
TSRJoe -

Thanx Joe. You have been providing some great information !


With regards,
357Mag
 
And such use would pretty much amount to a declaration of war by the US. something I'd hope even they (or its proxies) would not be stupid enough to do against another sovereign state no matter how much 'under threat' the hawks on the hill felt
There's no telling what the next administration will be stupid enough to do.
 
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All -

Not hard to list the many negatives that would be associated with a pre-emptive attack on Iran.

None the less, for Israel…. certain exigencies prevail.


With regards,
357Mag
 
All -

Not hard to list the many negatives that would be associated with a pre-emptive attack on Iran.

None the less, for Israel…. certain exigencies prevail.


With regards,
357Mag
If we are to assume that Iran's deterrence was generally based on the next pillars, in order of significance:
  1. Hezbollah, Hamas and other proxies forming a ring of fire around Israel.
    1. And Israel's retaliation strongly affecting US calculus in real time.
  2. Denial of trade in the
    1. Strait - Iran.
    2. Red Sea - Houthis.
    3. East Med - Hezbollah+Syria.
  3. Iran's own arsenal.
Then we can see that Iran has exhausted much of its retaliatory capacity.

Netanyahu is widely considered to be dovish - a strong believer in containment and appeasement. In no rush to pre-empt any threat. However in 2021-2022, during Israel's political crisis and elections spiral, Israel elected a government led by 2 prime ministers - Bennet and Lapid. Bennet is considered a defense hawk.
Current government performance led to a general consensus that Bennet and Lapid will return in January 2027. This means that during Trump's current term, he may face an Israeli administration that will be more volatile for the US's calculus.
Combine this with a general Israeli (population) desire to pre-empt threats, and the much lower effect of Iran's retaliatory options on Israel, and Trump may have little time to push for a truly independent policy.

I wouldn't bet on Israel not striking Iran again in Q2 of 2025. Not only has it reportedly dealt with much of Iran's ABM capability, but HTS's rise in Syria and Israel's following strikes against the SAA's former assets - have paved a direct aerial corridor between Israel and Iran, allowing replacing the heavy Golden Horizon munitions with a higher volume of lighter munitions, which in turn means more tonnage delivered.
It would be smart for the US to take into consideration this sense of urgency and this opportunity, and I'm feeling the dynamics between the Netanyahu-Trump administrations will be more fluid than Netanyahu-Biden.

We have seen, after all, how much hyped militaries like Hezbollah, can fall quickly.
 

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