Iowa and Alaska Class Conversion Projects

[Dilandu]

The GMLS Mk 4 launchers of Boston & Canberra was NOT a "drum", but a racetrack-style magazine, with one rack per arm.

Well, as I told before - it was an OLD idea) When I draw it quite a long time ago, I did not exactly knew how Mk-4 launchers on Canberra-class were arranged. So a mistake, yes, but excusable one)

 

[BlackBat242]

The GMLS Mk 4 launchers of Boston & Canberra was NOT a "drum", but a racetrack-style magazine, with one rack per arm.

Well, as I told before - it was an OLD idea) When I draw it quite a long time ago, I did not exactly knew how Mk-4 launchers on Canberra-class were arranged. So a mistake, yes, but excusable one)

Your drawing would still work with the actual Mk 4 magazine, so no biggie.

 

[Tzoli]

I was debating whether this should go elsewhere, but it is vaguely related to the Iowa Phase II plans.

In November 1982, when the Iowa reactivations were just starting and the elaborate Phase II conversions still seemed possible, a naval architect by the name of Gene Anderson wrote a short article for the US Naval Institute Proceedings proposing a class of "light battleships" built around the four turrets that would be removed from the Iowas in the Phase II process. As far as I know, this was strictly a private notion, not ever seriously considered, but it's interesting to look at.

The proposed design is ~9000 tons displacement, 400 ft length (oa), 84 ft beam, 22 ft draft. Hull shape is largely inspired by contemporary merchant ships (cruise ship bow above water and bulbous bow underwater), with protection consisting of an unspecified armored box above decks around the machinery and command and control spaces and the usual torpedo blisters, voids/fuel, and a triple bottom below the water.

Propulsion would be 4-6 medium-speed diesels, for 20-25,000 bhp, giving a speed of up to 25 knots (consistent with the need to escort 20+ knot amphibs of the era).

Armament obviously gets the most attention. As described:

• One triple 16"/50 turret, sited so it could traverse 270 degrees (blast overpressure on the superstructure would be fierce with the turret traversed fully aft...)
• Three to five Mk 45 5-inch guns, with some possibly replaced by Mk 48 8-inch guns or 155mm/50 Vertical Load Gun Mounts firing standard Army/Marine 155mm ammunition. (The drawing has three mounts that look like VLGM, which is probably the most "reasonable" choice here. Edit: Mk 48 is a mistake -- the author probably meant the Mk 71 8-inch lightweight gun.)
• Two Mk 26 launchers (which would certainly have been replaced by VLS if the design had been seriously considered)
• Two Phalanx CIWS. (As with other drawings from the era, the shape of Phalanx was not yet known, and an igloo-like structure can be seen standing in for it here).

Sensors are mostly unmentioned, and the drawing shows a fairly basic radar fit. (Taking full advantage of the Standard Missiles in the Mk 26 would call for at least New Threat Upgrade, I would think.) There is supposedly hangar space (in the hull, I assume) for two helicopters as spotters and for other duties as required, including ASW.

Manning is optimistically pegged at about 100 more than an OH Perry frigate (so about 320, of which about 25-30% would be required to operate the 16-inch gun turret.)

The letters that followed this article were not kind...

I notice from that letter that there seems to have been another February 1982 article about a different (?) BB(L) concept in February 1982, but Google Books is being stubborn and won't find it for me.

Can you identify the radars on that design? I'm not familiar with naval electronics

 

[Graham1973]

I was debating whether this should go elsewhere, but it is vaguely related to the Iowa Phase II plans.

In November 1982, when the Iowa reactivations were just starting and the elaborate Phase II conversions still seemed possible, a naval architect by the name of Gene Anderson wrote a short article for the US Naval Institute Proceedings proposing a class of "light battleships" built around the four turrets that would be removed from the Iowas in the Phase II process. As far as I know, this was strictly a private notion, not ever seriously considered, but it's interesting to look at.

....

The letters that followed this article were not kind...

I notice from that letter that there seems to have been another February 1982 article about a different (?) BB(L) concept in February 1982, but Google Books is being stubborn and won't find it for me.

Did you have any luck in running down the other BB(L) concept since you posted this?

 

[TomS]

Did you have any luck in running down the other BB(L) concept since you posted this?

This turned out to be a typo. The February 1982 article is actually a Professional Note about the BB(V) or Phase II conversion concept.

 

[bobtdwarf]

I

Now that would be one bizarre alternate history "Colorado class in Korean and Vietnam war..."

Weeeeeeeel...
View attachment 672408

My old idea of "standard" battleship recommissioned in late 1950s (for the war against fascist India-based regime ) as artillery/missile platforms. Rear turrets of "Idaho" removed, and adapted version of RIM-2 Terrier launchers (vertical drum magazine, like on "Boston"-class) are jury-rigged over hollowed barbettes.

The GMLS Mk 4 launchers of Boston & Canberra was NOT a "drum", but a racetrack-style magazine, with one rack per arm.


View attachment 687872


Here is the Mk 26 system - it seems to resemble a modernized Mk 4:

View attachment 687874


View attachment 687875


View attachment 687876

I have read that ASROC could be fired from the drum launchers for the Terrier.. I have often wondered if they could have been from the vertical ones. Do you happen to know or have a far more informed opinion on it?

 

[TomS]

I have read that ASROC could be fired from the drum launchers for the Terrier.. I have often wondered if they could have been from the vertical ones. Do you happen to know or have a far more informed opinion on it?

The Mk 4 GMLS was not configured to launch ASROC.

 

[TomS]

Can you identify the radars on that design? I'm not familiar with naval electronics

It the big one on the aft side of the main mast is likely SPS-49. It looks like there are also Mk 37 and Mk 38 gun directors (Mk 37 aft, Mk 38 on the top of the bridge structure). Not sure about the rest. Resolution is terrible.

 

[Firefinder]

Can you identify the radars on that design? I'm not familiar with naval electronics

It the big one on the aft side of the main mast is likely SPS-49. It looks like there are also Mk 37 and Mk 38 gun directors (Mk 37 aft, Mk 38 on the top of the bridge structure). Not sure about the rest. Resolution is terrible.

Pretty sure Ive seen that in Friedman's Amphibious Book.

If my pDF of its good...

Its a Mark 86 digital fire control system adapted to all the guns, SPS53 and full surface combatet Ewar sweet of WLR1, SLB8, SLQ12 and ULQ6 among others.

With it basically being a moniter made of the guns turrets from scrapping the Iowas to get several ships of 300 odd crew instead of 4 3000 crew behemoths. Ten ships will equal the same crew as one with better firepower by having the MCLG in addition to to the triple 16 and 5/54.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Pretty sure Ive seen that in Friedman's Amphibious Book.

If my pDF of its good...

The 16" Monitor in Friedman's Amphibious Ships and Craft is a 1960s design, completely unrelated to those drawn up twenty years later for a US Naval Institute Proceedings article.

 

[Tzoli]

Yes that was part of the Fire Support Ship proposals at that time, this is a different beast.
Though I wonder how would had the 12"/70 single and twin turret looked like knowing at that time and since then basically everybody uses the round dome like appearance for the gun mountings.

 

[Julio Garay Terrazas]

Estaba debatiendo si esto debería ir a otra parte, pero está vagamente relacionado con los aviones de la Fase II de Iowa.

En noviembre de 1982, cuando las reactivaciones de Iowa apenas comenzaban y las conversiones elaboradas de la Fase II aún parecían posibles, un arquitecto naval llamado Gene Anderson escribió un breve artículo para las Actas del Instituto Naval de EE. UU. Proponiendo una clase de "acorazados ligeros" construidos alrededor de las cuatro torretas que se eliminarían de los Iowa en el proceso de la Fase II. Hasta donde yo sé, esta era estrictamente una noción privada, nunca considerada seriamente, pero es interesante de ver.

....

Las cartas que siguieron a este artículo no fueron amables...

Me doy cuenta de esa carta que parece haber otro artículo de febrero de 1982 sobre un concepto diferente (?) BB(L) en febrero de 1982, pero Google Books está siendo terco y no lo encontraré para mí.

¿Tuviste suerte con el otro concepto BB(L) desde que publicaste esto?

¿Estás hablando de este: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/iowa-and-alaska-class-conversion-projects.7220/

 

[curious george]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5hJ_S_xm-E

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

 

[that_person]

I messaged Drach about getting the full scans

 

[that_person]

And here we are.
Edit: Other two uploaded

 

[Julio Garay Terrazas]

I get this information in Mecanica Popular august 1982 edition. It was the Popular Mechanics review spanish version.

 

[that_person]

So a buddy of mine went to the College Park archives looking for stuff on the 1950s BBG conversions. The NARA website said they had a whole box of them, but apparently, it was all reclassified by an Executive Order Obama signed in 2009. I presume this is because they deal with nuclear weapons. I'm disappointed with that.

Also, recently I've been trying to dig stuff up on the Iowa AEGIS conversions, but have drawn a blank. The only mention I can find of it anywhere is in the Garzke & Dulin book from the early 90s. I did manage to gather that there were 2 separate studies into the idea though, one in 1975 by the Center for Naval Analysis, and another as part of the Phase II modernization sketches. According to the book, the 80s modernization called for the removal of all the 16" guns and the installation of 412 VLS cells, but has no drawing. Make of that what you will. Does anyone know where I may be able to find more info on these studies? I tried drawing through Congressional records looking for a reference to an Analysis of Alternatives study, but found nothing.

 

[JerrySmith_598]

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA600139.pdf

I found this document on future NGFS (Naval Gunfire Support) ships that talks about reactivating the four Iowas at a cost of $1b per unit, and having two ready and operational within two to three years. Most of the information is on page 16 (slide 23). Hope this can be of use, I'm working on finding more information.

 

[TomS]

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA600139.pdf

I found this document on future NGFS (Naval Gunfire Support) ships that talks about reactivating the four Iowas at a cost of $1b per unit, and having two ready and operational within two to three years. Most of the information is on page 16 (slide 23). Hope this can be of use, I'm working on finding more information.

Oh, great, a Marine Major telling the Navy that it should just stop worrying about cost and find ~10,000 sailors to man a fleet of white elephants that have been museum ships for the last decade or more.

 

[Archibald]

Indeed, I thought that train had left the station FOREVER - the day, 12 years ago or more, all four Iowas exited even the reserve fleets and became floating museums. There is no way any of the four dinosaurs is returned again to service. No ? (Padme / Anakin funny meme intensifies). I've born in 1982 and my mom in 1943 - and both dates are familiar to those Iowa battleships ! They were returned to service on the second date... and born (or almost) with the first.

 

[TomS]

Indeed, I thought that train had left the station FOREVER - the day, 12 years ago or more, all four Iowas exited even the reserve fleets and became floating museums. There is no way any of the four dinosaurs is returned again to service. No ? (Padme / Anakin funny meme intensifies). I've born in 1982 and my mom in 1943 - and both dates are familiar to those Iowa battleships ! They were returned to service on the second date... and born (or almost) with the first.

To be fair, the thesis was written in 2009-10, but even then, those ships were not credible.

 

[Archibald]

Yes - since at least the end of Cold War (1993 ?)

 

[Tzoli]

Well the Marines wanting a dedicated fire support ship(s) since well the 1970's? When most gun-cruisers retired and the Iowas decommissioned for the what? 3rd time?

 

[SSgtC]

Speaking as a Marine, we are always going to want the biggest guns, on the biggest ship, with the heaviest armor to shoot us in when we have to hit a beach. That basic doctrine hasn't changed since the age of sail. And it likely won't ever change. Having a 16" armed battleship parked offshore is the stuff wet dreams are made of for Marines told to hit a beach.

What that paper is articulating is what the Marine Corps sees as needed to fulfill its tasking, namely amphibious assault. The Navy's issues with reactivating and manning 4 battle wagons isn't our problem. Our problem, is we need more than a couple of five inchers parked offshore to shoot us in. How the Navy addresses that, is their problem.

 

[TomS]

Speaking as a Marine, we are always going to want the biggest guns, on the biggest ship, with the heaviest armor to shoot us in when we have to hit a beach. That basic doctrine hasn't changed since the age of sail. And it likely won't ever change. Having a 16" armed battleship parked offshore is the stuff wet dreams are made of for Marines told to hit a beach.

What that paper is articulating is what the Marine Corps sees as needed to fulfill its tasking, namely amphibious assault. The Navy's issues with reactivating and manning 4 battle wagons isn't our problem. Our problem, is we need more than a couple of five inchers parked offshore to shoot us in. How the Navy addresses that, is their problem.

The Corps could stop thinking it's job is to repeat Tarawa. It's not happening. Large-scale opposed landings are dead as the proverbial LVT. The current commandant at least gets that (as much as one can quibble with the details).

 

[Foo Fighter]

It's an old problem and if I were a Marine of any flavour I would want the biggest, loudest door knocker around to announce my entry onstage. 16" door knockers especially with advanced sub munition dispensing would cure one heck of a lot of migranes onshore.
Problem is the shear number of ways to kill an old battlewagon now and the cost of assets to ship with them. You would need all new powerplants and a shed load of new systems so the navy probably wants a more modern start point.

 

[Firefinder]

It's an old problem and if I were a Marine of any flavour I would want the biggest, loudest door knocker around to announce my entry onstage. 16" door knockers especially with advanced sub munition dispensing would cure one heck of a lot of migranes onshore.
Problem is the shear number of ways to kill an old battlewagon now and the cost of assets to ship with them. You would need all new powerplants and a shed load of new systems so the navy probably wants a more modern start point.

Not only that but new guns and ammo.

Eyeah those 16 inchers?

The whole reason for the IOWAS RECOM WHEN deal?

Eyeah those guns are basically losttech. We cant make any more and the ones we have left are half way to be useless.

Those be the ones on the Wisconsin, she has guns with the least amount of shots on them.

Once thats used up? Thats it, no more shots out the barrel. Cause it officially too dangerous too fire any more.

Then you have the fact that we dont have anyway to make new 16 inch barrels and no high pressure pipeline doesn't work the Army checked.

Also the fact that back in 2016 the Navy had the Army started destroying the Shells.

Cause the newest one was made in 1950s.

That nearly 70 year old TNT base explosive in those things. They are not safe.

While of the two, making new shells are easier of the Shell Barrel issue.

Still leaves the issue of the barrel to shot them out off...

Which is are gone.

Plus even if we did get new zero shot barrels, they still be design to 1930 era powder spec. Specifically max chamber pressure of around 45k PSI.

A M777 routinely fire shells at 70k PSI with max of 80k in combat.

Meaning that you need to lower the amount of pwder used so it be safe to fire modern powders.

So unless that happens the Iowas be limited to like 50 km with new shells with GPS Gliding or go SABOT 11 inch shell to get more range like they want in the 80s.

Compare that to the Army New XM1299 155mm 60km with standard shells and over 100km with new assist shells. At like 90k PSI...

Eyeah we more likely to see the return of tge Heavy cruisers. Thats only because the Army made sure the Gun Machines can still make 8 inch barrels incase they ever want to bring those back since we last got ride of them in the early 1990s...

 

[Conspirator]

Estaba debatiendo si esto debería ir a otra parte, pero está vagamente relacionado con los aviones de la Fase II de Iowa.

En noviembre de 1982, cuando las reactivaciones de Iowa apenas comenzaban y las conversiones elaboradas de la Fase II aún parecían posibles, un arquitecto naval llamado Gene Anderson escribió un breve artículo para las Actas del Instituto Naval de EE. UU. Proponiendo una clase de "acorazados ligeros" construidos alrededor de las cuatro torretas que se eliminarían de los Iowa en el proceso de la Fase II. Hasta donde yo sé, esta era estrictamente una noción privada, nunca considerada seriamente, pero es interesante de ver.

....

Las cartas que siguieron a este artículo no fueron amables...

Me doy cuenta de esa carta que parece haber otro artículo de febrero de 1982 sobre un concepto diferente (?) BB(L) en febrero de 1982, pero Google Books está siendo terco y no lo encontraré para mí.

¿Tuviste suerte con el otro concepto BB(L) desde que publicaste esto?

¿Estás hablando de este: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/iowa-and-alaska-class-conversion-projects.7220/

this seems like a very plausible/effective design that could have multiple applications.

using a "shoot and scoot" technique being as light as it is you could get it a lot closer to the shore. giving it a slight tactical advantage. and also more range inland. being a "mini dreadnought" it would be slightly harder to hit due to its speed and size
possibly mounting an iowa class triple gun turret or a USS texas style double gun depending on certain applications.

thats just my take.

 

[bobtdwarf]

If only someone had thought about making some "dumb" munitions for the Zumwalt class...nOoO they had to only make high tech wiz bang stuff that costs as much as a squadron of F/A-18's to fill the magazines!

Sure people can think that large scale amphibious operations are never going to happen... but the best way to ensure that you will need to pull an Inchon to save your ass is to get rid of the ability to pull an Inchon to save your ass

 

[SSgtC]

The Corps could stop thinking it's job is to repeat Tarawa. It's not happening. Large-scale opposed landings are dead as the proverbial LVT. The current commandant at least gets that (as much as one can quibble with the details).

Ya know, every time we've gone, "we can get rid of this capability, we're never going to do this again, that type of warfare is outdated," we've gotten bit in the ass when we found out, the hard way, that the type of warfare in question was most certainly not outdated. Hell, we conducted an amphibious assault in Afghanistan. We conducted a combat drop of the 82d Airborne in Iraq. The way it looks may change, but the basic type of warfare remains. And the ability to conduct an opposed landing is still needed

 

[TomS]

The Corps could stop thinking it's job is to repeat Tarawa. It's not happening. Large-scale opposed landings are dead as the proverbial LVT. The current commandant at least gets that (as much as one can quibble with the details).

Ya know, every time we've gone, "we can get rid of this capability, we're never going to do this again, that type of warfare is outdated," we've gotten bit in the ass when we found out, the hard way, that the type of warfare in question was most certainly not outdated. Hell, we conducted an amphibious assault in Afghanistan. We conducted a combat drop of the 82d Airborne in Iraq. The way it looks may change, but the basic type of warfare remains. And the ability to conduct an opposed landing is still needed

I feel like I've done this argument so many times over the last 30 years now, that my heart's not really in it.

But one last time. Yes, missions may be the same. But the operating environment has changed so much that the same tools largely don't work. Sure, you may have to attack a coastal location with entrenched defenders. But you're not going to do it by storming over the beach in waves of landing craft with battleship guns roaring overhead. If you have fixed site defenses that need to be removed in advance of an amphibious landing, battleship guns are a stupid way to do it -- inefficient, inaccurate, (relative to PGMs), expensive, and inflexible. Makes far mroe sense to use Tomahawks and airpower to prep the target. And then plan to do your landing somewhere away from the heart of the defenses.

Which is pretty much exactly how Afghanistan played out. No beach, obviously, so this was more of an airmobile raid than an actual amphibious assault, but they prepped the battlespace with airpower, landed at an undefended site, and reinforced before moving on the objective. Classic application of operational maneuver from the sea.

 

[SSgtC]

The Corps could stop thinking it's job is to repeat Tarawa. It's not happening. Large-scale opposed landings are dead as the proverbial LVT. The current commandant at least gets that (as much as one can quibble with the details).

Ya know, every time we've gone, "we can get rid of this capability, we're never going to do this again, that type of warfare is outdated," we've gotten bit in the ass when we found out, the hard way, that the type of warfare in question was most certainly not outdated. Hell, we conducted an amphibious assault in Afghanistan. We conducted a combat drop of the 82d Airborne in Iraq. The way it looks may change, but the basic type of warfare remains. And the ability to conduct an opposed landing is still needed

I feel like I've done this argument so many times over the last 30 years now, that my heart's not really in it.

But one last time. Yes, missions may be the same. But the operating environment has changed so much that the same tools largely don't work. Sure, you may have to attack a coastal location with entrenched defenders. But you're not going to do it by storming over the beach in waves of landing craft with battleship guns roaring overhead. If you have fixed site defenses that need to be removed in advance of an amphibious landing, battleship guns are a stupid way to do it -- inefficient, inaccurate, (relative to PGMs), expensive, and inflexible. Makes far mroe sense to use Tomahawks and airpower to prep the target. And then plan to do your landing somewhere away from the heart of the defenses.

Which is pretty much exactly how Afghanistan played out. No beach, obviously, so this was more of an airmobile raid than an actual amphibious assault, but they prepped the battlespace with airpower, landed at an undefended site, and reinforced before moving on the objective. Classic application of operational maneuver from the sea.

So, just to be clear, I'm not personally advocating to bring back the Iowa class. They're 80 years old and use massively outdated technology. I don't think the Navy has the technical ability to operate them anymore. But my broader point is, that the Marine Corps will always want the biggest boom stick possible when we have to conduct any kind of assault. There's just something comforting in having your own artillery covering your ass when you're attacking. If we're going to rebuild a NGFS capability, it should be done with new platforms. Maybe bring back the Heavy Cruiser as a concept, with say 3-4x8"/55 guns (like the Mk71 for instance). Arm them with those, with VLS for Tomahawks and Standard SAMs, quad launches for Harpoons and build enough to put one with each Amphibious task force and maybe one SAG each in the Atlantic and Pacific. So maybe 8-12 hulls? That to me is a better option than returning 80 year old musuem ships to service. Because quite frankly, unless we end up in WWIII and we need ships within a 2-3 year time frame and can't build enough fast enough, there's zero reason to bring the Iowa class back into service.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Bringing the Iowa's back now is a fool's errand. Not only is the technology utterly outdated and mostly obsolete, but there are worse problems with it.

It is labor intensive. The 16" gun fire control systems require dozens of operators to make it work, as one example. Labor is expensive today.

You can't get parts for any of that stuff anymore. Even getting the drawings and other technical data for many parts is impossible. Try to find someone that will rewind a burned-out mag amp for example. Good luck with that...

Then there are the material conditions of the ship itself. Corrosion is a HUGE problem here. A ship that old that has had indifferent maintenance performed on it for decades is nothing but a massive rust and rot issue, and not just with the hull. Piping, and all structures exposed to salt air are issues too. Trying to restore those to a viable state could become cost prohibitive in an instant.

As for powder... Back when the Iowa's were recommissioned in the 80's, NWS Crane ID messed up a big chunk of the available powder by blending it. Then there was an issue with the new replacement bags for the powder that were static conductive versus actual silk. There likely isn't any stable, usable, powder left for the guns so now you'd have to open a production line at huge cost.

On Iowa herself, #2 turret was never restored to service after the explosion that happened while loading the guns. All of the class have serious--MAJOR serious--issues with maintenance. They just aren't worth dealing with for reactivation.

 

[SSgtC]

Bringing the Iowa's back now is a fool's errand. Not only is the technology utterly outdated and mostly obsolete, but there are worse problems with it.

It is labor intensive. The 16" gun fire control systems require dozens of operators to make it work, as one example. Labor is expensive today.

You can't get parts for any of that stuff anymore. Even getting the drawings and other technical data for many parts is impossible. Try to find someone that will rewind a burned-out mag amp for example. Good luck with that...

Then there are the material conditions of the ship itself. Corrosion is a HUGE problem here. A ship that old that has had indifferent maintenance performed on it for decades is nothing but a massive rust and rot issue, and not just with the hull. Piping, and all structures exposed to salt air are issues too. Trying to restore those to a viable state could become cost prohibitive in an instant.

As for powder... Back when the Iowa's were recommissioned in the 80's, NWS Crane ID messed up a big chunk of the available powder by blending it. Then there was an issue with the new replacement bags for the powder that were static conductive versus actual silk. There likely isn't any stable, usable, powder left for the guns so now you'd have to open a production line at huge cost.

On Iowa herself, #2 turret was never restored to service after the explosion that happened while loading the guns. All of the class have serious--MAJOR serious--issues with maintenance. They just aren't worth dealing with for reactivation.

Pretty much all of this. The only one of the 4 that might be even somewhat realistic is New Jersey because she received an extensive and thorough overhaul prior to being decommissioned. The other 3 had greatly truncated overhauls before being put into mothballs. I guess you might be able to bring back Missouri as well, since she does get somewhat regular maintenance and has been drydocked twice (I think) since she was retired. Wisconsin would be marginal at best. The only reason to bring her back would be because she had the least amount of use of all 4. Iowa would have to be considered as being in a box that says, "break glass in case of emergency." The damage to turret 2 would make any reactivation of her lengthy and expensive.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Maybe bring back the Heavy Cruiser as a concept, with say 3-4x8"/55 guns (like the Mk71 for instance). Arm them with those, with VLS for Tomahawks and Standard SAMs, quad launches for Harpoons and build enough to put one with each Amphibious task force and maybe one SAG each in the Atlantic and Pacific. So maybe 8-12 hulls? That to me is a better option than returning 80 year old musuem ships to service. Because quite frankly, unless we end up in WWIII and we need ships within a 2-3 year time frame and can't build enough fast enough, there's zero reason to bring the Iowa class back into service.

And it's still a terrible idea.

Among other things it's just way too easy to get the Moskva treatment these days.

If only someone had thought about making some "dumb" munitions for the Zumwalt class...nOoO they had to only make high tech wiz bang stuff that costs as much as a squadron of F/A-18's to fill the magazines!

Sure people can think that large scale amphibious operations are never going to happen... but the best way to ensure that you will need to pull an Inchon to save your ass is to get rid of the ability to pull an Inchon to save your ass

Welcome to firing on moving targets from 62 miles away. You need fancy whiz-bang stuff if you're going to hit the broad side of a mountain.

As far as large-scale amphibious ops, those are still on the table. They're just not going to involve ships sitting offshore with guns a'thundering.

 

[that_person]

Few things I want to point out.
1. The final 2 Iowas where stricken in 2006, because Congress demanded they be kept in the reserve fleet because yes
2. They where supposed to be replaced by the Zumwalts, which would serve as both ASW and NGFS platforms
3. It does seem that AGS did have some proposed dumb munitions, or at the very least a wider selection of guided munitions
4. Apparently, LockMart told the Navy each LRLAP she’ll would only be ~$50,000 USD. Don’t quote me on the exact number, but it was a definitely less than 100k.
5. The first signs something was going wrong with the Zumwalts was when Bush reorganized DD-21 as DD(X). This seems to be a political move to distance himself from Clinton, but it’s the first sign that politicians were getting more influence over the program.
6. It seems that up until the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the Navy was deadset on AGS, and both Congress and the Navy were generally getting along
7. Wartime experience showed that missiles were preferable to guns in the NGFS role.
8. Once this was discovered, the Navy wanted to go back to the drawing board with DD(X) and remove the AGS, likely wanting to install more cells for something similar to SM-4s.
9. Congress, being the super wise and knowledgeable body it is, decided that they wanted gun replacements for the Iowas, rather than a missile based replacement like the Navy had suddenly wanted. This was the final nail in the coffin for the Navy
10. Realizing they wouldn’t get what they wanted, the Navy tried to save face. They began cutting hull orders, and cancelled all the other AGS ammunition except for that required by Congress.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Maybe bring back the Heavy Cruiser as a concept, with say 3-4x8"/55 guns (like the Mk71 for instance). Arm them with those, with VLS for Tomahawks and Standard SAMs, quad launches for Harpoons and build enough to put one with each Amphibious task force and maybe one SAG each in the Atlantic and Pacific. So maybe 8-12 hulls? That to me is a better option than returning 80 year old musuem ships to service. Because quite frankly, unless we end up in WWIII and we need ships within a 2-3 year time frame and can't build enough fast enough, there's zero reason to bring the Iowa class back into service.

And it's still a terrible idea.

Among other things it's just way too easy to get the Moskva treatment these days.

If only someone had thought about making some "dumb" munitions for the Zumwalt class...nOoO they had to only make high tech wiz bang stuff that costs as much as a squadron of F/A-18's to fill the magazines!

Sure people can think that large scale amphibious operations are never going to happen... but the best way to ensure that you will need to pull an Inchon to save your ass is to get rid of the ability to pull an Inchon to save your ass

Welcome to firing on moving targets from 62 miles away. You need fancy whiz-bang stuff if you're going to hit the broad side of a mountain.

As far as large-scale amphibious ops, those are still on the table. They're just not going to involve ships sitting offshore with guns a'thundering.

thing is the reason they are wanted: COST. All that wiz bang stuff costs, not joking as much as a full squadron of Hornets to fill the magazines... dumb bombs are a few thousand a pop and move a ton of earth and fixed emplacements just fine... so instead of spending $15k to destroy this bunker 12 klicks inland I have to spend a million bucks?

You got to be able to afford to fight the war...

 

[T. A. Gardner]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07bmfWC1pRQ

 

[chimeric oncogene]

If only someone had thought about making some "dumb" munitions for the Zumwalt class...nOoO they had to only make high tech wiz bang stuff that costs as much as a squadron of F/A-18's to fill the magazines!

Sure people can think that large scale amphibious operations are never going to happen... but the best way to ensure that you will need to pull an Inchon to save your ass is to get rid of the ability to pull an Inchon to save your ass

You do realize guided munitions are waaay more cost effective, right?
One guided munition does the work of a dozen dumb bombs, and cuts down the number of aircraft and support assets needed to conduct a strike.