Ground Based Interceptor (GBI)

[UpForce]

... [snip] ...

If it ever comes down to a massed, nuclear exchange, how well will those 40+ ground based interceptors perform against the hundreds, if not thousands of warhead headed towards the US? Let us be realistic about this, please. Considering the high rate of failures displayed thus far in tests of the system, it doesn't look like money well spent IMHO.

"Rational" actors don't contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. They definitely don't contemplate the limited use of nuclear warheads against a word superpower. Only fools believe in such myths.

Apart from what effect

movies and other popularizations of nuclear conflicts may have on actual strategy, tactics or policy (baseless speculation very much beside the point here, really), your reasoning seems to be well and truly steeped in the kind of barely veiled threats, disdain and obfuscation in which effects driven state run media such as "RT" and "Sputnik" (and their online acolytes, foreign collusionists and botnets to boot) specialize in - known as "reflexive control" in the trade. I have not (re-)read the entirety of this discussion solely to answer your latest message but even so I believe it safe (and indeed prudent) to point out here that Russia's strategy to "de-escalate" conflicts with nuclear weapons (i.e. test adversaries' will) is not lost on anyone worth their salt within NATO countries (and other US allies) - be they politicians, activists, academics, thinktankers of both pacifist and hawkish leanings or core military professionals. There is ample data on this available online from all these (reputable) sources and also directly from published Russian military doctrine, theory and a plethora of belligerent diplomatic statements toward such jingoists as ... Denmark.

These purportedly de-escalatory strikes may involve tactical, unconventional (e.g. Status-6) or strategic use of nuclear weapons, the strategic dimension of course directly motivating the development and implementation of GBI as a believable, robust and also reproducible system. Russian scenarios of "winnable nuclear exchanges" have been actively developed and comprehensively rehearsed (on an increasing pace) during Putin's regime. These designs sometimes bear more than passing resemblance to Warsaw Pact (i.e. Soviet) designs on first use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. One worrying side-effect of all this is the re-emergence of low yield nuclear weaponry developed exactly for de-escalation and coercion purposes, recently coupled with Russian willingness to publicly flaunt breaches of missile arms control conventions. Also notable: whenever any kind of (NATO, other US aligned) regional missile defense has been brought up under any auspices we've heard pointedly loud howls of protest from the Kremlin (and their reference groups all around), most often coupled with the laugh-out loud claim that we somehow impinge on Russia's "right" to unimpededly threaten the use of nuclear weapons by our practicing any kind of dedicated missile defense (however limited or ineffectual) at all.

By your own account then, current Russian military doctrine and leadership is not rational.

Frankly I've seen enough of this to not take seriously anyone not convinced of the need for missile defenses. Of course there's a lead time in any endeavor, successes and failures but given the already existing realities and visible trendlines inaction is not an option (and this coming from someone who reserves judgement on all defense spending and does in no way, manner or form subscribe to some "more is always better" doctrine). It's an evolution, a process and every action does have a reaction down the line. But going without GBI and all the other layers of dedicated missile defense has become unthinkable and we've got to look forward to a World with this and beyond that as well.

So, yes, let us be realistic about this, in deed.

---

Edit: marauder2048 beat me to commenting, but as I believe our messages are not entirely mutually exclusive, I'll post as is.

 

[kaiserd]

I would repeat that I am not against limited missile defences against limited capability limited "rouge nation" levels of threat nor do I see there would necessarily be much public opposition to these type of systems and the associated level of expenditure.

It's when you start scaling these type of systems up in terms of numbers and aimed for capabilities that it becomes such a dubious proposition and the "ifs" start piling up;
- IF such a system will actually be effective at countering a peer powers balistic missile nuclear first strike, initially and after the peer has undertaken the relatively straightforward enhancements of their balistic missile first strike capability as mentioned above.
- IF associated defense systems against alternative delivery systems (for example sub & bomber launched cruise missiles) can similarly be enhanced against encreased peer power concentration of resources on these alternative delivery systems, both as a straight forward alternative to ballistic missiles and as a means of degrading your new missile defended to the point of being ineffective.
- IF you can also strengthen your security and defences against potential "unconventional" methods of delivery of nuclear weapons ("on the back of truck" etc.) given the potential capabilities and resources a peer power could develop in this area.
- IF you can simultaneously upgrade your own offensive capabilities to keep up with your peer opponents upgrade their own defensive capabilities in line with yours.
- IF you can afford all of this at all, or afford all of this while not massively cutting all other defense spending (including, but not limited to the entire "war on terror")
- IF you can obtain the continued consent and buy in of politicians and the public for all of this, given that this all could drawf hight of Cold War expenditures on such systems.

This is were the fantastical nature of what is being proposed becomes clear.

Undoubtedly apects of current Russian nuclear doctrine is troubling and potentially destabilising but it has been up to this point a product of their actual and perceived weakness versus the US/ NATO re: conventional weapons.

However as stated above there needs to be realistic achievable solutions, not fantasies of a security that can never be achieved.

 

[Rickshaw]

Another delusional claim? You appear to have forgotten that those young officers have been exposed to the reality of what fighting a nuclear war would entail to their homeland. They will have seen Threads, The Day After, When the Wind Blows, they will have read the equivalent literature in the last 15+ years. They will not have been isolated, they will not have been prevented from accessing that information. Always remember, US Presidents were unaware of the real consequences of fighting a nuclear war until Reagan admitted he had seen The Day After for the first time in 1983. There were no excuses for any fantasy ideals about being able to effectively win a nuclear exchange after that. The Day After was first shown in Russia in 1987. If they were indeed rational they would know, there was no benefit to using nuclear weapons, except in response to the use of nuclear weapons by the other side, just as American policy makers hopefully know that (in the present President's case, it is an unknown).


"Rational" actors don't contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. They definitely don't contemplate the limited use of nuclear warheads against a word superpower. Only fools believe in such myths.

Sadly, none of these tender sentiments can be reconciled with actual Soviet and Warsaw Pact war planning
documents nor the post Cold War interviews with the officers who developed and would have executed them.

That was then, now is now. The Cold War ended in 1990. You appear to live in the past, not the present.

Provide us with a link to the present Russian thinking on nuclear war, please, if you can. Not stuff that was published 25+ years ago. Then, think about this, as the song goes, "don't they love their children too?"

The thinking of both sides during the Cold War were divorced from reality. Yet, each time the US and the fUSSR went, "head to head" it was the leadership of the fUSSR which blinked, which backed down. Americans believed they could win a nuclear war it appears, the Soviets did not. If, as you claim, the Soviets believed the reverse, why then weren't they willing to carry it through and actually undertake such a conflict?

The Soviet Leadership was under no illusion as to what the effects a nuclear exchange would create. Washington, on the other hand? It appears not, not until Reagan came along.

That though, was then. Today? The world has moved on, except in the imaginations of some people it appears. Does anybody here seriously believe that a nuclear exchange is going to be beneficial to anybody? Really?

 

[fredymac]

For those who believe that it is principally the US which keeps the world from being a better place, it is strange to see such angst against a project which would, in their own estimations, be a wholly useless endeavor while wasting a significant percentage of the military budget. Moreover, this project would serve as a foundation to reduce reliance upon nuclear retaliation. This is truly a "twofer" in the category of win-win.

Anyone who considers US military spending to be "obscene" and principally employed to further imperialistic goals should applaud such an opportunity to hobble US military effectiveness.

 

[marauder2048]

That was then, now is now. The Cold War ended in 1990. You appear to live in the past, not the present.

Provide us with a link to the present Russian thinking on nuclear war, please, if you can. Not stuff that was published 25+ years ago. Then, think about this, as the song goes, "don't they love their children too?"

The current leadership was steeped in a the very comprehensive and well articulated
nuclear doctrine of the late Soviet period.

Schnedier's presentation to the Defense Science Board (obtained under FOIA)
and his recent, updated article describe Russian nuclear doctrine in terms that look very
much like evolved Soviet nuclear doctrine: highly flexible employment
down to the tactical level with a strong emphasis on preemption and escalate-to-deescalate.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/04/28/russian_nuclear_weapons_policy_111261.html

Absent a major defection from the Russian side along with documents to corroborate it's probably
the best argument that can be marshalled given the evidence and given Soviet/Russian military
history/tradition and known nuclear doctrine.

The thinking of both sides during the Cold War were divorced from reality. Yet, each time the US and the fUSSR went, "head to head" it was the leadership of the fUSSR which blinked, which backed down. Americans believed they could win a nuclear war it appears, the Soviets did not. If, as you claim, the Soviets believed the reverse, why then weren't they willing to carry it through and actually undertake such a conflict?

This really betrays a misunderstanding of Soviet nuclear doctrine; it was based on preemption and towards
the very end of the Soviet period, partially on launch-on-warning. The Soviets did not carry it through
because none of the intelligence sources could ever point to convincing evidence of
US/NATO preparation for a first strike.

This was at the strategic level. At the tactical or theatre level, just about every Warsaw Pact war plan
envisioned an initial Red offensive with an opening nuclear barrage (of the tactical variety) initiated by Red.

But there was flexibility: the Soviet General Staff believed that Warsaw Pact forces, by the mid-80's,
could fight their way to the English Channel quickly enough that when combined with the SS-20
as a deterrent would restrict NATO to small tactical, defensive employment of nuclear weapons only.

The Soviet Leadership was under no illusion as to what the effects a nuclear exchange would create. Washington, on the other hand? It appears not, not until Reagan came along.

More misunderstanding: The Soviet political leadership was not much involved in crafting nuclear doctrine and after 1972,
did not participate in nuclear exercises at all. The Soviet military was running the show in terms of doctrine and
the material to support it. Their view was that they could fight and survive a nuclear war.

That though, was then. Today? The world has moved on, except in the imaginations of some people it appears. Does anybody here seriously believe that a nuclear exchange is going to be beneficial to anybody? Really?

There's no evidence the Russian have moved on. On the contrary, they and the Chinese have doubled down
on nuclear modernization and improvement. And this in an era where NATO and allied conventional exercises
rarely exceed Brigade size and nuclear weapons release drills are practically non-existent.

 

[Jemiba]

This thread is very near to be closed !
If you want it to stay, please come back to a reasonable discussion.

That means, dealing with the arguments, not with those, who posted them !

 

[moonbeamsts]

Are there plans to activate shore based agegis in Hawaii ?

 

[marauder2048]

Are there plans to activate shore based agegis in Hawaii ?

I didn't see any money in the FY18 budget for operationalizing the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex.

But there's money for a new, medium range discrimination radar in Hawaii (HDR-H/Pacific Radar) that's described
as being between AN/TPY-2 and LRDR. Perhaps they'll revive the stacked AN/TPY-2s on a turntable concept.

 

[bring_it_on]

There are a few options on the table from what I see..A stacked TPY-2 as has been proposed earlier, or a scaled down LRDR (MRDR), or a scaled up SPY-6.

 

[DrRansom]

According to a new article about the test, the Kill Vehicle used is a new design, which has not been fielded on the majority of the launchers. Ignoring all politics, this would make the test useful for the future but not indicative of the present state of the GBI fleet.

Article: http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/try-as-it-might-ballistic-missile-defense-wont-solve-the-united-states-north-korea-problem/

 

[fredymac]

The GMD Combatant Commander is General Robinson and she has testified she is confident the deployed units are able to intercept anything launched out of North Korea. As far as kill vehicles go, this latest test was a final check of the most recent version of the original kill vehicle developed by Raytheon and 8 units will be deployed by the end of the year. Each version of the kill vehicle underwent its own series of validating tests. A totally new design built by a consortium of Boeing/Lockheed/Raytheon is already in development for deployment starting around 2022 and will replace most of the older units. This may be the last unitary kill vehicle as the MOKV phases in only a little later unless something like KEI gets resurrected pending the missile defense review that started on May 5th.

 

[marauder2048]

As far as kill vehicles go, this latest test was a final check of the most recent version of the original kill vehicle developed by Raytheon and 8 units will be deployed by the end of the year.

Nine CE-II Block 1 EKVs according to VADM Syring's testimony today.

https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/FY18_WrittenStatement_HASC_SFS.PDF

 

[Airplane]

Wasn't Japan asking for a land based Aegis basing?

 

[bobbymike]

From Inside Defense:

Missile Defense Agency researching possibility of 'common boost vehicle' for interceptors

The Missile Defense Agency is exploring the possibility of developing a "next-generation" common boost vehicle for Ground-based Interceptors defending the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

 

[sferrin]

From Inside Defense:

Missile Defense Agency researching possibility of 'common boost vehicle' for interceptors

The Missile Defense Agency is exploring the possibility of developing a "next-generation" common boost vehicle for Ground-based Interceptors defending the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That's what KEI was suppose to transition to.

 

[bobbymike]

From Inside Defense:

Missile Defense Agency researching possibility of 'common boost vehicle' for interceptors

The Missile Defense Agency is exploring the possibility of developing a "next-generation" common boost vehicle for Ground-based Interceptors defending the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That's what KEI was suppose to transition to.

AND make a nice intermediate range prompt strike missile IIRC.

 

[sferrin]

From Inside Defense:

Missile Defense Agency researching possibility of 'common boost vehicle' for interceptors

The Missile Defense Agency is exploring the possibility of developing a "next-generation" common boost vehicle for Ground-based Interceptors defending the United States from intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That's what KEI was suppose to transition to.

AND make a nice intermediate range prompt strike missile IIRC.

Yep. We'd have our own Shaurya but better.

 

[marauder2048]

HDR-H site alternatives.

https://www.mda.mil/news/hawaii_eis.html

 

[marauder2048]

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/07/16/putting-interceptors-on-trucks-is-the-fastest-way-trump-can-bolster-missile-defense-of-america/#58d99f347491

LT anticipating the rollout of the Missile Defense Review?

Always thought the GMD-E derived from KEI would have lent itself more readily to mobile basing modes.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-07/upgrade-national-missile-defense

Policymakers in some countries promote the idea of limited nuclear strikes to force favorable outcomes in a conventional war. Other regimes want nuclear weapons and delivery systems to gain advantage, deter great powers, or simply survive. U.S. policymakers know that the United States fields porous and arguably unreliable antiballistic-missile (ABM) systems and are fettered by this diplomatically and militarily. Such systems are unworthy of the country’s economic, military, and political power, and they threaten stability by permitting weaker powers to bluff and intimidate.

While the threat of retaliation—mutually assured destruction—deters most rational actors from contemplating a massive first strike against the United States, irrational actors—including otherwise rational actors who find themselves cornered—may not be deterred. Further, brinksmanship or a failed bluff might lead to small-scale initial strikes, and the lack of reliable defenses could encourage foolhardy enemy decisions.

There are countless potential scenarios that might result in a limited nuclear ballistic-missile strike against the United States. Should deterrence fail and an adversary initiate a limited launch, current national missile defense (NMD) architecture is insufficient to assure interception. This fact makes U.S. foreign policy self-restricted. Therefore, the United States must accelerate upgrading its NMD.

 

[bobbymike]

Space based kill assessment

http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-systems-2/future-bmd-systems-2/space-based-kill-assessment-ska-experiment/

Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) sensors are currently in development at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland. These sensors will be hosted aboard commercial satellites and placed into orbit to provide improved hit and kill assessment, the determination of whether a threat missile has been eliminated by a missile defense interceptor, for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Current plans call for deployment of numerous SKA sensors to create a space-based sensor network that will improve kill assessment and increase the efficiency of the BMDS.[1]

Once in orbit, SKA sensors will provide accurate and timely kill assessment data to missile defense command and control nodes. Ultimately, this improved kill assessment capability will reduce the number of interceptors needed to neutralize a ballistic missile threat, cutting costs for interceptors and improving situational awareness regarding an incoming threat.

Each SKA sensor consists of three single-pixel photodiode detectors that measure electro-optical signatures emitted during collisions between ballistic missiles and missile defense interceptors.[2] Using information provided by command and control, SKA sensors will point towards an expected intercept point to observe the visible and infrared light produced by the collision of intercept.[3] Information attained during intercept include kill assessment, type of threat warhead (i.e. nuclear, high-explosive, chemical, or biological), and post-collision lethality of threat warhead.[4]

 

[fredymac]

Each SKA sensor consists of three single-pixel photodiode detectors that measure electro-optical signatures emitted during collisions between ballistic missiles and missile defense interceptors.

3 single pixel (ie, nonimaging) sensors to assess kill probability might try to measure total energy of collision, impact power (heat generated), and temporal profile of energy release. Using multiple wavelengths you could estimate impact heat. Radiometry along with observation geometry could estimate total energy. Temporal profile of the thermal decay might also give some estimate of the thermal mass involved in the collision. I’m guessing collision mass is the quantity of most interest. I'm not sure how you get details of warhead type (nuclear/chemical/etc) unless you have some kind of spectrometer and linear array.

 

[bobbymike]

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/space-based-missile-defense-is-doable-dod-rd-chief-griffin/

SPACE & MISSILE DEFENSE SYMPOSIUM.: Some 35 years after Ronald Reagan’s famous Star Wars speech, the Pentagon’s R&D chief said that space-based missile defenses are technically feasible and reasonably affordable. Since Reagan’s day, technology has advanced enough that putting both sensors and shooters in space is not only possible but “relatively easy,” Undersecretary for Research & Engineering Mike Griffin said. What’s more, past estimates of the cost of space-based interceptors have been “unrealistically,” even “naively” high.

Specifically, Griffin told reporters here,

The US “absolutely” needs space-based sensors to detect low-flying hypersonic cruise missiles, a new threat that’s much harder to spot from orbit than ICBMs; and We probably need space-based interceptors to shoot down high-flying ballistic missiles during the boost phase, the period before the warheads separate from the rocket.

Note these are two different functions with two different types of targets. Space-based interceptors would not work against hypersonic cruise missiles, Griffin said. They fly too low, deep in the atmosphere, so any munition you shoot at them from space would have to be hardened against the heat of atmospheric reentry, which he called prohibitively difficult. “It may not be a bridge too far, but it’s a pretty far away bridge.” Ballistic missiles, by contrast, ascend rapidly out of the atmosphere into space, so space-based interceptors would only have to travel through vacuum, which is much easier.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Via Slashdot: https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-ballistic-missile-systems-have-very-poor-cyber-security/

http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/1713611/security-controls-at-dod-facilities-for-protecting-ballistic-missile-defense-sy/

 

[marauder2048]

An LRDR derivative.

Lockheed Martin Corp., Moorestown, New Jersey, is being awarded a $585,206,351
fixed-price incentive delivery order for the Homeland Defense Radar - Hawaii (HDR-H).
The contractor will design, develop, and deliver the HDR-H radar providing
autonomous acquisition and persistent precision tracking and discrimination
to optimize the defensive capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and
counter evolving threats. This award is the result of a competitively
awarded acquisition in which one offer was received. Fiscal 2018 and 2019 research
development test and evaluation funds in the amount of $51,389,757 are being
obligated at time of award. The work will be performed in Moorestown, New Jersey;
and Oahu, Hawaii. The exact location in Oahu, Hawaii, will be determined at the
conclusion of the ongoing site selection and National Environmental Policy Act processes.
The period of performance is from Dec. 18, 2018, through Dec. 17, 2023.
The Missile Defense Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (HQ0147-19-F-0018).

 

[marauder2048]

HDR-H rendering from Lockheed's release.

https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2018-12-18-Missile-Defense-Agency-Awards-Lockheed-Martin-Contract-to-Design-Manufacture-and-Construct-Homeland-Defense-Radar-Hawaii#assets_all

 

[bring_it_on]

Wasn't there a 2 face version planned at one time? Also fascinating to read that RTN didn't bid.

 

[marauder2048]

Wasn't there a 2 face version planned at one time? Also fascinating to read that RTN didn't bid.

HDR-P will have multiple array faces; I only recall seeing HDR-H depictions with a single face.

https://smdsymposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Wed-1530-3-NexGen-Panel-Ritter-.pdf

 

[bring_it_on]

HDR-P will have multiple array faces; I only recall seeing HDR-H depictions with a single face.

Thanks! I had confused HDR-H with HDR-P from those slides.

 

[bring_it_on]

Systems Engineering and Integration Support Services

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) intends to award a sole source research and development contract to the Boeing Company for performance of complex and highly technical systems engineering and integration (SE&I) efforts to provide MDA with specialized subject matter expertise that is needed for the Agency to achieve mandated capability enhancements to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Boeing Company will act as the prime contractor, with participation by all five BMDS major defense contractors (known collectively as the National Team - Engineering, to continue providing specialized system engineering guidance, integration, system development and data products that are currently being delivered by this same team under contract HQ0147-14-D-0001. The effort herein will include requirements related to the Agency's on-going mission to refine the layered BMDS Architecture to include incorporation of Homeland Defense Radars, Mobile Sensors, Space Sensors, Defense against the Hypersonic Threat, and meet presidentially directed Missile Defense and Defeat Enhancement (MDDE) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) BMDS capability enhancement commitments.

 

[marauder2048]

HDR-H rendering from Lockheed's release.

https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2018-12-18-Missile-Defense-Agency-Awards-Lockheed-Martin-Contract-to-Design-Manufacture-and-Construct-Homeland-Defense-Radar-Hawaii#assets_all

***In the original version of this release, Lockheed Martin published a rendering of the Homeland Defense Radar – Hawaii (HDR-H).
Lockheed Martin was not authorized by the Missile Defense Agency to publish the rendering, and it should not be considered
an accurate representation of the final project. The future site of HDR-H has not been chosen. The rendering has been removed
and Lockheed Martin regrets the error.***

Bumped into the above while looking for the local power plant output requirements for HDR-H (18 MWe) vs. LRDR (28 MWe).

 

[marauder2048]

Boeing's Transportable GMD System.

http://www.michman.org/resources/Documents/Shanahan%20-%20MAMA%20HMD%20Briefing%20.pdf

 

[sferrin]

Would make a nice mobile IRBM/ BGV carrier too.

 

[bobbymike]

Would make a nice mobile IRBM/ BGV carrier too.

A few dozen on Guam for starters

 

[Grey Havoc]

Would make a nice mobile IRBM/ BGV carrier too.

I had much the same thought.

A few dozen on Guam for starters

Could prove quite handy indeed the way things are going.

 

[fredymac]

FTG-11 salvo test against ICBM conducted yesterday. 2nd interceptor is launched well after the first has cleared the area.

Edit: Lead GBI destroyed the target and trailing GBI selected the next ‘most lethal object’ and also hit.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8DWAb7oys8

 

[sferrin]

Not sure why they're showing the interceptors taking off so fast. Maybe they have a mismatch between record frame rate and playback? Should be more like this:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikga7X99M7M

 

[bobbymike]

Pentagon Issues Classified RFP For New Missile Interceptor - Breaking Defense

DoD goes back to the drawing board to replace its missile interceptors. Can they make it work this time?

breakingdefense.com

 

[bobbymike]

A New Generation of Homeland Missile Defense Interceptors

CSIS’s Wes Rumbaugh analyzes the implications of cancelling the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and options for replacing it with the Next Generation Interceptor.

www.csis.org

 

[Grey Havoc]

Raytheon engineer arrested for taking US missile defense secrets to China

The case revolves around a laptop on the lam.

qz.com

Perhaps most significant is Sun’s involvement with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) program, an effort to replace the interceptor used by US air defense systems to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles.

The Pentagon cancelled the program last year because of technical problems, but information about the project would still be useful to China to understand what the US might do to defend from conventional or nuclear missiles. Missile technology has become central to Beijing’s strategy to deter US power (Quartz member exclusive) in the Pacific, making up for deficiencies and a lack of experience with weapons systems like jet fighters.