General Dynamics / Grumman F-111B

[Pioneer]

The design was reduced to 4 x AIM-54 instead of the needed six and the desired eight (From what I remember the glove pylons were removed during the weight reduction programs, I'm not sure if they ever planned to put them back)

Glove pylons?
Does anyone have any drawings or pics of this arrangement?
Would find it very interesting to see an eight Aim-54 loadout on the F-111B

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

CWIP Configuration

 

[aim9xray]

Excellent! The conformal Phoenix carriage on the belly is interesting. Are there any other images available?

Edit: The fore-and-aft Phoenix placement on the centerline means that Grumman scrapped the GD main landing gear, and probably the weapons bay. They probably repackaged the avionics that were aft of the cockpit to eliminate the 30-50 odd cubic feet of *empty space* required for access to the prior avionics layout. That would account for the foreshortened fuselage noted by Stevenson in his F-14 book. Of course that would adversely affect the fineness ratio, drag and range - but perhaps the trade in weight would have been worth it.

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

Excellent! The conformal Phoenix carriage on the belly is interesting. Are there any other images available?

Edit: The fore-and-aft Phoenix placement on the centerline means that Grumman scrapped the GD main landing gear, and probably the weapons bay. They probably repackaged the avionics that were aft of the cockpit to eliminate the 30-50 odd cubic feet of *empty space* required for access to the prior avionics layout. That would account for the foreshortened fuselage noted by Stevenson in his F-14 book. Of course that would adversely affect the fineness ratio, drag and range - but perhaps the trade in weight would have been worth it.

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

Are there any other images available?

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

More on the F-111B CWIP here: http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2010/11/f-111b-colossal-weight-improvement.html

 

[Colonial-Marine]

What was the actual weight of the F-111B prototypes as opposed to the specified weight?

 

[Tailspin Turtle]

What was the actual weight of the F-111B prototypes as opposed to the specified weight?

In late 1962, at program go-ahead, the F-111B was to have an empty weight of about 39,000 pounds and a gross weight of a little less than 70,000 pounds, including six Phoenix missiles at 1,000 pounds each and 23,000 pounds of fuel for four hours on station at a 150 nm distance from the carrier. The August 1965 SAC projected an empty weight of 46,000 pounds and a takeoff weight of 77,566 pounds with the six Phoenix and fuel for 3.8 hours time on station. In 1968, the Navy was still projecting that the final production configuration would have a weight empty of 46,121 pounds.

I have noted elsewhere that the F-14, when configured with six Phoenix and maximum internal and external fuel, was not all that much lighter, didn't have as much time on station, and had a higher approach speed in spite of some configuration and specification (e.g. design gross weight) concessions relative to the F-111B requirement. My takeaway from that comparison is that the F-111B may have been over weight to an unrealistic specification, but was not grossly over weight in terms of the requirement.

 

[Triton]

General Dynamics/Grumman F-111B carrier trials on U.S.S. Coral Sea (CV-43) July 23, 1968.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pFfni3gJ_0&feature=player_embedded#at=12


Photographs of General Dynamics/Grumman F-111B.

Source:
http://www.afwing.com/intro/f14/story-1.htm
http://s604.photobucket.com/albums/tt122/orourkematt/

 

[Triton]

Photographs of General Dynamics/Grumman F-111B.

Source:
http://s604.photobucket.com/albums/tt122/orourkematt/?action=view&current=NAVYF-111B4.jpg&newest=1#!oZZ31QQcurrentZZhttp%3A%2F%2Fs604.photobucket.com%2Falbums%2Ftt122%2Forourkematt%2F%3Faction%3Dview%26current%3DNAVYF-111B9.jpg%26newest%3D1

http://www.warbirdinformationexchange.org/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=13327&start=210

 

[Triton]

General Dynamics/Grumman F-111B manufactured by Precise found on ebay.

Source:
http://www.ebay.com/itm/PRECISE-MODELS-GENERAL-DYNAMICS-GRUMMAN-F-111B-NAVY-FACTORY-DESK-MODEL-TOPPING-/400356544891?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_0&hash=item5d371c117b

 

[Bruno Anthony]

Just for the sake of getting an often used quote correctly, here is Vadm. Connolly's quote on the F-111B
from March 4, 1968 to the Senate Armed Services Committee on pg. 1125 and further testimony:

 

[Bruno Anthony]

More testimony:

 

[circle-5]

A tandem-seat variant of the General Dynamics F-111B, proposed to the U.S. Navy.

(courtesy Sir George Cox Collection)

 

[Jemiba]

In a classic case of perfect teamwork, circle-5, aim9xray and me corrected my first drawing of the
tandem seated F-111B. My assumption, that the rear/center fuselage would have remained unaltered
was wrong, indeed changes incorporated into this design were considerable. Using the additional
material and good advise provided by those SPF members, the drawing should now stand up to
closer comparison with the model.
Many thanks indeed for the excellent support !

 

[allysonca]

Being the original poster and owner of the model I'd say that you had this one spot on. Great job. As I said earlier.... had this model been larger it would have remained in my collection as it was a stunning example of what the F-111B should have been.

 

[circle-5]

Thank you Jens -- you deserve all the credit.

 

[Jemiba]

... a stunning example of what the F-111B should have been.

... and if, without doubt the F-14 would have remained a What-If and the mount of the
VFA-103 "Jolly Rogers" maybe would have looked like this:

 

[fightingirish]

Nice picture, Jembia,
but "proposal" is only written with two "p", one in the middle and one at the beginning.
Not like Pfeiffer with three "f"... ;D

 

[circle-5]

EZ 2 Fix...

 

[F-14D]

... a stunning example of what the F-111B should have been.

... and if, without doubt the F-14 would have remained a What-If and the mount of the
VFA-103 "Jolly Rogers" maybe would have looked like this:

Hmmm,... maybe not. it still wouldn't have had the maneuverability, the flexibility (among other things, with the gear placed where it was, under fuselage weapons carrying capability would not be that good), wouldn't be designed to easily accommodate higher thrust engines, would not have the high AoA performance, etc. just by changing the seating.

By the time the VFX competition was in full swing the Navy's view of what was requierd for its next fighter had evolved. For example, Air superiority was the most important role, whereas in the design of the F-111, that was not even a major consideration.

 

[Jemiba]

Not like Pfeiffer with three "f"... ;D

That's good indeed, haven't seen that movie for a long time ! ;D And thanks for the clue
and the correction, Rolf and John.
Another error I just came across, is the squadron badge with that fat cat. If the F-111B would
have taken the place of the F-14 (and I fully agree with F-14D about its shorcomings and that
probably only severe political pressure could have led to it), it certainly wouldn't have carried
a typical Grumman "Cat" name.

 

[LEG]

BTW: Why *did* the USN reject the TFX design?

The USN wanted the Missileer concept when the notion of atomic warfare and particularly the rising capabilities of the Kennel and Kangaroo pointed to the ability of the Tu-95 (then Tu-20) to defeat the standing F3H and F4D with standoff. Early yields from satellite imaging showed how easy it was to get general intelligence from overhead assets (Though RORSAT was years away and relay from distant command centers could be difficult) while the USN desire to remain in the strategic deterrent game with the A3D and A3J indicated a strong commitment to the Carrier at a time when there was little else.

BANG.

Sputnik flies.

Massive crash program by the U.S., nominally under the 'space launcher' category but in fact an industry wide mega effort on several parallel development lines that literally soaked the U.S. defense industrial capacity for about five years through the mid 50s. Result: The SLBM chases the ICBM into service. Subs are more survivable and the USN has it's leg in the game but the manned fleet capability and the USAF bomber capability will both suffer.

About this time, some realistic data finally starts flowing out of the Soviet Union, showing how -little- they had in either the way of a bomber fleet (Mya-4 was their best and never produced in large numbers) or functional (less than 17hrs to fuel ala R-7) ICBMs.

Immediately the emphasis shifts and Eisenhower I think it was moved from investing in the Missileer as a fleet survivability measure where the Carrier was the only immediate, forward based, able to both hit strategic targets (Kamchatka and Kola = closest launch points for one way trips to the U.S.) and 'sneak into southern Europe' in case we needed to decapitate Russian forces that way, because the landforces of NATO were really pathetic.

Ike leaves the choice on the Missileer to the next President who will be murdered in office before the press can skewer him for screwing a German agent...

BANG.

Hello Vietnam.

Wherein a combination of uncertain ROE after the 5-6 frats and the questionable ability of stacked Kalman Filter banks to sort clutter from hard tracks brought into question the viability of longrange, radar missile, intercepts. The USN, like the USAF, was suffering MAJOR reliability issues with the Sparrow weapons system, to the extent that they often flew Phantoms without them and the relatively short vectoring range (until we wired the North Vietnamese GCI network for sound and started using QRC-249 to track IFF signatures off the EC-121D) meant that the AIM-9 became the 2nm preferred weapon.

The Missileer as the F6D would have been totally inept here, unable to functionally remain with the strike packages and while the USN depth of targeting over the beach was much shallower (and the radar based MiG-21 threat far lower as a result) the simple fact is that the slow, standoff, interceptor would have needed it's own fighter escort, rather like the EA-3 and RB-66.

BANG.

Kennedy, McNamara and The TFX.

The F-111B changed this but only insofar as the USN continued to see itself as a Sea Wings deterrent force with a useful role in the 'Real Thing' of WWIII. McNamara was not so sure and pushed for a mergence with the F-111, itself a make-do bomber which was brought about by the /retirement/ of theater ballistic weapons (Jupiter) which left a large gap in the survivable deep-strike mission as the F-105 was simply lacking in legs and many worried about the survivability of fixed bases to Soviet short range missiles which were not affected by the Kennedy deal.

McNamara wanted bang for the buck and a more balanced (less nuclear, more conventional) force for engaging in low intensity conflicts under 'The Domino Theory'. The USN was forced to agree because Yankee Station was sucking them dry. The USAF used the TFX, much the way the F-35 is being done today with Texas Politics and Industrial Base Insurance as key drivers (the real answer to theater nuclear deterrence was the Pershing 1A and Navajo).

When Kennedy died, LBJ inherits the wind and so does GD. Vietnam continues to crank up with 'victory at hand' until leftist/NWO leaning Kronkite lies about Tet. This is the period of intensive R&D on the F-111.

It is also the period where the USN 'pouts', rarely attending development council meetings and seldom contributing to _what they want_ in a high performance interceptor. But also doing things like boot stomping all efforts to get Pratt to clear up the TF30 or Hughes to lower the weight on the AWG-9. McNamara goes nuts trying to get honest numbers from everyone and has 1-2 meetings a week on his baby. Eventually, near the end of the crisis phase (i.e. with solutions in hand to the worst of the weight issues after SWIP) the USN releases the 'N-1' package of requirements which further messes with things. Just as McNamara gets set to leave.

It's obviously a delaying action which the USN has proved particularly adept at, in multiple instances of sabotaging joint programs and even sacrificing their own (the A-12 was rigged from the start).

BANG.

LBJ leaves office and the entire Vietnam war stalls in place with the Vietnamization process slowly gaining pace. The USAF, which has very poor initial performance from the F-111, starts backing away from it, even as they look longingly for an escape from 'that damn Navy Jet' the Phantom. The F-X replaces the TFX as the next great thing and the USN, always suffering penile envy, basically lies through it's teeth, cancelling the F-111B as 'that damn Blue Suiter Jet' through several acts of Congressional Committee lobbying _before flight trials begin_.

The F-111B actually passes these flight trials, thanks to a Herculeanean effort by GD and particularly Grumman, whose test pilots found the F-111B to land like a Cadillac, vastly easier than anything they had in service including the 125 knot F-4 which was something of a bar at the time. The USN, unable to kill the test phase outright, more or less countered with: "Yeah but if you take it out of CAS it's a dog!" Ignoring the fact that they already operated jets like the A-5, EA-3 (now so heavy it rarely came aboard) and Crusader, none of which boarded worth a damn, with or without AFLCS coupled.

Connolly commits treason and commercial fraud (seriously, if the USN had done this in the litigious 1980s they would have been sued, just like they were on the A-12) and says no amount of thrust in Christendom will make this a Navy Fighter. Which is correct. Because the USN would not allow the superior jet to fulfill a niche role when what they really wanted was a toy-fighter to match the F-X (F-15).

ARGUMENT:
Believe it or not, the combination of a low level interdictor with sufficient fuel to run 200nm at low level, supersonically, and a high altitude, loitering, FORCAP interceptor are not that far apart in terms of engineering requirements. Much of what Mach 1.3 at 500ft is actually far harder to achieve in terms of both thermal and fatigue limits which makes the overbuilt F-111 very much 'compatible' with the slam-sling life of a Navy jet.

What first killed the F-111B as a Missileer was a process of /normalization/ of psychological mental constructs by which manned nuclear strike, with all it's perils and long prep times/vulnerable basing modes was replaced by dispersed missile launch capabilities and satellites in orbit which effectively rendered the whole concept of theater strike secondary so long as MAD rules were enforced. It became a little dicier when Europe was the meat shield as 'flexible response' allowed for the major powers to incinerate something neither one really needed but with both the manned (nuclear) strike and the FADF nuclear mission fading (the original AAM-N-10 actually had nuclear warhead options to poison whole formations of atomic bombers or even post launch, subsonic, missiles with 'near misses'), it became easier to find roles for the military mindset as psychology which didn't involve constant hair trigger preparation for nuclear missions ala Chrome Dome as missile based systems were much more sterile and separately compartmented capabilities.

What next killed the F-111B was a war which showed the incredible expense and ultimate attrition of seal clubbing 'the old fashioned way' with dumb iron and conversely both the need for multirole platforms to swing-role between missions or dual-role within them. As well as the potential of PGMs to change the nature of how deep we penetrated the target terminal area and how many repeat trips were needed by these massive gorilla/alpha packages to effectively destroy key targets which could cripple a threat.

Both of these conditions argued against the system of systems approach, at least for air to air, by which the F-111B, as a standoff missileer, was a useful cog. Both because the number of escorts needed for PGM strikes was much more limited. And because the Soviet emphasis upon S2A showed that the bias of support mission platforms needed to be towards SEAD. It was not yet clear that systems like TISEO and TVSU (later TCS) would open up the BVR envelope and the F-111B/Phoenix combination was both too expensive and too clumsy an EM platform to be used as a conventional shoot-through-the-merge platform.

Though there were technical reasons for a lot of this (period TISEO, tested on a few F-4Es suffered from hail and water penetration and was quickly rendered useless in SEA's weather), it is in many ways unfortunate that the USN looked only to their own experience because they never took the fight downtown, to depth, like the USAF did and therefore did not face peer opponents with superior jets or the true power of an IADS like the USAF did. F-105s suffered murderous attrition, simply because F-4Cs could not penetrate the SAM bastions around airfield and key infrastructure targets and when QRC pods began to be available in sufficient numbers for the fighters to have some too, The Maneuver Cell proved to be a clumsy extension of Fluid Four which was nonetheless essential to survivability in putting out enough Jx to split the Fan Song and later Low Blow tracking gates around the formation. Fourships cannot survive without breaking up in a dogfight condition and over a SAM environment such fragmentation is lethal because the threat will shoot it's own interceptors to get hard kills on the TARCAP sweep and allow more QRA flights to rise up to meet the main package and particulary the Weasel, Iron Hand and Recce lead elements.

Long Range, Radar Based, fires obviates this limitation to the extent that you continue to work on the analogue filters of the AWG-9 with an eye towards a digital TWT based waveform generator and RSP (something never properly done, even with the F-14A).

The IRIAF proved this concept, quite a bit, during the first Gulf War (Iran/Iraq) as well as providing MFFC/Shooter/Illuminator pairing with F-4D/E and F-5E/F as a kind of mini-AWACS when a traditional AEW&C platform would have been at far too high a risk to Iraqi S2A and Mirage F-1 (Super 530D) intercept.

Bluntly, reach-in with BVRAAM has never been more important as SAM WEZs moved towards Mach 5, then Mach 7 and 30nm from the 15nm of the Guideline era. And everyone missed it.

Finally, of course, when engine T/Wr came up to around 8:1 and later series RSP Aluminum alloys, along with high strength titanium in place of Iconel and composites for certain areas of skinning, brought empty weight of twin engined fighters down to about 27,000lbs, allowing for vast improvements in airframe SEP and EM globals, the writing was on the wall that speeds would become transonic, turn rates would push 20dps and altitude bands would move towards 20,000ft, driving turn circles wider but compensating for this with ALASCA (All Aspect Capability, see German BGT 'Viper') heat seekers and high agility weapons (Tail Dog, AGILE, CLAW) which would increasingly make the first 60-90` of turn the most important part of winning a face shot fight.

It must be said here that we fought Vietnam below 14,000ft for much of the war because neither the F-4 nor especially the F-105 could fight competently any higher, while loaded. The F-15/16 would change all of this for the USAF. For the USN it would be a matter of incrementation due to naval structural penalties.

In any case, in the tradition of the Red Baron and White Silk Scarves as the /worst/ way to fight a real war but often the 'most fun' means of playing 3:9 games with the likes of Libyan Su-17/MiG-23s, the USN went with what they knew from SEA and particularly Loose Deuce/Double Attack and AIM-9D/G section tactics to demand that the VFX (F-14) be a jet which could match the Eagle for Energy Maneuver while also carrying Phoenix and landing on carriers.

The F-111B could never do this (neither could the Tomcat) and thus it was happily ditched, completely compromising USAF economies of scale on the -111 program and costing us the works-good F-111D/F variants which would have integrated smart weapons carriage with the rangeayload utility of the basic design (ironically, the speed of a nuclear laydown penetrator was more ultimately useful to the USN than to the USAF, the F-111B had vastly better fineness ratios, fuel reserves and unload super sprint acceleration than the F-14).

But the USN got the jet they wanted which was to say a jet that was 1/4 interceptor in the tradition of the Missileer, 1/4 escort fighter as they thought the F-15 was meant to be (a slatted F-4S will beat an F-14 in a turning fight) and 1/2 carrier landing aircraft.

Which is to say a whole lot of nothing.

If you want a statistical and engineering breakdown of some of the Shennanigans behind the F-111B and particularly the aeropropulsive (inlet to nozzle) problems which so damned the TFX as a whole, I can recommend _Illusions Of Choice_ by Robert F. Coulam.

 

[Triton]

General Dynamics–Grumman F-111B model

General Dynamics–Grumman F-111B model found on eBay

Source:
http://www.ebay.com/itm/F-111B-DESK-TOP-AIRPLANE-MODEL-GENERAL-DYNAMICS-GRUMMAN-U-S-NAVY-FIGHTER-w-STAND/272774382381

 

[TsrJoe]

just musing, were there any proposed squadron or carrier allocations for IOC. of the F-111B (I know such decisions are often discussed long prior to an aircraft's release for service) or was the whole programme scrubbed before such thoughts could be postulated ?

cheers, Joe

probably unrelated ? the old Revell F.111A/B kit provided markings for 'Atlantic' VF.101 and 'Pacific' VF.121 units ?

 

[Yellow Palace]

just musing, were there any proposed squadron or carrier allocations for IOC. of the F-111B (I know such decisions are often discussed long prior to an aircraft's release for service) or was the whole programme scrubbed before such thoughts could be postulated ?

cheers, Joe

I doubt if there were specific squadron allocations, but I believe (probably from Friedman's US Aircraft Carriers or from George Spangenberg) the planned deployment was one squadron of F-111B per Carrier Air Wing, alongside three squadrons of the VFAX then planned to be equal to an F-4 as a fighter and an A-7 as an attack aircraft.

 

[allysonca]

Here is a large scale in-house F-111B from the GD model shops. Always one of my fav's for some reason.

 

[blackkite]

Hi!

 

[lolek]

A rather nice animation of a F-111B (likely DCS originating). I must say that I've never understood why people called this aircraft a "pig", it's a really great-looking plane, even though I prefer the earlier, short-nosed prototypes.

View: https://www.youtube.com/shorts/hFhi09nxbGA

 

[Jeb]

That was an interesting video...I like the "what if" nature of some of this DCS content.

 

[Archibald]

Wow, it (almost) made that pig of aircraft, the F-111B, sexy.

 

[Pioneer]

Nice to see the animation included some air-to-ground weaponry on the F-111B's. Can one really believe that such a powerful and capable aircraft as the F-111B wouldn't have been used as a strike platform at some time or rather by the USN, had it been put into production and operational service.


Regards
Pioneer

 

[Grey Havoc]

Official US Navy artist's concept of a 12,000-ton catamaran-hull Sea Control Ship (SCS) released in 1971. The ship was expected to cost under $100 million.

(I don't know why aircraft that resemble the General Dynamics F-111B appear in this artist's concept.)

Source: "Sea-control ship" Popular Mechanics January 1972

Triton later posted a better version of the artwork (h/t also to Ryan Crierie), see below.

Artist's impression of SWATH Sea Control Ship (SCS)

Source:

https://flic.kr/p/9LJ2ff

View: http://www.flickr.com/photos/63014123@N02/5756978862/in/set-72157626674107805/

 

[Grey Havoc]

GD-Grumman F-111B: Until the Non-fighter.

Behold McNamara’s Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) fiasco. To think that he thought they could have made an interceptor/fighter out of the F-111, and a carrier-based one on top of that. Gr…

elpoderdelasgalaxias.wordpress.com

 

[NilsD]

F-111B always seemed to me like it could have replaced the F-4, the A-6 and the A-5.

 

[Archibald]

Geez, that lunchbox SCS is supremely ugly.

 

[Sundog]

GD-Grumman F-111B: Until the Non-fighter.

Behold McNamara’s Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) fiasco. To think that he thought they could have made an interceptor/fighter out of the F-111, and a carrier-based one on top of that. Gr…

elpoderdelasgalaxias.wordpress.com

Ahhh, another book by a guy who doesn't know the history of the F-111B program. I love how they all act like it was meant to be an F-14 initially, without realizing it's roots are in the missleer program and it would have been fine as an interceptor. But USAF requirements drove the weight up and that combined with the fact that the navy wanted tandem seating, not side by side, drove the Navy to drop support of the program. He really should have read Tommy Thomason's work, first. There's also a really good PDF on the history of the TFX program that used to be at DTIC. For ref.

Tommy Thomason's F-111B topics

 

[Caravellarella]

I love the F-111B, such a splendid-looking aircraft IMHO. I remember making two F-111Bs in 1/72 scale in the mid 1990s.

Terry (Caravellarella)

 

[pathology_doc]

The real pity, rereading this post now, is that the Spangenberg site is no longer functional. I don't like piracy per se, but this is one of those times I hope someone kept a digital resource of the whole thing that they could repost.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The real pity, rereading this post now, is that the Spangenberg site is no longer functional. I don't like piracy per se, but this is one of those times I hope someone kept a digital resource of the whole thing that they could repost.

Fortunately, this very site has it covered:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/george-spangenbergs-oral-history-tfx-vfax-nacf-etc.114/#post-20895

The PDFs aren't quite as convenient to navigate as the website, but it's all there.