French airforce from 1935 to 1940-41?

[Archibald]

"Our Time Line" - how things happened in our... dimension.

 

[Hood]

2. Regarding the ideas to build French-weaponry-specific factories in Louisiana or Quebec...where French-speaking workers were available, simplifying documentation and management...or in Savannah: good ideas, but movement on the French side was far too slow.

I am genuinely curious about this proposal. Presumably the intention was to avoid time consuming translation of technical documents? That would still seem to be largely pointless, regardless of whether or not the workforce understood French there is the matter of metric versus imperial measurements for the plans and tooling and different screw threads, tooling sizes and a multitude of other technical differences that would have to be overcome.

 

[JWilly]

As a retired engineer fluent in both measuring systems and with decades of (modern American) design and production experience for volume manufacturing:

Production engineering and purchasing/receiving/quality control are much more complicated when an imperial/inch/pound design is to be manufactured in a metric country or vice versa. The assembly labor process is not more complicated though. In modern American practice, including the 1940s, an assembly station either places parts or manipulates fasteners, or both. Fasteners are set with tools integrated into the line, that include any needed fitments (sockets/bits etc.) and speed or torque settings. Assembly workers do not need to read technical drawings, do not provide and use their own tools, and do not choose what fastener to use from an array of multiple sizes/threads/other characteristics.

French aircraft assembled in an American factory could be fully metric design-wise without causing any complications for the assembly workers and their supervisors, and without complications for the production engineers once all of the needed sockets/bits/settings were obtained and in place, and all the right parts were binned and labeled in accord with the job sheets for each work station. The complications would be at the design-for-function and design-for-production stages. US suppliers of sheet aluminum, for instance, might not have a particular alloy and hardness in a particular metric thickness, and a not-quite-equal imperial thickness might have to be substituted, with subtle cascading effects.

France bought a lot of US-manufactured, US-designed aircraft with imperial/inch/pound designs, built with imperial fasteners and materials using imperial documentation. The complexities of maintenance and repair were all piled on the French mechanics. The H75s, DB7s and Martin 167s all had some operational changes to suit French piloting...reversed throttle direction, metric-reading instruments and the like...but AFAIK there were no accommodations for the airframe and engine mechanics.

The advantage to French management of manufacturing in a French-language locale would have been from their easier time establishing a commonality of cultural understandings...a workplace camaraderie...that hopefully would have gotten operations off to a better start.

 

[Archibald]

I checked my sources again. Related to Charles Huntziger visionary leadership (I'm ironical here).

I knew that Huntziger had declared TWICE that the germans would never, ever, attack in the Ardennes, where his 2nd Army and Corap 9th were (obviously) crushed the next month.

Well, here is some more context.

Huntziger 8th April quote was an irritated answer to that Taittinger report. The one that had picked big holes in the Ardennes defenses of Corap and Huntziger.

In fact it was Corap himself, the month before and in despair of getting reinforcement, that had raised alarm. First to Gamelin (whose answer was, verbatim "I don't give a damn about the Meuse, the Ardennes, and your sector as a whole"). Corap went to the French Parliament and found an ear with Champagne tycoon (vive la France !) Pierre Taittinger. The Deputy toured the Ardennes and Meuse defenses, was appalled, and made a vitriolic report.

I thought the report had been lost to the atrocious late 3rd Republic red tape, but I was wrong.

Daladier got a copy, and Gamelin, and Georges; and finally, Huntziger himself. You guess the initiative of his neighbourgh Corap was not exactly well received. Scoop: these two hated each other.

(After signing French surrender in Rethondes (one more shame), Huntziger headed to Vichy on Pétain's heels (boom, more shame) and in passing, turned Corap into his failure scapegoat (one little more shame on top of a big pile of shames, what difference does that makes in the end ?. Charming fellow, that Huntziger !)

Huntziger could never be trialed for all the above because in November 1941 his aircraft slammed into that mountain and he died.

Mont Aigoual - Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

simple.wikipedia.org

On April 8 was Huntziger answer. "I see no point in improving my defenses." Boom, headshot !

One month later he got another bout of visionary leadership. This time he was speaking with Sedan's mayor - poor guy who would see his city not only ravaged, but in a startling return to 1870, become the very place where the Germans would breakthrough and invade, taking Paris only weeks later.

... and so a complacent Huntziger told Sedan mayor "I can't see the Germans attacking here. Ever."

Sweet Jesus. One month, one visionary quote. That was the French military leadership, in 1940. With Daladier's unflappable support (as if the shame of Munich wasn't enough, the same Daladier was Gamelin devoted groupie since 1933 at least. Nice, he sunk France twice, all by himself. Thank you, Edouard Daladier !)

 

[Archibald]

The 1940 French political and military leadership was so atrociously stupid and complacent, there is actually a conspiracy theory on the matter.
Bottom line: key people had sold their soul to Pétain right from 1939 to lose the war and make Vichy happen.

Make no mistake: that's 100% bollocks. Even if she says the contrary (and Annie Lacroix Ritz is hardly a nobody, still - she is wrong).

Annie Lacroix-Riz - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

To me Annie Lacroix Ritz outrageous thesis is interesting for different reasons. I don't believe for a second she is right: it is much more subtle and funny than that.

Bottom line: when one looks at the fabulous trio of Gamelin, Daladier and Huntziger; their actions, what they said - you can only shake your head in disbelief.

"Dear God, he didn't said THAT, Daladier ??!!!"

"Dear God, was Gamelin THAT stupid ?"

"Drats, Huntziger was THAT arrogant and complacent prick ?"

Hell, yes, all three above. Yet Lacroix Ritz, she just can't accept it. It is just too apalling to be true ! Alas...
So she is looking for a Pétain conspiracy, where there is none. Only arrogance, complacency and, let's say it loud: perfect, total, and absolute IDIOCY. Up to criminal level for sure. But that doesn't make a conspiracy, Annie !

I've red the 9-11 "truthers" are very similar to this. When reality just look too appalling or unbelievable, just look for a conspiracy instead. It is "reassuring".

"Surely, Gamelin couldn't be THAT stupid !"

"Surely, the CIA and FBI couldn't be THAT stupid !"

(scoop: they were, for real !)

What is not a conspiracy theory is that Gamelin had his brains fried by advanced stage syphillis. This has been proven by his declassified medical file, some years ago (yes, it was confidential for decades - one wonders why !)

So now you can see the odds poor France faced in 1940, with such luminaries at the controls.

 

[klem]

The 1940 French political and military leadership was so atrociously stupid and complacent, there is actually a conspiracy theory on the matter.
Bottom line: key people had sold their soul to Pétain right from 1939 to lose the war and make Vichy happen.

Make no mistake: that's 100% bollocks. Even if she says the contrary (and Annie Lacroix Ritz is hardly a nobody, still - she is wrong).

Annie Lacroix-Riz - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

To me Annie Lacroix Ritz outrageous thesis is interesting for different reasons. I don't believe for a second she is right: it is much more subtle and funny than that.

Bottom line: when one looks at the fabulous trio of Gamelin, Daladier and Huntziger; their actions, what they said - you can only shake your head in disbelief.

"Dear God, he didn't said THAT, Daladier ??!!!"

"Dear God, was Gamelin THAT stupid ?"

"Drats, Huntziger was THAT arrogant and complacent prick ?"

Hell, yes, all three above. Yet Lacroix Ritz, she just can't accept it. It is just too apalling to be true ! Alas...
So she is looking for a Pétain conspiracy, where there is none. Only arrogance, complacency and, let's say it loud: perfect, total, and absolute IDIOCY. Up to criminal level for sure. But that doesn't make a conspiracy, Annie !

I've red the 9-11 "truthers" are very similar to this. When reality just look too appalling or unbelievable, just look for a conspiracy instead. It is "reassuring".

"Surely, Gamelin couldn't be THAT stupid !"

"Surely, the CIA and FBI couldn't be THAT stupid !"

(scoop: they were, for real !)

What is not a conspiracy theory is that Gamelin had his brains fried by advanced stage syphillis. This has been proven by his declassified medical file, some years ago (yes, it was confidential for decades - one wonders why !)

So now you can see the odds poor France faced in 1940, with such luminaries at the controls.

Every time I read one of your lines I understand the bitterness that overwhelms you, but it is clear that the political scene of France at that time, its leaders, if only they could understand what was going on in the world. at the head of the state rocked in the distant past, they needed an update but it was too late the machine was obsolete obsolete archaic and senile in short they were overwhelmed because they lived in the old world blinded by the glow of a glory that had withered, they had not realized that the world had changed in all areas, they had not modernized anything so what was the point of hoarding all this gold, for nothing, it was time political intrigues the only area where they excelled. "Wise among the wise" of the first war, they accumulated madness on madness until the great madness, to believe that they would never be attacked but Maginot with his "magic" and his best pieces of artillery for would melt griffins and dragons at the same time, but alas the time was no longer for eloquence and phraseology and it is not with this that one enters and leads a war so when the moment arose France was not quite simply, everything was just a chimera. France, instead of seeing what was happening in the Spanish Civil War, the new testing ground for European powers, preferred to hide its face so as not to see the eagle and the condor. History does not forgive and yet many have been absolved. "the whys" unfortunately remain unanswered. how heroes become anti-heroes. Yes, it was madness to believe in the "absolute sinality" armistice, gerontocracy and laxity inevitably lead to a "merdocratie". A "ubuesque" grotesque end such as Alfred Jarry's theatrical play. In the movie "Sinouhé the Egyptian", adapted from the novel of the Finnish "Mika Waltari", Sinouhé who is a doctor says to the sick pharaoh "What a pity that the madmen cannot speak with wisdom about the madness that the wise do... you are mad and your madness is more magnificent than the madness of other men". Certainly France has known its moments of Folies Bergères but also its moments of warrior follies which ended in a debacle worthy of the great army at Bérézina, yes history repeats itself if we do not learn from it.

 

[Archibald]

I'm not really bitter - rather half-amused, half-baffled by the whole thing overall dumbarsery. I'm also puzzled by all the missed opportunities all the way from January 30, 1933 to May 21, 1940. Countless of them. Wouldn't take that much to butterfly the May 1940 collapse. Although I have to confess, the rot went so deep, sometimes I wonder whether it wasn't unavoidable.

Also no 1940 collapse means late 3rd Republic France survives longer and, well, it was quite a ugly place to live. I pity my grandparents who had to lived through such shitty times.

I realized my grandmother was born some day after November 11, 1918 while his son - my uncle - was born on May 19, 1940, the exact day the panzers arrived at the atlantic coast in Abbeville - sealing what became the Dunkirk pocket. On each ends of the interbellum - how about that.
My grandfather didn't knew his son was born until a month later: mid-May he barely escaped being taken prisonier in Belgium. His armored unit - he was a radio - crossed the border and was crushed near Dinant, central Belgium.
Now they had to return south with the panzers coming like a truck on a highway, on their left flank: rushing from Sedan in the east to Abbeville in the west.
The trap was closing in front of them !
They were straffed on the roads for three days (MAy 15 to May 18) but made it south just in time. My uncle was born the next day - May 19, 1940 so he very nearly knew his father.
And my mom born in 1943, hence had my grandfather been in stalag, 1940-45 - no mom, and then no Archibald typing this (think Back of the future when the McFlys vanishes on the photo).

 

[klem]

I'm not really bitter - rather half-amused, half-baffled by the whole thing overall dumbarsery. I'm also puzzled by all the missed opportunities all the way from January 30, 1933 to May 21, 1940. Countless of them. Wouldn't take that much to butterfly the May 1940 collapse. Although I have to confess, the rot went so deep, sometimes I wonder whether it wasn't unavoidable.

Also no 1940 collapse means late 3rd Republic France survives longer and, well, it was quite a ugly place to live. I pity my grandparents who had to lived through such shitty times.

I realized my grandmother was born some day after November 11, 1918 while his son - my uncle - was born on May 19, 1940, the exact day the panzers arrived at the atlantic coast in Abbeville - sealing what became the Dunkirk pocket. On each ends of the interbellum - how about that.
My grandfather didn't knew his son was born until a month later: mid-May he barely escaped being taken prisonier in Belgium. His armored unit - he was a radio - crossed the border and was crushed near Dinant, central Belgium.
Now they had to return south with the panzers coming like a truck on a highway, on their left flank: rushing from Sedan in the east to Abbeville in the west.
The trap was closing in front of them !
They were straffed on the roads for three days but made it south just in time.

I sincerely sympathize because in the general turmoil the search for salvation has become a primordial luxury.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

One thing the French and British did during this period that was clearly a mistake was put a lot of effort into developing army cooperation and observation aircraft.

 

[Archibald]

One thing the French and British did during this period that was clearly a mistake was put a lot of effort into developing army cooperation and observation aircraft.

Sure. Consider the following numbers.

Out of 1200 Potez 63 built, 700 were 63-11 for tactical and strategic reconnaissance.

Also, a large percentage of the AdA 1500 aircraft inventory (1938 - 1940) were GAO aircraft - Groupe Aérien d'Observation, essentially the role filled by Piper Cub, Stinson Sentinel, / Fieseler Storch & HS-123. These aircraft were under control of the Armée de Terre... who didn't really knew how to use those mostly obsolete types (Les Mureaux 117). Their thinking was stuck at 1918 level, - ballons as observation platforms for artillery.

One least known quagmire of pre-WWII AdA procurement was the T-3 program. Imagine a derated Potez 63-11 for the GAO mission. That is: three men with a radio, two 500 hp engines.
From 1937 to 1939 enormous sums of money were sunk into that program, only for flawed prototypes and the program being canned. France procured Caproni CA.313 instead.

Clearly the T-3 / GAO mission was at the core of many failures: RFP & procurement, AdA - AdT troubled relationship, tactical vs strategic reconnaissance...

Note that Army generals not only had GAOs, they could also take control of fighter groups to get local air superiority. In practice it did not worked too well.
At Sedan the Curtiss of I/5 squadron were under control of Huntziger or Corap, but they were ill-used and too few and were quickly overwhelmed by the German fighter / dive bomber onslaught.

 

[ArtosStark]

It’s interesting reading some of the assessments in this thread having spent time doing the same for the RAF.

For instance, a common critique of the RAF in this time period is their utter disregard for Army Cooperation, having only a small number of artillery spotting aircraft. Now generally those making the criticism are actually referring to the rejection of dive bombing and the lack of CAS doctrine. But the point stands.

Likewise I have seen criticism of the lack of a 20 mm turret in RAF bombers in this era. Colin Sinnott claims this was a missed opportunity at least for the doctrine that the RAF held. Since the RAF was confident on the ability of Bomber groups to self defend, they put considerable effort into increasing the firepower of their fighters (2 x .303 to 4, 4 to 8 and 8 x .303 to 4 x 20 mm with discussion of 12 x .303, along with turret fighter and heavy cannon concepts). But Sinnott mentions that in the same period the defensive armament for the bombers remained the same, with 20 mm turrets only being developed after the main bombers were and those being too narrow to take them by the time they were.

Seeing the opposite critiques for the AdA maybe calls those into question.

 

[Archibald]

For instance, a common critique of the RAF in this time period is their utter disregard for Army Cooperation, having only a small number of artillery spotting aircraft.

Very interesting. I would say that the RAF only had to look to the other side of the Channel to see an Air Force humiliated if not utterly castrated by their land army. The AdA was created only in 1933 - and it instantly got Darlan's Navy and the entire geriatric Army HQ dead set against them. If you thought the RAF had hard times with the Army or RN, I can readily assure that the AdA was far more miserable.

And yes, it is fascinating to make parallels between AdA and RAF in the 1930's. You British reasonably suceeded where the french truly and miserably failed.
- a V-12 powerful enough, the Merlin - check
- the air force not being screwed by the Army - check
- rationalizing fighter production - check (Hurricane, Spitfire, and screw any other major fighter bar perhaps Defiant)
- building light bombers aplenty (Battle, Blenheim) - check

It amaze me Great Britain could get enough Merlins, not only for Hurricane I and Spitfire I by the truckloads but also Defiant and Battle.

No such chance for France, Hispano Suiza 12Y was way out in the blue while 12Z was hopelessly late (and flawed).

Likewise I have seen criticism of the lack of a 20 mm turret in RAF bombers in this era.

That criticism is plain stupid. France wasted colossal amounts of energy putting 20 mm rear defensive guns on Amiot 350 and LeO-450, H-tail included.
End results
a) not enough 20 mm guns for fighters (HS production plateau-ed)
b) 60 shell drums weighed 25 kg and greatly diminished the weapon usefulness
c) even more since the gun was only powered by the gunner muscles, and flying at 250 mph it ensured the gun couldn't move sidewards
d) H-tail was pure idiocy, at least for French types. Make them heavier, draggier, and more difficult to fly and land (LeO-451).

Now, make no mistake... a belt-fed 20 mm HS-404 (crapton of shells + easier reloading) in an hydraulically powered turret would be something else entirely !

 

[Archibald]

Early September 1939 France three armies leaders met. Compared to Darlan (MN) or the WWI Army generals, AdA Vuillemin was essentially a nobody.
One of the Army leaders actually said, LOUD and CLEAR "France can very well fight and win that war without aviation" ("La France peut très bien se passer d'aviation pour faire la guerre" - verbatim). Vuillemin was quite apalled by what he had heard.

 

[Charlesferdinand]

("La France peut très bien se passer d'aviation pour faire la guerre" - verbatim). Vuillemin was quite apalled by what he had heard.

Do you know who this was? It is very typical of the mindset of the army.

 

[ArtosStark]

Very interesting. I would say that the RAF only had to look to the other side of the Channel to see an Air Force humiliated if not utterly castrated by their land army. The AdA was created only in 1933 - and it instantly got Darlan's Navy and the entire geriatric Army HQ dead set against them. If you thought the RAF had hard times with the Army or RN, I can readily assure that the AdA was far more miserable.

True enough. However, on the other hand, many of the RAF’s greatest failures were related to a lack of cooperation with other services.

- The Bomber offensive absorbing massive amounts of resources for questionable benefit while Coastal Command are denied the Long Range aircraft they need to close the mid Atlantic gap

- The FAA having no decent dive bomber due to the dismissal of the technique by the RAF

- officers in the Battle of France having to call the War Office in London to arrange air support with RAF headquarters.

It amaze me Great Britain could get enough Merlins, not only for Hurricane I and Spitfire I by the truckloads but also Defiant and Battle.

The shadow factories were a good investment as it turns out. Rolls-Royce worked out a good system. Derby could do the less efficient work of testing, improving and developing engines while still producing a usable number. At the same time the shadow factories allowed them to provide large numbers of standardized engines that could not easily be shut down by bombing.

That criticism is plain stupid

Now, make no mistake... a belt-fed 20 mm HS-404 (crapton of shells + easier reloading) in an hydraulically powered turret would be something else entirely !

I believe they were looking at hydraulic turrets at that point. They had just recently begun to require hydraulic powering for .303 mounts. I think Sinnott is referring to powered 20mm turrets with half the barrels (2 x 20 mm replacing 4 x .303). And at this stage they may have been considering Oerlikon FFS guns. They still would have been drum fed but even some of the .303’s were pan fed until the outbreak of war, so not hard to see.

 

[riggerrob]

c) even more since the gun was only powered by the gunner muscles, and flying at 250 mph it ensured the gun couldn't move sidewards
d) H-tail was pure idiocy, at least for French types. Make them heavier, draggier, and more difficult to fly and land (LeO-451).

Now, make no mistake... a belt-fed 20 mm HS-404 (crapton of shells + easier reloading) in an hydraulically powered turret would be something else entirely !

Man-powered turrets were the norm during the 1930s. It was only during World War 2 that WALLIES de-bugged hydraulic or electric-powered turrets to make them practical. See the silly little trim vane atop the turret on a Soviet Il-2 Stormovics.
H-tails were popular during the 1930s because they allowed smooth airflow to rudders. This was supposed to improve handling after one engine quit. I suspect that a large part of the problem was turbulent airflow along the aft fuselage. It was only during World War 2 that engineers learned how to smooth airflow enough to make single rudders practical.

 

[Archibald]

I see your point, but the turrets that were manned only had light machine guns hence were easier to move (think of Henry Jones in Last Crusade ROTFL !)
But a HS-404 20 mm gun was quite a heavy weapon to move in flight. The drum alone weighed 25 kg and there are some horror stories of gunners being thrown out trying to replace it. Can't imagine how much would weight the entire gun, even on a mount, try moving that thing sidewards against the airflow (250 mph) while the aircraft is wildly bouncing up and down in turbulences... in passing, the LeO-451 rear-firing gun station was open, at least from the rear. It had a split windshield on the other side (probably a big drag brake).

A Potez 63 defensive LMG could be man handled, a 20 mm gun I'm not so sure.

 

[riggerrob]

2. Regarding the ideas to build French-weaponry-specific factories in Louisiana or Quebec...where French-speaking workers were available, simplifying documentation and management...or in Savannah: good ideas, but movement on the French side was far too slow.

I am genuinely curious about this proposal. Presumably the intention was to avoid time consuming translation of technical documents? That would still seem to be largely pointless, regardless of whether or not the workforce understood French there is the matter of metric versus imperial measurements for the plans and tooling and different screw threads, tooling sizes and a multitude of other technical differences that would have to be overcome.

Great in theory, but there were many obstacles.

Starting with translation problems within factories in Montreal. Management tended to be bi-lingual engineers whose mother tongue was English. Meanwhile many workers on the factory floor were uni-lingual French.
French documents were written in a newer dialect than that spoken in Canada. For example, when I taught in Strassberg (sp?), locals complimented me on my fine French accent, but teased me that my accent was 300 years old.

For example, when teaching parachute riggers in Switzerland - during 2013 - I was forced to chose between multiple dialects. Many candidates were already familiar with American English technical terms, but their primary French-language textbook was written by a Frenchman (Eric Fradet). As an aside, Canadian Army parachute riggers have their own distinct dialect and terminology.

There were also problems with trying to mix metric and imperial measurements. It is much simpler to equip a new factory with all metric tools that to flop back and forth. But this would require educating factory floor workers on the metric system ... an education best started a few years earlier in high school. The metric system was only first taught in Quebec during the 1970s.

Shadow factories can suffer a variety of problems. For example, when the RAF shipped some airplanes to the RCAF early in Worl dWar 2, they forgot to send some of the hardware like bolts. Since RAF tradition discourages re-using bolts, RAF technicians dismantling airplanes simply tossed old bolts - assuming that the re-assembling station would have a complete supply of new bolts. It is unlikely that RAF senior staff ever told British technicians where those airplanes were destined. A few months later, RCAF technicians struggled to bolt together these airplanes without enough new hardware.
The situation was even worse in South Africa when a batch of AT-6 Harvards arrived with insufficient bolts. (Probably black) RSAAF lower-rank technicians just assembled the airplanes shy a few bolts. The problem came back to haunt ex-RSAAF surplus Harvards when wings cracked and fell off a few after 2,000. The FAA issued a Service Bulletin requiring expensive inspections (X-rays, etc.) of AT-6s suspected of cracked wings. The cracking problem was tracked back to too few bolts.

In conclusion, it would have been simpler to build new shadow factories from scratch on the outskirts of Montreal (see Fairchild Canada factory at St. Hubert).

Please note that I was not trying to criticize lower-rank blacks or lower-rank white technicians serving in the RSAAF. Rather the problem originated a pay-grade or two higher when management failed to provide sufficient hardware.

 

[Archibald]

Quebec french separated from France's french in the 1600's or 1700's, and there are marqued differences. Quebec accent is delightful and lovely to hear, but completely alien to any French (and the reverse is also true).
As usual, the daily words have diverged the most.
Car -
- voiture (France)
- char (Quebec)
Char still exist in France, but it either mean "horse drawn" or.. armored vehicle (char d'assaut) but NOT classic car.

 

[Archibald]

FFO / FTL unearthed a rather incredible plan to manufacture Amiot 350 bombers in Louisiana (!) again because of that french language connection.
My mind was completely blown, and just for the fun of it, I suggested to use Michoud - the place were NASA later build rockets.
Felix Amiot was a colorfoul caracter with plenty of interesting connections, notably the Wertheimers in New York. Also Coco Channel who was a Vichy darling (bottom line: she was a racist, reactionnary b*tch, a pretty disgusting person as a whole, or so it seems. The Wertheimers being Jewish, Coco tried to sold them or their assets to the Gestapo or Milice, and so they turned to Amiot, who happily screwed Channel and covered the Wertheimer brothers. Overall, a very ugly story).
After WWII Amiot shifted to naval construction and was still there in Cherbourg in 1969 - you know, when Israel seized those warships and made them escape. They got help from Amiot himself - (De Gaulle defense minister Debré probably had kittens over the whole quagmire).

 

[Elan Vital]

Early September 1939 France three armies leaders met. Compared to Darlan (MN) or the WWI Army generals, AdA Vuillemin was essentially a nobody.
One of the Army leaders actually said, LOUD and CLEAR "France can very well fight and win that war without aviation" ("La France peut très bien se passer d'aviation pour faire la guerre" - verbatim). Vuillemin was quite apalled by what he had heard.

Regarding that and the post before it, can one really blame Army officers for staying in their branch when Denain's air force proved not suited to them? Pétain himself endorsed the creation of an independant Air Force but also wanted army coop to survive.
Denain might have been the worst choice for an early AdA leader as he did not witness European developments or the Rif war, had very little technical and industrial knowledge and little doctrinal one. He lacked the skills to really draw in a lot of skilled and energic technical advisors and officers.

Was it the job of the Army to make the AdA good? NO, if it was then the whole concept of independence would be moot. It was Denain's damn job to do it and he was completely out of his comfort zone here.

 

[Archibald]

Denain de jardin LMAO (sorry, couldn't resist).

You probably have a point about the Army, but their GAOs and overall relationship with the Air Force was dismal. I'm probably a little biased against the Army Generals, as one can readily deduce reading my posts.

More seriously, I've long searched for a better commander than Vuillemin and his forerunners. Didn't found much alternatives besides Henri Jauneaud which seems to have been too controversial to ever get the job.

"henri Jauneaud" - Google Search

Vuillemin was a good guy, but lacked personality compared to a Darlan or to the geriatric WWI past "heroes".

 

[T. A. Gardner]

It doesn't help that seemingly every French bomber of the 30's looked and performed like it was made from left over parts of a Citroen 2CV...

 

[robunos]

Vuillemin was a good guy, but lacked personality compared to a Darlan or to the geriatric WWI past "heroes".

cf. Hugh Trenchard . . .

Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

cheers,
Robin.

 

[JWilly]

In a 1930s-or-before US factory, production of a complex assembly...an engine or airframe...might have been organized on a team-cell basis. A small group of workers, each with multiple skills approaching the level of craftsman, would build that assembly from beginning to completion. Then they'd build another one. There might be multiple cells in parallel, each turning out a slow series of completed assemblies.

I think quite possibly French aircraft-industry manufacturing mostly was organized on that basis in the late 1930s.

Team-cell manufacturing is highly dependent on worker skills. Each worker uses many tools, and must understand a great deal about the product and be able to understand complex technical drawings and how to effectively realize the finished assembly. Many of the assembly techniques and sequences may not be fully documented, or may be performed in a manner or order that the team has learned by experience is the preferred method...whether or not envisioned in that manner by the relevant design and production engineers.

In team-cell manufacturing, communication and language skills were crucial. Every team-cell has every tool and every part needed for its complete complex-assembly, and must have an intimate knowledge of which tools and parts are to be used where, and every way in which parts might be mixed up or installed incorrectly. A language issue between workers and production engineers could be disastrous, and at minimum would be a barrier to effectiveness.

I don't have any experience with parachute rigging, but I'd guess that it's much like team-cell manufacturing, in which one or a small group of skilled and experienced workers perform either the total operation, or perhaps a substantial part of the total operation.

In a 1940s-and-later US sequential repetitive manufacturing factory making complex assemblies, production is organized very differently. The production engineers plan the entire process one step at a time. Then a sequential production line is set up, with each worker directed and taught to do one operation or a small group of highly related operations. Every operation happens in the planned sequential order. No worker needs any tools or parts other than those for the specific single operation he or she does, and no other worker uses that worker's (and workstation's) tools and parts. Every worker is individually provided with focused documentation of only their operation, and taught what to do and what to not do. Often the worker documentation is pictorial or illustrated with technical line-art; both tools and parts bins are color coded; and work stations are provided with check fixtures or another means for individual workers to verify that the fasteners and parts they're assembling are the correct ones, assembled in the correct manner.

In sequential manufacturing, communication and language skills are much less important. The primary importance of a common language is in social interactions, which are an essential part of team building and organizational cohesion toward shared goals. For that, though, having only a single dialect of a single language among management, engineering and production workers is less important. Many modern manufacturing plants have been staffed with persons with a mix of languages...even sometimes with no common language between some of the production workers on the same production line...and have been effective.

Shadow factories can suffer a variety of problems. For example, when the RAF shipped some airplanes to the RCAF early in Worl dWar 2, they forgot to send some of the hardware like bolts. Since RAF tradition discourages re-using bolts, RAF technicians dismantling airplanes simply tossed old bolts - assuming that the re-assembling station would have a complete supply of new bolts. It is unlikely that RAF senior staff ever told British technicians where those airplanes were destined. A few months later, RCAF technicians struggled to bolt together these airplanes without enough new hardware.

The situation was even worse in South Africa when a batch of AT-6 Harvards arrived with insufficient bolts. (Probably black) RSAAF lower-rank technicians just assembled the airplanes shy a few bolts. The problem came back to haunt ex-RSAAF surplus Harvards when wings cracked and fell off a few after 20000. The FAA issued a Service Bulletin requiring expensive inspections (X-rays, etc.) of AT-6s suspected of cracked wings. The cracking problem was tracked back to too few bolts.

Most assuredly there are many ways for manufacturing to be screwed up, often involving someone that should know better, making an invalid assumption about how the process will work. Never Assume remains important.

 

[royabulgaf]

In a 1930s-or-before US factory, production of a complex assembly...an engine or airframe...might have been organized on a team-cell basis. A small group of workers, each with multiple skills approaching the level of craftsman, would build that assembly from beginning to completion. Then they'd build another one. There might be multiple cells in parallel, each turning out a slow series of completed assemblies.

I think quite possibly French aircraft-industry manufacturing mostly was organized on that basis in the late 1930s.

Team-cell manufacturing is highly dependent on worker skills. Each worker uses many tools, and must understand a great deal about the product and be able to understand complex technical drawings and how to effectively realize the finished assembly. Many of the assembly techniques and sequences may not be fully documented, or may be performed in a manner or order that the team has learned by experience is the preferred method...whether or not envisioned in that manner by the relevant design and production engineers.

In team-cell manufacturing, communication and language skills were crucial. Every team-cell has every tool and every part needed for its complete complex-assembly, and must have an intimate knowledge of which tools and parts are to be used where, and every way in which parts might be mixed up or installed incorrectly. A language issue between workers and production engineers could be disastrous, and at minimum would be a barrier to effectiveness.

I don't have any experience with parachute rigging, but I'd guess that it's much like team-cell manufacturing, in which one or a small group of skilled and experienced workers perform either the total operation, or perhaps a substantial part of the total operation.

In a 1940s-and-later US sequential repetitive manufacturing factory making complex assemblies, production is organized very differently. The production engineers plan the entire process one step at a time. Then a sequential production line is set up, with each worker directed and taught to do one operation or a small group of highly related operations. Every operation happens in the planned sequential order. No worker needs any tools or parts other than those for the specific single operation he or she does, and no other worker uses that worker's (and workstation's) tools and parts. Every worker is individually provided with focused documentation of only their operation, and taught what to do and what to not do. Often the worker documentation is pictorial or illustrated with technical line-art; both tools and parts bins are color coded; and work stations are provided with check fixtures or another means for individual workers to verify that the fasteners and parts they're assembling are the correct ones, assembled in the correct manner.

In sequential manufacturing, communication and language skills are much less important. The primary importance of a common language is in social interactions, which are an essential part of team building and organizational cohesion toward shared goals. For that, though, having only a single dialect of a single language among management, engineering and production workers is less important. Many modern manufacturing plants have been staffed with persons with a mix of languages...even sometimes with no common language between some of the production workers on the same production line...and have been effective.

Shadow factories can suffer a variety of problems. For example, when the RAF shipped some airplanes to the RCAF early in Worl dWar 2, they forgot to send some of the hardware like bolts. Since RAF tradition discourages re-using bolts, RAF technicians dismantling airplanes simply tossed old bolts - assuming that the re-assembling station would have a complete supply of new bolts. It is unlikely that RAF senior staff ever told British technicians where those airplanes were destined. A few months later, RCAF technicians struggled to bolt together these airplanes without enough new hardware.

The situation was even worse in South Africa when a batch of AT-6 Harvards arrived with insufficient bolts. (Probably black) RSAAF lower-rank technicians just assembled the airplanes shy a few bolts. The problem came back to haunt ex-RSAAF surplus Harvards when wings cracked and fell off a few after 20000. The FAA issued a Service Bulletin requiring expensive inspections (X-rays, etc.) of AT-6s suspected of cracked wings. The cracking problem was tracked back to too few bolts.

Most assuredly there are many ways for manufacturing to be screwed up, often involving someone that should know better, making an invalid assumption about how the process will work. Never Assume remains important.

Regarding the RCAF, did Canada use SAE or Whitworth nuts and bolts?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

In a 1930s-or-before US factory, production of a complex assembly...an engine or airframe...might have been organized on a team-cell basis. A small group of workers, each with multiple skills approaching the level of craftsman, would build that assembly from beginning to completion. Then they'd build another one. There might be multiple cells in parallel, each turning out a slow series of completed assemblies.

I think quite possibly French aircraft-industry manufacturing mostly was organized on that basis in the late 1930s.

Team-cell manufacturing is highly dependent on worker skills. Each worker uses many tools, and must understand a great deal about the product and be able to understand complex technical drawings and how to effectively realize the finished assembly. Many of the assembly techniques and sequences may not be fully documented, or may be performed in a manner or order that the team has learned by experience is the preferred method...whether or not envisioned in that manner by the relevant design and production engineers.

In team-cell manufacturing, communication and language skills were crucial. Every team-cell has every tool and every part needed for its complete complex-assembly, and must have an intimate knowledge of which tools and parts are to be used where, and every way in which parts might be mixed up or installed incorrectly. A language issue between workers and production engineers could be disastrous, and at minimum would be a barrier to effectiveness.

I don't have any experience with parachute rigging, but I'd guess that it's much like team-cell manufacturing, in which one or a small group of skilled and experienced workers perform either the total operation, or perhaps a substantial part of the total operation.

In a 1940s-and-later US sequential repetitive manufacturing factory making complex assemblies, production is organized very differently. The production engineers plan the entire process one step at a time. Then a sequential production line is set up, with each worker directed and taught to do one operation or a small group of highly related operations. Every operation happens in the planned sequential order. No worker needs any tools or parts other than those for the specific single operation he or she does, and no other worker uses that worker's (and workstation's) tools and parts. Every worker is individually provided with focused documentation of only their operation, and taught what to do and what to not do. Often the worker documentation is pictorial or illustrated with technical line-art; both tools and parts bins are color coded; and work stations are provided with check fixtures or another means for individual workers to verify that the fasteners and parts they're assembling are the correct ones, assembled in the correct manner.

In sequential manufacturing, communication and language skills are much less important. The primary importance of a common language is in social interactions, which are an essential part of team building and organizational cohesion toward shared goals. For that, though, having only a single dialect of a single language among management, engineering and production workers is less important. Many modern manufacturing plants have been staffed with persons with a mix of languages...even sometimes with no common language between some of the production workers on the same production line...and have been effective.

Shadow factories can suffer a variety of problems. For example, when the RAF shipped some airplanes to the RCAF early in Worl dWar 2, they forgot to send some of the hardware like bolts. Since RAF tradition discourages re-using bolts, RAF technicians dismantling airplanes simply tossed old bolts - assuming that the re-assembling station would have a complete supply of new bolts. It is unlikely that RAF senior staff ever told British technicians where those airplanes were destined. A few months later, RCAF technicians struggled to bolt together these airplanes without enough new hardware.

The situation was even worse in South Africa when a batch of AT-6 Harvards arrived with insufficient bolts. (Probably black) RSAAF lower-rank technicians just assembled the airplanes shy a few bolts. The problem came back to haunt ex-RSAAF surplus Harvards when wings cracked and fell off a few after 20000. The FAA issued a Service Bulletin requiring expensive inspections (X-rays, etc.) of AT-6s suspected of cracked wings. The cracking problem was tracked back to too few bolts.

Most assuredly there are many ways for manufacturing to be screwed up, often involving someone that should know better, making an invalid assumption about how the process will work. Never Assume remains important.

Regarding the RCAF, did Canada use SAE or Whitworth nuts and bolts?

Acme screw threads, just to be weird...

 

[Archibald]

Vuillemin was a good guy, but lacked personality compared to a Darlan or to the geriatric WWI past "heroes".

cf. Hugh Trenchard . . .

Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

cheers,
Robin.

I knew the man's name and reputation, but this blew my mind. He had one hell of crazy life, for sure. Most importantly, he seems to kept the RAF on solid ground during the turbulent 1930's. Exactly what France AdA lacked to resist tremendous pressure from Darlan colossal ego and the Army geriatric and plentiful WWI veteran generals, led by Pétain.

 

[robunos]

Vuillemin was a good guy, but lacked personality compared to a Darlan or to the geriatric WWI past "heroes".

cf. Hugh Trenchard . . .

Hugh Trenchard, 1st Viscount Trenchard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

cheers,
Robin.

I knew the man's name and reputation, but this blew my mind. He had one hell of crazy life, for sure. Most importantly, he seems to kept the RAF on solid ground during the turbulent 1930's. Exactly what France AdA lacked to resist tremendous pressure from Darlan colossal ego and the Army geriatric and plentiful WWI veteran generals, led by Pétain.

That's why I mentioned him . . .
If you can, get hold of this book . . .

Trenchard: Father of the Royal Air Force - the Biography: The Life of Viscount Trenchard, Father of the Royal Air Force eBook : Miller, Russell: Amazon.co.uk: Kindle Store

Trenchard: Father of the Royal Air Force - the Biography: The Life of Viscount Trenchard, Father of the Royal Air Force eBook : Miller, Russell: Amazon.co.uk: Kindle Store

www.amazon.co.uk

cheers,
Robin.

 

[Archibald]

"Tranchoir" in french is the machine to cut ham into slices. And since the Army HQ was packed with old hams... makes some sense.

 

[royabulgaf]

T A Gardner, I first thought "Acme" was a joke. Then I looked it up, and apparently the US used Acme standard in aluminum work until the 60s. I had a friend who was into sports car racing back in the day, and British carmakers used Whitworth until the mid 50s when they switched to the American standard. The problem is Whitworth and SAE look pretty much the same, but if you use the wrong one you pretty much ruin the bolthole by the time you realize something is wrong. I could imagine a bunch of ruined wings.

 

[Archibald]

Well "acme" essentially means "pinacle" in latin, so before Wile E. Coyote ruined it, the name was kind of sexy. It was like "game changing" nowadays, except in the 1940's.
F-35 new sensor is game changing technology
P-51 was the acme of piston engine fighters

 

[T. A. Gardner]

T A Gardner, I first thought "Acme" was a joke. Then I looked it up, and apparently the US used Acme standard in aluminum work until the 60s. I had a friend who was into sports car racing back in the day, and British carmakers used Whitworth until the mid 50s when they switched to the American standard. The problem is Whitworth and SAE look pretty much the same, but if you use the wrong one you pretty much ruin the bolthole by the time you realize something is wrong. I could imagine a bunch of ruined wings.

I threw it in because I knew about all those oddball threads. I simply whipped out my


And, away you go...

 

[JWilly]

No repetitive manufacturing operation should expect...or allow...anyone on the factory floor to choose what part to use for a given process step...including identifying the right fastener for a step.

To the extent that sort of thing was still happening in the late 30s...well, faulty processes in, faulty products out. No excuses.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

No repetitive manufacturing operation should expect...or allow...anyone on the factory floor to choose what part to use for a given process step...including identifying the right fastener for a step.

To the extent that sort of thing was still happening in the late 30s...well, faulty processes in, faulty products out. No excuses.

That was the result usually of continuation of handwork processes by master craftsmen protected by a strong union. The combination fought any attempt at assembly line manufacturing as a threat to their continued domination of the industry. Handcrafted quality, even if uneven in final result, was considered more important than mass production or interchangeability of parts.
While this a comparison of ship building, it gives you some idea of the difference between the two:

 

[JWilly]

I don't have any detailed knowledge of other US tank factories, but the Fisher Tank Arsenal in Grand Blanc, Michigan...just south of Flint, where I grew up...the Detroit Tank Arsenal in Warren, Michigan, and the Buick City complex in Flint, where the M18 was built, all used modern automotive-style production line manufacturing. Quality and quantity were considered all-important, including by the unionized workforces. "Handcrafted quality" was recognized, in regard to complex machinery, as an oxymoron. Old-school craftsmen became part of the sizeable skilled-trades workforce, maybe to a greater extent than at Kaiser's operations, where such a large percentage of the workforce was new to industrial work.

With respect to this thread's topic, YouTube has several videos about the Willow Run factory in Ypsilanti, Michigan, where automotive-style production line techniques were used to built thousands of B-24 bombers. That's how the French might have operated a US-built factory if they wanted quality aircraft in quantity.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I don't have any detailed knowledge of other US tank factories, but the Fisher Tank Arsenal in Grand Blanc, Michigan...just south of Flint, where I grew up...the Detroit Tank Arsenal in Warren, Michigan, and the Buick City complex in Flint, where the M18 was built, all used modern automotive-style production line manufacturing. Quality and quantity were considered all-important, including by the unionized workforces. "Handcrafted quality" was recognized, in regard to complex machinery, as an oxymoron. Old-school craftsmen became part of the sizeable skilled-trades workforce, maybe to a greater extent than at Kaiser's operations, where such a large percentage of the workforce was new to industrial work.

This is another example of quality and quantity trouncing "traditional" methods

 

[Michel Van]

There is this big white Elephant in this discussion, we have not talk about...

Money ! needed to build thing like aircraft or tanks

And here is biggest problem for France Defences,
in 1930s the Third Republic spent $9 billion into The Maginot Line
it suck up most of Military budget in France,
This and do political chaos, stop and go in Programs and worst nationalisation of companies
Hampers seriously the build up of French Armed forces with tanks and Airplanes
Like civil servant order Renault company to build trucks instead of Tanks
Or Marcel Bloch company got nationalisation and his aircraft got less powerful engines...

 

[elbmc1969]

That criticism is plain stupid. France wasted colossal amounts of energy putting 20 mm rear defensive guns on Amiot 350 and LeO-450, H-tail included.
End results

c) even more since the gun was only powered by the gunner muscles, and flying at 250 mph it ensured the gun couldn't move sidewards

The gun was mounted on a hydraulically-powered pedestal--essentially, it was a turret with no rotating glass. You can find photos of the only surviving mount online at a museum web site.

The hood the flipped up in front of the gun station was an air brake--or rather, a wind break. The slipstream was so strong that the gunner couldn't operate without something to break up the airflow. You see a more extreme version of this Hawker Demon turret fighter, where they put an almost cylindrical windshield around the gunner.

d) H-tail was pure idiocy, at least for French types. Make them heavier, draggier, and more difficult to fly and land (LeO-451).

The point was to clear the 6 o'clock line for the cannon. The LeO451 and the Am35 series were supposed to be so fast that fighters would only be able to make relatively slow approaches from astern. The best tactic for that fighter would be to hide in the blind spot caused by the tail.

Now, make no mistake... a belt-fed 20 mm HS-404 (crapton of shells + easier reloading) in an hydraulically powered turret would be something else entirely !

There were at least two problems with achieving a much wider firing arc. First, the narrow fuselage of the LeO451 simply didn't have enough space for everything to rotate much further. The gunner's seat was attached to the rotating pedestal, so there has to be enough space on both sides for him to be swung around. Of course, there's all sorts of junk on the front of the pedestal as well. Second, the long barrel of the HS.404 created increasing drag as it swung further to the side. The British attempts to build twin-engine bomber-destroyer turret fighters with quad Hispano-Suizas failed in great part because the hydraulics couldn't manage to be both powerful enough to overcome the immense drag and precise enough to aim toward the rear when there wasn't a huge load on the system. The Germans eventually modified the 20mm mounts in the Am451s for a much wider arc of fire, but only for use on the ground as flak! Since they were firing up, some problems went away.

 

[Archibald]

Wow. Welcome to the site, and what an informative post. Very interesting. Just for you to know, I tend to be harsh if not cynical with french interwar military - probably because I red way too much "horrors" and absurdities by people like Gamelin and way too many others. I'm french and I'm really puzzled, angered and baffled by a lot of things that went on in the 1930's at the military and political levels. The Daladier - Gamelin symbiotic and opportunistic alliance was a disaster of epic size. May 1940 was a multi-factor collapse, but these two bear a lot of responsability for the quagmire, all the way from 1933 and Hitler rise to power on the other side of the border.

One very baffling recent development amuses me to no end. There is one french historian, turned conspirationist (unfortunately) with the name of Annie Lacroix-Riz. She has self-convinced herself that May 1940 could not be a case of Murphy Law and Hanlon Razor; rather, that Pétain and his goons had conspired for the collapse and... the rise of Vichy, many years before. Yeah. And if my grandma had wheels...

This whacky conspiracy theory amuses me to no end, because it forgets the deadly alliance of Hanlon's Razor and the Murphy Law. That is: never understimates a) random hazard and b) human stupidity.

In a few words: Lacroix-Riz is looking for a conspiracy where there is none: only the baffling complacency (and also stupidity) of people like Daladier and Gamelin.

A few 1930's French politicians and commanders were so dumb, some people believe they were sabotaging, deliberately. Hell no: any "sabotage" they did, was through pure complacency and stupidity (Charles Huntziger, here's another major asshole...)