- Joined
- 27 September 2006
- Messages
- 6,242
- Reaction score
- 6,457
The deployment of Russian IRBMs (SS4 and 5) altered the situation along with the arrival of thermonuclear (supernuclear warheads).
At this stage it was assumed that both sides would resort to nuclear weapons quickly (massive response).
It is hard to fault Sandys' conclusion that manned interceptors would have no role against this Soviet threat.
Although the V force practised Quick Reaction Alerts (QRA) and dispersed operations to alternate bases the future now lay with the Polaris system (Mountbatten and Rickover).
The reduction to nine Lightning squadrons was reasonable given the Soviet Il28 and Tu16 aircraft had many other targets than the UK.
The evolution of Soviet fighters available to clients like Egypt and Indonesia was a more urgent problem. Lightning with Firestreak was seen as adequate but the Hunter replacement (P1154) reflected concerns about Migs.
The UK was badly placed in that unlike Saab and Dassault no single UK company had experience of evolving a family of fighter aircraft into service types.
The RAF lurched from straight wing Meteors and Venoms to the ghastly Supermarine Swift. The Hunter was so late that Canadair Sabres had to fill the gap. The fiasco continued with the DeHaviland 110 and Gloster Javelin, again obsolete before they entered service.
As in the 1930s the limitations of British resources condemned the RAF to inadequate equipment. Even successful types like the Canberra, Hunter and the V bombers had to serve much longer than comparable US types.
So while the technical types can discuss the merits of British solutions like Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi role Lightnings they are like Skiffle groups trying to compete with the Beatles.
At this stage it was assumed that both sides would resort to nuclear weapons quickly (massive response).
It is hard to fault Sandys' conclusion that manned interceptors would have no role against this Soviet threat.
Although the V force practised Quick Reaction Alerts (QRA) and dispersed operations to alternate bases the future now lay with the Polaris system (Mountbatten and Rickover).
The reduction to nine Lightning squadrons was reasonable given the Soviet Il28 and Tu16 aircraft had many other targets than the UK.
The evolution of Soviet fighters available to clients like Egypt and Indonesia was a more urgent problem. Lightning with Firestreak was seen as adequate but the Hunter replacement (P1154) reflected concerns about Migs.
The UK was badly placed in that unlike Saab and Dassault no single UK company had experience of evolving a family of fighter aircraft into service types.
The RAF lurched from straight wing Meteors and Venoms to the ghastly Supermarine Swift. The Hunter was so late that Canadair Sabres had to fill the gap. The fiasco continued with the DeHaviland 110 and Gloster Javelin, again obsolete before they entered service.
As in the 1930s the limitations of British resources condemned the RAF to inadequate equipment. Even successful types like the Canberra, Hunter and the V bombers had to serve much longer than comparable US types.
So while the technical types can discuss the merits of British solutions like Fairey Delta Mirage clones or multi role Lightnings they are like Skiffle groups trying to compete with the Beatles.