Fairey Delta 2, not the English Electric Lightning

[pathology_doc]

Can anyone tell me the last time an RAF pilot has shot down an enemy fighter in a dogfight? And no the FAA Sea Harriers in the Falklands don't count (these duels were subsonic anyway).

The last time a BRITISH pilot shot down an enemy aircraft was in the Falklands.

 

[uk 75]

No I sorry the b****y Falklands was a naval action (and totally avoidable) where dog fighting only happened because the FAA had the wrong carriers.
Why? because in 1966 politicians decided the UK would never make an opposed military landing without US support.
What would I have done if I had been Thatcher and my MOD had failed to send nuke subs south?
Simple phoned big Ron
"Mr President unless you and Ms Kirkpatrick get Galtieri out of the Falklands I am resigning and calling a general election which Mr Foot will win."

 

[Rule of cool]

My simple point (so far not refuted) is that the RAF has not done any dogfighting since? Korea? or even WW2.
Unlike the US we have not needed a single role fighter and even Typhoon is now very much multi-role.
So my point stands, we needed a decent supersonic tactical fighter-bomber-recce type for the RAF not a one trick large supersonic fighter.

The RAF sent 1.5 sqns of Tornado F3s to PGW1 but they were not thrown into the thick of the action because the USAF F15s were given that task. Indeed the RAF has been involved in numerous conflicts since Korea where aircraft have been shot down. In addition Britain has been adjacent to many more conflicts where aircraft have been shot down, indeed Britain could have found itself peripherally involved in almost every hot conflict of the Cold War.

Just because it didn't happen doesn't mean the RAF shouldn't prepare for it. That's the essence of deterrence.

 

[uk 75]

"Just because it didn't happen doesn't mean the RAF shouldn't prepare for it".

A sentence to gladden the heart of every HM Treasury bean counter or opposition MP wanting a new local children's hospital.

 

[zen]

So my point stands, we needed a decent supersonic tactical fighter-bomber-recce type for the RAF not a one trick large supersonic fighter.

And had this been the position of the Minister in 1957, a requirement would have been drawn up and tenders placed.
Resulting in a solution being selected for prototype and possibly..... production.

It wasn't.
It was no manned fighters beyond ten years.
Lightning "unfortunately too far gone to cancel"
And only OR.339 left for industry to consolidate around.

And even Hawkers P.1127 only won funding because it was stressed it wasn't a fighter but a potential ground attack aircraft.

Hawkers swinging efforts around on it as it took the hit of beibg told the RAF had no place in it's future for the private effort of P1121.

This was only subverted by OR.346 in 1960 having some fighter elements for the Navy....
It was only allowed to come to the fore in AW.406. Again for the Navy.

Even the Fighter capability for NMBR.3 come P.1154 was judged a secondary issue. F.242 became SR.250D in 1964 as the RAF only version continued, cutting out fighter elements.
It was the Navy that wanted real fighter capability.

The might and beloved F4M was tasked first to MRI. Only later on drawn to GIUK Gap patrols.

Eventually the RAF was able to openly talk of new fighter aircraft.
As a variant of the MRCA......

It wasn't until the 70's that Fighters were allowed. AST.403 is july 1975!

 

[uk 75]

I would argue that the only pure fighter built for the RAF after the Lightning is the Typhoon. And even this plane has become a Phantom, Jaguar, Tornado replacement.

The tragedy of the late 50s is that only the US has the resources and know-how to create the F4 as a weapon system. No amount of wishful thinking can turn what was on UK drawing boards into an F4.

The best the UK might have managed is something like the Etendard instead of the P1154 for the FAA and RAF. Hawkers could have built it, armed with four Firestreaks later Red Tops. But would it have been much better than Sea Vixen or Sea Harrier?

 

[Rule of cool]

"Just because it didn't happen doesn't mean the RAF shouldn't prepare for it".

A sentence to gladden the heart of every HM Treasury bean counter or opposition MP wanting a new local children's hospital.

Between 1957 and 1967 defence spending increased from 1.7 to 2.7 billion, whereas remaining total government spending went from 5.9 to 14.7 billion. Maybe they could pay for children's hospitals with the 150% increase in overall spending at the expense of a mere 60% increase in defence spending.

BTW ukpublicspending.co.uk is great site, I like the custom graphs.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The tragedy of the late 50s is that only the US has the resources and know-how to create the F4 as a weapon system. No amount of wishful thinking can turn what was on UK drawing boards into an F4.

The best the UK might have managed is something like the Etendard instead of the P1154 for the FAA and RAF. Hawkers could have built it, armed with four Firestreaks later Red Tops. But would it have been much better than Sea Vixen or Sea Harrier?

The UK had several designs on the drawing boards that could have been F4-adjacent.

P1121 is at least an F105, and could be made more fighter-like with the right radar fitted.

 

[Rule of cool]

And even Hawkers P.1127 only won funding because it was stressed it wasn't a fighter but a potential ground attack aircraft.

Even then the US paid for 75% of the engine development, which was the primary innovation with the type, as well as some assistance with wind tunnel testing. My guess is that this kept the concept alive through the Sandys years.

 

[red admiral]

So my point stands, we needed a decent supersonic tactical fighter-bomber-recce type for the RAF not a one trick large supersonic fighter.

P1154; also planned in large enough numbers (due to costs) to be the centre of the force mix. But this is a bit later.

(In my mind, preferrably STOL (no deflected thrust) to enable greater range and reduce complexity)

For late 50s then 1103/1121 looks more realistic POD than any smaller single Avon types; but it still comes down to the requirements branch within the air staff dissociating the "interceptor" concept from "fighter" or "combat aircraft"

 

[Archibald]

Mirage 4000 was Mach 2.5, F-15 size. Rafale kept the overall shape except a bit improved (move the air intakes to a better place) but shrunk to F-18 size and Mach 1.8. In passing, this made it CdG compatible (and even old Foch).

 

[Hood]

Eventually the RAF was able to openly talk of new fighter aircraft.
As a variant of the MRCA......

It wasn't until the 70's that Fighters were allowed. AST.403 is july 1975!

Agreed, even the acquisition of the Jaguar S was by stealth, suddenly the order for trainers was swapped for single-seat attackers. They got a modern ground-attack fighter on the cheap without really going through the whole motions of ORs and studies and inter-Service wrangling (in the main).

For late 50s then 1103/1121 looks more realistic POD than any smaller single Avon types; but it still comes down to the requirements branch within the air staff dissociating the "interceptor" concept from "fighter" or "combat aircraft"

It needs three things to happen:
a) the Air Staff to realise that OR.339 supersonic two-seat tactical bomber probably can't carry every dumb weapon needed or be available in enough numbers to meet the tactical support demand nor to be survivable enough.
b) that fighter-bomber doesn't automatically mean delivery of 'instant sunshine' - though this is a doctrinal shift that would effect all the Services.
c) that a purpose-built fighter-bomber with STOL and agility is possible (doesn't need to be Mach 2 superplane, VTOL proponents would probably hijack it).

The result though would not be a Lightning or FD.2 development - maybe a Super Hunter (half Hunter-half P.1121).

 

[Pirate Pete]

Literally OR.346's Fighter elements.
CAP for 4 hours over 100nm from the carrier. With new AI radar and AAMs. Mach 2+ speed, ceilings over 60,000ft.

Driven by RN having DLI pulled out from under them with the cancellation of F.177 and the prohibition on manned fighters in ten years.

But had someone not so dogmatic held the ministry position......then.

Arguably RAF should have taken the Blackburn option for interim OR.339 and thrown their lot in with the RN on this for the future.

Ironically the cheapest to prototype option was DH.127, being essentially a delta winged design with substantial excess in fuel and range.
Not until the STOL elements of switch in thrust deflation and lift jets would this have any risk.
So irony of ironies, this could have killed RN ambitions (running off to the F4 at best) and left the RAF with twin Spey heavy fighter.......

I have always thought that (yes, it’s ANOTHER paper plane) that the DH.127/128 would have been a great option. STOL instead of VTOL/V-STOL. Sized to operate from Ark Royal/Eagle sized carriers, and no doubt Victorious and Hermes could have coped with them.
The design has been discussed here elsewhere:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/de-havilland-dh-127-and-dh-128.33194/

A couple of illustrations too.

 

[Archibald]

Well... Sweden picked the delta (Draken) France picked the delta (Mirage) Canada picked the delta (Arrow) And Convair picked the delta (F-102 / 106 B-58). Also: Fairey picked the delta.
So - why not ?
Delta wing advantages (and flaws, before the days of FBW and reduced stability) were well known.

 

[Rule of cool]

Is the 'pure' Delta a suitable wing shape for carrier aircraft? I have a feeling that it isn't until more recently.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Vickers have plenty of VG aircraft designs which should be capable of fulfilling the RN and the RAF's interdictor, strike and interceptor requirements.

I definitely think a VG aircraft would be better for carrier use than a delta, and you could get rid of the lift jets.

 

[zen]

On delta wings.

Several competitors to the winning Vought design that became the F8 were delta wing designs.

F4 has a delta wing
F.177 just as SR.53 had a delta wing

So it's fundamentally wrong to say delta wings preclude carrier operation.

But this is also not to say VG wings don't give advantages for carrier operations. Rather obviously they do.

However in context of my previous statement on DH.127....
The basic airframe of a big delta wing is a fairly cheap and known configuration. Easy to validate with a developmental prototype.

Where the cost/risk comes in is thr clang box thrust diverters and the switch in lift jets.

So ostensibly the DH.127 is cheap and affordable to develop as the basic airframe, radar, missiles, engines, undercarriage, power services etc....

It's only when you move to the STOL features that program costs and perceivable operational costs escalate. Potentially leaving the basic non-STOL airframe as a RAF solution.

While leaving the RN high and dry....

 

[MadRat]

Leading edge sweep of the delta would greatly impact suitability. So would control at high angles of attack.

Something like a J-35 Draken would be a poor candidate, even if it enjoyed fly-by-wire, due to minimal control surfaces for fine adjustments at high angles of attack. Rafale is great because of its control at a high granular level of finesse.

 

[pathology_doc]

No amount of wishful thinking can turn what was on UK drawing boards into an F4.

Or ANYONE'S drawing boards, for that matter. The F-4 is one of those one-in-a-million designs that comes together to engender greatness. But by that stage, McDonnell-Douglas had already designed and built three generations of front-line fighters for the US Navy and they were on a roll.

Meanwhile, the services in the UK couldn't make up their minds, so the DH.110 (for example) came into service much later than it could have, and ONLY with the FAA; and the progression of Vampire, Venom, Vixen gets interrupted at that point. There's no fourth-generation fighter coming out of DH's works because the third generation is late to the party, taking up design and production resources that it should have been consuming three to five years earlier, and any possible successor runs into a political brick wall: Sandys has given the order that there are to be no more fighters.

So even if you assume for the sake of argument that DH pull a miracle out of their hats and create the greatest combat aircraft design ever, which leaves the Phantom in the dust, the Government is going to actively refuse to buy it or fund it and it will die in the cradle. And the same is true of any other company.

 

[zen]

Fourth Generation Fighter would have beenDH.116, DH.117 or DH.127.

First won prototype order but had to be abandoned for lack of resources, second is a bid to F.155, the other to OR.346

In between a brief examination of their OR.339 proposal for a naval aircraft and interceptor (due to it's calculated climb rate).

In all but the first case the bids lost because DH was being pragmatic and realistic about what could be achieved.....

 

[alertken]

USAREUR Units & Kasernes, 1945 - 1989

www.usarmygermany.com

A map of mid-60s locations of NATO Hawk/Hercules SAM belt from the Baltic-Switzerland. US invited Central Front Allies 2/57 to join in.

UK declined, but plugged our bit with Thunderbird I, wef 11/61 and Lightning F.2, ordered by vandal Sandys 14/6/59, but not opnl Gutersloh till 23/9/65, delayed not by him. He never dictated no fighters.

His Stormy Paper, 4/57 said: “A manned fighter force for(Defence of the Deterrent) will be maintained (later) equipped (w.AAMs) These fighter(s) will (be) replaced by a (SAM,) supplemented or replaced by (MRBMs)”. he said all that because we, our forebears, could not equip and crew jousting knights to amaze us by knocking down bad guys over our cities.

Everybody else agreed and did much the same. USAFE Fighter Interception Wings largely became Fighter Bomber, then Tactical Fighter Wings. Luftwaffe JG became JaBo. SAMs sprouted. The Hawk Belt was to protect mobile Land Forces and military high value assets.
The selling attraction of cheaper types like F-5s, Mirage IIIs, later F-16 was...multi-role: self-defence while strafing, searching.

See uk75 #313,327: "The problem with the idea that the RAF lost a high speed fighter is that it did not need one". If read calmly, not bewailing loss of fantasies, Sandys/4/57 was saying: "if AW-armed Bombers get close enough to find our cities, they will get through in sufficient quantity to delete us, so let's use our resources to deter that, by covering launch of our retaliation". That was what he was being told by Airmen. They were now all-Regular, so scarce and expensive: they wanted good kit with tail trim actuators that would not kill them.

They had much improved kit by late-60s. They then discovered their availability rates were dismal by civil standards; they heard people could change out a jumbo engine in fewer hours than they needed days...unless they were still flying on stacked engines. By 2000 they were flying types that had enjoyed early input from Maintainability/Reliability professionals (RAF's first One Star Engineer was in c.1990).
But they still have much to learn from civvy street. Clever kit, grounded, not good.

 

[pathology_doc]

pragmatic and realistic about what could be achieved.....

The threat assessment was anything but, which is what led to the unrealistic ORs in the first place. I've been re-reading John Forbat's "TSR-2: Precision Attack to Tornado", in which he gives details of the 1960-ish private venture missile he was designing for Vickers (I think for one of their FAA VG fighter projects). The kill profile included a 30 mile range and the ability to attack a high-speed target travelling at over a hundred thousand feet altitude. Not even the MiG-25 and SR-71 get close to that, but part of the problem is that most people were thinking in terms of performance continuing to improve to the degree it had between World War 2 and 1955.

But that never happened. Of the aircraft brought into service, the MiG-25 nudges Mach 3 at best while only the SR-71 comfortably exceeds it for an indefinite (fuel-dependent) period; and even the latter tends to operate somewhere in the eighty-thousands of feet - and even then, its missions are so carefully planned that they might as well be spaceflights. Sustained Mach 3 aircraft aren't dime-a-dozen either, as the XF-103 showed when its status got downgraded from production fighter to research aircraft to no longer being justified even for that (no doubt because the X-plane program had overtaken it in performance). I'm sure one day there will be the appropriate level of declassification to allow someone in Damian Burke's mold to explain why Lockheed were able to get their Mach 3 monster into the air (and into service) while Republic did not. (I'm leaving the Valkyrie out of this because she was designed from the start as a strategic heavy bomber, rather than as a too-expensive interceptor that fortuitously developed into a legendary reconnaissance aircraft.)

 

[tomo pauk]

Just a word on British AAMs and how few were carried compared to Aim9s. This is because the Firestreak and Red Top were twice the missile the Sidewinder was, more akin to a Sparrow and R530. Nobody seems to complain about the Mirage III carrying a single R530 or Crusader carrying two of them, yet a Lightning carrying a pair of Red Tops is seen as deficient.

I suppose this is another point of difference/interest for British as opposed to French or American kit, it gets criticized for things that get overlooked in other countries' kit.

Both Crusader and Mirage III have had half the number of engines than what the Lighting had, so it is deficient that the later carried just two missiles. Crusader was carrying 4, not two AIM-9s; Mirage III was capable to carry one R530 and two AIM-9s - is it okay to post the wrong numbers to reinforce the point?
See F-4 - same number of engines as the Lightning, 4 times as many missiles.
F-4 can indeed 'double-tap' the enemy and will still have missiles to spare; Lightning doing the same doing the same (weather and position permitting) had perhaps 50% chances of destroying one bomber, while also making itself 'Winchester' when doing it.

Sparrow or R.530 were all-aspect missiles, that also worked in cloudy weather. Not the case with Firestreak and Red Top.

 

[pathology_doc]

F-4 can indeed 'double-tap' the enemy and will still have missiles to spare; Lightning doing the same doing the same (weather and position permitting) had perhaps 50% chances of destroying one bomber, while also making itself 'Winchester' when doing it.

Most marks of the Lightning (bar the F.3) either had or were retrofitted with guns, something all USN Phantoms and many USAF Phantoms did not have.

That being said, I recall reading a justification for the two-missile armament somewhere. I did not agree with it then and still don't. For all their subsonic-ness, at least the Sea Vixen and Javelin had four, and the Javelin kept two of its guns to boot (early marks had four).

Britain's failure to take a SARH missile that wasn't Sparrow-derived to service status is a perpetual sore point with me, and the back-and-forth of that has been discussed to death here.

 

[Rule of cool]

USAREUR Units & Kasernes, 1945 - 1989

www.usarmygermany.com

A map of mid-60s locations of NATO Hawk/Hercules SAM belt from the Baltic-Switzerland. US invited Central Front Allies 2/57 to join in.

UK declined, but plugged our bit with Thunderbird I, wef 11/61 and Lightning F.2, ordered by vandal Sandys 14/6/59, but not opnl Gutersloh till 23/9/65, delayed not by him. He never dictated no fighters.

His Stormy Paper, 4/57 said: “A manned fighter force for(Defence of the Deterrent) will be maintained (later) equipped (w.AAMs) These fighter(s) will (be) replaced by a (SAM,) supplemented or replaced by (MRBMs)”. he said all that because we, our forebears, could not equip and crew jousting knights to amaze us by knocking down bad guys over our cities.

Everybody else agreed and did much the same. USAFE Fighter Interception Wings largely became Fighter Bomber, then Tactical Fighter Wings. Luftwaffe JG became JaBo. SAMs sprouted. The Hawk Belt was to protect mobile Land Forces and military high value assets.
The selling attraction of cheaper types like F-5s, Mirage IIIs, later F-16 was...multi-role: self-defence while strafing, searching.

See uk75 #313,327: "The problem with the idea that the RAF lost a high speed fighter is that it did not need one". If read calmly, not bewailing loss of fantasies, Sandys/4/57 was saying: "if AW-armed Bombers get close enough to find our cities, they will get through in sufficient quantity to delete us, so let's use our resources to deter that, by covering launch of our retaliation". That was what he was being told by Airmen. They were now all-Regular, so scarce and expensive: they wanted good kit with tail trim actuators that would not kill them.

They had much improved kit by late-60s. They then discovered their availability rates were dismal by civil standards; they heard people could change out a jumbo engine in fewer hours than they needed days...unless they were still flying on stacked engines. By 2000 they were flying types that had enjoyed early input from Maintainability/Reliability professionals (RAF's first One Star Engineer was in c.1990).
But they still have much to learn from civvy street. Clever kit, grounded, not good.

The manned interceptor and SAM wasn't what Sandys got got fundamentally wrong, although he did get that wrong by a reasonable degree. What he did get fundamentally wrong was acknowledging there would be limited wars but then didn't equip the RAF with the best equipment available* to fight such wars.

*Available, not possible or suitable.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Is the 'pure' Delta a suitable wing shape for carrier aircraft? I have a feeling that it isn't until more recently.

Not a tailless delta, those have approach speed and AoA controllability issues.

The successful Carrier delta is the A-4, which has a tail.

The Douglas F4D and Vought F7U were limited.

The threat assessment was anything but, which is what led to the unrealistic ORs in the first place. I've been re-reading John Forbat's "TSR-2: Precision Attack to Tornado", in which he gives details of the 1960-ish private venture missile he was designing for Vickers (I think for one of their FAA VG fighter projects). The kill profile included a 30 mile range and the ability to attack a high-speed target travelling at over a hundred thousand feet altitude. Not even the MiG-25 and SR-71 get close to that, but part of the problem is that most people were thinking in terms of performance continuing to improve to the degree it had between World War 2 and 1955.

But that never happened. Of the aircraft brought into service, the MiG-25 nudges Mach 3 at best while only the SR-71 comfortably exceeds it for an indefinite (fuel-dependent) period; and even the latter tends to operate somewhere in the eighty-thousands of feet - and even then, its missions are so carefully planned that they might as well be spaceflights. Sustained Mach 3 aircraft aren't dime-a-dozen either, as the XF-103 showed when its status got downgraded from production fighter to research aircraft to no longer being justified even for that (no doubt because the X-plane program had overtaken it in performance). I'm sure one day there will be the appropriate level of declassification to allow someone in Damian Burke's mold to explain why Lockheed were able to get their Mach 3 monster into the air (and into service) while Republic did not. (I'm leaving the Valkyrie out of this because she was designed from the start as a strategic heavy bomber, rather than as a too-expensive interceptor that fortuitously developed into a legendary reconnaissance aircraft.)

The Blackbird started life as a recon plane, the CIA A-12 "Archangel". It was then developed into an interceptor which may have been partially to cover for sightings of the CIA birds, and then into the SR71 two seater.

 

[uk 75]

This thread stands or falls on whether you like the paper planes that it seeks to create.
All the other arguments are irrelevant.

 

[Rule of cool]

True, but said paper planes should still have to fit into all sorts of fixed real life parameters such as budget and schedule and utilise fixed real life constants such as armament and radar. If these and other constraints are applied liking a paper plane won't get it over the line.

 

[pathology_doc]

The Blackbird started life as a recon plane, the CIA A-12 "Archangel". It was then developed into an interceptor which may have been partially to cover for sightings of the CIA birds, and then into the SR71 two seater.

Hm. I thought the interceptor came first. Back to American Secret Projects: Fighters I go.

 

[Hood]

Depends what kind of "warm war" you're fighting.
Remember in 1957 most non-Great Powers were still flying WW2 surplus, some MiG-15s had been donated by then to important Soviet clients like Egypt but few Sabres or F-80s/T-33 (though these would last well into the 1980s) had gone beyond NATO at that time. Plans like the great F-5A Freedom Fighter giveaway were only just forming. AA was still 1940s guns and cannon in the main.

Why would the RAF think that WW2 cab rank and fighter with lashed-up rockets and bomb racks wouldn't work?
Sending TSR.2s to Aden against Yemeni insurgents? Fairey Delta 3s to Sarawak to deter the P-51s of the Indonesian AF?

 

[zen]

Perhaps in '57, but by the early 60’s it was realised that the Soviets could 'loan' high performance aircraft to their proxies and allies to tip the local balance of forces in their favour.
Thus the RAN paper on acquisition of Essex and F4.

Worse, the stand-off missile started to enter service with Soviet bombers and threaten a new wave of V1-like conventional and nuclear attacks. Both at sea and on land.

Likely this was understood by Navy figures, hence their insistence of fighter capability beyond 1967. Hence the retention of radar technologies with the new AI radar program.

But to Sandys and the newly emergent MoD it took time to filter through it seems. Caught like a rsbbit in the headlights over WWIII. They didn't grasp the warm wars issues.

Glib dismissal as 'jousting' might seem valid in 1957. It was falling apart by 1963.
AWACS was subject to ultimately enormous spending and was brought in for the RAF.
That wasn't hubris at heart. But cold hard pragmatism.

 

[Rule of cool]

Depends what kind of "warm war" you're fighting.
Remember in 1957 most non-Great Powers were still flying WW2 surplus, some MiG-15s had been donated by then to important Soviet clients like Egypt but few Sabres or F-80s/T-33 (though these would last well into the 1980s) had gone beyond NATO at that time. Plans like the great F-5A Freedom Fighter giveaway were only just forming. AA was still 1940s guns and cannon in the main.

Why would the RAF think that WW2 cab rank and fighter with lashed-up rockets and bomb racks wouldn't work?
Sending TSR.2s to Aden against Yemeni insurgents? Fairey Delta 3s to Sarawak to deter the P-51s of the Indonesian AF?

Its the task of the MoD to forecast the future in order to insure against it, and within Sandy's dogma they did by building the Hunter FGA/FR to cover the gap to when SAMs and other missiles became available to meet Britain's security obligations.

Sure in 1957 Indonesia having the Tu16s with AShMs, Il28s, Mig21/19/17s that they had by 1962 might have seemed pretty far fetched but it would have been well known that nobody was making any more P51s, Mig 15s and F80s. The MoD should have assumed within the service life of the Hunter FGA/FR fleet it would face peers like Sabres, Mysteres, Hunters and Mig 17s, superior Super Mystere, F100 and Mig 19s and eventually the Mach 2 fighters that were flying in prototype form.

Going with an advanced combat aircraft give the RAF the capability edge and the ability to take on more foreign policy situations at an advantage. In contrast going with a warmed over obsolescent fighter puts the RAF at the middle of the capability spectrum (declining over time to the bottom) and limits Britain's freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere.

 

[red admiral]

In contrast going with a warmed over obsolescent fighter puts the RAF at the middle of the capability spectrum (declining over time to the bottom) and limits Britain's freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere.

And yet the cheapest option (by far) had near zero impact on this

You can always move other more advanced types around e.g. Lightning, Victor deployments to Singapore and Malaysia

 

[Rule of cool]

When you buy cheap stuff you get cheap results, I wouldn't consider the Hunter FGA/FR years a stellar success for British defence and foreign policy. For example perhaps Indonesia wouldn't be so confident in confronting Britain if the RAF FEAF wasn't equipped with Javelins and Hunters but with a Mach 2 multi-role type. I suspect that would be cheaper than fighting the limited war.

 

[kaiserd]

When you buy cheap stuff you get cheap results, I wouldn't consider the Hunter FGA/FR years a stellar success for British defence and foreign policy. For example perhaps Indonesia wouldn't be so confident in confronting Britain if the RAF FEAF wasn't equipped with Javelins and Hunters but with a Mach 2 multi-role type. I suspect that would be cheaper than fighting the limited war.

You are confusing cause and effect and are pushing a dubious ill informed version of history. You are also confusing the likely roles of, and greatly exaggerating the capabilities and impact of your “new” supposed Mach-2 aircraft.

The UK’s foreign influence didn’t decline because of the lack of such an aircraft. Even before 1956 and Suez the UK wasn’t really an independent world power anymore, but that event forced the UK to start taking a more realistic view of its place and role in the world. This manifested in various decisions taken in the late 50’s into the 70’s.

The RAF remained a well equipped capable airforce but was increasingly focused on the NATO Warsaw Pact front. The “East of Suez” role was not prioritised and shortly disappeared. There is no realistic scenario in which the UK could have afforded to maintain this role, after WW2 it only maintained the role for a limited period and was only able to do so as a US subsided proxy. Like the post war empire itself the role as post-imperial world police man was unavoidably very time limited for the UK.

In that context your claim that this 1960 Mach 2 fighter bomber was critically required, with this emphasis on “East of Suez”, is bizarre and both technically and historically illiterate. Any 1960 Mach 2 fighter bomber the UK would produce would almost certainly be of the one-nuke-one-trick-only variety, and be significantly inferior to the adapted Hunters in the more useful (in the “East of Suez” context) close support role with cannon, conventional bombs and rockets. And be much much more expensive to buy and operate. And as discussed in the whole topic thread above it is likely that any UK Mach 2 fighter aircraft that emerges in this time period has to be instead and not as well as the Lightening so would likely be pushed to be a Lightening equivalent, with emphasis on speed and climb leading a generally poor basis for a capable fighter bomber, even in a one-nuke-only-one-trick-pony scenario (would be even more pronounced in the general conventionally armed fighter bomber role). A FD2 development does not necessarily promise to be better in this regard.

In the “fighter” part of the role the Hunter would be sufficient for many scenarios and if not Lightenings (and later Phantoms) detachments could be deployed. Similarly V-bombers, Canberras and any other in-service RAF aircraft could also be deployed if required by a particular scenario.

But in general terms after 1956 the UK increasingly wasn’t looking to get deeply involved in major conflicts around the world that weren’t tied back to its NATO role (both by political and financial choice and necessity). For example the UK didn’t want to be involved in the 1960’s Arab Israeli conflicts or in Vietnam and these were the correct calls. The UK increasingly recognised its role as a regional, not world, power.

 

[Hood]

When you buy cheap stuff you get cheap results, I wouldn't consider the Hunter FGA/FR years a stellar success for British defence and foreign policy. For example perhaps Indonesia wouldn't be so confident in confronting Britain if the RAF FEAF wasn't equipped with Javelins and Hunters but with a Mach 2 multi-role type. I suspect that would be cheaper than fighting the limited war.

Indonesia's attempted infiltration of Sarawak and Malaysia was an embarrassing failure.
What won the day wasn't Bloodhounds, Javelins or Lightnings but the humble Westland Wessex supporting Army and SAS patrols and operations beyond the border.
But I feel we're drifting way off topic here.

 

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Merged with earlier thread on the same topic.

Relevant to this topic:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/fairey-er-103-fighters.3074

 

[starviking]

The UK’s foreign influence didn’t decline because of the lack of such an aircraft. Even before 1956 and Suez the UK wasn’t really an independent world power anymore, but that event forced the UK to start taking a more realistic view of its place and role in the world. This manifested in various decisions taken in the late 50’s into the 70’s.

Despite that, the UK was seen as the major power in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, with the US looking to the UK as late as 1967 to help assemble a force in the Straits of Tiran to keep it open to international traffic. Also see the base at Diego Garcia which was intended to be a joint US-UK base, before the UK govt withdrew from the project.

In that context your claim that this 1960 Mach 2 fighter bomber was critically required, with this emphasis on “East of Suez”, is bizarre and both technically and historically illiterate. Any 1960 Mach 2 fighter bomber the UK would produce would almost certainly be of the one-nuke-one-trick-only variety, and be significantly inferior to the adapted Hunters in the more useful (in the “East of Suez” context) close support role with cannon, conventional bombs and rockets.

But a few years later BAC would be planning the BAC P45 as a trainer/light fighter - with the fighter being aimed in part at the RAF’s eastern commitments.

 

[kaiserd]

Despite that, the UK was seen as the major power in the Gulf and Indian Ocean, with the US looking to the UK as late as 1967 to help assemble a force in the Straits of Tiran to keep it open to international traffic. Also see the base at Diego Garcia which was intended to be a joint US-UK base, before the UK govt withdrew from the project.



But a few years later BAC would be planning the BAC P45 as a trainer/light fighter - with the fighter being aimed in part at the RAF’s eastern commitments.

In 1967 the US was still trying to outsource to the UK in this regard to the Gulf. One assumes the simultaneous ongoing escalation of the Vietnam conflict and existing Cold War commitments had the US not especially keen to also get more deeply committed to the Gulf area at that time.

To help give context it should also be noted that France was a major supporter of Israel running up to the 1967 conflict (to some extent acting as a US surrogate) and the US policy was less partisan and less directly involved in the region at this time. US policy would evolve after 1967 and they would have less (and see less) need for UK/ France acting as their proxies/ surrogates in this region.

And the realities of the limits of the UK’s power and reach were underlined by the formal announcement of the UK withdrawal from “East of Suez” that followed the following year in 1968. This reality of fading UK military and economic power as reflected in these regions has events like the 1956 Suez crisis and the 1968 announcement but in practice was at least as much a drip by drip gradual process.

Re: the P.45 well in the real world the actual equivalents that entered service were the Jaguar and Hawk which a number of Gulf state customers. As did the Lightening, and as did do a larger number of refurbished Hunters. So it’s unlikely that BAC wouldn’t have considered the region re: the P.45. And if UK history and world history were very fundamentally different then the Jaguars could have replaced Hunters in “East of Suez” RAF service.

 

[zen]

But I feel we're drifting way off topic here.

This seems to have just spiralled away from the topic as those intent on trashing/hijacking/bogging down any debate over any alternative history run rampant.

Let alone a conceptual Delta II derived fighter by Fairey, or indeed any fighter by any UK aviation firm.

While you and I and a few others might grapple with whether Fairey was the best option, or whether other designs might do the mission sets better or worse and while we might debate how the RAF, RAE and civil service might have interpreted various studies and reports differently and the technology and the competance of various firms, ministers and otger figures.
To perhaps have concluded in favour of such concepts as Fairey and others put forward.

If this thread is so wide-ranging as to obviate the concept of a debate over the specifics. Then the title ought to be changed to
"why nothing could change no matter what you change"

Or if I was being generous "RAF fighters post 1957".