Different thought process for Post WW2 British Navy

[Scott Kenny]

Yes, in terms of unsnarling the UK's decision-making, scrapping the 1930s designs still on the slipways and starting over with ships designed with the current situation in mind from the beginning, rather than trying to make all the radars and missiles a 1950s/60s combatant needs into a 1930s design.

The rebuilds of 1930s ships took just as long as building a new ship from scratch.

I didn't mean that. What I was trying to say, is that both RN and Soviet Navy were putting much efforts into developing new conventional propulsion systems, while USN basically didn't bother; American admirals pretty seriously assumed that every large surface warship (i.e. destroyer leader and larger) in near future would be nuclear-powered, and weren't as interested in gas turbines.

Exactly. Rickover's plan was to make just about every ship in the USN nuclear powered. It was vital that submarines get nuclear power so they could stay underwater indefinitely, and nuclear powered surface ships didn't need to resupply anywhere near as often as conventionally powered ships. For carriers, it means the difference between ~2-3 days combat ops before they need to pause and get more jet fuel and ammunition onboard and a full week's worth of combat operations.

 

[Dilandu]

Yes, in terms of unsnarling the UK's decision-making, scrapping the 1930s designs still on the slipways and starting over with ships designed with the current situation in mind from the beginning, rather than trying to make all the radars and missiles a 1950s/60s combatant needs into a 1930s design.

Well, France, Italy and Netherlands all managed to fit 1950s/1960s missilles into 1930s hulls rather effciently.

 

[Arjen]

The single Dutch cruiser, converted in 1962, was sold to Peru in 1975 - it then had its missile launchers removed. With a crew of over 900 sailors, it proved to be uneconomical in use to the Dutch navy.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Seacat 2 would have provided a very useful capability indeed for both old and new designs.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well, France, Italy and Netherlands all managed to fit 1950s/1960s missilles into 1930s hulls rather effciently.

All on bigger hulls than anything the UK had. FFS, the last British cruisers were 8000 tons!

 

[Dilandu]

The single Dutch cruiser, converted in 1962, was sold to Peru in 1975 - it then had its missile launchers removed. With a crew of over 900 sailors, it proved to be uneconomical in use to the Dutch navy.

Launchers were removed because Netherlands did not have permission to export American missile systems - Terrier, specifically - to third party.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From Conway's 1922-46 and 1947-95

579ft pp, 613ft 6in oa x 63ft 4in Edinburgh class​

Belfast's beam was increased to 66ft 4in when bulges were fitted in her 1939-42 refit​

538ft pp, 555ft 6in oa x 62ft Colony class​

538ft pp, 555ft 6in oa x 63ft Swiftsure class​

538ft pp, 555ft 6in oa x 64ft Tiger class​

​

593ft oa x 66ft Colbert before conversion to CLG​

The book doesn't have the pp or wl length.​

It does say that the dimensions for De Grasse as completed were 592ft pp, 518ft oa x 61ft.​

But the pp & oa lengths seem to be reversed and 518ft looks too short pp length for a ship with an oa length of 592ft​

563ft 7in pp x 613ft 6in x 62ft Abruzzi class before conversion to GG​

591ft pp, 609ft oa x 57ft De Zeven Provincien before conversion to CLG​

​

600ft wl, 610ft 1in oa x 66ft 4in Cleveland class CL as built​

600ft wl, 610ft oa x 65ft 8in Cleveland class after conversion to CLG​

​

664ft wl, 673ft 5in oa x 70ft 10 in Baltimore class CA​

664ft wl, 673ft 5in oa x 69ft 8in Boston class CAG​

664ft wl, 674ft 11in oa x 69ft 9in Albany class GG​

​

So the British Colony to Tiger classes had hulls that were significantly shorter than the American, Dutch, French and Italian gun cruisers that were rearmed with area defence SAMs.

 

[Dilandu]

P.S. I recalled another argument, while completion of Tiger-class was important for RN. They were basically the first large warships of Royal Navy designed and build with nuclear warfare in mind; they have pressurization, washdown systems, remote controls for boilers and other vital parts. Essentially they were the only large units that could escort carriers in nuclear warfare situation - until County-class became available.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Well, France, Italy and Netherlands all managed to fit 1950s/1960s missiles into 1930s hulls rather efficiently.

All on bigger hulls than anything the UK had. FFS, the last British cruisers were 8000 tons!

What @Scott Kenny said, plus Terrier and Mascura (which used a lot of Terrier technology) had more compact stowage systems for the missiles. IIRC all the Dutch, French & Italian conversions had magazines that could accommodate 40 Terrier/Standard ER missiles. (Edit: Garibaldi's magazine could hold 72 Terrier/Standard ER missiles.)

Furthermore, I wouldn't be surprised to learn that the SPG-55 guidance radar was lighter than the Type 901. However, with my luck I'll be informed that it was the other way around.

The proposed guided missile conversion of a Fiji class cruiser produced a ship with dimensions of 550ft wl, 556ft oa x 62ft with a twin Seaslug launcher and 2 Type 901 guidance radars. However, the rest of the armament was reduced to one triple 6in Mk 23 gun turret (in A position) & 2 twin 40mm L60 Bofors Mk 3 with STD and only 24 Seaslug missiles were carried & there was no extra protection for the missiles. That was in November 1954 and is according to Page 130 of Norman Friedman's "Postwar Naval Revolution".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Launchers were removed because Netherlands did not have permission to export American missile systems - Terrier, specifically - to third party.

100% true and totally irrelevant as well.

 

[Dilandu]

So the British Colony to Tiger classes had hulls that were significantly shorter than the American, Dutch, French and Italian gun cruisers that were rearmed with area defence SAMs.

I should point out, that for vertical stored Terrier GMLS - the one used on Garibaldi refit - the length of the hull is less relevant.

 

[Arjen]

Launchers were removed because Netherlands did not have permission to export American missile systems - Terrier, specifically - to third party.

One of the reasons why the converted C802 De Zeven Provinciën and the unconverted C801 De Ruyter were sold was because the Dutch authorities considered them too costly in use with their 900+ crew complements. Their replacements, with much superior systems, had complements less than a third in size. At some time, C802 was intended to serve for a while along with the newer ships. This notion was abandoned in the seventies.
Because non-NATO Peru was C802's buyer, the launchers had to be removed.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Partly ninja'd by @Arjen.

The single Dutch cruiser, converted in 1962, was sold to Peru in 1975 - it then had its missile launchers removed. With a crew of over 900 sailors, it proved to be uneconomical in use to the Dutch navy.

And the conversion took so long and was so expensive that the planned conversion of her sister wasn't carried out as the ship's remaining service life didn't justify said time and expense.

I know that the French couldn't convert De Grasse into a guided missile cruiser even if they wanted to because her internal layout wouldn't allow it, whereas her half-sister Colbert was deliberately built to allow guided missiles to be fitted at a later date.

Does anyone know if the Italians planned to convert both Abruzzi class cruisers? As far as I know they only ever planned to convert Garibaldi and if a conversion of Abruzzi was planned my guess is that it wasn't carried out because her remaining service life didn't justify the time and expense.

 

[Hood]

The other thing to remember is that cruisers were chosen partly because they had internal space for the necessary C&C spaces and had more space for all the required radars (3-D/LR-search, height-finding, trackers/illuminators etc.) with decent arcs and less interference, as well as the necessary stability to cope with the topweight.

But cruisers were uneconomical because of their large crews. Ships like the Didos were looked at as FADEs (though without SAMs) and there was an attractive looking proposal to rebuild the Atlantas with Terriers but these smaller conversions never took place, partly because they were too cramped.

But in my view, the new-build cruisers like the planned GW96 et al were highly inefficient and should never have been allowed to balloon to that extent. The Counties were large for destroyers - fitted more akin to light cruisers with their flagship fittings etc., but were at least economical. It meant sacrificing the Type 984 and any later 3-D radar - though UK naval radar development was rather chequered and a lighter 3-D radar should have been achievable in the 1960s.

 

[Yellow Palace]

They're a force that can do less rigorous carrier jobs to free up more American carriers to go after strategic targets. Remember: the USN calculated it needed 22 carriers to do all its expected wartime taskings. Two British strike carriers doing some of the less intensive work would be very welcome.

Three of those carriers - plus a deployable force of a division plus a brigade - would be required for the Middle East.

Funnily enough, the UK's planning East of Suez pre-1965 was along the lines of four carriers (for three active), and a rapid reaction force of a Royal Marine amphibious brigade backed by a division from the Army. The UK's withdrawal from the theatre caused major problems for the US.

 

[Rule of cool]

One these that appear to me to be arising from these Cruiser conversions is that by the 50s outside the US Cruisers as well as Carriers were thought of as individual ships rather than classes. The RN converted 2 of its cruisers but not the other, the Dutch did one as did the French. The replacement for these ships were generally classes, Invincibles, Sufferens and Tromps.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

One these that appear to me to be arising from these Cruiser conversions is that by the 50s outside the US Cruisers as well as Carriers were thought of as individual ships rather than classes. The RN converted 2 of its cruisers but not the other, the Dutch did one as did the French. The replacement for these ships were generally classes, Invincibles, Sufferens and Tromps.

FWIW (1) the French couldn't convert De Grasse into a missile cruiser because of her internal layout made this impossible. FWIW (2) the original plan was to fit Terrier to both Dutch cruisers, but in the event the second wasn't because her remaining service life didn't justify the time and expense. FWIW (3) the Italians only converted one out of two Abruzzi class, but I don't know whether that was the plan all along or whether plans to convert the second ship were abandoned because her remaining service life didn't justify the time and expense.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

One reason why some of the ships under construction at VJ Day took so long to complete was the post-war Export Drive. The shipbuilding industry played its part by concentrating on rebuilding the British Merchant Navy (which at the time was the UK's greatest invisible exporter) and building merchant ships for export.

Therefore, was the RN forced into modernising some of its existing ships because the British shipbuilding industry couldn't build new ships in the numbers it wanted?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Does anyone have some actual costs for the Type 15 and Type 16 conversions? Freidman's "Post-war Naval Revolution" said £600,000 and £150,000, but they were the estimates, rather than the actual costs. I'm asking the question because the average costs of the new frigates built in the 1950s were:

£2.9 million Type 12 (Whitby class).​

£1.6 million Type 14.​

£3.2 million Type 41.​

And.​

£3.3 million Type 61.​

If Freidman's estimated costs were accurate the money spent on the 23 Type 15s and 10 Type 16s would have paid for 5 Type 12s.

 

[Scott Kenny]

One reason why some of the ships under construction at VJ Day took so long to complete was the post-war Export Drive. The shipbuilding industry played its part by concentrating on rebuilding the British Merchant Navy (which at the time was the UK's greatest invisible exporter) and building merchant ships for export.

Therefore, was the RN forced into modernising some of its existing ships because the British shipbuilding industry couldn't build new ships in the numbers it wanted?

I'd argue that was at least part of the issue.

 

[JudgeKing]

Regarding the Royal Navy's cruisers postwar, it honestly seems like they should've just bitten the bullet and built new cruisers based on either the Neptune or Minotaur-class design proposals while selling or scrapping as many of the prewar and wartime era cruisers as possible.

 

[EwenS]

Regarding the Royal Navy's cruisers postwar, it honestly seems like they should've just bitten the bullet and built new cruisers based on either the Neptune or Minotaur-class design proposals while selling or scrapping as many of the prewar and wartime era cruisers as possible.

But that is what happened to the pre-WW2 cruisers. Most were gone by 1948 and the last by 1950 except:

Cumberland - stripped and refitted 1949-51 as a gunnery trials ship for, amongst other things the 6" & 3" guns destined for the Tiger class.

Devonshire - stripped and refitted in 1947 as an officer cadet training ship until scrapped in 1954.

Only the Achilles (to India where she continued to serve as the INS Delhi) and Aurora (to Nationalist Chinese) were sold with the remainder scrapped.

That left:-
6 Town class
6 Dido class
4 Modified Dido - Bellona & Black Prince to the RNZN mid-1946
8 Fiji class
Swiftsure & Superb

Not all of these were in commission throughout the post war period. Argonaut for example saw no post War service after returning from the Pacific in early 1946 and most of the Didos saw little service after about 1950. The larger Town & Fiji classes were useful showing the flag around the shrinking Empire and for gunfire support in Korea.

And the next round of scrapping and transfers began about 1954.

There were only 6 of the 15,560 ton Neptune class envisaged and 5 of the later 15,280 ton Minotaurs.

 

[Archibald]

The last three, post WWII french cruisers were loose siblings
-De Grasse was too old, pre WWII. Lasted into the 1960's, then was turned into a floating command post for nuclear testing in French Polynesia. Was decommissioned in 1974 when nuclear testing slowed down (before going underground)
-Colbert had same hull shape but 1959 rather than 1939. It was retroffited with MASURCA and lasted into the 1990's.
-Jeanne d'Arc was Colbert hull shape turned helo carrier and plenty other missions, including training. Was decommissioned in 2010.

 

[Dilandu]

Cumberland - stripped and refitted 1949-51 as a gunnery trials ship for, amongst other things the 6" & 3" guns destined for the Tiger class.

Devonshire - stripped and refitted in 1947 as an officer cadet training ship until scrapped in 1954.

I wonder, were those two heavy cruisers in good enough condition for potential refits? They were old, of course, but their hulls were big and their seakeeping ability was excellent.

 

[Rule of cool]

Given the looming change from guns to missiles does it really matter that the RN didn't have a nice smooth path for its cruisers? After all in the gun era they were either going to be expended in WW3 or did well enough in Korea and Suez, and by the time missiles rolled around the RN built a new and innovative design from scratch. Its probably not worth the effort in getting great gun cruisers for the short period they were viable.

 

[Dilandu]

Given the looming change from guns to missiles does it really matter that the RN didn't have a nice smooth path for its cruisers? After all in the gun era they were either going to be expended in WW3 or did well enough in Korea and Suez, and by the time missiles rolled around the RN built a new and innovative design from scratch. Its probably not worth the effort in getting great gun cruisers for the short period they were viable.

Problem was, such attitude get Royal Navy right in 1956 - when they found out that their fleet have literally no adequate air defense weapons, and stood absolutely no chances against Soviet jet bombers with high-altitude rocket torpedoes and standoff missiles.

 

[EwenS]

I wonder, were those two heavy cruisers in good enough condition for potential refits? They were old, of course, but their hulls were big and their seakeeping ability was excellent.

Probably not. As a starting point, remember the 1930 London Treaty allowed replacement after 20 years, so a pretty good idea of the expected life of a cruiser. All had a hard war, much of it spent in the Arctic or the distant oceans clocking up the miles.

The Kents were the oldest of the Counties having completed in 1928. None were scheduled for AA refits in 1944/45. Kent herself was sent to Reserve in Jan 1945. Berwick & Suffolk were relegated to trooping duties between mid-1945 & mid-1946, being joined by Cumberland in Nov 1945 after her service in the Indian Ocean was finished. After that it was off to Reserve to await disposal, or conversion in Cumberland's case.

The London group were 1929 completions. London although extensively rebuilt in 1939-41 still had her original machinery but always had hull problems. Sussex was extensively refitted 1940-42 following her sinking in Glasgow. She and Devonshire both had their AA upgraded between 1943 & 1945. Never understood why Devonshire was never sent east with her AA fit. London & Sussex survived in active service until 1949/50.

Norfolk was the final survivor completed 1930 and remained in service until 1950, then a date with the scrapman.

In their new secondary roles Devonshire & Cumberland were not being strained much further.

 

[Dilandu]

Probably not. As a starting point, remember the 1930 London Treaty allowed replacement after 20 years, so a pretty good idea of the expected life of a cruiser. All had a hard war, much of it spent in the Arctic or the distant oceans clocking up the miles.

Yep, british "quantity over quality" approach toward cruisers really demonstrated its shortcomings after war; they were left with a large fleet of light cruisers that were generally smaller and less suitable for refits than other navies. And no new heavy cruisers, which could handle the refit better.

 

[EwenS]

Yep, british "quantity over quality" approach toward cruisers really demonstrated its shortcomings after war; they were left with a large fleet of light cruisers that were generally smaller and less suitable for refits than other navies. And no new heavy cruisers, which could handle the refit better.

Not really. Britain, with its worldwide commitment to trade protection, couldn't afford to wait until the Treaties expired to start renewal of its cruiser fleet from the mid-1930s. Inter-war the number of cruisers had been set at 70 (with no real explanation why) rising to 100 as war approached.

Even in 1939 they still had 27 WW1 designed cruisers in the fleet of 64. And they needed two types - small fleet cruisers (Didos) and trade protection ships (Fijis) ordered 1937-39. Limited to 8,000 tons. The last of those 1937-39 cruiser orders took until early Jan 1944 to be delivered.

Once WW2 arrived there was a hiatus in orders until 1941 by which time wartime pressures and cruiser losses prevented development of a new design. It was 1943 before thoughts turned to a new design and then plans chopped and changed delivered with Cunningham arriving as 1st SL and so nothing got built.

Also remember that cruisers competed with light carriers from 1942 in the shipyards. 1942 saw the sacrifice of 5 cruisers to get more light carriers.

The USA, with a much smaller cruiser fleet, only ordered the first 4 Atlantas to comply with 1936 London. The big expansion of their cruiser fleet came in 1940 with large orders for Clevelands & Baltimores, unlimited by Treaty.

Looking at the French, the effects were exaggerated by so much of their fleet being scuttled at Toulon in Nov 1942. The most modern ships they were left with were the 3 (of 6 built) Montcalms, with De Grasse only partly built.

 

[Grey Havoc]

The Treasury's obsession with Light Cruisers as being 'more economical' didn't help matters either.

 

[Rule of cool]

Its threads like these that remind me why I like the 1957 defense white paper so much. Such a neat, definite starting point with a handful of key people whos decisions can be tinkered with.

I'm all over the place with this one, I don't know what I'm aiming for let alone how to get there.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Its threads like these that remind me why I like the 1957 defense white paper so much. Such a neat, definite starting point with a handful of key people whos decisions can be tinkered with.

I'm all over the place with this one, I don't know what I'm aiming for let alone how to get there.

I know, there's so many people I want to reach back through time and knock some sense into it's not even funny...


================

When did ships turn the corner to the systems being the expensive part of the ship? 1950s? Or 1930s or 40s with gun directors and radar?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Not really. Britain, with its worldwide commitment to trade protection, couldn't afford to wait until the Treaties expired to start renewal of its cruiser fleet from the mid-1930s. Inter-war the number of cruisers had been set at 70 (with no real explanation why) rising to 100 as war approached.

I'm doing this from memory so it isn't 100% accurate (and may be wildly inaccurate) but gives the general idea.

In the period 1922-24 the 70 cruiser requirement was calculated on the number of cruisers Japan was expected to have by 1929 plus 25%. The contemporary requirement for 15 flotillas of destroyers was calculated on the number of destroyers Japan was expected to have by 1929 plus 25%.

By the 1927 Geneva Disarmament Conference it was the number of cruisers required to work with the fleet plus the number of cruisers required to protect trade. It was 25 fleet cruisers plus 45 trade protection cruisers equals a total of 70 cruisers. The formula was 5 fleet cruisers for every 3 capital ships and under the Washington Naval Treaty the number of capital ships the British Empire was allowed to have would decrease from 20 to 15 between 1934 and 1942: therefore 15 ÷ 3 = 5 x 5 = 25. The number of trade protection cruisers was calculated using a formula that included dividing the number (or tonnage) of British merchant ships at sea by the length of the trade routs or vice versa.

The 100 cruiser requirement of the second half of the 1930s was 55 fleet cruisers plus 45 trade protection cruisers. The number of fleet cruisers was a combination of the number of capital ships (to be increased to 20) that the British Commonwealth had and the number of cruisers Germany & Japan were expected to have by the early to middle 1940s. Although the number of trade protection cruisers was thought to be inadequate the new fleet plan included 5 trade protection aircraft carriers and that would compensate for the shortage of trade protection cruisers.

 

[Rule of cool]

When did ships turn the corner to the systems being the expensive part of the ship? 1950s? Or 1930s or 40s with gun directors and radar?

My guess is when Action Data Automated Weapons System (for the RN) became standard

The County's action information system was heavily reliant on manual data input, the rebuilt Eagle had the computerised ADAS and the Type 82s had the ADAWS-2 and CVA01 was to have the ADAWS-3. Everything has a cost, you save on crew, but have to buy and maintain the computer systems.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

If anything the analogue computers like the Comprehensive Display System were more expensive than their digital successors.

Batch I Counties had CDS, Batch II had ADAWS 1. Only ADAWS 2 onwards had automatic data injection everything prior to that, CSS, ADA, ADWAS and NTDS required manual input.

 

[Dilandu]

If anything the analogue computers like the Comprehensive Display System were more expensive than their digital successors.

No wonder, the analogue tech is quite... complicated.

 

[Rule of cool]

If anything the analogue computers like the Comprehensive Display System were more expensive than their digital successors.

Batch I Counties had CDS, Batch II had ADAWS 1. Only ADAWS 2 onwards had automatic data injection everything prior to that, CSS, ADA, ADWAS and NTFS required manual input.

Is that the order in which they were introduced?

Was the manual input gradually reduced as the systems evolved?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Threads like these tend to concentrate on SAMs. However, the RNs post-war record on torpedoes was not exactly stellar. E.g. the Mk 25 Tigerfish is the best known example.

But, the heavyweight ASW torpedoes for surface ships were so bad that they were taken out of service in the early 1960s. The ships that had been completed or refitted with the 21" tubes to fire had them removed and later classes such as the Counties, Leanders & Tribals (which were designed to have 6 of them) weren't completed with them.

Therefore, British surface warships didn't have an ASW torpedo until the late 1970s when they began to be fitted with tubes for 12.75in lightweight torpedoes. Therefore, for about 15 years their main anti-submarine weapon was the Limbo mortar. Yes, the County class had Wessex helicopters carrying ASW torpedoes; yes, many frigates had the Wasp, which came into service in the middle 1960s; yes the Type 82 had Ikara; and yes, 8 Leanders were fitted with Ikara from the early 1970s. But it still looks like a huge gap in the RN's ASW capability from the early 1960s to the late 1970s.

Could anything have been done to avoid that? Use as much hindsight as you like, but bonus points will be avoided if it could have been done without hindsight. E.g. could the 21" heavyweight torpedoes been made to perform adequately?

 

[Rule of cool]

Threads like these tend to concentrate on SAMs. However, the RNs post-war record on torpedoes was not exactly stellar. E.g. the Mk 25 Tigerfish is the best known example.

But, the heavyweight ASW torpedoes for surface ships were so bad that they were taken out of service in the early 1960s. The ships that had been completed or refitted with the 21" tubes to fire had them removed and later classes such as the Counties, Leanders & Tribals (which were designed to have 6 of them) weren't completed with them.

Therefore, British surface warships didn't have an ASW torpedo until the late 1970s when they began to be fitted with tubes for 12.75in lightweight torpedoes. Therefore, for about 15 years their main anti-submarine weapon was the Limbo mortar. Yes, the County class had Wessex helicopters carrying ASW torpedoes; yes, many frigates had the Wasp, which came into service in the middle 1960s; yes the Type 82 had Ikara; and yes, 8 Leanders were fitted with Ikara from the early 1970s. But it still looks like a huge gap in the RN's ASW capability from the early 1960s to the late 1970s.

Could anything have been done to avoid that? Use as much hindsight as you like, but bonus points will be avoided if it could have been done without hindsight. E.g. could the 21" heavyweight torpedoes been made to perform adequately?

What projects existed, and were any of them feasible?

The only post war torpedo I know about is the HTP 'Fancy' which blew up the Sidon and killed 12 people. However I have a vague notion that Sweden got the design and bought it int service with no problems.

 

[EwenS]

What projects existed, and were any of them feasible?

The only post war torpedo I know about is the HTP 'Fancy' which blew up the Sidon and killed 12 people. However I have a vague notion that Sweden got the design and bought it int service with no problems.

Here is a starter for you.

Post-World War II Torpedoes of the United Kingdom/Britain - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com