Let us cut through the politics of this thread to what the RN is and always has been about.
en.m.wikipedia.org
From 1945 to the present day only one navy has constituted a clear threat to the United Kingdom by virtue of being.
The Russian Navy has to be the focus of Britain's seapower.
Once you accept this, the sort of ships and aircraft you need become very different from "East of Suez" fantasies.
Let me add that this is not an anti-Soviet or Russian rant. It merely recognises that no other navy has the same scope to threaten Britain, and does not see this threat as inevitable.
The US and French Navies are of course also fleets in being but as both countries (perhaps reluctantly) have been our allies for over a century they do not constitute enemies.
True, and in 1948 the Soviet threat was their sub fleet, which needed frigates to defend against.
I'm not so sure the ships required for fighting the Soviet Navy are so different from East of Suez, particularly in the context of the late 1940s and 1950s. One of the lessons of WW2 is that surface ships alone are inadequate against massed submarines, which demands some sort of ASW carrier to extend coverage. This is especially important when only so many escorts can be provided - one thing that becomes clear in the 1970s is that ASW carriers cut down pretty significantly on the number of escorts needed to cover a specific area,
particularly expensive AAW escorts.
And in this technological context before helicopters the ASW carriers need to be pretty big to carry sufficient numbers of dedicated ASW aircraft. Then you consider surface raiders - i.e. the Sverdlov threat - and the need to drive off snoopers and maritime strike aircraft (and all this before Harrier and Sea Eagle), and suddenly you're looking at carriers not much smaller than the fleet carriers the RN kept trying to buy. The American SCB 100 series gives a pretty good idea of the size we're talking here.
From there it's not much of a leap to have the ability to equip these big ASW carriers as strike carriers as the need arises.
As well, we also have to consider NATO requirements. While ASW escorts were of course desired by NATO planners so too were strike carriers, particularly in the context of Norway. Without bases being allowed on Norwegian soil, the only way to prevent Norway from falling to a Soviet invasion is by sea, likely in the face of significant aerial opposition. This ties back into the submarine threat. The Brits know from two world wars that a friendly Norway is vital in the face of the submarine threat.
Which means it behooves the Brits to have the amphibious capacity and carrier strike ability to at least
contribute to reinforcement of Norway.
So far in this thread, I've been trying to keep things as close to the OTL politics and strategic thinking as possible, but with full hindsight, I'd say that the way to go was to, yes, abandon as many foreign commitments as possible, accept that you can't afford the big policing role, and laser-focus on WW3 operations close to home. That means:
- Six carriers to start with rather than 12 as was the case from 1947-1954 - half those carriers were to be for East of Suez. This means no rebuilds of the armored carriers, and overall a far more rational carrier force - ideally I'd get all three Audacious-class, with Irresistible built to Ark Royal standards by the mid-50s, and three Centaurs, Hermes being cancelled somewhere down the line. The Audacious' are for strike duties and the Centaurs for ASW (Sea Hawks + Gannets).
- Faster rundown of the cruiser force, which is increasingly unnecessary without all those overseas commitments.
- No Tribals, more Blackwoods.
- 1957 cut to four carriers proceeds as planned, Audaciouses prioritized for retention, priority given to escort cruiser to replace Centaurs as ASW carriers.
- Long-term outlook likely two big strike carriers for Norwegian operations in wartime and out-of-area in peacetime, three Invincible-style ASW carriers for, well, Atlantic ASW ops, and two Ocean-style commando carriers to get the Centaurs out of the job.
