Different thought process for Post WW2 British Navy

[Pirate Pete]

I an sure I will call down a whole host of ‘trouble’ on my head for raising this, but,
Here we go…

We all know that the Royal Navy post WW2 was in an invidious position regards available finance and the shifting sands of changing priorities.

One thing I think was the (in retrospect at least) flawed thinking of the reconstruction of Carriers and Cruisers (Victorious and Tiger Class in particular).
Inter-war, the Navy had no option but to modernise it’s Capital Ships as they were forbidden by Treaty to replace any prior to, ultimately, 1936…
I fear this thought process continued post-war which was why the proposals for the modernisation of the Illustrious class arose, and also the rebuilding of the Tiger class instead of accepting they were too small and outdated…Harsh I know but.

At worst, Victorious gets refitted in a far more basic form (as originally intended) and plans are not continually altered to include this and that new toy.
A basic ‘axial’ rebuild, no new boilers, 984 etc. Maybe, just MAYBE a basic angled deck along the lines of the American Antietam…
Realise that thus is NOT the way to go and, okay, complete the two Audacious’s with or refit with steam catapults and again a basic angled-deck, instead, accept that what you have built and in hand are obsolete/facing obsolescence and start building two of the ‘1952’ Fleet Carriers, ultimately to be followed by another pair/three(?) to keep the fleet air capable.
Most of the Escort programme as built, with perhaps more Type 81 (‘Tribal’s) built instead of the very single purpose Type 14’s. (Yes, I know this needs a different mind set, but this is MY version LOL).
As regards Cruisers - scrap the Tigers, stop looking at bigger and better missile cruiser designs and settle on something somewhat smaller than the final GW96A! Numbers would be few anyway as the County class destroyer type will be coming on-line and, despite the best will in the world, the Navy cannot have everything it wants…

Well, that’s the starting point - I know certain rebuilds are probably inevitable (Type 15’s?), but a steady replacement programme on new construction instead will help avoid block obsolescence and ships needing heavy manning numbers.
A lot of the left over (‘out of date’) fleet can be passed onto Allies/Commonwealth Navies so they can start rebuilding and gaining experience with more advanced vessels.

 

[CV12Hornet]

The problem, as always, comes back to the 1947/1948 conclusion that WW3 was coming and that to fight it the British military needed to complete rearmament by 1957, that being the "year of maximum danger". The Victorious rebuild dates back to that era, as a means to quickly and cheaply get more modern carriers in the water with new construction being deferred to at least 1954. Eagle's completion as an axial-deck, hydraulic-catapult carrier was also likely motivated by this urgency as well.

In regards to specific points:

At worst, Victorious gets refitted in a far more basic form (as originally intended) and plans are not continually altered to include this and that new toy.
A basic ‘axial’ rebuild, no new boilers, 984 etc. Maybe, just MAYBE a basic angled deck along the lines of the American Antietam…

Honestly, this aligns with my thinking. The whole point of the rebuilds was to get the ships ASAP for WW3, whereupon they'd either be expended or it would be safe to dispose of them afterward. Axial deck, original boilers, hydraulic catapults, at best a mirrored landing sight among the 1950s goodies as that's not hard to just bolt onto a sponson. Resist the urge toward feature creep.

Realise that thus is NOT the way to go and, okay, complete the two Audacious’s with or refit with steam catapults and again a basic angled-deck, instead, accept that what you have built and in hand are obsolete/facing obsolescence and start building two of the ‘1952’ Fleet Carriers, ultimately to be followed by another pair/three(?) to keep the fleet air capable.

This is unfortunately not viable. The 1952 design ran into the problem that Korea was ongoing, the mobilization for that war compounded every single issue I outlined prior, and worse, made it seem like WW3 was even more imminent. The Brits were very surprised that Korea didn't lead to WW3. So all the money, design effort, and political urgency was going to projects that could be finished now.

So unfortunately despite attempts, and despite at least one fitting into the British force structure planned at the time as a replacement for Formidable's rebuild, the project went nowhere and TBH I don't see any way to get it off the ground.

Most of the Escort programme as built, with perhaps more Type 81 (‘Tribal’s) built instead of the very single purpose Type 14’s. (Yes, I know this needs a different mind set, but this is MY version LOL).

TBH, I don't think this matters, the two designs were of different eras and naval policies. The Type 14s are a product of late 40s WW3 thinking and were rushed through for Korea; the Type 81s are colonial sloops for the post-1954 warm war doctrine. Given the shifts in British policy, it's both or neither. And, like, the choice of frigate construction is way far down the list of British naval problems postwar.

Not to mention both proved just as incapable of modernization and just as prone to cost overruns - that's why only 7 of the 23 planned Tribals were built.

As regards Cruisers - scrap the Tigers, stop looking at bigger and better missile cruiser designs and settle on something somewhat smaller than the final GW96A! Numbers would be few anyway as the County class destroyer type will be coming on-line and, despite the best will in the world, the Navy cannot have everything it wants…

This is probably doable, yeah. Again, we come to Korea, which was responsible for multiple deferments of the Tigers and their equipment. Given again the imminent WW3 thinking it probably wouldn't be too difficult to get them cancelled outright.

As far as new designs, it'd be interesting to push back escort cruiser design to the 1954-1956 time period the big GW series was conducted instead of around 1960. Of course, one of the big issues of the GW series was that they hadn't figured out Sea Slug arrangements yet...

 

[Dilandu]

So basically, your idea is "to save money on reifts and legacy designs and put more money in the modern designs".

worst, Victorious gets refitted in a far more basic form (as originally intended) and plans are not continually altered to include this and that new toy.
A basic ‘axial’ rebuild, no new boilers, 984 etc. Maybe, just MAYBE a basic angled deck along the lines of the American Antietam…
Realise that thus is NOT the way to go and, okay, complete the two Audacious’s with or refit with steam catapults and again a basic angled-deck, instead, accept that what you have built and in hand are obsolete/facing obsolescence and start building two of the ‘1952’ Fleet Carriers, ultimately to be followed by another pair/three(?) to keep the fleet air capable.
Most of the Escort programme as built, with perhaps more Type 81 (‘Tribal’s) built instead of the very single purpose Type 14’s. (Yes, I know this needs a different mind set, but this is MY version LOL).
As regards Cruisers - scrap the Tigers, stop looking at bigger and better missile cruiser designs and settle on something somewhat smaller than the final GW96A! Numbers would be few anyway as the County class destroyer type will be coming on-line and, despite the best will in the world, the Navy cannot have everything it wants…

Problem was, that Royal Navy of late 1950s was very far behind the curve already. It was basically still WW2 navy with some addition of more modern tech, and NOT ready for nuclear & missile warfare. The Suez crisis was a clear demonstration, how badly RN is equipped for modern warfare. And the refit efforts were basically the only thing that could restore at least some recemblance of combat capability in reasonable time.

 

[uk 75]

The main flaw in the Royal Navy's postwar plans was the absence of the Malta class in favour of the Audacious class.
The Illustrious and her sisters ought to have been sacrificed leaving the smaller carriers to operate until Malta, Gibraltar and New Zealand were completed.
I know this smacks of hindsight but the US were building three Midways and would shortly ask for the United States supercarrier.
The battleships should have been retired earlier, with Vanguard being retained in reserve in case rumoured Soviet big ships emerged.
Lord Mountbatten was a fan of cruisers. In view of the large number of such ships retained by the USN, the RN had to build some ships postwar. The three Tigers are unavoidable.
I agree that converting Superb and Swiftsure was a mistake but perhaps the RN could then have pressed for improvements in British shipbuilding.
The Type 12 GP frigate and the purpose built AA, ASW and Aircraft Direction ships were pretty decent and as good as any ships operated by other navies.
British maritime aircraft programmes are hit and miss. Seahawk and Gannet were good fits for the small carriers. Seamew cheap ASW and the flexible deck experiments failed but the angle deck and mirror landing aids were a success.
The County class destroyers and Seaslug were as good first generation missile ships as the Terrier equipped Coontz class. But the US showed that evolution rather than revolution in missile design was better with its three Ts missiles and their launchers.
Seacat was the only small footprint point defence missile until Phalanx and Ram arrived. Sea Sparrow like Seawolf took up the same deck space as a 3in/76mm turret.
The small ASW helicopter (Wasp then Lynx) was a good and exported innovation. I would like to have seen Seakings Canadian style on British escorts on Leanders.
Something better than Scimitar and Sea Vixen should have been possible by 1957. Maybe the Buccaneer took up too much RN investment but it showed what could be done.
The three Maltas with 984 and and angle decks could have carried a UK supersonic fighter and Buccaneer before replacing them with an F18 class aircraft in the 80s.
A carrier similar to the US CVV could have been built to replace the two remaining Maltas in the late 70s (instead of the Invincibles).
The US Spruance and Perry class shows what the RN should have built as escorts for the 80s.
A Type 82 armed like the Kidds but with British missiles, guns and helicopters would replace the four Countys in the mid 70s.
A single design Type 22 would operate Seawolf and helos in the ASW version and guns and stern mounted Seadart in the AD version.
The nuclear submarine programme was a success story. I would have retired the O class sooner and not built the U class boats. Additional S and T class boats would have been a better investment.
Polaris and Trident are highly political. They have been effective and well managed but not doing them might have made it easier to maintain a balanced navy.

 

[zen]

This hits the timing problem.

1945 WWII stops, the loans stop and repayments must be made even before the Economy has been switched back to civilian production.

By 1948 the entire Navy was alongside to save every penny as we skirted famine and potential collapse.

Then Korea happened and it was get things ready for WWIII NOW.

Then Korea hit the buffers, the money slowed and it became make-do-and-mend.

Then the there was an attempt to modernise but the Defence budget was overblown.
Then Suez and a run on the Pound.

'57 salvage the budget.....

But come '64 this was still unaffordable and ministers knew it as they went into the year. Let alone by the winter election.

At each point being far sighted enough to do what we think is the right thing is at the time borderline insane.

 

[Rule of cool]

IIUC the RN began long term planning again in 1948-49 and the naval threat was the big Soviet submarine fleet. The RN was faced with a choice of strategies; offensive like was practiced by the BPF against Japan in 1944-45 or defensive like broke the uboats in 1943. The latter was chosen, so a lot of frigates available at short notice what was needed and light fleet carriers were to do what cruisers did in WW2. Fleet carriers, while important, were not given priority for several years.

I think events showed that this was the wrong choice.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The main flaw in the Royal Navy's postwar plans was the absence of the Malta class in favour of the Audacious class.
The Illustrious and her sisters ought to have been sacrificed leaving the smaller carriers to operate until Malta, Gibraltar and New Zealand were completed.
I know this smacks of hindsight but the US were building three Midways and would shortly ask for the United States supercarrier.
The battleships should have been retired earlier, with Vanguard being retained in reserve in case rumoured Soviet big ships emerged.
Lord Mountbatten was a fan of cruisers. In view of the large number of such ships retained by the USN, the RN had to build some ships postwar. The three Tigers are unavoidable.

Disagree. Make the point that the small carriers are the modern cruisers, build the Audacious class as the new "cruisers." Yes, build the "through-deck cruisers" 20 years early. Fly Sea Kings off of them and see what else you can make fly off that tiny deck.

And build the Malta class as the new fleet carriers (and Royal Flagship), forget Vanguard unless His Majesty absolutely insists on a battleship instead of a carrier.

The Type 12 GP frigate and the purpose built AA, ASW and Aircraft Direction ships were pretty decent and as good as any ships operated by other navies.

I think the problem was that nobody slapped Treasury upside the head and said "building a 4000ton frigate will cost no more than the 3000ton frigate over the life of the ships. Easier maintenance, more upgradability, better sea-keeping. Steel is cheap and AIR IS FREE!!!"

Alternatively, the UK needed to build ships with a ~20-30 year expected lifespan and plan on selling them off at 10-15 years to keep the shipyards constantly producing. No "boom and bust" nonsense, constant employment and getting the workers more and more competent. So you'd build your class of Type 12s, and pretty much as soon as the first in class is out of sea trials you start design work on either the Type 12 Batch 2 or the Type 13. Keeps each class much more similar in where everything is and equipment fits.

British maritime aircraft programmes are hit and miss. Seahawk and Gannet were good fits for the small carriers. Seamew cheap ASW and the flexible deck experiments failed but the angle deck and mirror landing aids were a success.

I think all of those need to happen to develop into the angled flight deck.

The County class destroyers and Seaslug were as good first generation missile ships as the Terrier equipped Coontz class. But the US showed that evolution rather than revolution in missile design was better with its three Ts missiles and their launchers.

Yes and no. The Talos concept was effectively abandoned, and honestly shares the same issue with Seaslug: too big, needs a cruiser hull to carry it. Hits like a freight train, though, so might have been worth keeping around as a dedicated SSM with backup AA capabilities.

Tartar was basically a Terrier without the booster stage, but were only workable because they were rockets, not ramjets like Seaslug or Seadart. That said, Seadart was small enough to fit into the same footprint as a gun turret.

No, I think the fundamental problem was that the UK was not looking at rockets for their SAMs.

Seacat was the only small footprint point defence missile until Phalanx and Ram arrived. Sea Sparrow like Seawolf took up the same deck space as a 3in/76mm turret.

Didn't realize that Sea Sparrow or Sea Wolf took up that much space.

So an obvious focus here would be on a point defense missile system that could fit in a 40mm Bofors tub or 3"/50 tub. Might be able to sell those to everyone around NATO, even the US, if they worked well.

Or building ships roughly the size of the US Gearings that had space for a gun turret and a larger missile system forward, ASROC/Ikara equivalent and other ASW gear amidships, and a helicopter deck aft. Puts the minimum size of an ASW escort at about 2600 tons, and that's a bit marginal for a Sea King landing pad. Might have to bump up another 400 tons to an even 3000 to have good helicopter space.

Something better than Scimitar and Sea Vixen should have been possible by 1957. Maybe the Buccaneer took up too much RN investment but it showed what could be done.

The major problem there is that without the larger carriers, you're stuck.

This absolutely requires the Malta-class carriers to be built.

The three Maltas with 984 and and angle decks could have carried a UK supersonic fighter and Buccaneer before replacing them with an F18 class aircraft in the 80s.
A carrier similar to the US CVV could have been built to replace the two remaining Maltas in the late 70s (instead of the Invincibles).
The US Spruance and Perry class shows what the RN should have built as escorts for the 80s.
A Type 82 armed like the Kidds but with British missiles, guns and helicopters would replace the four Countys in the mid 70s.

Generally agreed here.

A single design Type 22 would operate Seawolf and helos in the ASW version and guns and stern mounted Seadart in the AD version.

NO.

Build bigger ships, to put gun and Seadart forward, and stick Seawolf on top of the hangar.

 

[uk 75]

Taking points in order:

To get Maltas you have to lose the Audacious class and Illustrious class and rely on the Light Fleet carriers until the Maltas commission.

Big guns are necessary until missiles and something like Buccaneer arrive. Vanguard in reserve and a handful of cruisers needed.
The three Tigers are essential to get shipyards able to build modern big warships. Lose Swiftsure and Superb as thr Colony class will do.

The frigate programme is hamstrung by the rapid changes in technology. The Type 12s are obsolete by 1970 and the leap to Type 22 was too great. The US had the same problem with the Knox class. A modified Type 12 should have been designed for building after 1966 with Ikara, then Exocet and finally with Seawolf.

The Type 22/42 design would be different if you build 4 Type 82 with double ended Seadart and no Ikara (put these on Leander Mods).

A Perry like design would allow a single Seadart launcher forward and a 76mm gun amidships on the superstructure and a helicopter deck aft. An alternative version would have Seawolf fore and amidships replacing the Seadart and gun.

Apart from the Falklands I think the 76mm gun is useful. I would reserve a US style 5" gun for the Type 82s.

 

[Scott Kenny]

What cruisers did the UK have that survived WW2? I'm thinking something like the US missile conversions.

 

[CV12Hornet]

What cruisers did the UK have that survived WW2? I'm thinking something like the US missile conversions.

A mix of Southamptons, Didos, and various flavors of Fiji. These were all much smaller and tighter than even the US Clevelands, and the latter proved too small and unstable.

As far as the Maltas: I'm sorry to say but given the financial situation of late-40s Britain they're a pipe dream.

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd we wary of attempting to resolve problems that arose in the late 50s and early 60s with ships and technology of the 40s. Sure the Malta class could handle Phantoms and the rebuilt Vic and Hermes couldn't, but if they were built from the 40s they'd be halfway through their life by the time the Buccaneer and Phantom issues arose.

I think the best course of action would be one where the RN could build a handful of new major warships through this difficult transition period while using up what WW2 ships they had as best as they could to maximise their investment. For example a single 1952-53 design carrier entering service in ~1958-59 would be vastly better than the twice rebuilt Vic and the advanced but small Hermes.

 

[EwenS]

A mix of Southamptons, Didos, and various flavors of Fiji. These were all much smaller and tighter than even the US Clevelands, and the latter proved too small and unstable.

As far as the Maltas: I'm sorry to say but given the financial situation of late-40s Britain they're a pipe dream.

The other problem with the Malta class is that the design was never finalised so we don't know how it might have turned out.

1943/44 - first design an enlarged Audacious armoured hangar ship. March 1944, earliest completion was Feb 1948.
1944/45 - redesigned at insistence of the then 5th Sea Lord (VA Sir Dennis Boyd until Jan 1945) as an open hangar, no armour above hangar deck design (I.e modelled on US carriers like the Essex and based on Pacific War experience to date). Never signed off by Board of Admiralty.
Mid-1945 - kamikaze menace at its height. New 5th Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Tom Troubridge). Illustrious returns from Pacific at end of June and her CO gives lectures to senior officers about her experience off Sakishima Gunto. Comments made to former DNC, Sir Stanley Goodall (recorded in his diary) about new 5th SL now believing an armoured flight deck is a necessity. At this time the USN has first 2 Midways about to enter service and is working on the 1945 Fleet Carrier also with an armoured flight deck.

So yes, while the country couldn't afford them, it wasn't clear what they wanted to build.

 

[MadRat]

Talos launchers became obsolete for sure. The notion of two missiles fired before taking the launcher offline to reload could not compete with vertical launch siloes. Standard as a common missile to overlap a Talos-replacement made much more sense than converting Talos to vertical launches.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Captain Keene: [news of the native revolt arrives] What do you intend to do, sir?
Sir Sidney Ruff-Diamond: Do? Do? We're British. We won't do anything...
Major Shorthouse: ...until it's too late.
Sir Sidney Ruff-Diamond: Exactly. That's the first sensible thing you've said all day.

 

[Scott Kenny]

A mix of Southamptons, Didos, and various flavors of Fiji. These were all much smaller and tighter than even the US Clevelands, and the latter proved too small and unstable.

Bugger. So much for that idea...

Which means that the RN needs new cruisers ASAP, whether gun armed or missile. And given the time, guns since even Seaslug wasn't available till the 1960s. And pretty big cruisers, too, if there's any hope of later converting them into missile cruisers like the US did.

So now we're talking about Edinburgh-class or Baltimore-class sized cruisers, 13,000 tons standard and 17ktons full. And closer to Baltimore-class size, since the 12kton standard Cleveland wasn't big enough and the Baltimores were.



Also need to find some rocket boffins to focus on solid fuels, to develop the short range missiles like the Terrier/Tartar/Standards. There's nothing innately wrong with ramjet missiles for long range, but short range defense requires rockets.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Bugger. So much for that idea...

Which means that the RN needs new cruisers ASAP, whether gun armed or missile. And given the time, guns since even Seaslug wasn't available till the 1960s. And pretty big cruisers, too, if there's any hope of later converting them into missile cruisers like the US did.

So now we're talking about Edinburgh-class or Baltimore-class sized cruisers, 13,000 tons standard and 17ktons full. And closer to Baltimore-class size, since the 12kton standard Cleveland wasn't big enough and the Baltimores were.

Not coincidentally, this is generally where the attempts at missile cruisers (1954-1956) ended up until the escort cruiser designs. GW 58, which was the most realistic basis for a Sea Slug missile cruiser, was 15,400 tons full. Unfortunately, as detail design progressed weight growth set in and grew unchecked. Some of it was feature creep - replacing the Bofors with additional 3"/70s and adding a varial-depth sonar instead of the usual self-defense sets bumped it up to a colossal 18,300 tons.

Things only got worse under detail design because key pieces of equipment - the twin 6" guns, the machinery plant, and the Sea Slug missiles themselves - kept getting bigger. All attempts to reign in the size of the ship were a failure, and so the project was canned in spring 1956.

Ultimately, the requirements were just too much for British resources. The new cruisers needed to be self-escorting and able to take on all comers in surface action, namely the Sverdlovs. That meant the combination of twin 6" guns and Sea Slug with associated radar infrastructure that sent the size of the ship skyrocketing. One of those needs to go if this is to have any chance.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Not coincidentally, this is generally where the attempts at missile cruisers (1954-1956) ended up until the escort cruiser designs. GW 58, which was the most realistic basis for a Sea Slug missile cruiser, was 15,400 tons full. Unfortunately, as detail design progressed weight growth set in and grew unchecked. Some of it was feature creep - replacing the Bofors with additional 3"/70s and adding a varial-depth sonar instead of the usual self-defense sets bumped it up to a colossal 18,300 tons.

Lock that down, and you have a lot less trouble.

Things only got worse under detail design because key pieces of equipment - the twin 6" guns, the machinery plant, and the Sea Slug missiles themselves - kept getting bigger. All attempts to reign in the size of the ship were a failure, and so the project was canned in spring 1956.

That also sounds like nobody was shooting down the Good Idea Fairies and saying, NO, you cannot exceed X size/weight for the Guns and Missiles.

I mean, the Americans managed to get a Tartar launcher down to the size replacement of a twin 5"/38 or single 5"/54 mount. Two of them, actually, the Mk11 and Mk13. Mk11 was in service by 1960, Mk13 by 1962.

And I know that the UK engineers aren't any worse than American engineers. They just tend to need someone to provide them some focus. Good enough instead of Perfect.

Ultimately, the requirements were just too much for British resources. The new cruisers needed to be self-escorting and able to take on all comers in surface action, namely the Sverdlovs. That meant the combination of twin 6" guns and Sea Slug with associated radar infrastructure that sent the size of the ship skyrocketing. One of those needs to go if this is to have any chance.

I think the Sverdlovs would be rudely surprised by a Seaslug in antiship mode. I know they'd be horrified by a Talos in anti-ship mode.

 

[Airbus A340 Fan]

Maybe the RN should have marinized, sorry this is a thread about the RN, not the USN, I meant to write marinised, the Spey instead of the Tyne and Olympus. This would have given them one engine instead of two, meaning economies of scale, simplified training, parts supply, etc. I don't see 1 Spey, 2 Spey, 3 Spey, 4 Spey being worse than 1 Tyne, 2 Tyne, 1 Tyne, 1 Oly, 2 Oly as choices for speeds.

The Type 42 was a mistake. The same equipment on a Type 22 hull would save money through economies of scale and allow upgrades. The Type 21 was also a mistake because it was not capable enough.

If anyone wants to write the book, I have the title: For But Not With: The Story of the Postwar Royal Navy.

 

[starviking]

Tartar was basically a Terrier without the booster stage, but were only workable because they were rockets, not ramjets like Seaslug or Seadart. That said, Seadart was small enough to fit into the same footprint as a gun turret.

No, I think the fundamental problem was that the UK was not looking at rockets for their SAMs.

Seaslug was actually all-rocket. Four wrap-around boosters, one sustainer.

Rockets and ramjets were both being developed in the UK, with neither particularly in the ascendancy - for example, the Army’s Thunderbird missile was all-rocket, the RAF’s Bloodhound, ramjet.

IIRC, British solids development lagged the States, but ramjet was broadly comparable. When it came time to choose a design for the Sea Dart requirement the HSA ramjet design was chosen over the BAC rocket one.

Also, whilst Sea Dart was originally planned to fit in the space occupied by a 4.5-inch gun turret, as the design developed it became impossible to do so.

 

[starviking]

Maybe the RN should have marinized, sorry this is a thread about the RN, not the USN, I meant to write marinised, the Spey instead of the Tyne and Olympus. This would have given them one engine instead of two, meaning economies of scale, simplified training, parts supply, etc. I don't see 1 Spey, 2 Spey, 3 Spey, 4 Spey being worse than 1 Tyne, 2 Tyne, 1 Tyne, 1 Oly, 2 Oly as choices for speeds.

The timing just doesn’t allow it - Tyne and Olympus are developed in the 50s - the Olympus being the older. She also benefits from an early-60s plan by the German Navy to use her in an all-gas turbine ship.

Spey is a bit of a ‘surprise’ engine, a cut-down Medway to fit in the shrunk HSA Trident airliner, that excelled in the civil and military market - but only from the mid-60s.

The Type 42 was a mistake. The same equipment on a Type 22 hull would save money through economies of scale and allow upgrades. The Type 21 was also a mistake because it was not capable enough.

Different types of ship need different hullforms to be really effective. Brown & Moore touch on this a little in Rebuilding the Royal Navy.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Lock that down, and you have a lot less trouble.

They did. All of the extra features were canned once the weight growth set in.

That also sounds like nobody was shooting down the Good Idea Fairies and saying, NO, you cannot exceed X size/weight for the Guns and Missiles.

I mean, the Americans managed to get a Tartar launcher down to the size replacement of a twin 5"/38 or single 5"/54 mount. Two of them, actually, the Mk11 and Mk13. Mk11 was in service by 1960, Mk13 by 1962.

And I know that the UK engineers aren't any worse than American engineers. They just tend to need someone to provide them some focus. Good enough instead of Perfect.

That may be the case with Seaslug, but by all accounts with the guns and propulsion they wouldn't be able to reach desired performance otherwise.

 

[uk 75]

The 1952 carrier would simply have given the RN another Hermes sized carrier. The Maltas, even if only two were built instead of Eagle and Ark Royal allow decent sized airgroups throughout their careers.

Seaslug gave the UK more Terrierlike SAGW ships than any other W European navy even if only 4 were built.

Four Type 82s should have replaced the last 4 Countys on the slipways from 1965. A Type 82 mod with double ended Seadart (replacing Ikara) should have followed.

If the Maltas are not built the Through Deck Cruiser and Sea Harrier are the only practical alternative I doubt if the British shipbuilding industry in the 60s-70s could have delivered CVA01 let alone two or three ships. Invincible took long enough to build.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Not coincidentally, this is generally where the attempts at missile cruisers (1954-1956) ended up until the escort cruiser designs. GW 58, which was the most realistic basis for a Sea Slug missile cruiser, was 15,400 tons full. Unfortunately, as detail design progressed weight growth set in and grew unchecked. Some of it was feature creep - replacing the Bofors with additional 3"/70s and adding a varial-depth sonar instead of the usual self-defense sets bumped it up to a colossal 18,300 tons.

Given that contemporary US Missile Cruisers were recieving SQS-23 sonars as self-defence sets, Type 192 (later removed from the design) and later Type 184 are entirely reasonable to have. Especially since Sea Slug, Type 984 and CDS are the main cost drivers.

 

[Pirate Pete]

These images come of the IWM website and show ‘options’ for what a modernised Illustrious class might look like, WELL before the Frankenstein situation that arose during Victorious’s actual mordernisation!
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205163259
(Url corrected)

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The angled flight deck could have been invented sooner. All it required was for someone to have the "Eureka" moment. Say have Warrior test it in the late 1940s instead of the flexible deck. Could the development of the steam catapult have been accelerated so the OTL trials on Perseus could have been brought forward about 4 years? My guess is, no it wasn't, because it would have involved spending money and using resources that weren't available.

If both were possible then:

• Eagle (ex-Irresistible) would have been completed in 1951 to at least the same standard as Ark Royal in 1955 IOTL. That is with a pair of 151ft BS.4 steam catapults and an interim angled flight deck. I wrote at least, because if we're lucky it might have been possible to give her a fully angled flight deck instead of an interim one.
• Albion, Bulwark & Centaur could have been completed 1953-54 to the same standard as Hermes in 1959 IOTL minus the advanced electronics.
• Ark Royal
  • Completed 1955 with a fully angled flight deck instead of an interim one.
    • Or.
  • Completed 1952 to the same standard as 1955 IOTL. According to Marriott the decision to fit steam catapults and an angled flight deck delayed her completion from late 1952 to early 1955.
    • Or
  • Completed 1952 with a fully angled flight deck instead of an interim one.
• Hermes completed 1955 to the same standard as herself in 1959 IOTL minus the advanced electronics.
• The third Audacious isn't cancelled in 1946. Instead she's suspended and her name is changed from Eagle to Irresistible.
  • Construction is resumed in 1950 and she's completed in 1958 to the same standard as Victorious after her OTL "great rebuild"of 1950-58 IOTL. That is two BS.4 steam catapults (but 151ft stroke), a fully angled flight deck, an AC electrical system, a Type 984 radar, CDS and DPT.
    • Or.
  • Construction is resumed in 1950 and she's completed circa 1955 with the steam catapults, fully angled flight deck and AC electrical system, but without the advanced electronics.
• Melbourne & Bonaventure might have been completed sooner and if they were Sydney might have been fitted with a steam catapult & angled flight deck too.
• I don't know if the Dutch would have rebuilt Karel Doorman sooner if the angled flight deck and steam catapult were invented sooner.
• This would have a knock-on effect on the Essex and Forrestal class aircraft carriers in the USN.
  • All 15 Essex class that had the SCB.27 refit would have been fitted with steam catapults and an angled flight deck as part of the refit.
  • All 4 Forrestals would have had the port side deck edge lift in a different position so it didn't interfere with the angled flight deck.
  • Some or all of the 15 Essex class might have had the port side deck edge lift in a different position so it didn't interfere with the angled flight deck too.

If accelerating development of the steam catapult was possible the RN would have had 6 or 7 aircraft carriers with steam catapults (and angled flight decks) by the "Year of Maximum Danger" instead of one. That's important because it gives the RN 6 or 7 ships in the middle 1950s that can operate aircraft like the Scimitar & Sea Vixen when it only had one (Ark Royal) IOTL. In the longer term it provides the RN with 3 ships (the Audacious class) that can be refitted to operate Phantoms.

IIRC Hermes, the rebuilt Victorious, the Tiger class, half the Daring class and 4 Battles converted to fleet pickets had AC electrical systems. Is there a feasible way to have more of the ships completed after 1945 built with AC electrical systems? In particular Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur and Eagle.

 

[Rule of cool]

The 1952 carrier would simply have given the RN another Hermes sized carrier. The Maltas, even if only two were built instead of Eagle and Ark Royal allow decent sized airgroups throughout their careers.

Seaslug gave the UK more Terrierlike SAGW ships than any other W European navy even if only 4 were built.

Four Type 82s should have replaced the last 4 Countys on the slipways from 1965. A Type 82 mod with double ended Seadart (replacing Ikara) should have followed.

If the Maltas are not built the Through Deck Cruiser and Sea Harrier are the only practical alternative I doubt if the British shipbuilding industry in the 60s-70s could have delivered CVA01 let alone two or three ships. Invincible took long enough to build.

IIUC the 1952-53 carrier design was a big one, 52,000t and 900' long.

I don't know about the last 4 Counties, but I think there was talk that the last 2 could have been Type 82s. I'm not sure why they weren't, maybe the Sea Dart and other things weren't advanced enough. They were laid down in January and March 1966 after a gap of 4 years since the first 2 Batch 2 ships and Bristol in November 1967, a year and a half later. I have a suspicion that the RN needed more SAGW immediately and had already waited 4 years so had to get those final 2 Counties laid down rather than wait another 2 years for more Type 82s.

British industry delivered the 2 Fearless in the mid 60s, the 3 Invincibles from the late 70s and already had long lead items for CVA01 on order. Apparently the British Government and the bidding shipyards thought they could deliver CVA01.

 

[Rule of cool]

Sea Slug's magazine and missile handling system drove the design of the entire County class. I used to have a diagram, but the missiles were stored amidships and were run out along horizontal tunnels have the wings and boosters attached along the way, before being run out to the launchers. They were not stored like a 'round of ammunition' like tartar and terrier, but assembled more like Talos. The point being this does not make it easy to convert an old gun cruiser into a Sea Slug ship.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Not the one I was looking for, but….

 

[Rule of cool]

Not the one I was looking for, but….

I like the label "enclosed bridge', as if open bridges were still a thing in 1960.

 

[starviking]

I like the label "enclosed bridge', as if open bridges were still a thing in 1960.

The previous destroyer class, the Darings, were open-bridged - as were the C-class destroyers that bulked out the destroyer fleet.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Sea Slug's magazine and missile handling system drove the design of the entire County class. I used to have a diagram, but the missiles were stored amidships and were run out along horizontal tunnels have the wings and boosters attached along the way, before being run out to the launchers. They were not stored like a 'round of ammunition' like tartar and terrier, but assembled more like Talos. The point being this does not make it easy to convert an old gun cruiser into a Sea Slug ship.

Most of this is entirely incorrect. Terrier required finning like Talos. In the Galveston class, 16 Talos rounds were stored fully assembled (sans fins) in a ready service magazine, with an additional 30 disassembled rounds in a missile stowage magazine. All 104 Talos rounds on the Albany were fully assembled (again, sans fins) ready rounds. Sea Slug was also stored as a ready round, in fact more ready than Terrier, as fins were already attached (as were boosters). In the first three ships, 24 Sea Slugs were stored in a fully ready state, later ships did store disassembled rounds to increase magazine depth, but still had 16 ready rounds in addition to 23 disassembled rounds.

I should point out that given the limited number of fire channels in early missile-armed ships, their significant magazine depth seems to be entirely redundant, given they will only get off a small number of salvoes in an engagement.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The previous destroyer class, the Darings, were open-bridged - as were the C-class destroyers that bulked out the destroyer fleet.

And there were plenty of staff officers who'd come up driving open-bridged destroyers, busily writing letters and memoranda about how closed bridges isolated the OOW from the environment and prevented him from properly understanding how the weather was affecting his ship.

There's a reason why the Type 15 frigates didn't have a bridge at all - the only way to convince war-veteran officers to fight the ship from the Operations Room was to make it impossible for them to do it from anywhere else.

 

[Yellow Palace]

And I know that the UK engineers aren't any worse than American engineers. They just tend to need someone to provide them some focus. Good enough instead of Perfect.

You also need the UK's staff officers to stop getting seduced by the Good Idea Fairy. The engineers and the staff officers are good at feeding each others imaginations.

Annoyingly, this is where the Treasury is supposed to step in and say 'do you REALLY need that?'.

Also, whilst Sea Dart was originally planned to fit in the space occupied by a 4.5-inch gun turret, as the design developed it became impossible to do so.

I'd love to know where this went wrong, because the missile isn't significantly different in size to Tartar/Standard MR. It ought to have been able to fit in a launcher the size of a Mark 11 or Mark 13. I suspect the Good Idea Fairy had been visiting the ordnance department.

The hoofing great Type 909 target tracker/illuminator won't have helped matters either, of course.

Different types of ship need different hullforms to be really effective. Brown & Moore touch on this a little in Rebuilding the Royal Navy.

Not just that - you physically cannot fit a Sea Dart launcher into a Type 22 hull. Type 42 was a bathtub by comparison.

Given that contemporary US Missile Cruisers were recieving SQS-23 sonars as self-defence sets, Type 192 (later removed from the design) and later Type 184 are entirely reasonable to have. Especially since Sea Slug, Type 984 and CDS are the main cost drivers.

In fact, comparing the GW series to their US equivalents, they didn't so much grow uncontrollably to 'colossal' size, as they rapidly grew to the size that a modern missile cruiser with those capabilities needed to be. The RN just hadn't realised that modern weapons and sensors required a big, expensive ship.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Sea Slug's magazine and missile handling system drove the design of the entire County class. I used to have a diagram, but the missiles were stored amidships and were run out along horizontal tunnels have the wings and boosters attached along the way, before being run out to the launchers. They were not stored like a 'round of ammunition' like tartar and terrier, but assembled more like Talos. The point being this does not make it easy to convert an old gun cruiser into a Sea Slug ship.

Funny, the USN converted two gun cruisers into Talos/Tartar ships without much trouble, the Albany-class CGs. Plus the Boston-class Terrier ships.

You also need the UK's staff officers to stop getting seduced by the Good Idea Fairy. The engineers and the staff officers are good at feeding each others imaginations.

Annoyingly, this is where the Treasury is supposed to step in and say 'do you REALLY need that?'.

Or a senior officer being stubborn about the vision of the ship and demanding proof that X, Y, or Z was absolutely required to make the ship work.

Note that a VDS is not required, but a hull sonar is, for example. A submarine attack on a surface ship is done at periscope depth, not from deep.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

US Cruisers were much bigger, entirely free from the constraints of the 1936 London Treaty, based upon earlier Washington Treaty compliant designs, but also no longer bound by those limits either. Aside from the Alaska class, the completely unlimited cruiser designs were not built due to the needs of wartime production. Regardless the US had access to large modern cruisers, with standard displacements greater than 10,000 tons, even without wartime additions.

Britain conversely entered the war two years earlier than the US, and so produced derivatives of what was already being built, the Crown Colony class, crammed into an 8,000 ton standard displacement. This was exceeded by wartime additions, but that served to make postwar modernisations harder.

If the US Navy had instead been forced to build the original 8,000 ton CL55 design below, they would be in a similar position to Britain in the 1950s.



Weight margins were so tight on this design that only four of the turrets had armour protection, the other having splinter protection only.

 

[Rule of cool]

Most of this is entirely incorrect. Terrier required finning like Talos. In the Galveston class, 16 Talos rounds were stored fully assembled (sans fins) in a ready service magazine, with an additional 30 disassembled rounds in a missile stowage magazine. All 104 Talos rounds on the Albany were fully assembled (again, sans fins) ready rounds. Sea Slug was also stored as a ready round, in fact more ready than Terrier, as fins were already attached (as were boosters). In the first three ships, 24 Sea Slugs were stored in a fully ready state, later ships did store disassembled rounds to increase magazine depth, but still had 16 ready rounds in addition to 23 disassembled rounds.

I should point out that given the limited number of fire channels in early missile-armed ships, their significant magazine depth seems to be entirely redundant, given they will only get off a small number of salvoes in an engagement.

IIUC Sea Slug had to have boosters attached as well as fins, whereas Terrier only added fins and Tartar had its find attached. Talos was a different kettle of fish entirely.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That may be the case with Seaslug, but by all accounts with the guns and propulsion they wouldn't be able to reach desired performance otherwise.

Yet the US built some pretty spectacular 6" automatic guns during the war...

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

IIUC Sea Slug had to have boosters attached as well as fins, whereas Terrier only added fins and Tartar had its find attached. Talos was a different kettle of fish entirely.

No, boosters were attached, the shoes running along the rails in the magazine were attached to the boosters.

Source: Warship 2015

 

[CV12Hornet]

Four Type 82s should have replaced the last 4 Countys on the slipways from 1965. A Type 82 mod with double ended Seadart (replacing Ikara) should have followed.

I don't know about the last 4 Counties, but I think there was talk that the last 2 could have been Type 82s. I'm not sure why they weren't, maybe the Sea Dart and other things weren't advanced enough. They were laid down in January and March 1966 after a gap of 4 years since the first 2 Batch 2 ships and Bristol in November 1967, a year and a half later. I have a suspicion that the RN needed more SAGW immediately and had already waited 4 years so had to get those final 2 Counties laid down rather than wait another 2 years for more Type 82s.

Orders for British missile destroyers are a fairly complex subject due to constantly-changing numbers. The first batch were ordered under the 1955-1956 and 1956-1957 estimates; at the time there were plans for ten. Then the Escort Cruiser showed up and the last four were cancelled, leaving two Batch II ships to be ordered in the 1961/1962 program. And then two more Batch 2 ships were tacked on with the deferral of the Escort Cruiser to fill the gap until Sea Dart was ready.

Why there was a five-year gap between the two County batches is unclear in the sources I have - I suspect, like with the USN and Typhon, the Brits were betting on first Blue Envoy and then NIGS to replace the Counties on the building ways.

As far as replacing the Counties on the slipways with Type 82s, given Type 82 development started in 1961 there was no way possible they were replacing the first two Batch II ships. In the end, the design was not finalized until 1964 with orders planned for 1965, most likely after the last two Counties had been ordered and far too late to meet the initial goal of ships in the water by 1967.

In other words, the timing doesn't work.

Yet the US built some pretty spectacular 6" automatic guns during the war...

The Mark N5 had double the rate of fire of the 6"/47 Mk. 16, and compared to the DP variant of that gun it was rather more reliable.

Albion, Bulwark & Centaur could have been completed 1953-54 to the same standard as Hermes in 1959 IOTL minus the advanced electronics.

Hermes completed 1955 to the same standard as herself in 1959 IOTL minus the advanced electronics.

Mm, I'm not so sure about these parts, because "Hermes standard" was more than just the new flight deck arrangement, steam catapults, and radar fit. It also included major structural modifications in the form of a portside deck-edge elevator and, most importantly, a hanger deck strengthened to handle planes over 30,000 lbs.

I genuinely don't think such deep modifications are possible on Centaur, Albion, and Bulwark, and performing them on Hermes was, IIRC, a big reason why she finished in 1959 - just a lot of work to do on both the design and construction side.

I think the best course of action would be one where the RN could build a handful of new major warships through this difficult transition period while using up what WW2 ships they had as best as they could to maximise their investment. For example a single 1952-53 design carrier entering service in ~1958-59 would be vastly better than the twice rebuilt Vic and the advanced but small Hermes.

I mean, if you can get past the political, doctrinal, and financial headwinds this is probably the best option for the RN to get a new carrier in the 1950s, particularly in conjunction with an axial-deck Victorious. It has the best chance of surviving subsequent defense reviews.

 

[Rule of cool]

I mean, if you can get past the political, doctrinal, and financial headwinds this is probably the best option for the RN to get a new carrier in the 1950s, particularly in conjunction with an axial-deck Victorious. It has the best chance of surviving subsequent defense reviews.

Its not as if the RN didn't commission a bunch of new and heavily rebuilt carriers in the 50s.