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The final major challenge at this point involves the infrastructure that will go with hypersonic weapons. Beyond sheer speed, a major benefit to hypersonic weapons is that they tend to fly significantly lower than ballistic missiles; in the upper atmosphere rather than a low earth orbit. The vast majority of ground-based radar stations - the core of most air defense networks - simply cannot see a hypersonic weapon at those altitudes until it is extremely close. This very same fact provides difficulties for the side launching hypersonic weapons as well. Incredibly basic operations such as communicating with the missile become a significant challenge.
Hypersonic weapons are meant to be more than ballistic missiles, they should be able to change course in flight based on input from the operator, whether to confuse the enemy as to the intended target, adjust to hit a mobile target, or to update the aim. During hypersonic flight there is very little time to adjust like that, so even a momentary lapse in communication can be the difference between a successful strike or a catastrophe. Further, the DoD has not stated any intent to equip hypersonic weapons with nuclear warheads at this time, which means that any developed by the U.S. must be more accurate and reliable than any being developed by Russia or China.
Yet at this time, the U.S. lacks the infrastructure to guarantee complete control and constant communication with a hypersonic weapon throughout its entire flight. Ground-based stations are insufficient – true control over hypersonic weapons will require an advanced network of satellites and space-based sensors able to maintain communication, seamlessly handoff communications with a hypersonic weapon in flight to the next satellite, and able to transmit information to and from the missile in real-time. Though the U.S. certainly possesses an extensive satellite network, even this is insufficient for the needs of hypersonic weapons.
Of course, this solution presents many challenges of its own. Money naturally is the primary challenge – the defense industry is well aware that building a single satellite and putting it into space can be quite expensive, much less installing a network on the scale needed here. Political considerations come very much into play here as well. The most effective method for ensuring full sensor coverage is to put each satellite into a geosynchronous orbit. This means that a satellite capable of tracking and communicating with an object moving at speeds up to Mach 25 would be permanently parked over a particular area of the earth. Many nations will fear the possible intelligence collection value such a satellite would possess, and would likely refuse to allow us to place satellites over them – general protestations regarding the existence of such a satellite network aside. As a result, the DoD would have to calculate the best places to place these satellites to maximize their coverage and communication while respecting all territorial claims, which may, in turn, affect how these satellites are developed.
View Static Version
The final major challenge at this point involves the infrastructure that will go with hypersonic weapons. Beyond sheer speed, a major benefit to hypersonic weapons is that they tend to fly significantly lower than ballistic missiles; in the upper atmosphere rather than a low earth orbit. The vast majority of ground-based radar stations - the core of most air defense networks - simply cannot see a hypersonic weapon at those altitudes until it is extremely close. This very same fact provides difficulties for the side launching hypersonic weapons as well. Incredibly basic operations such as communicating with the missile become a significant challenge.
Hypersonic weapons are meant to be more than ballistic missiles, they should be able to change course in flight based on input from the operator, whether to confuse the enemy as to the intended target, adjust to hit a mobile target, or to update the aim. During hypersonic flight there is very little time to adjust like that, so even a momentary lapse in communication can be the difference between a successful strike or a catastrophe. Further, the DoD has not stated any intent to equip hypersonic weapons with nuclear warheads at this time, which means that any developed by the U.S. must be more accurate and reliable than any being developed by Russia or China.
Yet at this time, the U.S. lacks the infrastructure to guarantee complete control and constant communication with a hypersonic weapon throughout its entire flight. Ground-based stations are insufficient – true control over hypersonic weapons will require an advanced network of satellites and space-based sensors able to maintain communication, seamlessly handoff communications with a hypersonic weapon in flight to the next satellite, and able to transmit information to and from the missile in real-time. Though the U.S. certainly possesses an extensive satellite network, even this is insufficient for the needs of hypersonic weapons.
Of course, this solution presents many challenges of its own. Money naturally is the primary challenge – the defense industry is well aware that building a single satellite and putting it into space can be quite expensive, much less installing a network on the scale needed here. Political considerations come very much into play here as well. The most effective method for ensuring full sensor coverage is to put each satellite into a geosynchronous orbit. This means that a satellite capable of tracking and communicating with an object moving at speeds up to Mach 25 would be permanently parked over a particular area of the earth. Many nations will fear the possible intelligence collection value such a satellite would possess, and would likely refuse to allow us to place satellites over them – general protestations regarding the existence of such a satellite network aside. As a result, the DoD would have to calculate the best places to place these satellites to maximize their coverage and communication while respecting all territorial claims, which may, in turn, affect how these satellites are developed.
From
The Road to Hypersonic Weapons
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES & EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES
Is it Hacksaw or another missile?Lockheed awards $81.5M contract for hypersonic missile motor
The $81.5 million contract award is to support Lockheed Martin’s efforts in creating an air-launched, standoff missile that can reach Mach 5.www.defensenews.com
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, is awarded a $10,000,000 cost contract for development of a Mach 10 Quiet Wind Tunnel. This project will ultimately result in crucial advancements in hypersonics fluid mechanics technologies. This acquisition is in support of Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane’s Hypersonics Program. Work will be performed in Notre Dame, Indiana, and is expected to be completed by June 2022. Fiscal 2019 research, development, test and evaluation (Defense) funding in the amount of $8,568,231 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(3), necessary to award the contract to a particular source in order to establish or maintain an essential engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational institution. The Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, Crane, Indiana, is the contracting activity (N00164-20-C-GT10).
Is it Hacksaw or another missile?Lockheed awards $81.5M contract for hypersonic missile motor
The $81.5 million contract award is to support Lockheed Martin’s efforts in creating an air-launched, standoff missile that can reach Mach 5.www.defensenews.com
Technically yes, practically probably not. It would most likely violate the Missile Technology Control Regime in spirit if not letter (non binding however) and none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.Can the United States sell its hypersonic weapons to allied countries such as the UK, Australia and Japan? I am referring mainly to air missiles launched as agm 183a and Hacksaw.
HCSW is light enough to be carried by current fighter fleet.none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.
The objective of the HCSW program, informally called “Hacksaw,” is to develop long-range hypersonic missile prototypes that can be integrated on the service's current bomber and fighter aircraft fleets and be supported in all operations, mission-planning and sustainment efforts, according to the Air Force
Technically yes, practically probably not. It would most likely violate the Missile Technology Control Regime in spirit if not letter (non binding however) and none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.Can the United States sell its hypersonic weapons to allied countries such as the UK, Australia and Japan? I am referring mainly to air missiles launched as agm 183a and Hacksaw.
Technically yes, practically probably not. It would most likely violate the Missile Technology Control Regime in spirit if not letter (non binding however) and none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.Can the United States sell its hypersonic weapons to allied countries such as the UK, Australia and Japan? I am referring mainly to air missiles launched as agm 183a and Hacksaw.
MTCR is by payload weight and voluntary. The UK bought Tomahawks, which aren't MTCR compliant.
Technically yes, practically probably not. It would most likely violate the Missile Technology Control Regime in spirit if not letter (non binding however) and none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.Can the United States sell its hypersonic weapons to allied countries such as the UK, Australia and Japan? I am referring mainly to air missiles launched as agm 183a and Hacksaw.
MTCR is by payload weight and voluntary. The UK bought Tomahawks, which aren't MTCR compliant.
MTCR also counts range, and trades between payload and range, so a nominally under-range missile with a heavy warhead could be prohibited if it would exceed the range limit with a lighter payload.
But NATO members have decided that MTCR does not apply to transfers between members because the treaty's defense cooperation clauses predate the MTCR and the MTCR exempts pre-existing agreements.
Technically yes, practically probably not. It would most likely violate the Missile Technology Control Regime in spirit if not letter (non binding however) and none of those countries have any platform that could carry the ARROW/HCSW (probably in the 3-5 ton range weight wise). The HAWC program looks to be building something lighter that is more of a tactical aircraft missile in terms of weight.Can the United States sell its hypersonic weapons to allied countries such as the UK, Australia and Japan? I am referring mainly to air missiles launched as agm 183a and Hacksaw.
MTCR is by payload weight and voluntary. The UK bought Tomahawks, which aren't MTCR compliant.
MTCR also counts range, and trades between payload and range, so a nominally under-range missile with a heavy warhead could be prohibited if it would exceed the range limit with a lighter payload.
But NATO members have decided that MTCR does not apply to transfers between members because the treaty's defense cooperation clauses predate the MTCR and the MTCR exempts pre-existing agreements.
Was just pointing out that determining factor wasn't system weight, but payload weight. And a transfer can be made as long as the delivering party can guarantee it won't be used or modified for WMD or nuclear use.
I don't think that one is hypersonic weapon, it probably not even faster than Israel's Rocks.Air Force seeks advanced technologies for new counter-A2/AD weapon | InsideDefense.com
The Air Force is looking to integrate a warhead, fuze and other technologies into the Stand-in Attack Weapon, a new missile intended to thwart anti-access/area-denial targets, according to a notice the service published today.insidedefense.com
What I can't understand is whether the term "relocatable target" refers to targets that have been moving or that have been moved from their original positions.Lockheed Martin to develop a ground-launched hypersonic weapon to attack relocatable time-sensitive targets
DARPA pursuing the OpFires project to compensate for limitations of U.S. ground forces in the effective range of surface-to-surface precision fires.www.militaryaerospace.com
Move from position to position rather than constantly moving. For example a TEL.What I can't understand is whether the term "relocatable target" refers to targets that have been moving or that have been moved from their original positions.Lockheed Martin to develop a ground-launched hypersonic weapon to attack relocatable time-sensitive targets
DARPA pursuing the OpFires project to compensate for limitations of U.S. ground forces in the effective range of surface-to-surface precision fires.www.militaryaerospace.com
And what does it mean that it will be able to transport a variety of payloads to several different ranges? What payloads are we talking about? I thought it was just a hypersonic glide body.Move from position to position rather than constantly moving. For example a TEL.What I can't understand is whether the term "relocatable target" refers to targets that have been moving or that have been moved from their original positions.Lockheed Martin to develop a ground-launched hypersonic weapon to attack relocatable time-sensitive targets
DARPA pursuing the OpFires project to compensate for limitations of U.S. ground forces in the effective range of surface-to-surface precision fires.www.militaryaerospace.com
We'll also have to see the NGLAW program.Slightly OT, but has the USAF considered using an air launch version of army’s precision strike missile as a hypersonic weapon for tactical aircraft? It seems to me you could put a hard back and lugs on the weapon with an appropriate interface rather easily and have a low end hypersonic along the lines of the Israeli EXTRA/Rampage system. Not sure what the weight or speed will be, but we know it is faster than ATACMs and lighter/more narrow. Assuming a Mach 3-4 burn out speed from ground launch, it should be in the low hypersonic range when launching from aircraft cruise speed at altitude. I can’t imagine it will weigh more than 3000lbs, given that ATACMs is under 4000. It would be a pretty easy effort that would allow tacair to carry something hypersonic and it would benefit from later army spirals like terminal guidance and range upgrades.