Current Nuclear Weapons Development

[fredymac]

START I, Open Skies, and New START were all signed with Russia (not the Soviet Union), as well as START II and SORT.

Russia in the 90's up to the early 2000's was not the Russia of today. There had been some hope that Russia would evolve into another European country. It's a shame it didn't. As for later treaties, they rode on the momentum of prior treaties. In any event, any new treaty must:

-include all nuclear powers (ie, China)
-have ironclad verification processes that allow direct inspection along the entire production/basing chain
-explicitly define violations and time limits to resolve them
-address all facets of nuclear weapons including the production of fissile material (ie, Russia has to shut down/abolish their facilities to the same extent we did).
-permit inspection of geographic areas/facilities suspected of involvement with nuclear weapons but not identified as such by the host country (ie, secret tunnels etc)

And of course, permit full development and establishment of missile defense systems.

I have a feeling this wouldn't go very far either with Russia/China or the arms control crowd.

 

[Trident]

I will respond the same you respond when asked: ...........

Examples? In response to your allegations about Russian violations of Open Skies I wrote some 600 words to explain (using facts you are free to check, and refute if you can) why my opinion is the way it is. The equivalence between the factual content of my responses and yours that you are implying is frankly a bit ridiculous.

Still hasn't caught up with them? More fact based thinking? The Soviet Union collapsed. Russia is not the same.

And yet the nuclear threat is still here, with the only reason that it diminished at all being arms control, NOT economics.

q.e.d.

As for when Russia collapses, that will be determined by how much they wish to divert into military spending.

... or by when they push the button and take you with them.

A sane person would treat an infinitesimal threat with disinterest. But that's my own biased opinion.

I spend a lot of time in the mountains, so I'm cool with risks if the stakes relate favourably. With this kind of disaster in the cards? No way!

 

[fredymac]

Examples? In response to your allegations about Russian violations of Open Skies I wrote some 600 words to explain (using facts you are free to check, and refute if you can) why my opinion is the way it is. The equivalence between the factual content of my responses and yours that you are implying is frankly a bit ridiculous.

And yet the nuclear threat is still here, with the only reason that it diminished at all being arms control, NOT economics.

q.e.d.

... or by when they push the button and take you with them.


I spend a lot of time in the mountains, so I'm cool with risks if the stakes relate favourably. With this kind of disaster in the cards? No way!

600 words and nothing to say.

I have a feeling economics drove Soviet interest in arms control. I won't say QED because I'm not as omniscient as you.

Yes someone may push a button. And that button can be pushed with or without a treaty.

Again, more non partisan thinking on risk assessment.

 

[Trident]

600 words and nothing to say.

If you can't see facts even when they're plainly spelled out for you that would certainly explain a lot.

In any event, any new treaty must:

With the caveat that currently the issue is not a new treaty but extension of an existing one...

-include all nuclear powers (ie, China)
-have ironclad verification processes that allow direct inspection along the entire production/basing chain
-explicitly define violations and time limits to resolve them
-address all facets of nuclear weapons including the production of fissile material (ie, Russia has to shut down/abolish their facilities to the same extent we did).
-permit inspection of geographic areas/facilities suspected of involvement with nuclear weapons but not identified as such by the host country (ie, secret tunnels etc)

... this is not such a bad wish list for a NEW agreement. It's basically the "arms control crowd's" dream! I would add for good measure:

- comprise all types of delivery systems, including novel (think Poseidon)
- prohibit nuclear weapons sharing arrangements

However...

And of course, permit full development and establishment of missile defense systems.

I have a feeling this wouldn't go very far either with Russia/China or the arms control crowd.

The missile defence part certainly won't because unlimited missile defence is pretty much at odds with limiting nuclear warhead numbers.

Good luck getting even the US to agree to just your original points, though.

 

[Desertfox]

Yes someone may push a button. And that button can be pushed with or without a treaty.

Yes, and it will be those treaties that will reduce the effects of pushing the button from world ending to merely nation ending. I and most everyone will agree thats a good trade.

 

[Trident]

It might even reduce the probability of the button push happening at all, due to the confidence building effect. From where we are now, there is certainly plenty of confidence to be rebuilt.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Trump administration ends waivers in Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday announced that the U.S. would end the last remaining sanctions waivers enshrined in the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal, eliminating key provisions meant to …

thehill.com

Open Skies withdrawal throws nuclear treaty into question

President Trump’s move this week to withdraw from an international pact meant to prevent accidental war has added to concerns about the fate of a separate arms control treaty with Russia.The …

thehill.com

 

[bobbymike]

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in China’s National Defence

At the end of April, two upgraded Chinese Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) reportedly went into service. But China’s SSBN capability is a far less important compone

www.realcleardefense.com

 

[bobbymike]

As China Builds Nuclear Arsenal, Sens. Cruz, Cotton, Cornyn Urge President Trump to Continue Unwinding U.S. From Nuclear Arms Control Treaties That Exclude China | U.S. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas

WASHINGTON, D.C. - U.S. Sens. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,...

www.cruz.senate.gov

 

[kaiserd]

Nuclear numbers game: What’s on China’s mind?

It is to be expected that any move by China, or even expression of intention, to expand its nuclear arsenal would evoke concern in India. An expanding number gap would be perceived as placing India at a disadvantage. Such thinking, however, would be missing the basic fact that numbers in the...

www.google.com

 

[marauder2048]

Yes someone may push a button. And that button can be pushed with or without a treaty.

Yes, and it will be those treaties that will reduce the effects of pushing the button from world ending to merely nation ending. I and most everyone will agree thats a good trade.

Wouldn't you have to show that nuclear arsenals wouldn't have declined naturally?
After all, the US arsenal peaked in the 60's and were declining at a very steady clip before SALT was signed.

 

[Trident]

This is true for the US stockpile (even then the decline was pretty moderate until 1990, you could also characterize it broadly as stagnation), but the Soviet arsenal (and that is what defines the threat to the US, after all) peaked right before INF.

 

[Josh_TN]

Did the US strategic arsenal really decline that much? I think a lot of tactical systems went out of favor post 60's and also the increased accuracy of delivery reduced the total megatonage of the strategic inventory. I don't have the numbers but I suspect the total number of deliverable strategic warheads - and thus the number of targets that could be confidently engaged - changed very little.

I think fredymac's of the opinion that the US should simply outspend Russia by intentionally provoking an arms race. Which might have some merit in a bipolar world. But it seems likely that China will be able to do the same thing to the US in a decade, and that having that kind of policy isn't in the long term interests of the US. It also seems likely that Russia will outspend itself even at its current level of defense spending - it's trying modernize its conventional forces while recapitalizing its nuclear forces and also inventing several entire new classes of strategic delivery, all with arguably less of an economy than the Soviet Union. With the falling price of oil and miserable demographics that kick in 10-20 years from now, it seems likely Russia will decline without a hard push form the US.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

The only thing of interest will be seeing how China reacts to anti colonial sentiment among African countries when the time comes to pay off debts and repatriate the Chinese population that has been settling there.

Yes, and after that, I'm sure at some point (I'll probably be dead by then, I agree) some East African President is going to sweep to power on an anti-American/anti-European campaign, because of European and American corporate interests in Africa and South Asia (And slavery! And global warming! And colonialism! Blame the Americans for all our problems!). The Chinese and Russians do not hold a monopoly on geopolitical revisionism or power politics.

Plus, at some point, if the Chinese get far too uppity and/or go insane or something, the Russians will flip on them; and India is coming up too. The Chinese question is self-limiting, and the Chinese know it. China does not pose an existential threat to the United States, the Japanese are firmly in the American camp, and worst worst worst case scenario, the sphere of influence runs up to the straits of Malacca (I mean, what are they going to do, try to invade Australia? Control Africa? The Mideast? With the Fifth Fleet in the way?). The Chinese are adequately contained by geography.

Chinese self-perceived vulnerability is why they're feeling paranoid right now. Since they don't think they can win much (come on, Central Asia at best? Not much of a prize, man, a consolation prize at best, and the Russians think it's theirs), they think the only reason the Americans could be fearful is American fearmongering in preparation for a military buildup followed by a hard-on triggered collapse of the Chinese state.

The "game" never stopped. America just quashed the opposition and has been sitting at the top of the hill (and giving it a good makeover, for better or worse) for three decades. Americans tend not to see the game because they are on top of the pile.

At this point, nuclear weapons are important, but not desperately so. Unless the US wants to go full on evil conqueror and blast the Chinese to bits (casus belli are easy to manufacture), the stakes aren't that high yet.

 

[Trident]

I think fredymac's of the opinion that the US should simply outspend Russia by intentionally provoking an arms race. Which might have some merit in a bipolar world. But it seems likely that China will be able to do the same thing to the US in a decade, and that having that kind of policy isn't in the long term interests of the US. It also seems likely that Russia will outspend itself even at its current level of defense spending - it's trying modernize its conventional forces while recapitalizing its nuclear forces and also inventing several entire new classes of strategic delivery, all with arguably less of an economy than the Soviet Union. With the falling price of oil and miserable demographics that kick in 10-20 years from now, it seems likely Russia will decline without a hard push form the US.

Yup. I think what needs to be kept in mind is that the way the US interacts on arms control with the Russians is being watched narrowly in Beijing. Eventually China will have to be engaged on this topic and even if you feel an arms race with Russia justifies the severe risks inherent in such a policy, it potentially does irreparable damage to the prospect of treaties with the Chinese. As you correctly note, this is a very different proposition with a healthy economy that is in a very good position to sustain an arms race with the US, so if nothing else arms control today should be viewed as nurturing an alternative for the future. By taking the hardliner, unrelenting stance you risk completely alienating China from the very idea of arms control because it sows plausible doubt that there is any good-faith interest in such agreements on the US side at all. So at the very moment when it is finally up against an opponent with the economic clout to out-compete US military spending in the long term, the US might find itself locked out of any other option by its past conduct.

Russian demographics have improved, BTW.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

Yup. I think what needs to be kept in mind is that the way the US interacts on arms control with the Russians is being watched narrowly in Beijing.

I think the point of leaving the arms control treaty is precisely to force the Chinese into a strategic buildup by starting a massive American one. The Russians aren't going to be expanding their strategic forces anytime soon.

 

[Josh_TN]

Yup. I think what needs to be kept in mind is that the way the US interacts on arms control with the Russians is being watched narrowly in Beijing.

I think the point of leaving the arms control treaty is precisely to force the Chinese into a strategic buildup by starting a massive American one. The Russians aren't going to be expanding their strategic forces anytime soon.

I rather doubt that. First, the Chinese have always been fine with being at less than parity with the US and Russia. Second, the US has no warheads or delivery systems in production, so it has little means of putting additional pressure on the Chinese. The US can quickly reMIRV up to around ~3200 warheads, but after that it is played out. I think the current administration just hates anything made by the previous administration, and that is reason enough to scrap the deal. I think they also insist that any deal that doesn't involve China is worthless, not realizing that backing out of every arms control arrangement, and indeed most every international arrangement it can void, sets bad precedent for any future cooperation. IE, I think the current admin is simply short sighted in its goals and naive in its expectations of the Chinese.

We will see which government is in power come February. That will decide whether New START survives or not; that is all there is to it.

 

[Trident]

I think the point of leaving the arms control treaty is precisely to force the Chinese into a strategic buildup by starting a massive American one. The Russians aren't going to be expanding their strategic forces anytime soon.

What could the point of doing that possibly be? There seems to be precious little benefit to such a strategy - unlike Russia, China can call the move and stomach the cost just fine. Can the US really still afford to race China after having already outspent Russia (do not underestimate them - they may not be able to keep up forever, but they won't just keel over without giving the US a run for it first). More to the point, can it afford to race both at the same time if they feel compelled to cooperate (or at least coordinate)?

 

[In_A_Dream]

I rather doubt that. First, the Chinese have always been fine with being at less than parity with the US and Russia. Second, the US has no warheads or delivery systems in production, so it has little means of putting additional pressure on the Chinese. The US can quickly reMIRV up to around ~3200 warheads, but after that it is played out. I think the current administration just hates anything made by the previous administration, and that is reason enough to scrap the deal. I think they also insist that any deal that doesn't involve China is worthless, not realizing that backing out of every arms control arrangement, and indeed most every international arrangement it can void, sets bad precedent for any future cooperation. IE, I think the current admin is simply short sighted in its goals and naive in its expectations of the Chinese.

We will see which government is in power come February. That will decide whether New START survives or not; that is all there is to it.

The Chinese were content with being at less-than-parity with the US because it suited their long term strategic plan to be courted by the United States. A strong nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States would have hindered the relationship building process. And it's true, any deal that doesn't involve China is worthless. Russia can't hold a candle to the threat that Communist China is today. Russia & the US both see the imperative of forcing China to the negotiating table but I don't see China yielding as it is a sign of weakness to the hawkish leadership that has slowly gained dominance in the Politburo. With regards to the current administration, its not short-sighted or naive, they are doing everything they can to slow down something that should have never gotten this far in the first place. Communist China is quickly becoming, in every sense, the Nazi Germany of the 21st century. The sooner you accept that reality, the better.

 

[Josh_TN]

I rather doubt that. First, the Chinese have always been fine with being at less than parity with the US and Russia. Second, the US has no warheads or delivery systems in production, so it has little means of putting additional pressure on the Chinese. The US can quickly reMIRV up to around ~3200 warheads, but after that it is played out. I think the current administration just hates anything made by the previous administration, and that is reason enough to scrap the deal. I think they also insist that any deal that doesn't involve China is worthless, not realizing that backing out of every arms control arrangement, and indeed most every international arrangement it can void, sets bad precedent for any future cooperation. IE, I think the current admin is simply short sighted in its goals and naive in its expectations of the Chinese.

We will see which government is in power come February. That will decide whether New START survives or not; that is all there is to it.

The Chinese were content with being at less-than-parity with the US because it suited their long term strategic plan to be courted by the United States. A strong nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States would have hindered the relationship building process. And it's true, any deal that doesn't involve China is worthless. Russia can't hold a candle to the threat that Communist China is today. Russia & the US both see the imperative of forcing China to the negotiating table but I don't see China yielding as it is a sign of weakness to the hawkish leadership that has slowly gained dominance in the Politburo. With regards to the current administration, its not short-sighted or naive, they are doing everything they can to slow down something that should have never gotten this far in the first place. Communist China is quickly becoming, in every sense, the Nazi Germany of the 21st century. The sooner you accept that reality, the better.

I absolutely agree that China is a a huge long term threat to the US. That is not the issue. What I disagree with is the steps the administration is taking with regard to engaging Russia and how this will ultimately be viewed by China. The US is not in a position to simply outspend China like it outspent the Soviet Union. At some point the US will have to accept some kind of parity with the Chinese in the broad sense and more specifically in strategic arms. I think long term that New START will have to be scrapped when the Chinese start to approach the limitations set in that treaty. Until that day, I think New START serves the purpose of limiting Russians and setting an example for future arms control agreements with China. I don't see what leaving New START does other than signal the US will leave arms control treaties it has made regardless of whether there is any concrete reason to do so - ie, Russian cheating, Chinese proliferation, or the US having any additional launchers in production. Leaving New START arbitrarily I think signals that it is pointless to engage in arms control with the US, and in the future that is probably an option we don't want to close the door on.

 

[marauder2048]

Did the US strategic arsenal really decline that much? I think a lot of tactical systems went out of favor post 60's and also the increased accuracy of delivery reduced the total megatonage of the strategic inventory. I don't have the numbers but I suspect the total number of deliverable strategic warheads - and thus the number of targets that could be confidently engaged - changed very little.

You aren't seriously suggesting that post-1989, strategic arsenals would have had the inventory levels they had pre-1989 absent any treaty?

After all, SALT I was an upper bound which the Soviets built up to. The US didn't.
The only treaty that reduced strategic arsenals was START which was signed in 1991 and came into force in 1994!

If a treaty merely codifies what's a radically changed reality on the ground why is it needed?

 

[In_A_Dream]

I absolutely agree that China is a a huge long term threat to the US. That is not the issue. What I disagree with is the steps the administration is taking with regard to engaging Russia and how this will ultimately be viewed by China. The US is not in a position to simply outspend China like it outspent the Soviet Union. At some point the US will have to accept some kind of parity with the Chinese in the broad sense and more specifically in strategic arms. I think long term that New START will have to be scrapped when the Chinese start to approach the limitations set in that treaty. Until that day, I think New START serves the purpose of limiting Russians and setting an example for future arms control agreements with China. I don't see what leaving New START does other than signal the US will leave arms control treaties it has made regardless of whether there is any concrete reason to do so - ie, Russian cheating, Chinese proliferation, or the US having any additional launchers in production. Leaving New START arbitrarily I think signals that it is pointless to engage in arms control with the US, and in the future that is probably an option we don't want to close the door on.

START only puts the US in a weaker position against an opponent who is experiencing rapid military modernization and is determined to destroy US hegemony. In these type of situations, the policy has been to escalate to de-escalate, and by breaking the chains of START, the US will be able to flex until both see it as necessary to meet at the negotiating table.

In China's mind, now is not the time to yield to the US. There is going to be a significant amount of posturing that will happen on both sides as China continues to assert itself in an effort to defend its position/growth. But ultimately, the days of buying US corporations & politicians is over, Beijing will need to snap out of its 90s daydream that it can subvert the current world order unhindered and accept a reality where there are two suns in the sky.

 

[sferrin]

More to the point, I know of no one in the current administration who has stated the Russians have cheated, much less provided any evidence. Where as it was fairly clear the INF treat was being violated (and more over no longer was suitable due to lack of Chinese involvement). Since there isn't any US nuclear weapon in production and there won't be any delivery platform in production until the B-21, again, I fail to see what leaving the treaty does at this time. It still inconveniences the Russians even if you assume they are cheating.

Why stay in it if there is no good reason to do so and plenty to leave?

 

[stealthflanker]

So, there goes the CTBT i guess.

China would be happily re-using their Lop Nur range. Since they are not even limited by any arms treaty they can just go ahead and start producing and testing as many as they want.

 

[Trident]

Why stay in it if there is no good reason to do so and plenty to leave?

What reason (let alone in plural to the extent of "plenty") is there to leave? Even allowing for uncertainties (created, notably, by the absence of arms control agreements and attendant verification regimes with the PRC) about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and the capacity of their production infrastructure, Russia's stockpile is still several times larger and its warhead production capacity higher.

Leaving therefore means removing all constraints from what will remain by far the largest nuclear threat to the US for at least a decade. It further risks triggering an arms race with two opponents at once:

1) Russia which is perhaps liable to run out of steam eventually but still has the infrastructure in place to put significant pressure on the US well into the mid-term. With allegedly greater legacy fissile material production capacity than the US and several in-production delivery systems that can be ramped-up at short notice, it may have the ability to initially outpace an American built-up.

2) China, which cannot respond as rapidly due to a lag in arsenal starting size and warhead production capacity but which in the long-term has the economic clout to hang with and potentially outpace the US for as long as it pleases.

So you may gain the freedom to build-up, but from the word go face savage competition first from one, then the other opponent - with a non-trivial risk that both might seek to limit their costs by forming an alliance and combining their resources against you. That seems like a bit of a self-licking ice cream cone, only by creating the ability to build-up do you supply a reason for doing so at all.

And as pointed out several times before by now, it probably means a return to arms control at some future date is permanently off the table, due to the (then perfectly plausible) perception that the US is not a good-faith actor in this field.

 

[In_A_Dream]

And as pointed out several times before by now, it probably means a return to arms control at some future date is permanently off the table, due to the (then perfectly plausible) perception that the US is not a good-faith actor in this field.

Russia has just as much interest in seeing China handicapped by effective Nuclear Arms Control management as the US and Russia knows the US isn't seeking to fry Russia because both have found a way to co-exist for the time being. Not to mention both Russia & the US have been in talks to find a way to bring China to the table. If the US decides to leave, they understand why and can make the US out to be the bogeyman for the sake of political face. China is the big unknown, and until they are willing to show themselves as willing to be a party of an enforceable treaty, it's in everyone's best interest to do what is right for their own national security. Arms Control is never permanently off-the-table, not even sure what would justify that. And let's not act like China has ever acted in good faith on ANYTHING substantial, their whole long range strategic plan is heavily based in deception.

 

[marauder2048]

Why stay in it if there is no good reason to do so and plenty to leave?

What reason (let alone in plural to the extent of "plenty") is there to leave? Even allowing for uncertainties (created, notably, by the absence of arms control agreements and attendant verification regimes with the PRC) about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and the capacity of their production infrastructure, Russia's stockpile is still several times larger and its warhead production capacity higher.

Leaving therefore means removing all constraints from what will remain by far the largest nuclear threat to the US for at least a decade. It further risks triggering an arms race with two opponents at once:

1) Russia which is perhaps liable to run out of steam eventually but still has the infrastructure in place to put significant pressure on the US well into the mid-term. With allegedly greater legacy fissile material production capacity than the US and several in-production delivery systems that can be ramped-up at short notice, it may have the ability to initially outpace an American built-up.

So the alternative is to re-up on a treaty (for 5 years) with a state that by your description is break-out capable at a moment's notice?
How is that stabilizing?

 

[Trident]

Russia has just as much interest in seeing China handicapped by effective Nuclear Arms Control management as the US...

True, but only for as long as it is secure in the knowledge that it need not worry about having a US break-out thanks to binding arms control agreements in place. Remove that factor, and the rules of the game change completely from their perspective.

... and Russia knows the US isn't seeking to fry Russia because both have found a way to co-exist for the time being.

I seriously think that trust has been very deeply eroded since 2002, and particularly in the past 10 years - to the extent that relations with China (certain misgivings not withstanding) are already more cordial. If New Start dies and the US embarks on a genuine build-up, all bets are off. Far stranger alliances have been precipitated by exogenous pressures, think WWII.

And let's not act like China has ever acted in good faith on ANYTHING substantial, their whole long range strategic plan is heavily based in deception.

Not sure things are all that black and white, but even supposing that you're right, extending New START buys the US 5 years of time to prove that to the world at large and then still start the arms race with a comfortable lead. Without blowing billions on a redundant race with the Russians in the meantime.

 

[sferrin]

Why stay in it if there is no good reason to do so and plenty to leave?

What reason (let alone in plural to the extent of "plenty") is there to leave? Even allowing for uncertainties (created, notably, by the absence of arms control agreements and attendant verification regimes with the PRC) about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and the capacity of their production infrastructure, Russia's stockpile is still several times larger and its warhead production capacity higher.

Leaving therefore means removing all constraints from what will remain by far the largest nuclear threat to the US for at least a decade. It further risks triggering an arms race with two opponents at once:

1) Russia which is perhaps liable to run out of steam eventually but still has the infrastructure in place to put significant pressure on the US well into the mid-term. With allegedly greater legacy fissile material production capacity than the US and several in-production delivery systems that can be ramped-up at short notice, it may have the ability to initially outpace an American built-up.

2) China, which cannot respond as rapidly due to a lag in arsenal starting size and warhead production capacity but which in the long-term has the economic clout to hang with and potentially outpace the US for as long as it pleases.

So you may gain the freedom to build-up, but from the word go face savage competition first from one, then the other opponent - with a non-trivial risk that both might seek to limit their costs by forming an alliance and combining their resources against you. That seems like a bit of a self-licking ice cream cone, only by creating the ability to build-up do you supply a reason for doing so at all.

And as pointed out several times before by now, it probably means a return to arms control at some future date is permanently off the table, due to the (then perfectly plausible) perception that the US is not a good-faith actor in this field.

There is ALREADY an arms race. Both Russia and China are building numerous new nuclear systems. Since we're already IN the treaty, and it stopped none of this, there is no point in staying in it.

 

[Trident]

So the alternative is to re-up on a treaty (for 5 years) with a state that by your description is break-out capable at a moment's notice?
How is that stabilizing?

Easy:

Break-out capable =/= break-out minded, as the past quarter century has demonstrated.

The break-out *capability* is not in violation of any agreement and, barring a rational reason for taking advantage of it, will (based on past precedent) continue to go unused.

 

[marauder2048]

So the alternative is to re-up on a treaty (for 5 years) with a state that by your description is break-out capable at a moment's notice?
How is that stabilizing?

Easy:

Break-out capable =/= break-out minded, as the past quarter century has demonstrated.

The break-out *capability* is not in violation of any agreement and, barring a rational reason for taking advantage of it, will (based on past precedent) continue to go unused.

"break-out minded"....psychology at a distance. Since you're at it:

What's the mindset for retaining short-term breakout capability if the treaty is a useful guarantee of security?
The former costs money and effort. The treaty is cheap on both counts.

 

[Trident]

There is ALREADY an arms race. Both Russia and China are building numerous new nuclear systems. Since we're already IN the treaty, and it stopped none of this, there is no point in staying in it.

With Russia? Hardly. Every new Russian warhead and every new Russian delivery system currently comes at the expense of an existing Russian warhead or delivery system, thanks to New START. It is a re-capitalization (to borrow US DoD procurement speak), not a build-up*. Arms control provides the US with a hard ceiling on the Russian arsenal - unless of course it needlessly removes that ceiling by leaving a perfectly good treaty that Russia has voluntarily offered to extend, of course. Your call.

China on the other hand is definitely building up, but even in the most pessimistic interpretation of uncertainties surrounding its current status and abilities it will not approach a critical threshold in as little as 5 years.

*At the risk of repeating myself, there are factors at play in the Russian modernization drive that the US simply never had to contend with. Portraying it as a build-up is just disingenuous. What would the US be doing if California had seceded in 1991, suddenly leaving the manufacturing site for Trident SLBMs in Sunnyvale on foreign territory? What would the US be doing if it had not commissioned a new SSBN since 1990? Shrug dismissively at the loss of operational sovereignty over the arsenal and increasing obsolescence? Why do you think the Columbia class is being prepared, to build up the arsenal or to replace an increasingly elderly Ohio class?

What's the mindset for retaining short-term breakout capability if the treaty is a useful guarantee of security?
The former costs money and effort. The treaty is cheap on both counts.

I'm not making any determination about whether that was a smart choice on Russia's part, or whether the US was right to unilaterally draw down its own capability. Just pointing out that logically the mere presence of a capability (which does not contravene any commitments Russia entered into) doesn't automatically translate into malicious intent. Unlike the US with its missile defence system, Russian officials have not made noises about making destabilizing use of this potential, for example. If they are comfortable with paying through their nose for the peace of mind of having it sitting in their bedside table drawer, I'd say we let them.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

Communist China is quickly becoming, in every sense, the Nazi Germany of the 21st century. The sooner you accept that reality, the better.

That is utter bullshit. Who are they about to invade? Their maximum objective is literally Taiwan. If they get too uppity, the Russians will flip on them.

As for Africa and Central Asia... the Fifth fleet can most definitely hold the Indian Ocean SLOCs to cut short any proxy war, and Central Asia is Russia's sphere.

The Chinese are boxed in seven ways to Sunday, and they know it. They're running scared, not out for conquest.

With Russia on the board, and India coming up, the Chinese Question is self limiting. What needs to be done are economic reforms in India.

Read your Adam Tooze (Wages of Destruction). Germany went to war because it needed imports but had inadequate exports. Unless the US intentionally and wilfully shuts down China's access to markets in Eurasia, or destroys the Chinese economy, there is little reason for the Chinese to be aggressive. Of course, the Americans could also be backing the Chinese into a corner so they could wipe the Chinese off the board and claim the Chinese struck first... but the US can't be that evil, can it? Oh wait...

 

[sferrin]

There is ALREADY an arms race. Both Russia and China are building numerous new nuclear systems. Since we're already IN the treaty, and it stopped none of this, there is no point in staying in it.

With Russia? Hardly. Every new Russian warhead and every new Russian delivery system currently comes at the expense of an existing Russian warhead or delivery system, thanks to New START. It is a re-capitalization (to borrow US DoD procurement speak), not a build-up*. Arms control provides the US with a hard ceiling on the Russian arsenal - unless of course it needlessly removes that ceiling by leaving a perfectly good treaty that Russia has voluntarily offered to extend, of course. Your call.

China on the other hand is definitely building up, but even in the most pessimistic interpretation of uncertainties surrounding its current status and abilities it will not approach a critical threshold in as little as 5 years.

*At the risk of repeating myself, there are factors at play in the Russian modernization drive that the US simply never had to contend with. Portraying it as a build-up is just disingenuous. What would the US be doing if California had seceded in 1991, suddenly leaving the manufacturing site for Trident SLBMs in Sunnyvale on foreign territory? What would the US be doing if it had not commissioned a new SSBN since 1990? Shrug dismissively at the loss of operational sovereignty over the arsenal and increasing obsolescence? Why do you think the Columbia class is being prepared, to build up the arsenal or to replace an increasingly elderly Ohio class?

What's the mindset for retaining short-term breakout capability if the treaty is a useful guarantee of security?
The former costs money and effort. The treaty is cheap on both counts.

I'm not making any determination about whether that was a smart choice on Russia's part, or whether the US was right to unilaterally draw down its own capability. Just pointing out that logically the mere presence of a capability (which does not contravene any commitments Russia entered into) doesn't automatically translate into malicious intent. Unlike the US with its missile defence system, Russian officials have not made noises about making destabilizing use of this potential, for example. If they are comfortable with paying through their nose for the peace of mind of having it sitting in their bedside table drawer, I'd say we let them.

Russia has two new ICBMs in production, an new SLBM, an new SSBN, and THREE nuclear capable bomber assembly lines. Yeah, that Treaty is doing a fantastic job. Why are you so eager to stay in it?

 

[Trident]

Yeah, that Treaty is doing a fantastic job.

If you ask it to do a job it was never designed to do, perhaps not. The task it was conceived to fulfill it is indeed doing pretty adequately, though.

Then there is the fact that the job you apparently want it to do seems... baffling to me. Under a treaty that prohibits those systems you mention, the US would be forced to soldier on with the Ohio class and MMIII into perpetuity. No Columbia class, no GBSD, no W93, no B-21, no LRSO. Somehow I find it difficult to believe that such an arrangement would not arouse your ire in a similar manner. Or are you proposing that Russia agree never to modernize its arsenal while allowing the US to do so?

Seriously, is it really so hard to see that the replacement cycles for Russian and US systems are simply out of sync due to the effects of the Soviet collapse on Russia's arsenal? I would have thought that would be a trivial realization.

Why are you so eager to stay in it?

Have you been reading my posts?

 

[Trident]

THREE nuclear capable bomber assembly lines

I count only one, BTW - Kazan. From what I saw of it the Tu-95 plant in Samara is decrepit, its scratch-built output of the past 20 years totals a handful of 50-seat turboprop airliners.

 

[marauder2048]

*At the risk of repeating myself, there are factors at play in the Russian modernization drive that the US simply never had to contend with. Portraying it as a build-up is just disingenuous. What would the US be doing if California had seceded in 1991, suddenly leaving the manufacturing site for Trident SLBMs in Sunnyvale on foreign territory? What would the US be doing if it had not commissioned a new SSBN since 1990? Shrug dismissively at the loss of operational sovereignty over the arsenal and increasing obsolescence? Why do you think the Columbia class is being prepared, to build up the arsenal or to replace an increasingly elderly Ohio class?

Which is irrelevant since it was a Russian decision to end the Soviet Union.
The Russians had only spent the last 70 years brutally crushing Ukrainian independence movements whenever they popped up.

Somehow, the UK is fine with its strategic missiles (and the RVs and the warheads actually) being manufactured by someone else.
And that someone else isn't literally next door and totally dependent economically on a single buyer.

I'm not making any determination about whether that was a smart choice on Russia's part, or whether the US was right to unilaterally draw down its own capability. Just pointing out that logically the mere presence of a capability (which does not contravene any commitments Russia entered into) doesn't automatically translate into malicious intent. Unlike the US with its missile defence system, Russian officials have not made noises about making destabilizing use of this potential, for example. If they are comfortable with paying through their nose for the peace of mind of having it sitting in their bedside table drawer, I'd say we let them.

You had previously made a strong mathematical assertion that was in part premised on inferring a mindset.
Which you've followed by more inference about mindsets. Were the Soviet ABM Treaty violations which were detected clandestinely
evidence of an honest and dismissible mindset? It was breakout capability after all.

The vast Russian ABM system is also completely unaccounted for in any treaty whatsoever; there's no evidence the US has sized
its strategic arsenal to overcome it as it once had (fully 10% of the strategic arsenal was targeted just at the "Moscow" ABM system).

And Putin said in 2002 that they did not feel threatened by the US withdrawing from the ABM treaty. So which noise is salient here?

 

[Trident]

Which is irrelevant since it was a Russian decision to end the Soviet Union.
The Russians had only spent the last 70 years brutally crushing Ukrainian independence movements whenever they popped up.

While both those statements are perfectly true (well, closer to 100 years at this point), they also are perfectly irrelevant to the subject at hand. The cause is neither here nor there - but the effect is what it is.

And I STILL fail to see the difference (other than timing) between GBSD and Topol-M/Yars or Borei and Columbia, for example. What am I missing?

Somehow, the UK is fine with its strategic missiles (and the RVs and the warheads actually) being manufactured by someone else.
And that someone else isn't literally next door and totally dependent economically on a single buyer.

Talk about a red herring. The UK is not party to the relevant treaty and quite apart from that it is probably no accident that it is a singular exception in adopting such an approach.

At least its supplier hasn't expressed an interest in joining the Warsaw Pact (if it still existed).

Were the Soviet ABM Treaty violations which were detected clandestinely
evidence of an honest and dismissible mindset? It was breakout capability after all.

No. They do provide a pretty good example of the contingency provisions in an arms control treaty working as designed, though. So thanks for making that point for me. Besides, I would be *very* careful about invoking ABM of all things as an example of the US holding the moral high ground in treaty matters - there are a couple of skeletons in the closet there that arguably simply slid by the Soviets. And I say Soviets advisedly, because I'm not even talking about the eventual abrogation in 2002.

One man's violation is another man's "contentious interpretation". Which is why it is so nonsensical to get worked up over technicalities (even though strictly speaking they may amount to a violation) and ditch a treaty that is fundamentally sound. If the Russians start cranking out warheads tomorrow, by all means leave, but the kind of stuff that is going on with Open Skies is just ridiculous. It's so obvious that the Trump admin simply wants out, but is too cowardly to just do it without a pathetic technicality as a fig leaf.

The vast Russian ABM system is also completely unaccounted for in any treaty whatsoever; there's no evidence the US has sized
its strategic arsenal to overcome it as it once had (fully 10% of the strategic arsenal was targeted just at the "Moscow" ABM system).

Vast? You have got to be joking. It covers the grand total of one city and has been reduced to only the short-range endo-atmospheric component nowadays. At the end of the day, the fact remains that even if ABM were still in force, this "vast" system would be in compliance with its provisions, where GMD and Aegis Ashore would not.

And Putin said in 2002 that they did not feel threatened by the US withdrawing from the ABM treaty. So which noise is salient here?

I suspect you are simply quoting him out of context there. Russia has been registering its displeasure ever since the treaty's demise, though it is true that it was (and likely still is today) not worried about the then-planned (and currently implemented) scope. Its worries have always centered on the absence of an upper limit established by a treaty.

 

[marauder2048]

Which is irrelevant since it was a Russian decision to end the Soviet Union.
The Russians had only spent the last 70 years brutally crushing Ukrainian independence movements whenever they popped up.

While both those statements are perfectly true (well, closer to 100 years at this point), they also are perfectly irrelevant to the subject at hand. The cause is neither here nor there - but the effect is what it is.

Just pointing out that you completely mischaracterized the factors at play to produce your hypothetical. Now you are arguing for effect.

The Russians made a choice. And there were other choices they could have made (see below) for mitigating that original choice.
They elected not to do that especially in a period where the US was paying for their warheads to be dismantled and bending over backwards
to help out in general.

And I STILL fail to see the difference (other than timing) between GBSD and Topol-M/Yars or Borei and Columbia, for example. What am I missing?

The evidence for the hull life of the Ohio class. The evidence for the lifespan, maintainability and supplier base of MMIII esp. wrt
the number of glory trips required per year. All public domain. No such evidence is available for the Russian systems.

Somehow, the UK is fine with its strategic missiles (and the RVs and the warheads actually) being manufactured by someone else.
And that someone else isn't literally next door and totally dependent economically on a single buyer.

Talk about a red herring. The UK is not party to the relevant treaty and quite apart from that it is probably no accident that it is a singular exception in adopting such an approach.

At least its supplier hasn't expressed an interest in joining the Warsaw Pact (if it still existed).

It was a plausible approach for the Russians to have taken vis-a-via Ukraine in the period 1991 - 2013 (?). They didn't.
The Russians were offered NATO membership. They declined. So they and Ukraine could have been part of another alliance all over again.

Were the Soviet ABM Treaty violations which were detected clandestinely
evidence of an honest and dismissible mindset? It was breakout capability after all.

No. They do provide a pretty good example of the contingency provisions in an arms control treaty working as designed, though. So thanks for making that point for me.

The Russians cheated. They got caught cheating through a massive clandestine effort that was not part of the treaty.
They then stopped cheating in that manner. And moved on to other cheating see Krasnoyarsk.

And of course the ABM treaty compliance body was incapable of applying sanctions. So why not continue to cheat?

Besides, I would be *very* careful about invoking ABM of all things as an example of the US holding the moral high ground in treaty matters - there are a couple of skeletons in the closet there that arguably simply slid by the Soviets.

Go ahead and bring them out.

That SAM-D (Patriot) was strictly limited in engagement velocities was the best example of the US scrupulously
abiding by the treaty to a ludicrous degree.

One man's violation is another man's "contentious interpretation". Which is why it is so nonsensical to get worked up over technicalities (even though strictly speaking they may amount to a violation) and ditch a treaty that is fundamentally sound. If the Russians start cranking out warheads tomorrow, by all means leave, but the kind of stuff that is going on with Open Skies is just ridiculous. It's so obvious that the Trump admin simply wants out, but is too cowardly to just do it without a pathetic technicality as a fig leaf.

Treaties are "enforced" by a diplomatic corps that has a vested interest in not leaving. Diplomats don't like spats or ruptures.
It's the same corps that was opposed to using MELODY to detect Soviet cheating under the ABM Treaty.

So no violation is ever likely produce a breach. And none of the treaty compliance bodies can apply or enforce sanctions.

And the inspection protocols are deliberately designed *not* to find violations: inspectors can be held at a distance of 50 meters.

The high-fidelity SCUD TEL decoys the Iraqis cobbled together by 1991 could not be distinguished from the real thing from
a signature perspective until you were under 22 meters.

Vast? You have got to be joking. It covers the grand total of one city

The late 80's system had a defended area of many thousands of square miles. The defensive complexes were 50 miles away from Moscow itself.
At its upper bound, they could have defended a good chunk of European Russia.

and has been reduced to only the short-range endo-atmospheric component nowadays. At the end of the day, the fact remains that even if ABM were still in force, this "vast" system would be in compliance with its provisions, where GMD and Aegis Ashore would not.

Short-range endo: makes complete sense given the general de-MIRVing of the US arsenal under START+. Just wait for atmospheric strip-out of the decoys.

Aegis Ashore has no utility against strategic weapons. And the radars meet no plausible definition under the ABM treaty.

GMD is not credible against a Russian threat of practically any size. They know that.

I suspect you are simply quoting him out of context there.

I'm not. There are too many direct quotes from period. Particularly what Putin said on Russian national television.

 

[In_A_Dream]

That is utter bullshit. Who are they about to invade? Their maximum objective is literally Taiwan. If they get too uppity, the Russians will flip on them.

As for Africa and Central Asia... the Fifth fleet can most definitely hold the Indian Ocean SLOCs to cut short any proxy war, and Central Asia is Russia's sphere.

The Chinese are boxed in seven ways to Sunday, and they know it. They're running scared, not out for conquest.

With Russia on the board, and India coming up, the Chinese Question is self limiting. What needs to be done are economic reforms in India.

Read your Adam Tooze (Wages of Destruction). Germany went to war because it needed imports but had inadequate exports. Unless the US intentionally and wilfully shuts down China's access to markets in Eurasia, or destroys the Chinese economy, there is little reason for the Chinese to be aggressive. Of course, the Americans could also be backing the Chinese into a corner so they could wipe the Chinese off the board and claim the Chinese struck first... but the US can't be that evil, can it? Oh wait...

What do you think is going to happen as the lines continue to be drawn? The US is already telling countries to pick a side, that's what happens in a Cold War between major powers. I'm sorry I don't hold any adoration for an authoritarian superpower that doesn't answer to its citizens and believes its form of government should be an example for the world to follow. We've been here before, and America exists to put down cancers like Communist China.

True, but only for as long as it is secure in the knowledge that it need not worry about having a US break-out thanks to binding arms control agreements in place. Remove that factor, and the rules of the game change completely from their perspective.

I seriously think that trust has been very deeply eroded since 2002, and particularly in the past 10 years - to the extent that relations with China (certain misgivings not withstanding) are already more cordial. If New Start dies and the US embarks on a genuine build-up, all bets are off. Far stranger alliances have been precipitated by exogenous pressures, think WWII.

Not sure things are all that black and white, but even supposing that you're right, extending New START buys the US 5 years of time to prove that to the world at large and then still start the arms race with a comfortable lead. Without blowing billions on a redundant race with the Russians in the meantime.

I agree, trust has been eroded, publicly, and while we had our spat over Ukraine & Syria, I think the bigger picture is more concerning for both nations. Russia knows it can't do anything about China (who is sitting comfortably under the Siberian resource belt), which is pushing it to field a new generation of missiles and strategic bombers in the interest of its own national security. As tensions between the US & China grow, Russia will fade into the background because both China & the US will pull far away and ahead of the rest of the world in their quest for dominance.