Conventional Arms No Substitute for Nuclear: Strategic Command Official
By Elaine M. Grossman Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- A U.S. Strategic Command official said recently that conventional weapons cannot substitute in any “meaningful” way for nuclear weapons, a view that appears to diverge somewhat from an Obama administration focus on reducing the role of atomic arms in ensuring national security (see GSN, Feb. 16). “You can’t replace nuclear weapons today with conventional capability,” Greg Weaver, the combatant command’s deputy director for plans and policy, said on Feb. 16 at a symposium just outside of Washington. “They don’t have the same effects on targets, but as a result they don’t have the same effects on people’s decision calculus.”


President Obama in April 2009 called for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide and pledged “concrete steps” toward that end, even while promising to keep remaining U.S. atomic arms “safe, secure and effective.” Achieving the goal of zero nuclear arms might not be possible within his lifetime, he acknowledged. The Defense Department’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reflected the dual approach, to include robust modernization of atomic forces and infrastructure. The underlying current, though, has been an assumption that to at least some degree, conventional weapons might assume an increased share of the security role accorded nuclear weapons over the past several decades. “Fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years -- including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries -- enable us” to deter potential adversaries and reassure friends and partners “at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” the 2010 review document states. Recent news reports suggested that the Obama administration is contemplating a variety of options for fresh nuclear-warhead reductions in coming years, perhaps a small dip to 1,100 warheads or dropping even as low as 300 (see GSN, Feb. 15). Any significant cuts would likely be negotiated with Russia rather than taken unilaterally. Administration officials have acknowledged that they are studying future arms control options but would not confirm the numerical caps under consideration. The U.S.-Russian New START agreement, which entered into force last year, by 2018 limits each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 fielded delivery systems. Speaking at the same three-day conference this month, the Pentagon’s top policy official said new nuclear arsenal reductions would be possible, thanks to modern conventional bomb and missile technologies that offer the precision and firepower to attack a larger set of targets than ever before. A “long-term trend” in U.S. national security strategy has been to enhance conventional capabilities so much that Washington now relies less on nuclear weapons’ massive blast potential than in previous decades, said James Miller, acting Defense undersecretary for policy. The White House has nominated him to serve permanently in the position. Under the current administration, the gradual shift from nuclear toward conventional deterrence is “a matter of policy and I think has very broad support in the Department of Defense,” he said, speaking on Feb. 15. Miller cited the Pentagon’s effort to develop conventionally armed “prompt global strike” technologies as a step toward strengthening non-nuclear forces for “a key part of deterrence,” along with missile defenses. Pentagon leaders see the prompt-strike mission as allowing for conventional weapons that could reach distant targets in less than an hour, “a capability that’s only been available previously with nuclear-armed strategic missiles,” Miller noted.


“DOD has no plans at this time to replace nuclear warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs with conventional warheads, but we continue to look at the full range of options,” he said. Options do appear to include a new effort to design a conventionally armed ballistic missile for possible fielding aboard Virginia-class attack submarines (see GSN, Jan. 27). Other ongoing prompt global strike efforts comprise Army, Air Force and Navy projects to develop ballistic or boost-glide technologies, some of which could potentially maneuver at hypersonic speeds into targets half a world away. Air Force Gen. Robert Kehler, who heads Strategic Command, is “very interested in having increased conventional strike capability,” Weaver said at the recent event, a “Nuclear Deterrence Summit” sponsored by the Exchange Monitor publications. “There are scenarios where promptness matters. …. But again, not as an alternative to nuclear arms.”


The Pentagon has considered fielding a relatively small number of conventional global-strike weapons at any one time, once they are developed and built. Before his military retirement last year, the previous top strategic commander, Gen. Kevin Chilton, directed the Air Force to plan for a single Conventional Strike Missile to be put on alert at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, with two spares held in reserve (see GSN, June 24, 2011; and Sept. 3, 2008). His predecessor in the job, the since-retired Gen. James Cartwright, imagined perhaps as many as two dozen submarine-based conventional prompt-strike weapons kept on alert (see GSN, Nov. 7, 2008). That plan, however, ran into serious congressional opposition based on concerns that a conventional ballistic missile launch from a nuclear-armed submarine could trigger a hasty and potentially disastrous response from a future Russia or China (see GSN, June 16, 2011). The global-strike weapons would ostensibly be used only against pressing targets that no other U.S. conventional forces, like Air Force bombers or Navy carrier-based aircraft, could reach in rapid fashion. The notion that these conventional weapons are more plausibly usable could make them a more effective deterrent than nuclear arms, advocates argue. Scenarios in which a conventional prompt global strike weapon might be launched include the detection of a key terrorist leader at a safe house or an imminent enemy ballistic missile threat to the United States or its allies, according to Defense officials. “I think [Gen. Kehler] would agree fully with what Gen. Cartwright said” about developing a conventional ballistic missile capability for a small number of such urgent contingencies, Weaver said. “What I don’t think he agreed with Gen. Cartwright on is that there’s a significant portion of what we currently use nuclear weapons to do -- both in a deterrence role and in a response role -- that can be replaced with conventional weapons, in any kind of a cost-effective or meaningful way.” Cartwright, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, this week declined comment on the matter. As the first Marine to head Strategic Command -- serving there from 2004 to 2007 -- Cartwright challenged the long-held taboo against discussing publicly the political and ethical problems associated with actually detonating nuclear weapons in combat. Though he never called for nuclear abolition, the four-star general actively sought conventional alternatives that he saw as more practical and effective tools for a U.S. president (see GSN, May 28, 2008).


“There is a nuclear deterrent that's going to be necessary out there for as long as I can see into the future," Cartwright said in 2008. "But it is for those things that are the last ditch in the defense of this nation." The Obama administration has acknowledged that the U.S. nuclear arsenal continues to play a unique role in reassuring friends and deterring would-be adversaries against the most serious threats. “The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners,” the 2010 posture review stated. “The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.” The Omaha, Neb.-based Strategic Command takes the Defense Department lead for strategic deterrence planning, which Weaver said includes not only nuclear but also non-nuclear attacks against the nation or its allies. “Nuclear deterrence is included in strategic deterrence,” he said. “We see strategic deterrence as the deterrence of strategic attack on the United States and its allies … defined by the effects the attack has on us or our interests, not just on the means employed in the attack.” One example of a strategic threat against which Washington relies on deterrence to help prevent might be “an attack that has catastrophic effects on U.S. or allied civilian infrastructure or population,” Weaver said.
 
Nuclear F-35s Still in Abeyance: It's still undecided when and how the Pentagon will incorporate nuclear weapons on the F-35, said Lt. Gen. Hawk Carlisle, deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements. Speaking with reporters after an AFA-sponsored speech Tuesday in Arlington, Va., Carlisle said making the F-35 a "dual-capable" aircraft is "a discussion for the future." He declined to discuss specifics, saying only, "it's still a decision to be made as to when we incorporate that into the F-35." Carlisle's comments echoed those made last fall by Maj. Gen. William Chambers, who oversees nuclear issues on the Air Staff. (For more Carlisle coverage, see: Reapers and Sentinels and F-35 Numbers.)
 
U.S. Vets Mock Nuclear Warhead in ICBM Trial

March 1, 2012


The United States has carried out a flight test involving a data-collecting Joint Test Assembly for the W-87 nuclear warhead as part of a Minuteman 3 ICBM trial launch, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced on Thursday (see GSN, July 11, 2011). The ICBM carried the non-nuclear assembly for the test, according to the semiautonomous Energy Department office. It did not specify the date of the trial (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, March 1). The Air Force on Saturday fired one Minuteman 3 ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (see GSN, Feb. 27). Concerns over a potentially defective monitoring system prompted the service to delay a second test of the missile originally scheduled for Thursday, the Lompoc Record reported (Janene Scully, Lompoc Record, March 1). Joint Test Assemblies are equipped with various information gathering and delivery components, according to an NNSA statement. The technology incorporates a mechanism to record information for a weapon reliability analysis created at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico. The W-87 is carried on Minuteman 3 missiles. “JTA flight tests are essential in ensuring that all weapon systems perform as designed,” NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator Brig. Gen. Sandra Finan said in provided remarks. “The working relationship between NNSA and the Department of Defense is vital as we continue our strong partnership in support of our national security.”


The National Nuclear Security Administration produced the mock weapon for the Joint Surveillance Flight Test Program, an effort the agency oversees with the Pentagon. Test-assembly trials seek to replicate real warhead configurations and employ the maximum amount possible of actual "war reserve hardware," according to the release. The mock bomb was built at the Pantex Plant in Texas (National Nuclear Security Administration release).
 
Ronald Reagan proposed giving the USSR not just some 'limited' classified data, but the actual technology of SDI. Not a new idea.
 
Timeline for Nuclear Warhead Life Extensions:


The United States' three nuclear warhead life-extension programs are continuing, but at a slower pace due to budget cuts, said Thomas D'Agostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Thursday. "Over the last two years, the Administration's been very consistent at putting out a fairly significant program to do life-extension work on the stockpile itself," D'Agostino told reporters in Washington, D.C. Commitment to regenerating the Air Force's B-61 free-fall warhead and the Navy's W-76 warhead that Trident ballistic missiles carry "hasn't changed, . . . just the pace has slowed down a little bit," he explained. NNSA is also continuing to study future life-extension needs for the W-78/88 warheads fitted to the Minuteman III and Navy Trident II missiles. "What's being slowed down are what's typically been called hedge warheads," said D'Agostino. "We're going to slow down and stretch out that particular piece" to meet budgets constraints over the short term, he noted. This means that the Navy's W-76, which is currently in production, is the highest priority in the short run. After that, the B-61—arguably the most complex rework—will tentatively begin production in 2019, he said. The W-78/88 life extension programs, which are the least pressing, are longer term goals, said D'Agostino.
 
Sea Skimmer said:
Ronald Reagan proposed giving the USSR not just some 'limited' classified data, but the actual technology of SDI. Not a new idea.

As did Bush II.
 
Madurai said:
Sea Skimmer said:
Ronald Reagan proposed giving the USSR not just some 'limited' classified data, but the actual technology of SDI. Not a new idea.

As did Bush II.

Of course saying Bush or Reagan "did it to" is overly simplistic unless we know the details underlying the offer. Reagan and Bush wanted massive concessions it appears Obama is just giving it to them as a "confidence building measure" so the offers are very very different.

1) I'll lend you $10,000 and use your car as collateral
2) I'll lend you $10,000 and you have to give me your house

Same offer of $10,000 right?
 
New Nuclear Course Launches:


The Air Force started a new course on advanced nuclear concepts at its Nuclear College at Kirtland AFB, N.M. Nuclear 300, as it is known, is a five-day professional continuing education offering that explores nuclear deterrence theory and application, nuclear operations policy and strategy, nuclear incident response, and nuclear surety and effects, according to Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center officials. "This course will be a game-changer for the way we professionally develop our nuclear enterprise leaders," said Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, AFNWC commander, in his opening remarks to the inaugural class. "The [Nuclear] 300 course material goes much deeper into foundational nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations policy issues than any other course at the college," added Harold Camacho, Nuclear College director. The course targets senior master sergeants and chiefs; field grade officers; staff officers from numbered air forces, major commands, combatant commands, and Air Force headquarters; and majors and lieutenant colonels who are squadron leaders. The first class began on Feb. 29. (Kirtland report by Col. Clarence Johnson)
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bobbymike said:
New Nuclear Course Launches:


The Air Force started a new course on advanced nuclear concepts at its Nuclear College at Kirtland AFB, N.M. Nuclear 300, as it is known, is a five-day professional continuing education offering that explores nuclear deterrence theory and application, nuclear operations policy and strategy, nuclear incident response, and nuclear surety and effects, according to Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center officials. "This course will be a game-changer for the way we professionally develop our nuclear enterprise leaders," said Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, AFNWC commander, in his opening remarks to the inaugural class. "The [Nuclear] 300 course material goes much deeper into foundational nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations policy issues than any other course at the college," added Harold Camacho, Nuclear College director. The course targets senior master sergeants and chiefs; field grade officers; staff officers from numbered air forces, major commands, combatant commands, and Air Force headquarters; and majors and lieutenant colonels who are squadron leaders. The first class began on Feb. 29. (Kirtland report by Col. Clarence Johnson)
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I guess if we can't build actual weapons we need to teach a class to remind people they really exist.
 
sferrin said:
bobbymike said:
New Nuclear Course Launches:


The Air Force started a new course on advanced nuclear concepts at its Nuclear College at Kirtland AFB, N.M. Nuclear 300, as it is known, is a five-day professional continuing education offering that explores nuclear deterrence theory and application, nuclear operations policy and strategy, nuclear incident response, and nuclear surety and effects, according to Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center officials. "This course will be a game-changer for the way we professionally develop our nuclear enterprise leaders," said Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, AFNWC commander, in his opening remarks to the inaugural class. "The [Nuclear] 300 course material goes much deeper into foundational nuclear deterrence and nuclear operations policy issues than any other course at the college," added Harold Camacho, Nuclear College director. The course targets senior master sergeants and chiefs; field grade officers; staff officers from numbered air forces, major commands, combatant commands, and Air Force headquarters; and majors and lieutenant colonels who are squadron leaders. The first class began on Feb. 29. (Kirtland report by Col. Clarence Johnson)
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I guess if we can't build actual weapons we need to teach a class to remind people they really exist.

When I first read "advanced nuclear concepts" I thought they were teaching "weapons" concepts not deterrent concepts. But you're right when we are slowly losing our ability to build anything why bother.
 
Pentagon Undecided on Nuclear Warhead for New Cruise Missile

March 20, 2012
By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire



WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Defense Department has yet to determine which nuclear warhead will be fielded on a weapon that replaces the 1980s-vintage Air Launched Cruise Missile, according to Pentagon and combatant command officials (see GSN, Feb. 24). Defense officials are “carrying out an Analysis of Alternatives to be completed this fall for an ALCM follow-on system,” John Harvey, a Pentagon nuclear force official, said last month. “Plans are to sustain the ALCM and the W-80 warhead, [the] ALCM warhead,” until the new missile, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, “can be fielded,” he said. Manufactured between 1979 and 1990, the cruise missile’s W-80 warhead is deployed aboard 85 nonstealthy Air Force B-52 bombers to give the 1960s-era planes an ability to launch nuclear weapons without having to enter heavily defended airspace. The warhead has a variable explosive power of 5 to 150 kilotons, or roughly one-third to 10 times the yield of the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima. The Pentagon had earlier planned a major overhaul of the warhead to extend its service life, a recent Congressional Research Service report states. Initial studies were to begin in late fiscal 2029. By 2039, the W-80 nuclear explosive package and firing set would have received a major refurbishment, according to fiscal 2008 charts prepared by the Energy Department’s nuclear security agency. However, it appears that the plans for W-80 life extension have been suspended, if not outright canceled. A Senate appropriations bill in June 2006 said “W-80 life-extension activities” were “no longer supported by the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Department of Defense,” and as a result Congress ceased funding for them. At the time, the Pentagon and the joint Energy-Defense Department council anticipated that a version of the new “Reliable Replacement Warhead,” optimized for cruise missiles, would be designed and built. However, upon taking office, President Obama canceled his predecessor’s program to build new nuclear warheads, siding with critics who argued that the stockpile could instead be kept viable for years to come without introducing new weapons (see GSN, Aug. 19, 2009). Defense and Energy leaders “were wiling to sacrifice the W-80 [life-extension effort] when they thought they could get the RRW,” said Hans Kristensen, who directs the Nuclear Information Program at the Federation of American Scientists. “Now they can’t get the RRW,” he said. That means the administration must instead “explore the use of existing warheads” for the future cruise missile, Harvey said last month in a speech at a nuclear weapons symposium. The Air Force plans to retain today’s Air Launched Cruise Missiles through 2030, according to fiscal 2013 budget documents. Current expectations are, though, that the workhorse B-52 bomber will remain flying at least a decade longer -- “beyond the year 2040,” the Air Force says. Harvey suggested that the LRSO weapon is needed to ensure that the aging Stratofortress bomber can retain its stand-off nuclear capability after today’s Air Launched Cruise Missile becomes obsolete or is retired. The missile has a range of more than 1,500 miles. “Modern air defenses put the bomber stand-off mission with ALCM, the current strategic cruise missile deployed with the [B-52] bomber, increasingly at risk,” he said on Feb. 15 at the Arlington, Va., event. The Air Launched Cruise Missile for now is undergoing a maintenance program to keep it functioning properly, according to the Air Force. Roughly 1,140 of the cruise missile’s nuclear version, the AGM-86B, are fielded in today’s arsenal.


At the same time, the Analysis of Alternatives currently under way is aimed at determining what capabilities and technologies would be appropriate for the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon. Fiscal 2013 budget plans include more than $600 million for development of the future cruise missile over the next five years. If no major overhaul is presently planned that would extend the W-80’s service life, what nuclear warhead would go aboard the new Long-Range Stand-Off cruise missile? “The DOD has not ruled in or out a life extension program for the W-80, the decision has not been made,” Navy Capt. Jeff Bender, a U.S. Strategic Command spokesman, said last week in response to queries. Based in Omaha, Neb., Strategic Command determines military requirements for nuclear weapons and would take responsibility for them if ever used in combat. “The W-80 is one of three candidate warheads for the future Long-Range Stand-Off missile,” Bender stated by e-mail. “If the W-80 is selected for the LRSO weapon system, it will require a life-extension program in the future.” A major warhead life-extension effort of this kind would require about a decade’s advance notice, so that design studies and preparations could be carried out, Thomas D’Agostino, who heads the National Nuclear Security Administration, told reporters on March 8. Harvey -- who serves as principal deputy assistant Defense secretary for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs -- said another candidate warhead for the new cruise missile is the B-61, several variants of which are fitted on gravity bombs and are now being readied for service life extension (see GSN, March 15). The first life-extended B-61 warhead should be available by 2019, according to D’Agostino. Kristensen said the bomb warhead’s potential use on a new cruise missile, though, would be likely to require significant additional modifications and flight testing. The third warhead alternative for the new cruise missile, Harvey said, is the W-84, which was designed in the late 1970s for use on the since-banned Ground-Launched Cruise Missile. The W-84 is a B-61 derivative that is closely related in design to the W-80. Which warhead is ultimately selected for the cruise missile replacement could depend on a variety of factors, Kristensen said. Some warheads feature more modern security devices -- such as “permissive action links” that require secret codes before activating -- or nuclear explosive cores that resist accidental ignition if caught in a blaze. “If safety and security are the issue, they would use the W-84 because it has the best permissive action link and fire-resistant pit,” said Kristensen, comparing it to the W-80 and B-61. All three of the potential LRSO warheads use insensitive high explosives, a key safety feature that make warheads less likely to detonate if accidentally dropped or hit with a bullet, for example, according to the Washington-based analyst. Kristensen opined, though, that Defense and Energy officials seem to be asking the wrong question.


“One can always fiddle with whether it’s necessary to use this or that warhead. But my fundamental question is whether it’s necessary to have a nuclear-armed cruise missile,” he said in a Monday telephone interview. Today’s Air Launched Cruise Missile has conventional as well as nuclear variants. “Given the overwhelming capability that we have in the highly accurate, long-range ballistic missile force -- and the gravity bombs that can also be delivered by aircraft -- it’s hard for me to see why an air-delivered nuclear cruise missile is needed, as well, in this day and age,” Kristensen said. “If the mission is deterrence, then it’s clearly not needed.”


The Air Force, by contrast, sees the new weapon system as central to its ability to carry out its nuclear responsibilities. “The LRSO weapon system will be capable of penetrating and surviving advanced integrated air defense systems from significant stand-off range to prosecute strategic targets in support of the Air Force's global attack capability and strategic deterrence core function,” the service stated in fiscal 2013 budget documents, submitted to Congress last month.
 
USAF's FY-13 S&T Budget Invests In Hypersonics, Fifth-Gen Weapons
Despite the prospect of a slight cut to its overall budget, the Air Force's science and technology effort expects to increase investment in a number of areas in fiscal year 2013, notably in a new hypersonic program and a variety of weapon capabilities designed for fifth-generation aircraft.1203 words
Long Range Standoff AOA To Study Speed, Accuracy, Integration Options
An analysis of alternatives for the Air Force's next-generation, nuclear-capable cruise missile will consider a number of traits such as speed, range and warhead integration capabilities, and in the shorter term, the service's nuclear enterprise is continuing several initiatives to strengthen its intercontinental ballistic missile fleet based in the United States.991 words
 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/26/obama-begs-russians-space-missile-defense-talks/

EDIT:

Via The Drudge Report:

http://freebeacon.com/turner-to-obama-what-flexibility/
 
Obama Seeks Additional Nuke Cuts With Russia
March 26, 2012

The United States intends to seek additional reductions to its nuclear arsenal in exchange for potential comparable curbs by Russia, President Obama said on Monday (see GSN, Feb. 16). "We can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need," Reuters quoted Obama as saying in South Korea on Monday, hours before the opening of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (see related GSN story, today). The U.S. president vowed to seek bilateral curbs on quantities of atomic armaments at a meeting planned in May with Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin. Republican lawmakers have already charged Obama with undermining the nation's capacity to discourage aggression by other states, and they would mount significant resistance to nuclear-weapon cuts he might propose during this year's presidential campaign, according to Reuters. Defense hawks would respond skeptically to such a proposal, as they contend the president has failed to follow through with adequate speed on a nuclear arms complex modernization commitment he made while seeking GOP backing of a Russian-U.S. strategic nuclear arms control treaty that entered into force last year (see GSN, March 15). Washington and Moscow "can continue to make progress and reduce our nuclear stockpiles," Obama said. "I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat, and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal." "Going forward, we'll continue to seek discussions with Russia on a step we have never taken before -- reducing not only our strategic nuclear warheads, but also tactical weapons and warheads in reserve," the president said. The U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles are unrivaled in size, together comprising thousands of weapons that nonproliferation backers contend are multiple times the quantity necessary to eviscerate life on the planet. The New START pact, which entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011, requires the two nations by 2018 to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by this year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded strategic warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 systems permitted in reserve. The treaty calls for the nations to regularly share quantities, siting and schematics of armament equipment and sites (see GSN, March 9).


Obama also addressed China's increasing nuclear arms effort, saying he had called on Beijing "to join us in a dialogue on nuclear issues, and that offer remains open" (Spetalnick/Laurence, Reuters, March 26). The U.S. nuclear force was built to stave off Soviet aggression and is “poorly suited to today’s threats including nuclear terrorism,” Obama said in remarks reported by Bloomberg. That characteristic, he said, prompted his mid-2011 call for a White House reassessment of the arsenal (see GSN, Feb. 15; Talev/Goldman, Bloomberg, March 26). "I believe the United States has a unique responsibility to act -- indeed, we have a moral obligation," USA Today quoted Obama as saying. "I say this as president of the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons. I say it as a commander in chief who knows that our nuclear codes are never far from my side. Most of all, I say it as a father, who wants my two young daughters to grow up in a world where everything they know and love can't be instantly wiped out" (Aamer Madhani, USA Today, March 26).
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If the case for further disarmament is so strong why do proponents of further cuts make it sound like we are at the height of Cold War arsenal levels?
 
The exchange on missile defense:
President Obama: On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this, this can be solved but it’s important for him to give me space.
President Medvedev: Yeah, I understand. I understand your message about space. Space for you…
President Obama: This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility.
President Medvedev: I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir.
 
The Navy's proposal to delay construction of new ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) meant to succeed the current Ohio class is both good and bad news for America's shipbuilders, according to the program manager for the new "boomer" sub. But key members of Congress -– already at odds with the Administration over delays to the Virginia-class submarine -- remain skeptical.


Pushing construction start on the 12 so-called "Ohio Replacement" subs to 2021 from 2019 could raise costs, though by how much is not clear, Brian Wilson from General Dynamics' Electric Boat told AOL Defense. On the other hand, the delay could give designers more time to refine the new subs' blueprints, potentially avoiding costly complications in construction, Wilson said. "It is two more years of design effort, so there is the possibility of ensuring we have the most mature design in place."


Electric Boat already employs 4,000 people on the Ohio Replacement program, according to shipyard spokesman Bob Hamilton, a figure that will surely rise as the submarines begin to enter production in a few years' time. The comparable Virginia attack-submarine program employs 6,000 people at Electric Boat. Electric Boat and the Newport News shipyard in Virginia have together produced between one and two submarines a year in recent years.


With so many jobs at stake, sub boosters in Congress don't want to take any chances with the Ohio replacement. "Some folks want to push the next-generation SSBNs into the future ... to save money," remarked George Behan, a staffer for Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee. "The problem is you risk the industrial base," Behan said. The Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives is debating a proposed defense budget that adds $25 billion to the White House's roughly $525 budget submission and could reverse some of the Navy's recent shipbuilding changes.


It's not clear whether the Democrat-controlled U.S. Senate will also support reversing the Ohio Replacement's delay. Sen. Joe Lieberman, a Connecticut independent who sits on the Armed Services Committee and whose state is home to Electric Boat and Groton submarine base, has opposed other cuts to sub production and could take a stance against the boomer delay. Lieberman has spoken out against the Pentagon's January Defense Strategic Guidance, which codified changes to submarine build plans. "The changes outlined today greatly increase the risk that an adversary would calculate that we would not necessarily devote maximum effort to fighting back against them," Lieberman wrote in a statement following the guidance's release.


The Navy originally wanted 14 new boomers to replace the 14 Ohios. (Eighteen Ohios were built between 1976 and 1997 but the Navy recently converted four into conventional guided-missile subs.) To save money the Navy cut the new boomer class to just 12 vessels. Retired Rear Adm. Frank Lacroix estimated that design and production of the reduced class could set back the taxpayer $100 billion. In its more recent 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Navy admitted the cost of acquiring new boomers could put the annual ship construction budget $2 billion over historical averages in the 2020s and 2030s, potentially threatening other ship programs.


The two-year Ohio Replacement delay the Navy announced as part of the Defense Strategic Guidance helped protect near-term shipbuilding plans, but it could also create a gap between the planned retirement of the Ohios (as their nuclear reactors wear out) and the completion of the replacement vessels in the 2030s. "We believe this risk can be managed," the Navy asserted.


Electric Boat's Wilson is equally sanguine about the boomer delay. "Across the submarine industry this does represent a bit of a slowdown," he told AOL Defense. "It does create issues trying to ensure the industrial base and the people designing the components for us are able to conduct the work in a manner that supports the evolving maturity of the ship design." "But there's a chance that design work on the submarine could benefit," he added. Specifically, the Ohio Replacement could mine advancements introduced on the latest Virginia models as the latter come on-line over the next decade or so. "I steal -- I should say, reuse -- everything I can from the Virginia."
 
Protecting the Triad: Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) praised the Defense Department for its "clear commitment" to modernizing the nuclear triad despite tough economic times during Wednesday's hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee's strategic forces panel. However, he noted that sustaining and modernizing the triad will not be cheap, citing an estimated $120 billion cost just over the next decade. A modernized tried must be affordable, said Sessions, the panel's ranking member. "Uncontrollable cost, perhaps more than anything else, could be a threat to our ensuring it in the future," he asserted. He expressed his support "to do whatever is possible to modernize our nuclear weapons," but he also acknowledged that he's "been taken aback" by the estimated cost of $8 billion or more to build a new uranium-processing facility and a plutonium-handling facility for the nuclear weapons complex. Madelyn Creedon, assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, said the Pentagon's Fiscal 2013 budget request generally protects the nuclear modernization initiatives despite "some adjustments in some of the schedules of programs," like the two-year slip to the fielding of the Ohio-class replacement submarine. "Where we are all concerned, and where we have work to do, is in the outyears," she said. (Creedon-Weber joint statement)
 
Spending Reductions Could Delay Nuke Updates: Strategic Command Chief

March 29, 2012


Planned spending cuts at the U.S. Defense Department could delay refurbishment of nuclear armaments for the country's bomber aircraft and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Strategic Command chief Gen. Robert Kehler said on Tuesday (see GSN, March 15).


Funding reductions constitute an "acceptable" threat to the nation's ability to ward off potential aggression by present-day antagonists in possession of nuclear weapons, the Washington Times quoted Kehler as saying at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing (see GSN, March 28). The U.S. atomic stockpile is "safe, secure and effective," he told Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.). “And so today I believe that that deterrent force could meet its objectives.” Still, tighter budgets could hold up updates to W-76 nuclear warheads for U.S. submarine-fired ballistic missiles, as well as B-61 nuclear gravity bombs, Kehler said. The Obama administration has asked for $80 million less for W-76 nuclear warhead life-extension efforts in fiscal 2013 than it had anticipated last year, according to previous report (see GSN, March 8). The administration requested $369 million in the upcoming budget cycle for extending the service life of the B-61, a $136 million increase over fiscal 2012 appropriations, another earlier report states. The next budget year begins on Oct. 1. “We have weapons that are beginning to reach their end of life,” the general stated. “What the budget reductions did was it slowed the delivery of those (modernized) weapons.” Kehler described the W-76 warhead refurbishment slowdown as "manageable." The initial refurbished B-61 bomb is not slated for completion for seven more years, two years after it would become necessary, according to the Times. “I believe that’s manageable risk as well,” Kehler said. Life-extension activities for the bomb are expected to begin in 2013.


Strategic Command is examining land- and sea-based ballistic missiles for "commonality" relevant to potential new refurbishment activities, Kehler added. Fiscal 2013 spending plans would enable the United States to mitigate threats to the ability of its nuclear forces to discourage potential hostile actions, but "the issue is what happens beyond" the upcoming budget year, he said. The Energy Department's fiscal 2013 budget request excludes cost projections for nuclear weapons-related efforts beyond fiscal 2013, and administration officials have said the figures would be released later this year, according to previous reporting. "That’s where the two secretaries of Energy and Defense have said that we do not have the complete plan in place for what happens beyond [fiscal 2013],” Kehler stated. “That concerns me.” The Obama administration has failed to follow through on nuclear weapons spending commitments while implementing a strategic arms control deal with Russia, according to some GOP lawmakers (see GSN, March 9; Bill Gertz, Washington Times, March 29). Any ICBM reductions carried out to comply with the bilateral New START pact should should be evenly dispersed between launch sites in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming, senators from the three states and Utah said on Wednesday in a statement to the top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee.


New START, which entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011, requires the United States and Russia by 2018 to each reduce deployment of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, down from a cap of 2,200 mandated by this year under an older treaty. It also limits the number of fielded strategic warhead delivery platforms to 700, with an additional 100 systems permitted in reserve (U.S. Senator John Hoeven release, March 28).
 
Common Interests:


The Obama Administration is studying a common nuclear warhead design that could replace the W78 that sits atop Minuteman III ICBMs and the W88 carried by Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Pentagon officials told lawmakers this week. "A common warhead will need to be able to meet both the Navy requirements for the SLBM, as well as the Air Force requirements for the ICBM," Rear Adm. Terry Benedict, director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee's strategic forces panel on Wednesday. He added, "That's never been done before. [But] I do believe that, given the right time and talent, we can achieve those requirements." Benedict said he anticipates that the Pentagon would seek the authority in this fiscal year to proceed into the applied research phase for the warhead. He said current plans call for the Air Force to lead this effort, with the Navy in a supporting role. At the same hearing, Andrew Weber, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear matters, characterized the common warhead as "among our highest priorities" for the strategic nuclear deterrent.
 
bobbymike said:
Common Interests:


The Obama Administration is studying a common nuclear warhead design...

Why do I have the feeling that this is the type of bomb the administration would like to replace the current stock with:
the_hundreds_medicom_adam_bomb_01.jpg
 
Grey Havoc said:
Yet another phantom project, I fear.

It's election season. Gotta placate the masses somehow. Until he, "gets more flexibility" anyway.
 
Cruise Missile's Start Slips: The Air Force's Fiscal 2013 budget request delays by two years—to Fiscal 2015—the start of the Long Range Standoff Missile, the service's future nuclear-capable cruise missile, two generals told lawmakers last week. LRSO, as it is known, is the planned successor to the Air Launched Cruise Missile, which B-52s carry as an essential part of the US strategic nuclear deterrent. The Air Force slipped LRSO's start "as part of the adjustments necessary in our constrained fiscal environment," Maj. Gen. William Chambers, Air Staff lead for nuclear matters, told the Senate Armed Services Committee's strategic forces panel on March 28. "Despite the LRSO delay, there will not be a gap between ALCM and LRSO," he noted. That's because service life-extension programs are in progress for ALCM "to ensure its viability beyond 2030," said Chambers. They address the cruise missile's propulsion, guidance and flight-control systems, and warhead-arming components, he said. Meanwhile, work on the LRSO analysis of alternatives continues and "will be completed in late 2012," said Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, head of Air Force Global Strike Command. (Chambers' written testimony) (Kowalski's prepared testimony) (See also Speed Matters.)
 
Test Ban Treaty Gains 183rd Signatory State
April 9, 2012


The South Pacific island nation of Niue on Monday became the 183rd signatory state to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (see GSN, Feb. 6). "I welcome Niue to the CTBT family of nations. Niue's signature of the CTBT consolidates the Pacific region's firm stand against nuclear testing and closes the door on nuclear testing a bit further," Tibor Tóth, head of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, said in a press release. "I also hope that this step will serve to encourage other Pacific island states that have not yet done so to sign or ratify the treaty at the earliest opportunity."
 
Strategic Arsenal Slowly Coming Down: The US strategic nuclear arsenal is slowly coming down in size to the New START agreement's ceilings, according to the latest bilateral exchange of data with Russia on each party's respective force levels. The United States had 1,737 deployed nuclear warheads, 812 deployed launchers (i.e., heavy bombers, ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles), and 1040 total deployed/non-deployed launchers, as of March 1, states the State Department's newly released fact sheet on the biannual data exchange that the treaty requires. That compares to 1,800 warheads, 882 deployed launchers, and 1,124 deployed/non-deployed launchers that the United States declared as of Feb. 5, 2011, in the first data dump after New START entered force. The treaty requires each party to have no more than 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed launchers, or 800 deployed/non-deployed launchers by February 2018. Initially, the United States is focusing on eliminating deactivated ICBM silos and retired B-52s that still count as part of the arsenal under New START's counting rules. The Russian arsenal stood at 1,492 warheads, 494 deployed launchers, and 881 deployed/non-deployed launchers, as of March 1, states the fact sheet. (See also aggregate numbers through Sept. 1, 2011.)

If They'll Work, None Can Say:
The United States can never know that its nuclear arsenal is functional and effective under the current self-imposed test ban, and the problem is only worsening with time, said Paul Robinson, former director of Sandia National Laboratories. "To live without testing is to live with uncertainty," stressed Robinson during a panel discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty sponsored by the Heritage Foundation on Tuesday in Washington, D.C. As US warheads have aged and technology has continued to advance, "that uncertainty has grown . . . and continues to grow today," he explained. New trends like cyber espionage heighten the uncertainty, adding the potential that an enemy could even "get to our design codes," noted Robinson. In the past, testing actual warheads from the stockpile served as a hedge against sabotage. Today, that safeguard no longer exists, he observed. "We're fooling ourselves to think we've designed them correctly when we have no idea whether the systems are still representative of a good design," he added. Someday, uncertainty as to the health of US nuclear warheads will grow to the point where "we'll say we have to [test]—if we're lucky and don't lose our nation first," summed Robinson.The United States has signed, but not ratified the CTBT; if President Obama wins a second term in November, securing ratification is likely to be a top foreign policy goal of his Administration.(Heritage Foundation webpage of event)
 
In about five years, every scientist with experience designing and testing nuclear weapons will have retired from the U.S. government.


Thomas D’Agostino, the undersecretary for nuclear security and the administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), said the number of nuclear scientists with weapons testing experience is somewhere in the mid- to low teens. The definition he uses for test experience is “someone who’s had a key hand in the design of a warhead that’s in the existing stockpile and who was responsible for that particular design when it was tested back in the early 1990s.” “Last year, it was in the 17 to 18 range, but I’ve got to believe it’s five fewer than that now,” he said at a March 8 breakfast with reporters. “Five years from now, they will no longer be active employees of our laboratories.” For some, this is cause for hand-wringing. For others, it’s just the inevitable outcome of a longstanding U.S. policy of not conducting nuclear weapons testing. The U.S. last conducted an explosive nuclear weapons test in 1992. “As long as it is the policy of the United States — and it has been now for four successive administrations, two from each party — not to test, that is inevitable. So the question becomes: What do you do about it?” said Linton Brooks, a former ambassador and administrator of the NNSA at the Energy Department. For some, the answer is the resumption of nuclear weapons tests or designing and building a new nuclear weapon. However, the Defense Department’s new strategic guidance, released in January, made clear that nuclear weapons are playing a shrinking role in U.S. national security strategy. “In the wake of the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have occupied a less and less prominent part of our defense and national security strategy, rightly so,” Michèle Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense for policy, said March 6 at the Stimson Center in Washington.


The Obama administration has said it would like to pursue new disarmament talks with Russia. It is also pushing for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 and then defeated in the Senate in 1999. Some see this move toward a smaller nuclear force, plus President Barack Obama’s stated desire for a nuclear weapons-free world, as being in competition with the administration’s other policy goal of maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear weapons stockpile in the near term. Sometimes these policies are in conflict, John Foster, former director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, said April 10 at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. The challenge these policies create can be seen at the laboratory level, where the government continues to try to attract and retain the best new talent in a field that it hopes will one day disappear.


Meanwhile, the effort to keep young scientists engaged at the national laboratories is made more difficult by recent funding cuts tied to deficit-reduction efforts. Last month, the Los Alamos National Laboratory announced that 557 of its employees had volunteered to take buyouts to help deal with budget cuts. The lab has a permanent workforce of 7,600.

The Testing Question

“If the administration has said they want to abandon testing, then certainly they have no interest in nurturing the knowledge base that would support it,” Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, said in a March 21 interview. He serves as the chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. Some believe the U.S. should reserve the right to test its nuclear weapons not only to keep unique scientific and engineering skills alive, but also because the weapons may require it. By not testing, “we may be running serious risks and not know it,” Foster said. However, a new report from the National Academy of Sciences says the U.S. is able to maintain a safe and effective nuclear weapons stockpile without testing. Brooks served on the committee that wrote the report.


“The report focuses on how you maintain that knowledge and capability given that the actuarial tables make it certain that there will be no one left who actually did a test,” he said in an April 10 phone call with reporters. Sustaining a high quality workforce remains one of the most important aspects of maintaining a safe, effective nuclear deterrent, the report says. “At the laboratories, that means continuing to recruit the best people, but it also means giving them real projects that will develop their skills,” Brooks said. “Things like the attempt to design a reliable replacement warhead — whatever the merits of that as a policy decision — it got new designers working with old designers on the process of how you design.” Much of the scientific work being done on the weapons is called “surveillance,” performing routine checkups on the weapons to make sure the components are still safe and functioning. “If it were a car, it would be the equivalent of checking to see if the batteries are good, the fan belt works,” D’Agostino said. Advocates of testing say surveillance is not reassurance enough that the warheads, which experience natural degradation over time, are still working.


D’Agostino disagrees. “I would say, based on the information that I review and the information that the laboratory directors review, that we have a much better understanding of what’s going on inside our stockpile now than we ever did during the days of underground testing. We can now explain phenomena that we never could back then.” However, things are constantly changing, he said, which is why it’s important to continue to develop scientific expertise. “There are always going to be people who say, ‘We have to test,’” D’Agostino said. “In my tenure in this job and however long it’s going to be out into the future, I’m supremely confident that we do not need to test a warhead.”



Keeping Interest


Over the past several years, the government has taken steps to expand the work of the laboratories to include projects beyond the not very glamorous, but immensely important, surveillance work. The report from the National Academy of Sciences cited a 2008 Defense Science Board study that found morale was low at the laboratories due to declines in funding and the lack of a clear, high-level government affirmation of the importance of their mission. Maintaining a safe and effective nuclear weapons stockpile is mostly an issue of resources, Brooks said. This means continued funding to recruit and maintain a high-quality workforce, repairing aging infrastructure, and investing in needed technologies, especially satellites for international monitoring. To boost morale and to attract the best talent, the laboratories need to get scientists involved in work on nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, nuclear forensics and intelligence, especially of foreign nuclear programs, the National Academy of Sciences committee said. The recommendation echoes a similar one made by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which released its findings in a May 2009 report. The commission, which was chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry and vice chaired by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, concluded that the intellectual infrastructure was in “serious trouble” and that steps were required to address the situation. “The laboratories must be able to provide challenging research on national problems,” the report said. In the weapons area, this should include projects that include design skills.


Turner, an advocate of increased spending on nuclear weapons, agreed. “There needs to be a pursuit of knowledge that’s actually not tied to any particular weapons systems.” For him, it’s important to sustain the knowledge base that could support “new items and new policy directives” if there is a change in political leadership. However, for some, the problem is an existential one that requires more than just resources to solve. “The best way to manage it is to ensure that as the inevitable reduction in the role and number of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy continues, we should maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal, but also begin transitioning the work of the labs to more pressing 21st-century national security applications,” said Kingston Reif, director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

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A chilling article from Defense News.
 
It's going to take somebody getting nuked before Washington will wake up. Hopefully it's not the US that is the painful example.
 
Lieberman Knocks Obama Nuke Spending
April 20, 2012


U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) this week joined a growing number of lawmakers who charge the Obama administration with failing to keep to its spending pledge for modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (see GSN, April 18). While making his case for ratification of the New START arms control treaty with Russia, President Obama in 2010 pledged $85 billion in spending over the next decade on the nation's nuclear arms complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration for fiscal 2013 is requesting $7.6 billion for programs “to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.” The figure is 5 percent more than the funding Congress provided for the current fiscal year, but $372 million less than what the administration projected in 2010. "The United States committed to reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal under the terms of the New START treaty with the Russian Federation. However, the FY13 budget request does not fully fund the nuclear modernization efforts identified by the 1251 Report of November 2010 that the administration committed itself to in advance of Senate ratification of that treaty," Lieberman stated in a letter sent on Tuesday to the top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. "If modernization efforts to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of a smaller stockpile are not sustained, then further reductions to the stockpile should not be considered until the expiration of the treaty and a report by the U.S. Strategic Command to the congressional defense committees on the risks of a smaller strategic nuclear stockpile," the former Democratic vice presidential candidate said in addressing his broader opposition to additional defense reductions for the budget year that begins on Oct. 1 (U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman release, April 17).


A number of Republican lawmakers have aired similar concerns since the Obama budget was rolled out in February. Representative Michael Turner (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, in March introduced legislation that would specifically link U.S. arsenal cuts to the fulfillment of Obama’s modernization pledge (see GSN, March 9). However, NNSA and Defense Department officials have publicly argued that the proposed funding level for fiscal 2013 is sufficient to ensure a reliable deterrent. A spending bill approved this week by a panel of the GOP-controlled House Appropriations Committee matches the administration's $7.6 billion nuclear arms funding request. Still, there is anticipation that top GOP lawmakers on the House Armed Services Committee in coming weeks will attempt to "block implementation" of the New START accord unless the Obama administration pledges heightened spending on the nation's nuclear arms complex, the Washington-based Arms Control Association said on Friday.


The treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, requires Russia and the United States by 2018 to each reduce deployments of operational strategic nuclear systems to 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems. "This type of partisan 'hostage taking' threatens to undermine U.S. national security, ignores budget reality and defies common sense," the organization said in an issue brief.


"Blocking U.S. implementation of New START, as Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Representative Michael Turner (R-Ohio)'s bill H.R. 4178 threatens to do, would likely result in Russia doing the same," according to the Arms Control Association. "The treaty would unravel, allowing Moscow to rebuild its forces above treaty levels and increase the number of nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. Moreover, the inspection system established under the treaty could collapse, depriving the United States of crucial data exchanges and on-site inspections of Russian forces." The organization highlighted the proposed 5 percent increase in nuclear spending from current levels and noted that the 2010 projection was established prior to approval of the 2011 Budget Control Act that demanded significant cuts to federal spending (Arms Control Association release, April 20).
 
End of the Advanced Cruise Missile: Without fanfare, an excavator recently severed the fuselage of the Air Force's last AGM-129A Advanced Cruise Missile during a ceremony at Hill AFB, Utah. Destruction of this AGM-129 completed the demilitarization of this cruise missile type and associated trainers, components, and engines "within budget and ahead of schedule," according to an April 24 release from officials at Tinker AFB, Okla. Tinker's Missile Sustainment Division, along with Tinker's Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center and Hill's Ogden ALC, began the process of destroying the AGM-129 inventory—some 460 missiles—in February 2008. The Air Force had opted to eliminate the AGM-129 fleet as part of US efforts to draw down nuclear force levels to meet the cap of 2,200 operational nuclear warheads imposed by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty with Russia. B-52H bombers carried the low-observable, subsonic cruise missiles. (AGM-129A fact sheet)
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My question would be, "Will we see, "End of the Minuteman III ICBM, US has no more land based ballistic missiles" stories 10 or 20 years from now?
 
China Calls for "Drastic" Russian, U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions
April 30, 2012


China on Monday urged Russia and the United States to pursue "drastic" reductions to their nuclear arms stockpiles, and called on all possessor states to formally offer no-first-use guarantees for their atomic arsenals, Reuters reported (see GSN, April 5). "As countries with (the) largest nuclear arsenals, U.S. and Russia should continue to make drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner," Chinese diplomat Cheng Jingye said during a conference on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Vienna, Austria. "Other nuclear-weapon states, when conditions are ripe, should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament," according to Beijing's lead envoy to the event. China, France, and the United Kingdom are the world's other three recognized nuclear powers, while India, Israel and Pakistan are known or assumed to have developed nuclear arsenals outside the NPT accord.


Russia and the United States agreed under the New START accord to by 2018 reduce their respective fielded strategic arsenals to 1,550 warheads and 700 delivery systems. The Obama administration has said it would like to open new arms control talks with the Kremlin that could address nonstrategic weapons and warheads held in storage, but issue specialists do not believe formal negotiations would take place in the near future.
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Right after we see your 3000 miles of tunnel complex.
 
If China wants that they can open their country up for inspection by the US and Russians. Nah, didn't think so.
 
Gen Robert Kehler written testimony to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee:


http://www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Testimony/2012/April2012/041712kehler.pdf
 
Interceptor-Dodging Russian ICBM Could Take 10 Years to Prepare

May 8, 2012


Russia would require at least another decade to equip its armed forces with a planned ICBM designed to evade U.S. missile interceptors, a missile production company in the country stated in Tuesday comments reported by RIA Novosti (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2011). Moscow last December said it would prepare the silo-based, liquid-fueled ICBM as a successor to the R-36M Voyevoda missile. Russia's armed forces referenced the concept for such a weapon roughly three years ago. The United States plans between now and 2020 to deploy increasingly advanced sea- and land-based missile interceptors around Europe as a proclaimed hedge against a potential ballistic missile attack from Iran. The Kremlin says it suspects that next-generation U.S. interceptors planned for Europe could have the ability to target its strategic nuclear forces (see related GSN story, today). Russian strategic missile forces head Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev last year said the military's solid-fueled strategic weapons might be vulnerable to interception by U.S. antimissile systems. It is difficult to estimate how long the new ICBM would require to prepare, according to Andrei Goryaev, deputy head of the Russian missile production firm NPO Mashinostroyeniya. “Statistics says it will take about 10 years,” Goryaev said. “If the country has not done it for 30 years then difficulties are inevitable” (RIA Novosti, May 8).
 
B-61 Bomb Project Expense Projection Hits $6B, Report Says

May 11, 2012


The projected expense of U.S. B-61 nuclear gravity bomb life extension efforts has risen to $6 billion, $2 billion more than projected in 2011 by the National Nuclear Security Administration, an independent analysis on Wednesday quoted informed insiders as saying (see GSN, April 27). The change stems from poor oversight as well as planned risk reduction alterations sought for the weapons by the semiautonomous Energy Department agency as well as the Defense Department and U.S. nuclear-weapon research facilities, according to the assessment by Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.


The weapons presently have the least accident-prone configuration of any in the nation's atomic arsenal, the expert said, noting that the "second-most ambitious" proposal for updating the bombs received the Nuclear Weapons Council's endorsement five months ago.


Close to 200 B-61 bombs are kept at six bases in five NATO states in Europe. The life-extended weapons would be “critical” to “deterrence of adversaries in a regional context, and support of our extended deterrence commitments," according to the Air Force (see related GSN story, today). The Defense Department hopes to replace four variants of the bomb with a single model, dubbed the B-61 Mod 12, in part to reduce expenses (see GSN, June 3, 2011). Still, "we have yet to see the budget justification for that and it is not clear how much of the savings will come from consolidation or from simply reducing the overall number of B-61s in the stockpile," Kristensen wrote. "Already the consolidation part is turning out to be much more expensive than we were led to believe."
 
New US Nuclear Posture Proposed: The United States should adopt a new nuclear posture that eliminates its first-strike capability by reducing the strategic arsenal to 900 warheads or less, said retired Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, former Joint Chiefs vice chairman, in a media teleconference May 16."It is a significant departure from our posture [and] it is one that we would have to enter into with the Russians," explained Cartwright in introducing the Global Zero initiative's new report (caution, large-sized file) advocating this new doctrine and structure. "We're talking about having about 300 weapons . . . that are available at any given time . . . so the numbers are not there for the pre-emptive, decapitating strike," he stressed. Cartwright further advocated eliminating the ICBM force, asserting that fixed missile sites are "malpositioned" and "vulnerable" in comparison to ballistic missile submarines and the strategic bomber force. Asked for comment during a May 16 appearance at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C., Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz said "Cartwright's supposition is farfetched and it introduces the likelihood of instability in a deterrence equation, which is not healthy." Schwartz added: "I don't agree with his assessment, nor the study that is referenced."
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And if our subs are vulnerable we won't have a first or second strike. Why all this disarmament talk we are already disarming at an alarming rate and more importantly losing key industrial capacity. Can the US even produce a new ICBM or advanced nuclear warhead anymore?
 
He's gone completely off the reservation. This is the guy who convinced Gates to deep-six the first attempt at the new bomber a few years ago (maybe there were good reasons to do so, but "I don't like bombers" isn't one of them).

I love the part about somehow we would ensure that it would take a minimum of 72 hours to launch a retaliatory strike. Unilaterally of course.
 
bobbymike said:
Can the US even produce a new ICBM or advanced nuclear warhead anymore?

Not without more expense than anybody is willing to bare. Reinventing the wheel is expensive, especially when you have to start from infrastructure on up. We can thank short-sighted politicians in Washington for that.
 
U.K. Delivers Design Contracts for New Sub

May 22, 2012


The United Kingdom on Tuesday delivered about $550 million in deals to draft the design of a next-generation ballistic missile submarine, Reuters reported (see GSN, May 21). The nuclear-armed vessels would be intended to replace four Vanguard-class submarines slated for retirement beginning in the 2020s. The government is not anticipated to formally decide on pursuing the effort -- projected to cost as much as $31.5 billion -- until after national elections in 2015. Contracts issued on Tuesday would provide more than $517 million to a branch of military contractor BAE Systems, close to $24 million to Babcock and $6.3 million to Rolls Royce.
"It's without commitment in theory, but of course it is with commitment in practice. We wouldn't be spending this kind of money on design if it didn't look as if it was going to go forward," said Eric Grove, who heads the University of Salford's Center for International Security and War Studies. The Conservative Party, which leads the British coalition government, has appeared to support full replacement of today's deterrent force. That stance has been criticized by nuclear disarmament advocates and members of the junior coalition partner Liberal Democrats, who say the existing arsenal does not reflect the present threats facing the nation.
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Wonder if there is any 'cross Atlantic' cooperation happening, other than on the CMC (Common Missile Compartment) of course?
 

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