Current Nuclear Weapons Development

[Josh_TN]

I think there should be flexibility in nuclear response options as a deterrent to low yield or tactical nuclear first use by an opponent. I am just not at all convinced sub launched cruise missiles are how the U.S. should go about achieving that.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The “sales pitch” for the nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile coming back was that it would supposedly give a lower point of escalation, a more easily identifiable/ distinguishable/ acceptable counter/ retaliation to potential Russian first use of tactical nuclear weapons, versus, say, a single trident missile launch with a dialled-back warhead. A lot of people (including, probably least significantly, me) don’t really buy that supposed rationale (appears to be buying into rather than blatantly refuting Russia’s massively flawed ideas around supposedly threatening or undertaking nuclear escalation to somehow de-escalate crisis/ conflicts). It appears to make first use of nuclear weapons more acceptable/ palatable, which is a very bad idea.

So the response to a Russian tactical nuke is to commence SIOP and nuke Russia till it glows?

I think there should be flexibility in nuclear response options as a deterrent to low yield or tactical nuclear first use by an opponent. I am just not at all convinced sub launched cruise missiles are how the U.S. should go about achieving that.

Exactly.

I want an option to say, "this is your last warning, the next nuke results in full SIOP."

 

[kaiserd]

So the response to a Russian tactical nuke is to commence SIOP and nuke Russia till it glows?


Exactly.

I want an option to say, "this is your last warning, the next nuke results in full SIOP."

Why can’t that last warning be a B61 or a single Trident launch?
Why field/ reintroduce a class of sea based nuclear weapons apparently specifically for this purpose?

And isn’t it quite possible that more of this “more usable” class of nuclear weapon is in itself destabilising and specifically plays into Russia’s stated and extremely dangerous “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, rather than refuting it and publicly clearly indicating that you are playing a very different game.

It gives Russia greater comfort (a degree of certainty?) that the maximum they are going to get back for instigating a tactical nuclear attack is one of these “limited” weapons” back. It potentially makes the start of a chain of nuclear escalation more not less likely, in exchange for a likely illusory self-deceptive idea that theoretically having this particular extra step could make it more likely that such a chain of nuclear escalation could actually be stopped in practice.

Out of weakness the post-USSR Russia has liked to pretend that it can compensate for relative convention arms weakness with greater reliance on the supposed threat/ use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia’s relative failure in the Ukraine conflict so far (and their clear inability to really use tactical nuclear weapons in the real world in anything but the most extreme circumstances where the Russian leadership is willing to accept the likely risk of a chain of nuclear escalation) shows the self-deception and relative bankruptcy of their doctrine; why now should the US and/ or NATO start buying-in/ pandering to it? And wouldn’t the money to be spent on these sea based nuclear tipped cruise missiles be better spent on updating the specific US and/ or NATO conventional forces deterring further Russian “adventurism” (or in supporting Ukraine holding back this current manifestation)?

 

[Scott Kenny]

Why can’t that last warning be a B61 or a single Trident launch?

B61 is fine, though time to deliver may take a while. Half a day or so for a B2 flying from the US, for example.

Single Trident launch is terrible, because you just revealed the location of 23 other Tridents and anyone with half a brain will drop a Max Load MIRVed heavy ICBM onto that location to eliminate those 23 Tridents because the farthest that sub can go is less than 15nmi in half an hour.

You'd be much better off sending a Minuteman as your "Last warning, (expletives deleted)."

Why field/ reintroduce a class of sea based nuclear weapons apparently specifically for this purpose?

SLCM-N is a terrible idea, but the "last warning" is a necessary capability.

And isn’t it quite possible that more of this “more usable” class of nuclear weapon is in itself destabilising and specifically plays into Russia’s stated and extremely dangerous “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine, rather than refuting it and publicly clearly indicating that you are playing a very different game.

Bluntly, because the KGB doesn't, has never, believe(ed) US public statements. They always see the statements as propaganda for either internal or external consumption, not an honest statement of intent.

 

[Josh_TN]

B61 is fine, though time to deliver may take a while. Half a day or so for a B2 flying from the US, for example.

Single Trident launch is terrible, because you just revealed the location of 23 other Tridents and anyone with half a brain will drop a Max Load MIRVed heavy ICBM onto that location to eliminate those 23 Tridents because the farthest that sub can go is less than 15nmi in half an hour.

Realistically, what can Russia or China do to an SSBN based over a thousand miles off their coast even if they knew its course, speed, depth, and the captain’s wife’s bra size?

ETA: <Mr Picky> All USN SSBNs have been limited to 20 active tubes, I think by filling the remainder with concrete ballast.</Mr Picky>

 

[Desertfox]

Nuking a SSBN is a good way to get nuked back. Also there is nothing a SLCM-N can do, that an ALCM/LRSO can't do better and quicker.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Realistically, what can Russia or China do to an SSBN based over a thousand miles off their coast even if they knew its course, speed, depth, and the captain’s wife’s bra size?

ETA: <Mr Picky> All USN SSBNs have been limited to 20 active tubes, I think by filling the remainder with concrete ballast.</Mr Picky>

They can drop a circle of 750kt warheads around it.

 

[NMaude]

Bluntly, because the KGB doesn't, has never, believe(ed) US public statements.

That indicates a profound lack of understanding (One could say wilful) of the US government by the former KGB* hierarchy.

*Since 1993 has been split into the FSB and SVR.

 

[Josh_TN]

Nuking a SSBN is a good way to get nuked back. Also there is nothing a SLCM-N can do, that an ALCM/LRSO can't do better and quicker.

I don't know how you would nuke an SSBN at sea?

 

[Josh_TN]

They can drop a circle of 750kt warheads around it.

Can a major above water nuclear detonation propagate effectively? My understanding was that even ASROC was limited to a mile or two, and while it was only a few kilotons, it had the dramatic advantage of being detonated underwater to fully couple with the medium and presumably being fired close to the actual target (one of the main advantages of B-61-11: ground penetration). How many half megaton bombs would it take to create the same effect, assuming the target platform dived to max depth after firing? Would 750kt even work at an Ohio's test depth?

 

[Desertfox]

It was definitely a concern back in the Cold War era, but I don't know if anyone has deployed ICBM warheads that can survive a water impact, or can be quickly re-targeted.

 

[NMaude]

Since the B61 has been mentioned a number of times this old film about it might be of interest:

0800072 - Developing and Producing the B-61 - 1970's - 26:29 - Color - The B-61 thermonuclear bomb, first produced in 1966, has developed into an extremely flexible weapon. Its many different modifications has made it able to fill the multipurpose needs of the military. Major modifications were made to the B-61 in 1966, 1975, 1977, 1979, and 1991.

Designed by the Department of Energys Los Alamos National Laboratory in northern New Mexico, the lightweight bomb could be delivered by the Air Force, Navy and NATO planes at very high altitudes and at speeds above Mach 2. The 141.6-inch long, 13.3-inch diameter bomb averaged approximately 750 pounds, but actual weight varied with each modification.

 

[bobbymike]

Can a major above water nuclear detonation propagate effectively? My understanding was that even ASROC was limited to a mile or two, and while it was only a few kilotons, it had the dramatic advantage of being detonated underwater to fully couple with the medium and presumably being fired close to the actual target (one of the main advantages of B-61-11: ground penetration). How many half megaton bombs would it take to create the same effect, assuming the target platform dived to max depth after firing? Would 750kt even work at an Ohio's test depth?

I’ve never read anything that has contemplated this scenario nor about the possible effects a water surface blast even directly above a submarine at 300m depth for example.

But just thinking about it from - SLBM leaving the water, detection, ICBM retargeting (assuming near immediate response), launch, to impact, while the SSBN dives to X depth and moves off in an unknown direction at max speed (or not could be anywhere inside a certain sized circle) Seems a very difficult thing to assess the effectiveness of.

 

[Desertfox]

Check some of the MX basing studies done for basing single MX missiles on very small subs.

 

[kaiserd]

The most likely threat to a US (or UK or French) SSBN after firing this theoretical 1 retaliatory missile would be Russian SSN sent to the general area the missile was launched from. This is likely to involve a journey time long enough to make it potentially a bit of a token effort. I don’t think Russia has the long range ASW capabilities to realistically otherwise target such a sub.

And this essentially misses the wider/ more significant points. What would Russia actually decide to do if it’s initial use of a tactical nuclear weapon was followed by 1 US (or UK or French) nuclear retaliation, potentially using a strategic weapon like 1 Trident missile? Essentially anything other than magnanimously taking it on the chin without retaliating would lead to an escalating nuclear tit for tat probably unavoidably leading to a full scale nuclear exchange. And if determined to retaliate, and if the launch sub was just too difficult (or weapon intensive) to find and/or target, then they would just pick another easier less demanding target.

While I’m not a fan of nuclear weapons I accept their inevitability and recognize that it’s not helpful or healthy to have some kind of massive-retaliation-only policy. However I think it’s essentially ignoring human nature and actual decision making to pretend that we are talking about rational people making dry logical decisions. Given the existential risks involved the side that decides to be the first to use nuclear weapons has already made an irrational decision. Why is it remotely reasonable to think there won’t be more such decisions from multiple sides in such a pressurised stressful scenario, with both sides likely unavoidably trapped in an escalation spiral.

The sales pitch of the SLCM-N smacks of the absolute worst Cold War era game-theory influenced, almost semi-autistic nuclear strategy, a pseudo-rational fantasy masquerading as an accurate depiction of actual decision making, sold on a false promise of limited reassurance and some sense of control to those that want/ need to believe it.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That indicates a profound lack of understanding (One could say wilful) of the US government by the former KGB* hierarchy.

*Since 1993 has been split into the FSB and SVR.

In the US, it's said that misunderstanding comes from being in a place where what the government says is deliberately never what the government actually does.

And that goes all the way back to the time of the Czars.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I’ve never read anything that has contemplated this scenario nor about the possible effects a water surface blast even directly above a submarine at 300m depth for example.

But just thinking about it from - SLBM leaving the water, detection, ICBM retargeting (assuming near immediate response), launch, to impact, while the SSBN dives to X depth and moves off in an unknown direction at max speed (or not could be anywhere inside a certain sized circle) Seems a very difficult thing to assess the effectiveness of.

We can assume a roughly 30min flight time from Launch to Impact for most ICBMs, especially the big ones that we're talking about here.

How many missiles are you willing to spend to get rid of 23 19 missiles? I would be willing to spend the same number of missiles, not warheads. Which means I am assuming the urgent-retargeting of 19x SS-18mod5 to drop 190x 750kt warheads in a star-cluster pattern centered on the launch location of the Trident missile and large enough in diameter to cover the entire area in the warhead kill zones.

750kt is enough to make a bubble roughly 1km in diameter, I'll be conservative and assume a kill radius of 1km from any given explosion (which gives the smallest diameter "Trident Delete Zone" or uses the maximum number of missiles to cover a given area). Warheads landing roughly every 1600m to keep the entire area within that 1km from at least one explosion. 127 warheads will cover an area roughly 19,200m across in a hexagonal pattern (rows of 7-8-9-10-11-12-13-12-11-10-9-8-7), the remaining 63 warheads will make it a bit more circular instead of a hexagon. And a submarine will have to be able to get up and MOVE to clear 10km from the hover in half an hour.

 

[Josh_TN]

Aren’t Ohio’s faster than 20km/hr? Plus expending 190 warheads to kill ~80-90 opponent warheads (New START data reveals generally 950-1000 W76/88 deployed across 240-280 launchers means ~4 warheads on average). It doesn’t seem like a workable solution to me.

 

[kaiserd]

Aren’t Ohio’s faster than 20km/hr? Plus expending 190 warheads to kill ~80-90 opponent warheads (New START data reveals generally 950-1000 W76/88 deployed across 240-280 launchers means ~4 warheads on average). It doesn’t seem like a workable solution to me.

That’s because it’s not a workable solution.

And what would the wider consequences be for a decision by the Russian Federation to target/ kill a US (or UK or French) SSBN in this manner in this type of scenario (assuming it is technically feasible, which is a big if)?

Aren’t these consequences likely to involve a nuclear escalatory spiral for which Russian ICBM force missiles and warheads otherwise almost literally lobbed in the ocean would for Russia have far more pressing and productive uses re: alternative targets?

 

[Desertfox]

Using up half of your accurate heavy warheads to kill one sub? The US would take that ratio any day.

 

[brownt62]

Realistically, what can Russia or China do to an SSBN based over a thousand miles off their coast even if they knew its course, speed, depth, and the captain’s wife’s bra size?

ETA: <Mr Picky> All USN SSBNs have been limited to 20 active tubes, I think by filling the remainder with concrete ballast.</Mr Picky>

Question....can this ballast be removed (a precast plug) or was the concrete ballast just poured in (almost impossible to remove)?

 

[Josh_TN]

Question....can this ballast be removed (a precast plug) or was the concrete ballast just poured in (almost impossible to remove)?

It’s unclear, but I think realistically the Ohios are twenty rube boats for the rest of their service life. Even after New START expires, i cannot see the USN investing money to restore the four tubes to operational status just to retire the boats a few years later.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It’s unclear, but I think realistically the Ohios are twenty rube boats for the rest of their service life. Even after New START expires, i cannot see the USN investing money to restore the four tubes to operational status just to retire the boats a few years later.

If it was just a ballast can, those are trivial to winch out of the tube.

 

[NMaude]

If it was just a ballast can, those are trivial to winch out of the tube.

Do you have any links, please?

 

[Josh_TN]

If it was just a ballast can, those are trivial to winch out of the tube.

I’d expect it to be a more permanent modification for the Russians to accept it as denuclearized. In any case I doubt the U.S. has an extra 50 Tridents it could spare.

 

[sferrin]

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/mar/6/exclusive-china-building-new-generation-of-mobile-/

“Sometimes called the DF-45 or DF-51, it is clearly intended to outperform the DF-41,” said Mr. Fisher, a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

Mr. Fisher said reports from Chinese military sites are hard to confirm, but one blog posting from Aug. 8, 2020, stated that the DF-45 would be “my country’s new generation of solid heavy well-based intercontinental missiles.”

The DF-45 would have a takeoff weight of 112 tons, a payload weighing 3.6 tons and would be armed with seven 650 kiloton warheads. The new missile’s estimated range would be between 7,456 miles to 9,320 miles.

“Such an ICBM would not be much larger than a DF-41 to preclude a road-mobile version,” Mr. Fisher said.

North Korea has produced the world’s largest transporter-erector launcher (TEL) for its Hwasong-17 ICBM, a missile that was mostly built with Chinese assistance, he added.

“So, China could produce TELs much larger than the 16-wheel TEL of the DF-41, to transport a larger ICBM like DF-45/51,” Mr. Fisher said."

 

[Scott Kenny]

Do you have any links, please?

Can't say I've ever seen a picture of one of the ballast cans.

Dodgy ascii art time:

_][_
[__]

Ballast cans look kinda like that. Big center pole sticking up out of a 83"/211cm diameter concrete cylinder. Whole package is ~20ft/6m tall.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I’d expect it to be a more permanent modification for the Russians to accept it as denuclearized. In any case I doubt the U.S. has an extra 50 Tridents it could spare.

56, but yes, the US has more Tridents than tubes to put them in. If a bird ages out and needs to be worked on, it gets swapped with another bird at the time. Or if they are going to do a DASO and test launch however many birds, the live RBA birds get pulled and swapped with birds with test RBAs in one sitting.

Not to mention the 96 birds removed from the SSGNs (yes, that was 20 years ago, makes me feel older than usual since I qualified in Submarines on Georgia BN).

 

[bobbymike]

South Koreans want their own nukes. That could roil one of the world’s most dangerous regions

The alliance with the United States has allowed South Korea to build a strong democracy with citizens confident Washington would protect them if North Korea ever acted on its dream of unifying the peninsula under its own rule.

apnews.com

And Japan and Australia

 

[Josh_TN]

Probably not Australia. Japan pretty clearly has a plan for a breakout ICBM capability.

 

[NMaude]

Japan pretty clearly has a plan for a breakout ICBM capability.

Introducing Japan's notICBM.

 

[Forest Green]

South Koreans want their own nukes. That could roil one of the world’s most dangerous regions

The alliance with the United States has allowed South Korea to build a strong democracy with citizens confident Washington would protect them if North Korea ever acted on its dream of unifying the peninsula under its own rule.

apnews.com

And Japan and Australia

It was an inevitable consequence of the regional imbalance caused by North Korean nukes. The only problem is that Beijing won't be keen on nukes that can reach... well Beijing, which is <1,000km away.

 

[Arjen]

The only problem is that Beijing won't be keen on nukes that can reach... well Beijing

Unless they are the DPRK's nukes?

 

[Forest Green]

Unless they are the DPRK's nukes?

Well of course, because they don't feel the DPRK's nukes are pointed at them, which is likely a good assumption.

 

[BullpupRafale]

North Korea has produced the world’s largest transporter-erector launcher (TEL) for its Hwasong-17 ICBM, a missile that was mostly built with Chinese assistance, he added.

Absolute disinformation as there is literally no evidence of any kind to support bold assertion that Hwasong-17 was built with Chinese assistance of any kind.

"So, China could produce TELs much larger than the 16-wheel TEL of the DF-41, to transport a larger ICBM like DF-45/51,” Mr. Fisher said."

Nonsense as Hwasong-17 may be as heavy or heavier than speculated DF-45/51.

 

[Forest Green]

Maybe Castro built those missiles himself back in '62 as well.

 

[sferrin]

Absolute disinformation as there is literally no evidence of any kind to support bold assertion that Hwasong-17 was built with Chinese assistance of any kind.

Do YOU have any evidence that NK built them entirely without assistance?

Nonsense as Hwasong-17 may be as heavy or heavier than speculated DF-45/51.

Or not. Typically solid rockets are more dense than liquid.

 

[BullpupRafale]

Do YOU have any evidence that NK built them entirely without assistance?

Not first time such kind of assertions were made only to be proven wrong or very least no evidence to support it.

- Russia or China supplying UDMH and N2O4 (fuel/oxidizer)
- China transferring submarine and SLBM technology
- Russia providing RD-250 gas generator rocket engine
- Russia providing 9K720 Iskander SRBM's
- Russia providing Topol-M ICBM's

History repeating itself yet again with bold assertions of such caliber.

Or not. Typically solid rockets are more dense than liquid.

Upper end estimate for Hwasong-17 is 150 tons.

 

[sferrin]

Not first time such kind of assertions were made only to be proven wrong or very least no evidence to support it.

- Russia or China supplying UDMH and N2O4 (fuel/oxidizer)
- China transferring submarine and SLBM technology
- Russia providing RD-250 gas generator rocket engine
- Russia providing 9K720 Iskander SRBM's
- Russia providing Topol-M ICBM's

History repeating itself yet again with bold assertions of such caliber.

So that's, "no".

 

[In_A_Dream]

Do YOU have any evidence that NK built them entirely without assistance?

There is a plethora of well-researched literature and intelligence publications documenting the expertise provided by the Soviet Union, Russia, and China to various military and nuclear programs in countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. I have always been surprised by the few occasions on here (of all places) where users asserted that the notion of outside help was simply unfathomable.