kaiserd
I really should change my personal text
- Joined
- 25 October 2013
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I’m not sure in what scenarios the US would want to undertake a nuclear first strike, hopefully not too many as the US would be the one instigating a nuclear exchange/ war killing multiple millions/ billions and quite possibly ending the human race.
IF the US had to instigate a first strike it appears likely to use a portion of their Trident armed subs from relatively close-in launches to minimise warning times. These would give the least warning, be the most difficult for the defences to deal with, and would be among the most accurate of the US nuclear forces. They would also likely throw in their bomber and land based ICBM forces (but timed to not give warning of the initial Trident strikes) as they would not survive the likely opponents retaliatory strikes. Given the likely targeting of navy and sub based and infrastructure by an opponent’s retaliatory strike there would also be a certain logic to throwing the full available Trident force into that first strike (you’ve just lost your ability to sustain them anyway).
The proposed reintroduction of a low-yield nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile into US service was not “sold” as relating to US first strike capability. Nor are cruise missiles necessarily inherently good first strike weapons or likely not to be detected and identified relatively early by a peer nuclear power, certainly earlier than versus a close-in Trident launch.
The “sales pitch” for the nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile coming back was that it would supposedly give a lower point of escalation, a more easily identifiable/ distinguishable/ acceptable counter/ retaliation to potential Russian first use of tactical nuclear weapons, versus, say, a single trident missile launch with a dialled-back warhead. A lot of people (including, probably least significantly, me) don’t really buy that supposed rationale (appears to be buying into rather than blatantly refuting Russia’s massively flawed ideas around supposedly threatening or undertaking nuclear escalation to somehow de-escalate crisis/ conflicts). It appears to make first use of nuclear weapons more acceptable/ palatable, which is a very bad idea.
IF the US had to instigate a first strike it appears likely to use a portion of their Trident armed subs from relatively close-in launches to minimise warning times. These would give the least warning, be the most difficult for the defences to deal with, and would be among the most accurate of the US nuclear forces. They would also likely throw in their bomber and land based ICBM forces (but timed to not give warning of the initial Trident strikes) as they would not survive the likely opponents retaliatory strikes. Given the likely targeting of navy and sub based and infrastructure by an opponent’s retaliatory strike there would also be a certain logic to throwing the full available Trident force into that first strike (you’ve just lost your ability to sustain them anyway).
The proposed reintroduction of a low-yield nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile into US service was not “sold” as relating to US first strike capability. Nor are cruise missiles necessarily inherently good first strike weapons or likely not to be detected and identified relatively early by a peer nuclear power, certainly earlier than versus a close-in Trident launch.
The “sales pitch” for the nuclear tipped sea launched cruise missile coming back was that it would supposedly give a lower point of escalation, a more easily identifiable/ distinguishable/ acceptable counter/ retaliation to potential Russian first use of tactical nuclear weapons, versus, say, a single trident missile launch with a dialled-back warhead. A lot of people (including, probably least significantly, me) don’t really buy that supposed rationale (appears to be buying into rather than blatantly refuting Russia’s massively flawed ideas around supposedly threatening or undertaking nuclear escalation to somehow de-escalate crisis/ conflicts). It appears to make first use of nuclear weapons more acceptable/ palatable, which is a very bad idea.